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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

**The U.S.-Japan Relationship in the Evolution of
Japan's National Security Strategy, 1945-1983:
American Perspectives**

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of the

Department of Politics

School of Arts and Sciences

Of The Catholic University of America

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Warren H. Switzer

Washington, D.C.

1996

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ABSTRACT

This study delineates the evolution of Japan's national security strategy in terms of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. In so doing, it posits a strategic concept, describes the strategic milieu, and then examines Japan's activities and the course of events in specific, formative periods. This approach specifically addresses the significantly asymmetrical aspect of the U.S.-Japan relationship in terms of conceptions of security, threat perceptions and the cultural foundations underlying the approach to alliances.

Despite the dislocations of World War II, the Cold War, and the Korean War that allowed little latitude in options, Japan's security strategy has been successful. The bilateral security arrangement was asymmetrical because it could hardly have been otherwise. Yet, examination of Japan's options (even had the milieu not narrowed them) suggests that Japan would have chosen the same course.

The course of events from 1945 to 1983 illustrates Japan completely understood this asymmetry, and recognizing the potential of extraordinary benefits deriving therefrom, sought only minor adjustments. The main parameters of its security strategy successfully set, Tokyo wanted greater flexibility in economic and political, as well as military matters. Yet it simultaneously evidenced a remarkable sense of restraint. This restraint insured that strategy's three central aspects, hypothesis, process and dialogue, were kept in proportion and balance. The result was a very effective, inexpensive strategy.

Japan has often been called a "free rider" in security affairs. However, this

description does not appropriately frame the scope of the “free rides,” nor that Washington both arranged and facilitated the situation. The U.S. global strategy of containment and a stable world order required Japan’s recovery, economic vitality and international integration. In these respects, Japan’s strategic goals and those of the U.S. were coincident, virtually insuring complementary efforts. Thus, Japan got a “boost,” if not a “free ride,” in multiple arenas. For their own reasons and despite great differences, Washington and Tokyo accommodated each other, perpetuating the alliance. Japan’s recovery and great prosperity have been matched by Washington’s keeping of Japan within the Western coalition, preventing the formation of a possibly antagonistic power center. and, as of this writing, seeing its strategy of containment fulfilled.


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
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1996

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This dissertation was approved by John K. C. Oh, Ph.D., as director, and by James P. O'Leary, Ph.D., and Charles C. Chadbourn, Ph.D., CAPT, USN, as Readers.


Director


Reader


Reader

Peace hath her victories
No less renown'd than war.

- John Milton
from *To the Lord General Cromwell*, 1652

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PREFACE

I have undertaken this dissertation with four objectives in mind: posit a definition of strategy, delineate the evolution of Japan's security circumstances, analyze the various options available to Japan, and provide the student of strategy, Japan or Far Eastern security affairs a source document. First, in positing a definition for a national security strategy, I attempt to get at the nature of strategy in a way that relates the dynamic of strategy to state power. This portion specifically defines the evolving nature of strategy, explains its application beyond strictly military considerations, and attempts to illustrate the effective (if largely unexplored) strategic techniques of restraint and potential. Second, in keeping with the holistic nature of national security, this study describes the evolution of Japan's strategy by examining events from the strategic perspective of the larger milieu. This approach is necessary because of the dynamic relationships of state power within the larger strategic milieu. Thus, economic, political, and cultural factors, both in Japan and in and among the several regional states, also apply. Third, this study explores and analyzes the options available to Japan during several formative postwar periods. These analyses include considerations of the threats to Japan. Japanese goals, objectives, alternatives, strategic themes, policies and the choices made. Notably, the ability to compare Japan's choices with the events corroborates the central thrust of Japanese efforts. In this fashion, the ability to debunk notions premised upon non-Japanese perceptions or emotionally laden agendas and preconceptions may prove salutary. Fourth, I hope that others may find instructive the patterns here revealed and the analyses used. The value of this investigation's approach

should be determined through two particulars: the illumination of Japan's strategy from 1945 to 1983, and the approach's usefulness in assessing the continuity, adjustments and future implications of the alliance. If application by way of analytic process, analogy or definition might be made to other alliances, then this effort will have exceeded expectations.

In conceptualizing, researching, and writing this dissertation, I am grateful for the advice, criticisms and support of many individuals. At an early stage, the succinct advice of Dr. William Vizzard (then on the staff of HQ, U.S. Forces, Japan), the encouragement of Mr. Shinsuke J. Sugiyama (then of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the notion of proportion from Lieutenant Colonel Ralph E. Shrigley (then Assistant Army Attache in Tokyo), and the sense of long development periods from Mr. Harry K. Fukuhara (of the Akasaka Press Center) all have proven sound. Dr. Irving Eisenstein and Mr. Carl Whiting (both then of the staff of HQ, U.S. Forces, Japan), have been generous with their time and precise with their contributions. I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph N. Flanz who has been most responsible for acquainting me with Japanese matters. Without his generosity and scholarly effort not only I, but many others would have but scant awareness of this important relationship.

With respect to the main effort of this dissertation, the central figure is Professor John K. C. Oh, who provided the precise critique, research advice, and useful insights that both motivated and disciplined my efforts. His guidance enabled me to reach a considerable body of original material, leading to fundamental adjustments in

perception and organization. My dissertation advisors, Professors Charles C. Chadbourn and James P. O'Leary have not only persevered with me in this effort, their comments have rendered this a better product, shored up my morale on occasion and guided my reading to fill out areas that allowed a better balance in understanding the relationships between and among the several scholarly fields that apply to this area.

Highly knowledgeable, helpful research archivists and librarians have proven invaluable in this effort. In particular, the staffs at the libraries of The Catholic University of America, The American University, George Mason University and the Marine Corps Research Center reduced time, effort, and expense. Their persistence in obtaining materials was only exceeded by their skill at finding them.

I would be remiss were I not to mention my gratitude to those scholars who preceding me have done so much work in this field. Their investigations, insights, and scholarly efforts suggested avenues and areas worthy of consideration; their notions provided a means to gauge proportion in my efforts. Whether they are living or dead, their contributions remain an important part of the great scholarly conversation to which I am greatly indebted and of which I am deeply appreciative.

My expression of thanks to these persons, of course, does not suggest that any of them agree with my findings, interpretations or conclusions, or, for that matter, with my methodology or choice of materials. I alone am responsible for any errors.

My deepest thanks go to all the members of my family who have persevered with me in this effort. The burdens involved were not mine alone. Without their support and encouragement this dissertation would not have been possible.

I. INTRODUCTION

A descriptive analysis of the strategic relationship between the United States and Japan is justified by the global importance of harmonious relations between the two.¹ While the security relationship has been crafted and maintained with great diligence on both sides, there is no matching community of perception. The harmony of any relationship is at risk if it is not clearly perceived by both parties, especially perhaps, one dealing with the security of two such major industrialized democracies. Much of the literature concerning the relationship has been preoccupied with differences rather than shared or complementing interests, and seems overly narrow, focusing largely on the military aspects of security. Further, the examination of such a complex matter under greatly changed or highly charged geopolitical conditions requires clarity, and this requirement clashes with the paired demands of security and flexibility. However, this is not a new problem. This study has been undertaken to contribute to a greater clarity of perception and thereby more harmonious partnership.

The objective of this study is to analyze the evolution of Japan's national security strategy through the U.S.-Japan relationship from an American viewpoint. An additional objective is to clarify the understanding of the factors that frame and support the relationship.

This study focuses on the evolution of Japan's security strategy as found in each

¹U.S. Department of State, "Asian Security in the 1990s: Integration in Economics, Diversity in Defense," *US Department of State Dispatch* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, November 5, 1990), p. 5. Hereafter U.S. DOS Dispatch.

partner's differing goals, objectives, dialogues, and contributions to the security relationship. Specifically how and why this relationship evolved, and what kind of future it might portend, may interest students of history, politics and strategic theory.

Yet, policy makers in both nations express more urgency. While describing the relationship as an anchor point for both regional stability and national security, these officials occasionally seem uncertain of its solidity and stability. Although the alarmist literature common only a few years ago seems diminished,² the relationship itself has become an issue in U.S.-Japan relations.³ With the seemingly chronic friction of trade relations threatening to rupture relations, the security alignment may be assuming a larger role in maintaining bilateral harmony.

However, despite the importance and sustained nature of the alliance, some problems exist in executing the analysis. For example, Japan's unwillingness to assume military responsibilities commensurate with its capabilities places it in special roles found in less common paradigms of alliance theory. Additionally, the membership and roles of the U.S. and Japan with respect to other security relations are vastly different. Even U.S. and Japanese views about the role of the state in economic and military

²Literature of this type often carries evocative (if not provocative) titles. For example, Daniel Burstein, Yen: Japan's New Financial Empire and Its Threat to America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988) and Marvin J. Wolf, The Japanese Conspiracy: The Plot to Dominate Industry Worldwide - And How to Deal With It (New York: Empire Books, 1983).

³Kent E. Calder, "The North Pacific Triangle: Sources of Economic and Political Transformation," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. VII, No. 2, (Summer, 1989), pp. 3-16. For a call to change the relationship see Ted G. Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War (Washington, D. C.: Cato Institute, 1992), pp. 50-1, 63-71, and Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say No (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991). For an analysis of those arguments advanced from the Japanese point of view see Andrew Goble and James C. Carlson, "Japan's America-Bashers," Orbis 34 (Winter, 1990), pp. 83-102.

affairs show significant variance. All these affect analytic modeling. Unfortunately, other obstacles abet the problem.

Often noted are the cultural and perceptual "gaps," but difficulties in communication, personalities, and priority of effort, all of which, perhaps, are unavoidable, also exist. Unfortunately, how much influence culture-based variables had on a particular subject is indeterminable, precluding notions of a "mathematical" approach to the analysis.

Yet, despite significant differences and obstacles, the persistence of the alliance is crucially significant. While the two nations, the region, indeed, the whole globe, have changed, the alliance survives, serving the national interests of both and sundry other states. Central to this investigation is the unchanging nature of Japan's national security strategy through 1983, despite holistic change in Japan and profound regional developments. This continuity has had remarkable effect on the region, suggesting the successful exercise of uncommon strategic forms. With the continuing global evolution in security affairs, illuminating how and why this alliance continued will help clarify and hence, perhaps, help preserve this crucial significant partnership.

II. THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

The structure of this examination begins with general circumstances and theoretical matters and moves to specific aspects. It attempts to join strategy and history to political science so that each aids illumination of the other. The method's goal is to let the event sequence and processes disclose the nature of the U.S.-Japan relationship

and the evolution of Japan's national security strategy. This investigation attempts to combine different bodies of specialized knowledge¹ by synthesizing general international relations theory with a specific historical model, focused on strategy. Illuminating this synthesis should clarify specific aspects of this relationship since the topic of strategy is broad, complex, and checkered with uncertainties. Because the U.S.-Japan relationship is of a continuing nature, policy planners have the task of devising flexible strategies and policies to resolve uncertainties. Those planners may find this examination useful in crafting ways to deal with those uncertainties.

My investigation begins with a discussion of the strategic milieu that pertains to the U.S.-Japan security relationship, and is followed by a discussion of strategy. In part because of the confusion about what strategy is, does, and its relationship to the various factors of national power, this section posits a concept of strategy that is applied to Japan's case throughout the investigation. Although this construct is not entirely new, it includes aspects that are not found elsewhere.

Further, the discussion covers U.S. strategy because of both its American characteristics and the fact that it was largely the strategy of the U.S. that provided the overarching framework for Japan's security throughout the period. A paralleling

¹This process parallels a recommendation by Alexander L. George aimed at resolving the problem of bridging the gap between theory and practice. In part, he maintained:

When a policy (or design) problem is broad and complex, analytical forecasting requires several different kinds of expertise. It also requires special procedures by means of which analytical interactions among the various specialized experts can take place within the framework of a holistic approach to problem solving. Analytical interaction among diverse experts is particularly necessary since there is usually no single theory that is adequate to serve as a forecasting model for the policy problem in question.

Alexander L. George "Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice," *In Search of Global Patterns*, ed. James N. Rosenau, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. 1976), p. 118.

overview of Japan's national strategy is provided briefly to illustrate and introduce its similarities and contrasts to the American mode.

The third section of this examination discusses how Japan and the U.S. approach national security. If the application of strategy in a particular milieu is to be kept in proportion, then a description of what forms security is pertinent to that state in that specific milieu. In particular, the idea of the value of each partner to the other under changed conditions is a crucial portion of the analytic framework.

The fourth section discusses Japan's national security situation. It describes the endemic features (e.g., geography and natural resource scarcity) that render Japan vulnerable and therefore go far in explaining the continuity of its goals.

The fifth section is divided into six periods, the examination of which provide more detailed treatments of the conditions and events directly affecting the key forms of strategy. These historical summations are delineations of developments tending either to alter or confirm Japan's security relationship with the United States.

The sixth section focuses on key features of Japan's strategic evolution, moves to interpretations of the factors framing the relationship, and reaches the investigation's conclusions.

III. THE STRATEGIC MILIEU

. General

Three factors condition the strategic milieu and this study: cultural differences, post-World War II adjustments, and the fact that the U.S.-Japan relationship has been

maintained.

. Cultural Differences as Applied to Alliance Affairs

There seems little disagreement that culture does affect the U.S.-Japan security relationship.¹ Ample literature describing the general U.S.-Japan relationship in terms of differences is available.² Notably, significant public statements from both defense partners seek to frame, or at least describe, themselves and their appropriate roles in contemporary affairs over the period.³ Some searching for identity and appropriate roles in a security alliance buffeted by a changing international milieu is apparent.⁴ Several accounts, both from a general and a specific (e.g., economic) perspective, describe what occurred. Yet, the same literature gives few accounts explaining those cultural factors that have positively influenced the formation, maintenance, and evolution of the security alliance.⁵ The incompleteness is apparent from the lack of

¹The considerations given by U.S. policy makers to the acceptability by the Japanese of a constitution premised on Western notions suggest this has been apparent to U.S. officials for some time. Letter, from Allison dated November 30, 1948, Subject: "Review of Japanese Constitution by FEC," p. 3, in reel 1 of *Confidential U.S. State Department Special Files, Northeast Asia, 1943-1956*, microform from University Publications of America. Hereafter *C. DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56, UPA*.

²Some of these take an extreme approach. For example George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, *The Coming War with Japan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), tend to overemphasize the differences and underemphasize the common interests.

³For example, President Nixon was to make public an adjustment in America's roles in a statement issued in Guam in 1969 (the Nixon Doctrine), and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made public such role searching by Japan during an address in London in 1984. Michael Leifer (ed.), *The Balance of Power in East Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), p. 41.

⁴Michita Sakata, *A Study of Japan's Defense Issues*, (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1975), pp. 6, 9, 14, 33-35, 40.

⁵There are significant problems with such discussions. Linking cultural factors to actual events is, at best, an uncertain process. This is particularly true in terms of cause-and-effect logic links. Not only is it impossible to ascertain what factors were at play and when for individuals, there is no agreed upon scale of measurement or value assessment. Among other difficulties, such aspects make it difficult to

discussion of which factors foreclosed options or altered basal perceptions, why and how the parties overcame those cultural obstacles, or what accommodating cultural aspects aided success.⁶ Since the U.S.-Japanese strategic dialogue is over four decades in duration, differences in basal perceptions are of some significance.

Some authors have made significant contributions by posing explanations for differences in basal perceptions. For example, Kinhide Mushakoji in an explanation of the cultural premises of Japanese diplomacy,⁷ maintains that the differences are due to the nature of perception which is, in turn, the cultural perception of the way people see themselves in relation to their physical and social environments - the nature of things altogether. Mushakoji explains this difference as the contrast between an *erabi*

model cultural factors or include them in game theory. Yet, it seems a typical conclusion that culture and the perceptions devolving therefrom do affect state-to-state affairs even if there is no agreement of the means of assessing the relationship. Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 86, William D. Coptin, *Introduction to International Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), p. 147, Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3, Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol III (1959), pp. 120-31, and Shintaro Ishihara, "A Nation without Morality," *The Silent Power: Japan's Identity and World Role* ed. Japan Center for International Exchange (Tokyo: The Simul Press, Inc., 1976), p. 93.

⁶Some authors are very pessimistic. For example, Tadao Umesao, a director of the National Museum of Ethnology and former Professor of Cultural Anthropology at Kyoto University, suggests that cultures are inherently antagonistic.

A culture is like a jealous mistress - perhaps cultures are ultimately mutually incompatible. Since a culture is essentially a value system, it cannot tolerate or completely understand a different value system. The very nature of culture almost demands that one maintain constant suspicion and mistrust toward another. When a civilization exists as a solid and stable synthetic whole, its culture has a base and a powerful life force of its own.

Tadao Umesao, "Escape from Cultural Isolation," *The Silent Power*, p. 17.

⁷see Kinhide Mushakoji, "The Cultural Premises of Japanese Diplomacy," *The Silent Power*, pp. 35-49.

(choosing or selecting⁸) view (Western) and an *awase* (combining and adjusting) view (Japanese).⁹

The *erabi* view is that ideally, man can freely manipulate his environment for his own purposes. This view implies a behavioral sequence whereby a person sets his objective, develops a plan designed to reach that objective, and then acts to change the environment in accordance with that plan.¹⁰

The *erabi* view implies a logical structure composed of concepts and their opposites.

Each alternative is a discrete entity and thereby by being one cannot be another.

Positive expressions are choices of "A" or "B," and negative expressions are usually "A" or "Not A."

Thus, *erabi* is the logic of choosing the best one from a set of alternatives composed of selected factors from various dichotomies.¹¹

Mushakoji contrasts *erabi* to the *awase* view which

" . . . rejects the notion that man can manipulate the environment and assumes instead that man adjusts himself to it. According to this way of thinking, the environment is not characterized by dichotomous concepts such as hot versus cold. . . . the environment consists of a continually changing continuum of fine gradations. *Awase* is the logic of seeking to apprehend and adapt to these fine gradations of change."¹²

⁸The form of such a logic construct is Aristotelian and falls into a Western tradition epitomized by the logic polarities of Immanuel Kant. Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, trans. E. M. Edghill, Book I, Chap. 10-14, and *Prior Analytics*, trans. A. J. Jenkinson, Book 1, Chap. 45-46, in vol. 8 of *Great Books of the Western World*, ed. Robert M. Hutchins et al (54 vols.; Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), pp. 46-49 and 69-71 respectively; Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Book II, Chap. 2, Sections 1-4, in vol. 42 of *Great Books of the Western World*, pp. 64-93.

⁹For a detailed explanation see Kinhide Mushakoji, "The Cultural Premises of Japanese Diplomacy," *The Silent Power*, pp. 35-49.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Ibid.*

Thus, the *awase* perspective is never wholly one thing or another but a combination in constant flux.

In terms of alliances, this sort of difference in perceptual structure is striking. Alliances between *erabi*-based parties would tend to be clear in focus, with a pronounced effort to frame unequivocal conditions and responses in precise words of standardized meaning. The alliances have a legalistic, polarized character often framed in a language understood by both (but perhaps native to neither), providing a way for heterogeneous societies or dissimilar entities to operate.

In contrast, the vocabulary of the *awase*-based society is imprecise because linguistic, culturally laden expressions are used to infer the true nature of agreements, leaving considerable room to "agree to disagree."¹³ The tone and the milieu of the exchange, first established by a personal relationship between the negotiators, carry the understanding. In contractual negotiations, as the tone and milieu shift, so does understanding. This equates to latitude and flexibility of position, but it also provides a means to evade obligations. It requires a different style of negotiation than that used by *erabi*-based parties.

In contrast,

The *erabi* view assumes negotiations will proceed via a clear statement of position by each side; the *awase* preference is to infer the other's position without clear explanation . . . according to the ethics and etiquette of *erabi* negotiation, it is not necessary to sympathize with the position of the other party. . . . [while] In Japan, the feeling is "You adjust to my position and

¹³Cf., Tadao Umesao, "Escape from Cultural Isolation," *The Silent Power*, p. 17.

I'll adjust to yours." ¹⁴

Another author, Michael Blaker, building on Mushakoji's premise, notes that such perceptual differences lead to frustration between both Japanese and U.S. officials.¹⁵ *Erabi*-premised exchange is usually on terms of common general principles, within which they hammer the particulars of the agreement into shape. The whole goal of the enterprise is to arrive at a fixed, discrete entity. However, in *awase*-premised exchange, the focus is on the persons involved; they, not general principles, are where the negotiation occurs.¹⁶ Little discussion of terms of reference or definitions takes place, because they assume that such things are already common knowledge.¹⁷ The *awase* negotiator has the objective of gaining and maintaining a focus on a continuing process, the goal being maintaining the ability to adapt. A fixed entity (the *erabi* goal) is precisely what is to be avoided.

However, to *erabi* negotiators the *awase* premises are hardly comprehensible. The lack of the sort of logic which *erabi* negotiators see as the bedrock of all

¹⁴Mushakoji, "The Cultural Premises of Japanese Diplomacy," *The Silent Power*, p. 44.

¹⁵Michael K. Blaker, "Probe, Push, and Panic: The Japanese Tactical Style in International Negotiations," *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, ed. Robert A. Scalapino (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 60-7.

¹⁶This point also is discussed by Lucian W. Pye who specifically notes, "In non-Western societies the political sphere is not sharply differentiated from the spheres of social and personal relations." Pye further notes that this characteristic applies to both internal and external relations of the non-Western society. Lucian W. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), pp. 286-94.

¹⁷Lucian Pye, citing of the prevalence of homogeneity and cultural cliques of the leadership elites in non-Western societies, reinforces this point, noting that such groups will have the dual characteristics of a common base of understanding and a relatively fixed conception of process and acceptable outcome. *Ibid.*

understanding defies their concept of communication. Although initial responses may be grounded on the assumption of a lack of clarity in communications, repeated recurrences may give rise to a perception that the *awase*-based negotiators are "changing the rules to suit themselves as they go along." Thus, in transcultural discussions, the parties may find themselves talking past one another, with both reluctant to alter their approach.

Not all observers see cultural differences as the root of the problem. For example, Karel van Wolferen, maintains that the Japanese approach is only power in the guise of culture. His explanation is that when 'culture' is used to explain Japan, it becomes an excuse for systematic exploitation, for legal abuses, . . . and for other forms of uncontrolled exercise of power. In the international realm, culture is made an excuse for not living up to agreements and responsibilities.¹⁸

Van Wolferen agrees with Mushakoji in the basic premise that the Japanese "go along to get along." However, he is not optimistic about the probability of closure in negotiations between the Japanese and members of the West. Van Wolferen sketches a picture of a cultural ideology whose task "is to make the existing Japanese socio-political world completely acceptable and immune to any advocacy of drastic change."¹⁹ In short, he asserts there may be cultural differences, but they are not the

¹⁸ Arguments of the sort advanced by persons like Mushakoji are dismissed by van Wolferen as being illogical tautologies, a fundamental function of which is to "blind the world." Characterizing Japan's culture as ideology, he paints a picture wherein, "Government officials demonstrate great conviction that all their actions and everything Japan is held responsible for internationally can be explained by Japanese culture and must therefore be excused." Karel van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), pp. 245-7.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

cause of alliance negotiation difficulties. The cultural differences are merely a tool used to cloak the actual sources.

The significance of the actual source of differences becomes stark when it is time to meet the responsibilities of an alliance or to transform it. Since the entire postwar period has been marked by major changes, the difference in perceptions, regardless of source lent a cast to all aspects of strategy.

. Post-World War II Adjustments

In the aftermath of the Second World War, both the U.S. and Japan had to make extraordinary adjustments. These adjustments affected the evolution of the U.S.-Japanese relationship, directly affecting the formation of the strategies of the two partners. If both partners foresaw changes in the relationship,²⁰ they neither wanted nor anticipated the scale of those changes.²¹

Japan's postwar adjustments may be grouped into internal, external and bilateral affairs. Changes to internal affairs included adjustments necessary for maintaining social order, facilitating national recovery and preserving national unity since government credibility and official philosophy also were war casualties. Even without

²⁰Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Accords in its surrender made clear that there would be numerous changes for Japan. The U.S. determination to be the salient power in the affairs of post-war Japan required the U.S. to assume roles quite different from its prewar posture.

²¹Paul H. Nitze suggests that with the shattering of the international system the fundamental issue for the United States was not merely addressing its own security, but constructing a new international order. He suggests, "whether we were then fully conscious of it or not, what we were doing during the seven years from 1946 to 1953 was . . . contesting with the Soviet Union and its allies, whether it would be they, or we and our allies, who would succeed in constructing such a new system." Paul H. Nitze, "Coalition Policy and the Concept of World Order," in *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, ed. Arnold Wolfers, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), p. 17.

the changes driven by the Occupation's mandate, adjustments in these major areas would have been necessary. Significantly, some affected Japan's social core.

The second set of adjustments centered on Japan's external environment. The war's end found Japan reduced to a third-rate power. Badly damaged, shorn of trade, greatly constrained by shortages in natural resources and isolated from most other nations, Japan had gone from Asia's leader to shattered outcast. This change in status required major alterations in the techniques and near-term objectives, if not ultimate goals, of Tokyo's foreign policy.

The third set centered on Japan's relationship with the U.S., an alien power intent on remolding the Japanese nation in its own, liberal democratic tradition. These three sets of adjustments largely describe the evolution of Japan's security affairs.

Affecting all three groups of adjustments was the overarching global struggle of the Cold War. For Japan as well as the U.S. the Cold War was a challenge, new in both type and scale. Although fundamentally a bipolar ideologic struggle, the Cold War's effects on Japan were not solely a product of Japan's relationship with the United States. Aggressive pre- and post-surrender communist activism in Japan, and the Soviet ideologic indoctrination of Japanese prisoners of war show Japan was a communist target regardless of Tokyo's association with Washington.

Vulnerability to ideologic attack was new to Japan; its socio-political cohesion had always been a notable national strength. Further, despite its foreign origin, most advocates of communism in Japan were Japanese. This created challenges stemming, in part, from the difference between prewar and postwar Japan. Communist influence in

the prewar period was minor and easily controlled. However, the postwar period saw the dramatic growth of communist influence throughout the labor and academic sectors of Japanese society. The Occupation's introduction of popular democratic process had enthused political activists and simultaneously removed the traditional mechanisms of suppression. Neither was there much initial support from SCAP in suppressing communist activity (although this was to change). In sum, Japan had to make multiple internal adjustments to meet the communist challenges.

Besides internal matters, the Cold War complicated Japan's external affairs. Tokyo's relationship with America continued to affect Tokyo's relations with Moscow and Beijing. Moscow's demands for territorial concessions, ceding of sundry controls to Soviet authority, and denial of Japanese access to fishing grounds were continual Soviet maneuvers that hampered Japan's recovery.

Tokyo also faced structural difficulties; its officials no longer possessed the traditional tools of foreign policy. Absent military and economic strength and its sovereignty suspended, Tokyo hardly could conduct foreign affairs as did other states.²² In all, Japan's vulnerability demanded adjustments, some possibly radical in aspect.

Yet, the Cold War affected Japan's security most significantly through Japan's relationship with the United States. That Tokyo was affiliated with Washington may have stiffened Soviet resolve over a number of issues. Similar difficulties attended Japan's relationships with other communist countries. For example, for more than two

²²Tokyo's techniques in dealing with the international environment were not limited to contacts with the U.S.; Japanese officials used the U.S. as its conduit to other nations.

decades the impact of ideology in economic fora would be felt in Japan's relations with China despite Japanese desires for a non-ideological arrangement. In their global struggle, Japan was a great prize for either the U.S. or the USSR. In a complex political-military arrangement also involving China and Korea, Japan's value to both sides grew. This change alone required Tokyo to adjust its policies.

More broadly, the Cold War was the most important global intrastate relationship of the period. The many forms of that relationship affected all of Washington's postwar security strategy and those its allies. Indeed, Washington developed many of those postwar relationships in keeping with its overarching Cold War strategy of containment.

Nor could Tokyo evade the U.S.-Japan junction. The bilateral bonds were so entwined, especially in the first decade, that Japan hardly could have escaped the security embrace even had it so wished. Since the U.S. assumed responsibility for Japan's security during the occupation, and maintained it through the mechanism of the 1951 Mutual Security Treaty (MST), the evolution of U.S. strategy was crucial to Japan. In this way, much of Japan's postwar strategy developed the way it did because of the Cold War.

Thus, as Japan adjusted to U.S. particulars, it found its foreign policy affected by affairs more of direct concern to Washington than to Tokyo. As a vulnerable power to which war would be a disaster, Japan needed to remain particularly sensitive to, yet detached from, changes in the Cold War. The need for policy flexibility required Japan to adjust from its prewar historical patterns and develop policy latitude.

For the U.S., too, there was no going back to an international stance of mercantilism and relative political isolationism, a realization that boded unparalleled policy changes. The global dislocations of World War II also demanded attention, especially in the light of the economic dislocations and political failures that had precipitated the world from World War I to World War II. Beyond humanitarian motives or the practical problems of relieving distress and aiding recovery, the historical overtones suggested to Washington that precluding a repetition of the conditions it perceived as causing the cataclysm of global war was imperative. In sum, U.S. officials believed they must rebuild the world in such a way as to prevent a new cycle of disaster.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the onset of the Cold War intensified U.S. determination. They also made plain the U.S. would have to chart new territory in military and political relations. This new global role carried responsibilities for both action and the development of doctrine unifying the expanded concepts of security.²³ Clearly, Washington, like Tokyo, faced significant adjustments.

When the U.S. accepted the surrender of Japan, it set about remolding the Japanese nation in ways that were in keeping with American traditions. The goals of this effort (to be accomplished during the Occupation period) were broadly stated as "to insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace

²³Economically rehabilitate major nations, enable revitalization of a global economic system, and simultaneously integrate atomic weapons were among the problems the U.S. acquired.

and security of the world."²⁴ Starting with its own liberal notions, unhindered by its allies,²⁵ and backed by the emotional momentum produced by the war, the U.S. plunged into the task of recasting a non-Western culture having a discredited political order.

The means used to achieve the goals were demilitarizing the society, not merely disarming the military, and democratizing the nation. The results of the evident failure to insure the success of German democracy in the wake of World War I were sobering to Americans,²⁶ who perceived that militarism and autocracy had led Japan (like Germany) into the abyss. In the tradition of President Woodrow Wilson's 1917 slogan to "Make the world safe for democracy," the effort for Japan was to be of greater depth and scope. At the core, this effort was premised on the notion that the internal defects of the structure of states, specifically, that the lack of democratic characteristics, are a, if not the, root cause of war - itself a moral evil. The adjustments to Japan were to

²⁴U.S. Government, "Initial Summary of United States Post Surrender Policy Relating to Japan," dated 10 August 1945, p. 3, in reel 1 of *C, DOS, SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

²⁵The United States had every intention of being the dominant power in occupied Japan. Prior to the war's end the chief policy characteristics were specifically delineated:

While the establishment of policies for the control of Japan is a matter to be entered into by the major Allies in harmony with the United Nations, the United States should insist on the control of the implementation of those policies. The United States should exercise the controlling voice in the occupation authority in Japan Proper, [sic] should make available its share of occupational forces, should designate the commander of all occupation forces and principal subordinate commanders, and should keep strategically placed those forces necessary to implement its policies. Furthermore, the occupation authority in Japan should be organized on the principle of centralized administration, avoiding the division of the country into national zones of independent responsibility administered separately.

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 11 August 1945, pp. 1-2, Subject: "National Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan Proper in the Post-Defeat Period," in reel 1 of *C, DOS, SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

²⁶Letter dated November 30, 1948 from Embassy Tokyo to Department of State Washington, D.C., Subject: "Review of Japanese Constitution by FEC," in reel 1 of *C, DOS, SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

democratize it in ways "which will be compatible with United States principles of liberal and representative government" and "deemed likely to stress the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people."²⁷ It was to be a practical application of an idealistic conceit aimed at the eradication of a moral evil.

Thus, it is not surprising that MacArthur insisted upon the insertion of Article 9 (the article renouncing war) into the new Japanese Constitution. The contrite utopianism of Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara, a senior, well-respected Japanese statesman, aided this effort.²⁸ Coming from such sources, they enhanced the credibility of pacifism as a viable national policy.

The notion of pacifism as an acceptable theme was an abrupt departure from Japan's experience. Further, it seemed an illogical departure from the European tradition and the lessons of the Second World War. Yet, apparently SCAP and a great segment of Japan's polity seemed adamant in their espousal of Japan's disarmament, if not complete neutrality. Although a sizeable segment of Japan's leadership opposed any notion of neutrality, the vision of Japan becoming "the Switzerland of the East" was popular.²⁹

²⁷U.S. Government, "Initial Summary of United States Post Surrender Policy Relating to Japan," dated 10 August 1945, p. 1.

²⁸Although MacArthur's dissatisfaction with the draft Japanese Constitution, which led to the resulting SCAP version, is well-known, MacArthur insists that the inclusion of the provisions of Article 9 were based upon the suggestions of Prime Minister Shidehara made in January 1946, before SCAP acted. Douglas A. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, (Greenwich, CN: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1965), pp. 346-7.

²⁹MacArthur used this analogy to describe Japan's future role during an interview with representatives of London's *Daily Mail* on March 2, 1949. Japan's leadership observed that Switzerland may be neutral, but it was very heavily armed, literally a nation-in-arms. Since Japan was to be disarmed, perhaps a closer analogy was Belgium, whose fate, despite guarantees of inviolable security by powerful neighbors, was to be overrun

Also apparent was that an unarmed Japan, which many of Japan's neighbors wanted, would be a ward of the U.S.³⁰ This had strategic implications affecting diplomacy, security, economics and ideology.

As to diplomacy, Japan's status as America's ward shifted Japan's foreign relations away from the European diplomatic tradition to the U.S. mode. This was a shift from basic power politics (fundamentally amoral in character), with which Japan had been familiar for a century, to an American tradition that included idealistic, moralistic and legalistic aspects. Because of the differences in mode, the strategic dialogues were affected, insuring, at least for the Occupation period, that American values would influence Japan's international interactions. Although the shattering effects of defeat may have provided opportunity for a new mode, Tokyo's earlier experiences with the U.S. gave little commonality on which to base it.³¹

Further, beyond being different, the American mode was confusing. Japan's tradition, similar to that of Europe, harkened to Clausewitz in that military power was simply an element of statecraft. With a different tradition in the moral and legal dimensions of conflict, morality in war or politics was not an issue to the Japanese. In

and occupied twice within 26 years. DOS Dispatch from Tokyo 800 dated May 23, 1950, subject: "Interpellations and Answers on International Affairs" from *U.S. Department of State Central Files, Japan, 1946-1957*, microform from University Publications of America. Hereafter *US DOS CF, Japan, 1946-1957*. UPA.

³⁰The U.S. role as guardian was underscored by two particulars. Not only was the U.S. unwilling to brook any interference with its policies towards Japan, but the U.S. as the world's dominant naval and air power (overwhelmingly so in the Pacific) was the only nation which had the means to enforce such stewardship.

³¹Shintaro Ishihara, "A Nation without Morality," *The Silent Power*, p. 93.

short, the Japanese saw the military and power politics, not as root causes of war and moral evils, but as part of the central, supporting and protecting structure of the Japanese society and nation.³²

In contrast, the American tradition included morality and democratic political premises that the U.S. saw as universal.³³ For example, when MacArthur insisted on Article 9 renouncing war "as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force in settling international disputes," he was basing that belief on "the good faith and justice of mankind . . . on the evolution of mankind under which nations would develop, for mutual protection against war, a yet higher law of international social and political morality."³⁴ In this, MacArthur was not far from the ideals of Wilson.

MacArthur envisioned the following goals:

A complete reformation of the Japanese people - reformation from human slavery to human freedom, from immaturity that comes of mythical teaching and legendary ritualism to the maturity of enlightened knowledge and truth, from the blind fatalism of war to the considered realism of peace.³⁵

Thus, at the bottom, the Occupation was a moralistic approach in foreign affairs fully in keeping with the characteristics of the American diplomatic tradition.³⁶

³²See *infra*, pp. 75-81.

³³This is not to suggest that U.S. policy officials, including those who framed the occupation in Japan, were united in this viewpoint. There were those, particularly among the long-serving professionals, who were of the "classical" mode. Their subsequent clashes with the so-called "plains liberals" over policies with respect to Japan were not wholly due to the ideological aspects of the Cold War.

³⁴Douglas A. MacArthur, *A Soldier Speaks* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 169, 182.

³⁵MacArthur, *A Soldier Speaks*, p. 182.

³⁶More detailed discussions are found in Arnold Wolfers and Lawrence W. Martin, *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), chap. 12; and Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), chap. 4.

But, as the Cold War deepened and ever-larger opposing camps sparred, it seemed that power politics and the character of international relations had not changed. Although a stable balance was not yet evident, the processes and undergirding rationale of the international states system seemed essentially unchanged. Washington found itself confronting the incongruities of its diplomatic mode.³⁷ As a result, Japan's officials faced adjusting to the U.S., itself adjusting to its altered roles and the different diplomatic modes of others.

Thus, the differences in diplomatic mode, paralleling those of culture with which they were entwined, were to affect the bilateral dialogue and processes. The perceptions upon which the modes were based, springing from cultural antecedents, insured longevity and recurring effects.

. Alliance Theory and Its Shortcomings

Part of the problem in understanding the U.S.-Japan security relationship seems tied to the structural assumption that, at the core, a security alliance is an entity defined by the existence of a common threat.³⁸ A presumption of a common threat contains

³⁷Some Western observers concur, and in their concurrence imply that the U.S. undertook the practice of what it idealistically opposed. For example, Trevor Taylor noted that power-politics, beyond being a means to control state behavior,

went further than mere prescription, seeking also to explain and justify; for instance, in presenting a view of the state system in which the balance of power, a much-criticized concept in the US, played a prominent and stabilizing role, it made US participation in world politics more acceptable. Power-politics theory made the balance of power an inevitable feature of international politics, not an evil feature.

Trevor Taylor, ed. *Approaches and Theory in International Relations*. (London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1985), p. 123.

³⁸For example, see George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 12.

several logic shortfalls, including a sense of negative definition and differences in threat perception. Yet, this assumption of a common threat dominates Western alliance and security literature.³⁹

Significantly, the presumption of a common threat subsumes the notion that absent that common threat there is no reason for an alliance. The "either-or" nature seems to give scant consideration to matters of degree (for example, when and under what conditions what is done becomes threatening to individual alliance members). Further, since threat is a matter of relative degree, presumptions of threat commonality tend to be expressed in terms of order of battle data sets.

During periods of major conflict, this salience of a common threat is a quite reasonable assumption, reflecting strategy focused on the military component.⁴⁰ However, during peacetime the importance of a common threat declines with the sense of urgency and because change alters the relative factors, not only of possible opponents, but of allies. This seems most pertinent to prolonged periods showing

³⁹For typical discussions see Francis A. Beer (ed.), *Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), and Coral Bell, "Security Preoccupations and Power Balances after Vietnam," *Conflict and Stability in Southeast Asia*, ed. Mark Zacher and R. Stephen Milne (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 469-89. For a more theoretical discussion see Hans J. Morganthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).

⁴⁰The logic sequence often is simplistic. For example: The key component of security is military strength. Without military strength there is no security if faced with a threat. Therefore, the crucial security strategy of a nation is its military strategy. Alliances are a crucial part of military strategy. Basil H. Liddel-Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), pp. 333-46. See also Colin S. Gray, *Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1967), p. 5. and Michael Howard, *Studies in War and Peace* (London: Temple Smith, 1970), p.13. The implication is that since alliances are defined by common threat, and the crucial portion of threat is military, then the alliance exists for so long as there is a common military threat. Should the military threat be removed, then the alliance and the military strategy cease to be. Absent the need for military strategy, security is assured, and, by extension, a security strategy is unnecessary.

significant change where the threat is vaguely defined.

A similar difficulty attends theoretical applications found in writing focused on cultural differences in U.S.-Japanese affairs. Indeed, mutual misperception does exist due to differences in culture, domestic structure and language. Significant work has been done on the misperceptions that originate in alliances even between similar states.⁴¹

However, this approach, contains two shortfalls. First, it makes an assumption in applying a common alliance theory to both partners. When difficulties in language and style are present, they might be presumed as causing differences in articulated security objectives and methods. Yet, the differences may not be rooted in cultural perceptions, but in theoretical mismatch,⁴² or combinations of both. Second, explanations of what does not fit a case notably fall short of those explanations which do.

Another limitation is security literature. Most readily available security literature on alliance theory is Eurocentric. Non-Western contributions, while profound, are sparse.⁴³ In so being, the main body of alliance theory carries Western

⁴¹Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), takes a transcultural approach. For an in-depth study of "muddled perceptions" between similar alliance partners (the U.S. and Great Britain) see Richard Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 56.

⁴²Such a mismatch even need not be between different paradigms. For example, two states might agree on a balance-of-power construct, yet the focus of one could be on extant military capabilities and the other on an amalgam of military and economic prowess.

⁴³The sparseness of Oriental contributions may be a product of Western ignorance. For example, the best known Oriental author is Sun Tzu whose *The Art of War* was introduced to the West in 1772 in a translation into French by French Jesuit Fr. P. Amiot. Translations into Russian began in the 1800s, English in 1905,

cultural precepts. This reveals two shortcomings: the limited theoretical influence of the Oriental tradition on security affairs, and the incomplete theoretical development that may result if fundamental precepts differ.

For example, balance of power theory is limited in explaining the persistence of Japanese force levels and the stability of American and Japanese military contributions to common security. In contrast to theoretical expectations that a rise in threat results in a rise in countering capabilities, Japan's force levels remained remarkably stable during the period examined.⁴⁴ Remarkably, when Japan's national interests seemed increasingly threatened by regional military developments, Japan's defense spending slowed. As a percentage of GNP, that portion of the budget for defense usually was unchanged or declined compared with the portions devoted to other sectors. However, the relative drop and sustained low level of defense spending expressed in GNP percentage do not illustrate the whole picture.

True, the *percentage* of GNP devoted to defense remained low (dropping from 1.78% of GNP in 1955 to 0.78% in 1970 and remaining below but within 0.1 of 1% of GNP thereafter).⁴⁵ However, Japan's GNP was rising dramatically. Gains averaged

and German in 1910. Notably, Sun Tzu's work has been known and studied in Japan since the time of the T'ang Dynasty (A.D. 618 to 906). R. L. Wing, *The Art of Strategy: A New Translation of Sun Tzu's Classic The Art of War* (New York: Doubleday, 1988), p. 11. Moreover, the lack of a suitable theory in Western literature is not proof of the absence of a practice.

⁴⁴This conclusion is based upon information compiled from *Defense of Japan* (1976, 1983 and 1986 editions), (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd.), hereafter JDA, *Defense of Japan*; and *The Military Balance 1983-1984* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984).

⁴⁵International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1987-1988* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988).

13.35% between 1950 and 1983.⁴⁶ Thus, holding the defense portion of the budget at a near constant percentage of GNP resulted in *significant annual real growth in absolute funds* (a compound annual growth rate of 10.64% for 1955-1985⁴⁷)(See Figure 1).

Japanese Defense Expenditures 1955-1983




Figure 1 Defense of Japan, 1983

Comparatively, the absolute amounts Japan devoted to defense outlays placed it as high as sixth (and never lower than eighth) among the world's nations during the 1955-1983 period.⁴⁸

(See Table 1).

Defense Outlays: Top Eight Nations, 1955-1985*

	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985
1	USSR	US	US	US	US	US	USSR
2	US	USSR	USSR	USSR	USSR	USSR	US
3	UK	UK	UK	France	UK	UK	UK
4	France	France	FRG	FRG	FRG	FRG	France
5	FRG	FRG	France	UK	France	France	FRG
6	Italy	Italy	Italy	Italy	Iran	Japan	Saudi Arabia
7	Neth.	Japan	Japan	Japan	Japan	Italy	Japan
8	Japan	Neth.	Canada	Nigeria	Italy	Iran	Italy

Table 1 Compiled from *The Military Balance, 1987-1988*.
*based on defense expenditures as % national GDP, 1980 dollars.

⁴⁶Kar-yiu Wong, "National Defense and Foreign Trade: The Sweet and Sour Relationship between the United States and Japan," *Sharing World Leadership?: A New Era for America & Japan*, ed. John H. Makin and Donald C. Hellman (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989), p. 82.

⁴⁷Computation based on James H. Buck (ed.), *The Modern Japanese Military System* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 241, *Defense of Japan 1983* (Tokyo: Japan Times, Inc., 1983), pp. 295-7, and *Defense of Japan 1987* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Inc., 1987), pp. 302.

⁴⁸Thomas A. Drohan, *The U.S.-Japan security bargain: Origins and transformation* [sic] (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University), (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1991), p. 9.

Yet, the real importance is not how much was spent, but capabilities acquired in comparison to nations potentially threatening to Japan. Significantly, the changes in the quantity and quality of Japan's forces were modest. (See Figure 2).




Figure 2 Source: Compiled from *Defense of Japan, 1983*, pp. 260, 270, 275-77, 291-94.

With respect to the improvements made by other regional states during the latter part of the period (1972-1983), the relative overall military efficiency of Japan's defense forces probably lost ground.⁴⁹ But this may be moot. Seen in terms of an alliance, Japan's military security may be understood (narrowly) as the combination of

⁴⁹For example, the USSR, China and both South and North Korea greatly improved the quality (and often the quantity) of their military forces. China acquired nuclear weapons and the USSR introduced sea, air and ground based strategic weapons systems. For a general summation as seen by Japan see Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan, 1983*, (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd., 1983), pp. 28-35, 40-44, 138, 260, 274-77, 283; hereafter JDA, *Defense of Japan*.

Japanese and U.S. forces.⁵⁰ Therefore, in keeping with the balance of power theory, should Japan not increase its power commensurate with a rise in the capability of the threat, it is of limited consequence if America made up the difference, and the alliance remained steadfast.

Yet, developments during the period suggest that the U.S. did not make up that difference (see Figure 3 and Table 2).

Defense Outlays as a Share of GNP: US and Japan, 1950-1985




Figure 3

compiled from *The Military Balance, 1987-1988*, and *Defense of Japan 1983*, and 1987.

⁵⁰Often conceived in these terms, the concept is flawed since the relationship of the U.S. to other nations serves, with their assistance, to undergird regional and global stability and, in the event of an emergency, may bring them into a conflict. In this respect, Japan's military security in terms of both deterrence and warfighting incorporates others states. Nor is this all. In the event of an emergency, which necessarily would be major, those non-aligned regional states would be forced to assess whether assisting or staying out of a conflict would be in their long term best interest. Thus, despite the lack of a formal alliance and a desire to remain free of the conflict, some of these nations could become "allies."

Changes in U.S. Far Eastern Forces

Type Force	Year	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Specifics												
Ground Forces												
# of soldiers [1] (10,000)		9	6.4	5.9	5.7	5.2	6.1	6.1	5.7	5.5	5.5	5.6
# of divisions		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Naval Elements												
# of personnel [2] (7th Fleet) (10,000)		8	6	6	5.5	5	5	5	5	5.5	5.5	5.1
Total # vessels		143	85	61	60	55	55	55	55	60	60	60
Aircraft carriers		6	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	2-3
Cruisers		5	2	2	2	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Destroyers		45	28	22	23	20	20	15	15	15	15	20
Submarines		12	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	7	7	7
Naval Auxiliaries		75	47	29	27	23	23	27	27	30	30	25
Total # Aircraft[3]		750	550	550	540	465	555	425	425	500	500	500
Air Forces												
Bombers [4]		170	170	40	42	15	14	14	14	14	14	14
Fighters		586	519	330	236	180	180	202	229	250	250	270
Patrol/Recon/ Transports/Helicopters		180	162	127	78	48	92	45	53	55	55	55
Total # aircraft		936	851	497	356	243	286	261	296	320	320	340

Notes: [1] Includes USMC elements not part of Fleet Marines

[2] Includes USMC Fleet Marines

[3] Includes USN ground-based aircraft

[4] Includes bombers based in Guam

Table 2

Source: *The Military Balance, 1981-1982*, pp. 371-372.

The U.S., with its many global obligations and involvements, also had a generally declining defense budget (measured by percentage of GNP)(see Table 3, following page). Further, a combination of developments (e.g., increasingly expensive social welfare programs) reduced the funding, and by that the size and general

U.S. Expenditures for National Security as a Percentage of Total Government Expenditures and Gross National Product: 1945-1980

Fiscal year	Total government expenditures (billions \$)	National security expenditures ⁵¹ (billions \$)	Percent of total expenditures allocated to defense	Gross national product (billions \$)	Percent of gross national product allocated to defense
1945	95.2	81.6	85.7	211.9	38.5
1946	61.7	44.7	72.4	208.5	21.4
1947	36.9	13.1	35.5	231.3	5.7
1948	36.5	13.0	35.6	257.6	5.0
1949	40.6	13.1	32.2	256.5	5.1
1950	43.1	13.1	30.4	284.8	4.6
1951	45.8	22.5	49.1	328.4	6.9
1952	68.0	44.0	64.7	345.5	12.7
1953	76.8	50.4	65.6	364.6	13.8
1954	70.9	46.6	65.7	364.8	12.8
1955	68.5	40.2	58.7	398.0	10.1
1956	70.5	40.3	57.2	419.2	9.6
1957	76.7	42.8	55.8	441.1	9.7
1958	82.6	44.4	53.8	447.3	9.9
1959	92.1	46.6	65.7	364.8	12.8
1960	92.2	45.9	49.8	503.7	9.1
1961	97.8	47.4	48.5	520.1	9.1
1962	106.8	51.1	47.8	560.3	9.1
1963	111.3	52.3	47.0	590.5	8.9
1964	118.6	53.6	45.2	632.4	8.5
1965	118.4	49.6	41.9	684.9	7.2
1966	134.7	56.8	42.2	749.9	7.6
1967	158.3	70.1	44.3	793.9	8.8
1968	178.8	80.5	45.0	864.2	9.3
1969	184.5	81.2	44.0	930.3	8.7
1970	196.6	80.3	40.8	977.1	8.2
1971	211.4	75.8	35.8	1063.4	7.1
1972	232.0	76.6	33.0	1171.1	5.3
1973	247.1	74.5	30.1	1306.6	5.7
1974	269.6	77.8	28.9	1412.9	5.5
1975	326.2	85.6	26.2	1528.8	5.6
1976	366.4	89.4	24.4	1700.1	5.3
1977	401.7	97.5	24.3	1887.2	5.2
1978	450.8	105.2	23.3	2107.6	5.0
1979	493.7	117.7	23.8	2313.4	5.1
1980	563.6	130.4	23.1	2518.0	5.2

Table 3 Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington: GPO, 1975), pp. 224, 1116; and *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979), pp. 364, 435; U.S. Office of Management and Budget *The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1981* (Washington: GPO, 1981), pp. 552, 612.

⁵¹Includes veterans benefits.

capability⁵² of U.S. forces even as they introduced more lethal weapons. Accordingly, the U.S. adjusted containment (i.e., the Nixon Doctrine)⁵³ and made parallel shifts in its military strategy (e.g., moved from a "2-and-a-half-wars" to a "1-and-one-half-wars" premise).

Therefore, the evidence does not support the notion that the shortfall resulting from Japanese inactivity was made up by U.S. efforts. Since the threat expanded in both size and quality (see Table 4) and neither nation covered the resulting imbalance, the applicability of balance of power theory to the U.S.-Japan alliance seems imprecise.

Changes in the Soviet Union's Far Eastern Forces

Type Force	Specifics	Year										
		1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Ground Forces (10,000)	# of soldiers	26	26	26	30	30	30	30	35	35	36	36
	# of divisions	30	30	30	31	31	31	32	34	34	39	39
Naval Elements	Total tons (10,000 tons)	110	110	115	120	125	125	133	138	152	158	160
	Total # vessels	740	745	750	755	755	755	755	770	785	800	810
	Naval seaplanes	410	410	410	400	390	390	390	400	410	415	420
	Submarines	120	120	120	125	125	125	125	125	130	135	135
	Naval auxiliaries	210	215	220	230	240	240	240	245	245	250	255
Air Forces	Bombers	600	570	560	580	510	480	480	450	450	450	420
	Fighters	1300	1260	1280	1300	1380	1420	1420	1450	1450	1600	1550
	Patrol/recon	140	130	130	130	140	140	140	140	160	160	150
	Total # aircraft	2040	1960	1970	2010	2030	2040	2040	2040	2060	2210	2120

Table 4

Source: *The Military Balance, 1981-1982*

⁵²This is a holistic (and overly simplified) assessment reflecting as much the effects of an unpopular, domestically divisive war, the adoption of modes of warfare by opponents that offset U.S. military prowess, and the strategic conundrums of nuclear weapons.

⁵³Richard M. Jennings, "The Thrust of the Nixon Doctrine," *Military Review*, Vol. LII, No. 2, (February, 1972), pp. 3-9.

That said, the reality of the Cold War as a global balance of power system, whose holistic embrace included Japan, makes dismissal of its relevance impossible. What seems to be the case was that the level and scope of analysis alters the applicability of a theoretical paradigm. What is most apparent at the global level (e.g., mutual nuclear deterrence) may be less so at regional levels and at the individual state level may incorporate extraordinary apparent incongruities (e.g., Japan's "Three Non-nuclear Principles"). This poses analytic problems since the U.S.-Japan relationship is simultaneously a bilateral, regional and global arrangement (if, by definition an arrangement has major influence at that level). Thus, if balance of power is defined in terms of extant military capabilities⁵⁴ or direct contributions to defense, the U.S.-Japan relationship seemingly falls short of meeting balance of power criteria.⁵⁵ However, if the economic and technical power of Japan (and their implied military potential) are factored into the balance of the West, then a case could be made for a greater applicability of balance of power theory.⁵⁶

⁵⁴For an argument supporting the notion that extant forces are the primary factors in sustaining deterrence and preventing the outbreak of war see Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 64-65.

⁵⁵One of the problems in assessing this balance is the comparison of objectives. There is a considerable difference in the military capabilities required for denial rather than compellence. See Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 70-71, 112. That Japan recognized this difference is apparent from the text of the 1980 Report on Comprehensive National Security. See The Comprehensive National Security Study Group, *Report on Comprehensive National Security*, trans. M. Nakajima, (Tokyo: The Comprehensive National Security Study Group, 1980), p. 42.

⁵⁶This inclusion of additional factors raises notions of time which Schelling discounts. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 112. However, Schelling's appraisal may be overly narrow. Clearly, there is the need for sufficient conventional forces to preclude a quick, easy victory (essentially a strategic fait accompli). Yet, wars have the habit of becoming protracted, despite expectations and efforts to the contrary. Thus, factors of national power that change over time could be the pivotal difference for Japan as they have for others.

Moreover, balance of power applicability need not be a polar choice. The U.S.-Japan relationship is an ongoing process characterized by change, accommodation and continuity. Hence, the applicability of any theory may be a matter of degree varying over time. Thus, although some behavior by both alliance partners over a protracted period seems a departure from theoretical expectations (see Table 2 and Figure 2 above), balance of power aspects are not thereby wholly invalidated. Neither are other approaches automatically certified.

For example, a much better (if still inexact) theoretical match is found with the collective (or public) goods theory of international relations.⁵⁷ Several aspects of this theory seem germane to the U.S. - Japan relationship including disproportionate burdensharing, different perceptions of the good to be realized, the effect of group size, the nature of indirect incentives, the utility of the purchase of the good, strategic interactions, and behavioral assumptions of the members.⁵⁸

This theory specifically realizes and accounts for inequalities among states,

⁵⁷The literature on this theory is extensive with perhaps the illustrations most applicable to Japan being found in Mancur Olson, *On The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), hereafter Olson, *The Logic of Collective Goods*; and Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer and Oran R. Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), hereafter Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*. More general discussions are found in Paul Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 36, (November, 1954), pp. 387-89; John Baylis, et al., *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975); and Mancur Olson and Richard J. Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 48, pp. 266-79. For a more formal treatment of the "free rider" aspect (particularly germane to Japan's case) see Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, "I Get By With a Little Help from My Friends," *World Politics*, 23, (October, 1970), pp. 104-20.

⁵⁸There also are aspects which are inappropriate to this investigation. For example, the role(s) of political leaders as entrepreneurs and the interaction of opposition political leaders are more suitable to levels of analysis focusing on individuals rather than systems (e.g., Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963)).

including unequal contributions, positing the weaker⁵⁹ ally will gain a disproportionate advantage - a "free ride" - at the expense of the larger ally. Yet, according to Olson, the larger ally acquiesces and pays more for this public good because the larger ally values the alliance more. Asymmetry in contributions to the common defense is expected to lessen as the weaker ally gains economic strength. At this juncture the actual evolution of events seems a departure from Olson's expectations, while the terminology becomes less specific. For example, precisely how the U.S. might value the alliance more than the Japanese is unclear,⁶⁰ as is the criteria used to measure such "value."⁶¹ Yet, without mentioning Japan, Olson (and others),⁶² perhaps have addressed this point by positing that some who value a collective good more than the cost of providing it will not be able to supply it to themselves in any meaningful manner.⁶³

This circumstance pertains to Japan, which probably could afford the economic,

⁵⁹The terms "weaker" and "larger" denote measurement in terms of national income.

⁶⁰The first impression is that Japan's national survival is directly at risk, while the U.S. survival is secondarily so. Although hardly so stark, and perhaps the distinction between the two is imprecise, there is still the notion that Tokyo cannot afford the luxury of being wrong, while Washington (at least to a greater degree) can. For a discussion of national priorities and the difficulties in reversing foreign policy decisions, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 15, 66-67.

⁶¹Ascertaining relative values, perhaps, is in the realm of the subjective, particularly when the strategic levels involved (e.g., global versus regional) differ. The economic growth of Japan, and thereby its stake in global affairs, only blurs attempts at discriminating such values. Nor is this all. Even when calculating costs of military hardware, the cost to Japan and the U.S. differ as do the relative utility of the items purchased; both are variables affecting value. For an expression of U.S. official recognition of this problem denying so-called tripwire theories or abstract calculations see Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 79.

⁶²See Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, Chapter 1.

⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 14. See also Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *Rand Memorandum 4297-ISA*, October, 1966, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1966), Fig. 3, p. 10, pp. 9-19.

political and social costs incident to expanded military capabilities, but would remain vulnerable despite considerable expansion. Indeed, such an expenditure might raise Japan's absolute fighting capability, not alter its relative status (especially in a nuclear environment), and simultaneously invoke more hostility.

The logic of the collective goods theory continues, suggesting that if the larger ally reduces its contribution, the weaker ally would reassess its position raising or lowering its burden share according to its perception of the good to be realized. This feature leads to questions about the complete applicability of the collective goods theory if that logic is followed.⁶⁴

The history of the period shows that Japanese defense allocations remained anchored at approximately 1% of GNP despite both Japan's extraordinary economic growth and a corresponding diminishing U.S. GNP growth rate. If the assumption is made that U.S. and Japanese spending was optimum and appropriate to the security received (the collective good), then a rise in threat capabilities should result in a commensurate rise in U.S. and Japanese response. Significantly, it is the rise in response, expressed in terms of capability, not spending per se, that is crucial. Thus, if the context of Japan's military security is denial instead of compellence, the rise in capabilities need only deal with that portion of the threat that renders denial

⁶⁴The implication throughout most collective goods literature is that in the event that the resolve of the larger ally is questioned, the smaller will increase its share of the burden, take an independent approach (e.g., like France), or enter into other alignments. Discussions of collective goods theory seem vague in discriminating between the collective goods of deterrence and warfighting. Nor is there any mention that a smaller ally might see greatly expanded military capability as a *detriment* to its security in the absence of substantial surety by its larger partner.

improbable. This can be achieved with more, more capable (higher quality), offsetting (e.g., naval versus ground) assets, or better positioning.

As the U.S. contribution to defense declined (as shown by declining defense budgets), and the threat expanded, Japan's position concerning the good (as shown by Japan's increased affluence) seems to have enlarged. Having experienced great economic growth, Japan had more at risk and more ability to contribute than at earlier times. Theoretically, both the motivations to pay more and the capability to do so⁶⁵ had increased. Yet, Japan's increases in capability were muted, even stunted. While linkage to a growing GNP did increase the absolute amounts available to Japanese defense sectors, both the proportionate amount and the amount relative to the threat's expansion shrank. In keeping with the theoretical expectations of collective goods theory, lower defense outlays occur when the cost of providing increases in the good exceed the value of the good received. Since the U.S. capabilities at the strategic nuclear level answered that level's requirements, and the combination of extant U.S. and Japanese forces possessed sufficient power for denial purposes at the lower conventional levels, there was little practical incentive for Japan to do more than maintain that already in place. Thus, Japan's actions with respect to defense outlays and capabilities suggest an apt, but perceptually misleading, fit to the collective goods theory.

There are additional circumstances where public goods theory seems ambivalent in

⁶⁵Notably, the ability to pay more is applicable regardless of the spectacular growth of Japan's economy. With 1 percent of GNP devoted to defense, Japan's ranking (on a percentage of GNP basis) was among the world's lowest in defense allocations. Compared with the U.S. proportion of about 6 percent, it seems clear the robustness of Japan's economy would allow shouldering a much heavier burden.

its applicability to the U.S.-Japan relationship. For example, if instead of using security expenditures to meet a common military threat, those expenditures are used for individual national security benefits, then the public goods theory would not seem to apply because the good benefits only one partner. Olson argues⁶⁶ that since one (or more) members of the group values the good more than the cost of providing it, that member will provide enough to maximize his own utility with respect to the good. Olson continues his argument, noting that since collective goods cannot be denied to the other members,⁶⁷ they eventually will receive some of the good. This is because even if the individual who values the good more than the cost of supplying it may not immediately act to provide that good, eventually that party will do so once they realize that they cannot rely on the contributions of others to attain sufficient amounts of the good.⁶⁸

Thus, deployments of the U.S. 7th Fleet to the Indian Ocean may initially seem a unilateral good, but when such U.S. activity is seen to enhance deterrence and imply protection for Japan's vital petroleum Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), it is evident that Japan, as well as the U.S., attains benefits. Yet, the Japanese may see these results as benefits only to a certain extent. If U.S. actions significantly raise the

⁶⁶Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, pp. 1-65.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁶⁸This raises the question of the U.S. approach to the collective good of the so-called "nuclear umbrella." The U.S. could not count on the contributions of others (indeed, Washington discouraged proliferation), yet it strove through diplomacy to provide that good to many while unilaterally bearing the costs. This differs from Olson's hypothesized expectations in that the U.S., after some consideration, chose to take this burden on itself and discouraged contributions. Washington's activity seems to stem more from perceptions of appropriate roles and the control of power than from economic factors.

probabilities of Japan's entanglement in a conflict or place at risk access to crucial raw materials, then Japan could be reaping a (largely) unilateral "ill."

Similarly, but less precisely, is Japan's development of economic and technical power. Economic and technical advantage, particularly those at the direct expense or displacement of the U.S., may be seen as a good unilaterally favoring Japan. However, in the broader U.S. strategy of containment, it was precisely the development of independent power centers that formed the core objectives of Washington's strategy.⁶⁹ Hence, at the bilateral level the U.S. seems to have been damaged and the collective goods theory at risk, while at the global strategic level the West (under Washington's strategic leadership) seems to have gained. This, it is unclear that collective goods theory is refuted in this case.

In both of the examples, it seems that the structural level at which the theory is applied and the perspective from which it is interpreted makes a significant difference. This difference in level of application and interpretation also is evident in other ways. For example, if Washington's key focus was the USSR in a global level context, the goods it was willing to supply are measured against requirements on that scale. However, Japan might not identify the same focus of threat to itself from the USSR, particularly at the regional level. Thus, U.S. contributions are likely to be larger and its

⁶⁹For example, Martin Weinstein posits a quid pro quo in which Japan accepted American military security in exchange for pursuit of economic security, as the basis for the entire security arrangement. Martin Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 21-31. He correctly points out this arrangement protects Japan while simultaneously precluding it from becoming a major military entity and shackles it to the West. His argument ignores that this probably was Japan's desired course of action in any event.

demands for allied contributions similarly large. Yet, Japan's contributions were discounted by Tokyo's not sharing the same perception of threat, and its understanding that U.S. efforts already sufficed for most major contingencies.⁷⁰ In addition, Washington discouraged some developments and Japan had other relationships to consider, both of which served as additional disincentives. Last, Japan may have considered any contributions on its part to be insignificant and therefore hardly to be missed.⁷¹ Thus, the level of application (global versus regional) and the perspective of role (global leader versus regional small power alliance member) led to significant differences in expectations, both theoretical and concrete.⁷²

The collection of bilateral Pacific alliances crafted by Dulles illustrates differences associated with the levels of application and perspective. Washington's perception of threat was very different from those of the other alliance members (as were the specific forms and levels of that threat). Indeed, America's allies might see Washington's major threat coming to them via their association with Washington. Washington was caught between requesting contributions for a threat which was not held in common, or unilaterally supporting the burden. Thus, the presumption of common threat held by Washington served to distort the applicability of collective goods theory and

⁷⁰Cf., Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, pp. 31-32.

⁷¹Cf., *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁷²This is a departure from Olson's conclusions that the good supplied by the entity which values it more will be suboptimal. Yet, Japan could hardly consider the U.S. shields suboptimal as they were the best in the world. The U.S. might have considered the overall security arrangements suboptimal (perhaps for other, more parochial reasons), yet this applied more to perceptions at a global vice regional level. Thus, use of terms such as "optimal" must be understood as expressions of relative value depending, in turn, on the level of applications and the perspective of interpretation.

simultaneously, muddle strategic hypothesis and dialogues. For the weaker alliance members (e.g., the Philippines or Australia), their real limitations precluded major problems; they hardly could threaten each other or Japan. Yet, Japan, whose economic and technological strength increased exponentially, could and implicitly did pose a potential threat to them. Therefore, in its strategic dialogues, Washington, which had crafted for itself the key roles at the global, regional and bilateral levels, found a dissonance resulting from discontinuities manifest between and among the level of perception and the level of application. These discontinuities resulted in a case (Japan) wherein a "contribution" to a collective good, at regional levels of perception and application, may be in doing less rather than more.⁷³ For the U.S. this is a paradox since its primary focus and role is the global level, and its strategy requires the (hopefully vigorous) participation of all its allies.

Other interactional approaches have been tried. One, presented in game form in which players representing national negotiators strive to satisfy domestic constituencies while concluding international agreements is advocated by Robert Putnam.⁷⁴ Some

⁷³This is a departure from Olson and others which make no mention of restraint being a collective good. This is surprising, since the notion of collective security reduces the military burdens incident to an international, Hobbesian, anarchical environment. The chief collective good in a security-centric collective goods arrangement may be the mutual restraint exercised by the members. This notion is strongly supported by descriptions of strategic interaction. See Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, pp. 34, 122.

⁷⁴Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and International Politics," *International Organization* 42, No. 3, (Summer 1988), pp. 427-60.

illustrate the security dilemma of nations⁷⁵ in an anarchical international states system and others the dilemma of addressing internal state perceptions of security. Security dilemma conditions have been used as backdrops for "alliance games" and "adversary games," both employed in explaining and forecasting alliance interactions.⁷⁶ While aspects of these approaches could be applied to the U.S. - Japan relationship, for the period this investigation covers, the scope, imprecise measurement criteria, expanding factor sets, and general evolution of events renders their focus tangential to this effort.⁷⁷ More utility may be found in newer theoretically-based game models that address alliance dynamics. For example, Glenn Snyder and Paul Deising have made contributions that specifically include alliance bargaining,⁷⁸ and Robert Jervis,⁷⁹ building on John Herz's security dilemma, posited an alternative four worlds to illustrate varied forms and levels of allied cooperation.⁸⁰

⁷⁵This term arises from the problematic search by a state for security in an international system composed of units pursuing self-interests. For an expanded explanation see John Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

⁷⁶Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, (January 1984), pp. 461-95. Snyder maintains that alliance games arise from fears that one's ally will either abandon or entrap him. Similarly, adversary games arise from the decision process of allies focusing on the problem of whether to be firm or conciliatory towards a common enemy. See also Glenn Snyder and Paul Deising, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 16, 164, 293, 424.

⁷⁷This investigation holistically addresses historical events, not game theory.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 73-4, 175.

⁷⁹Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, (January, 1978), pp. 167-214.

⁸⁰As intriguing as further forays into these contributions may be, this investigation must limit itself. At this time, the author can only suggest that relating the results of further inquiry along these lines to the U.S.-Japan relationship might be fruitful to another investigator.

Additionally, there are two other pertinent aspects germane to this investigation's analysis: the view the participants held of their situation, and the level of analysis used by the author. For example, if U.S. and Japanese officials were consciously acting according to balance of power theory (as they understood it),⁸¹ then their actions might best be interpreted in that light. However, the extent to which their perceptions matched a more general milieu is the extent to which that theory should be accepted. If this parameter is not thus applied, distortion occurs.

Similarly, any analysis that holistically addresses a spectrum of activity faces the difficulty of differentiating scope and scale. What is crucial at an individual level of analysis (e.g., the outcome of a prefectural election) may be minor at the state level and insignificant in intrastate affairs. Moreover, the same paradigm (e.g., balance of power) applied to different levels may result in very different combinations.⁸² In consideration of these aspects, literature from the field of comparative politics can help understanding. It can reveal the longer term strategic interests of alliance partners, present alternatives to alliance paradigms based on common enemy assumptions, and address change in alliance affairs occurring during protracted periods of peace.

For this examination this last is a crucial point. The predominant and joined

⁸¹See statement by Paul H. Nitze, page 12, footnote 21, *supra*. See also Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963), p. 25, for a theoretical perspective.

⁸²For example, at the global level the Cold War was an East-West ideological bipolar system with the U.S. leading the coalition of the West. However, regionally, the collection of bilateral alliances to each of which the U.S. was the major partner, included states whose chief concern was not the USSR, but other regional states - especially Japan. Thus, while there was a balance of power paradigm, it was multipolar, non-ideological, and contained multiple foci.

conditions of the U.S.-Japan alliance have been peace and change. This is remarkable since for most of the period the U.S. was involved in a series of military entanglements (some of which had significant influence on Japan's security), and simultaneously was committed to the larger ideological conflict of the Cold War. Yet, combat never tested the U.S.-Japan military relationship.⁸³ Indeed, insofar as possible, Japan avoided every circumstance even hinting at direct involvement, a restraint mirrored by the absence of any U.S. request for direct military assistance.⁸⁴ The lack of Japanese involvement is instructive since it suggests that Japan (and perhaps Washington) calculated the amount of benefit they might obtain from the costs incurred, compared to those of the alternatives, including the contributions of others for non-participation.⁸⁵ In all, the lack of participation and the lack of pressure (from the U.S. or others) supports the notion of Japanese restraint being accepted as a "contribution" to the collective good of security.

A similar situation exists with respect to change. Besides the changes that each partner underwent in adjusting to a transformed international environment, the altered

⁸³The lack of test contributes to a sense of unreality in the relationship, unreality in the sense that there is a requirement for a significant, capable, military organization. This sense degrades the perception of the military component of national strategy. In addition to reducing the stature of the military as an entity in the Japanese domestic power structure, it also serves to degrade the perception of the value of the U.S.-Japan security arrangement. It also does damage to the U.S. strategic notion of multiple power centers balancing each other off in a global states system. For discussion of this last point see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Balance of Power Delusion," *Foreign Policy* 7, (Summer, 1972), pp. 54-59.

⁸⁴The clear difference in Japan's case is apparent in two Asian wars wherein other U.S. Pacific allies (e.g., Australia and Korea) contributed troops, but Japan officially contributed nothing. The lack of U.S. pressure on Japan (by far its most robust Pacific ally) suggests the notion of strategic interaction applied to Washington and those other of its allies, pertaining to military matters and Japan. See Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, p. 122.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, p. 125.

relative stature of the partners was significant. Additionally, there is the change each partner underwent as to its own self-image. Finally, there are the changes that the relationship underwent in terms of the regional and international arenas.

Analytically, a crucial aspect of these changes is that all levels of analysis are affected. In effect, the changes constitute variables that blur analytic discrimination within and between levels.⁸⁶ The effects of these changes make the analytic process more challenging and suggest that neither a reductionist nor a systemic approach is wholly adequate.⁸⁷ Yet, elements of both must be entertained, particularly the systems approach, since the structures of the international environment and the alliance affected the alliance partners and vice versa. Further, the perpetuation of the basic character of the international system and the alliance suggest that the systemic forces were strong enough and sufficiently maintained by the alliance members⁸⁸ (and by those on whom the alliance acted) to dispose Washington and Tokyo to behave in particular ways.

Apparently, both the traditional balance-of-power paradigm and the public goods theory have interrelated relevance to this relationship even as the impact of

⁸⁶This point follows Kenneth Waltz's critique of Morton Kaplan noting the difficulty in discriminating between the international environment and the states themselves, positing the duality of being in but also a structural part of that environment. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979), p. 54, hereafter Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 44, 53. See also Morton A. Kaplan, *Macropolitics: Selected Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Politics* (Chicago: Aldine Publishers, 1969), pp. 212-13.

⁸⁸Descriptive of the evolution of events, this corresponds with theoretical expectations. See Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, p. 129.

domestic, internal factors increased.⁸⁹ This raises questions of whether more than one paradigm may be operant at a time, and whether alliance partners (alone or in combination) simultaneously may be acting on the same and/or different levels according to different paradigms.

. A Sustained Relationship

That it is constitutes the most concrete fact of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Beyond a brief accommodation dictated by the immediate pressures of an unusual milieu, this alliance evolved, persisted and succeeded despite (and perhaps because of) pressures to both partners. Since states produce their situations, of which this allied relationship is an example, clearly, the alliance served the national interests of both states, or one or both would have abandoned it. Moreover, despite the varied changes and pressures, the relationship seems to have been confirmed rather than weakened.

There are those who may argue that in the early 1950s Japan would not, perhaps could not, refuse a security treaty with the United States. But, in 1960, Japan was no longer the fragile, isolated, occupied and defenseless nation it had been in 1951. No longer occupied, it had the liberty of accepting or rejecting a continued alliance with the U.S. and of exploring other alignments.⁹⁰ Yet, Tokyo seems not to have explored

⁸⁹The clash of objectives and methods between the foreign policy elites of both the U.S. and Japan with their respective domestic constituencies suggest that more than one process model operates at a time.

⁹⁰Although Tokyo was at liberty to explore alternative arrangements, it is difficult to envision Japan believing an alliance with any of the other regional states would be better for Japan than its relationship with the U.S. Further, it is unclear that a neutral Japan, either armed or unarmed, could provide for its own security in the same degree of surety as it enjoyed allied to the U.S. Last, in the event of providing the whole spectrum of its security, it seems clear that Japan's costs (of all kinds) would exceed those incident to the extant relationship with Washington. In sum, Japan's behavior seems to fit the concept of expected utility which may be found in John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic*

alternative security arrangements. It declined both neutrality and the sort of rearmament that might provide an independent capability. Further, it avoided accepting any UN military roles. In short, Tokyo contented itself with modifying its existing relationship with the United States.⁹¹

Yet, the Japanese government took considerable risks insuring the modifications⁹² to the original agreement and signing the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.⁹³ However, by 1970, the treaty's renewal year, there had been a shift in

Behavior, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), and Anatol Rapoport, *Games and Debates* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1960), pp. 121-29. Therefore, despite being able to choose a radical strategic shift, the realities of the strategic milieu pruned the options to more modest, prudent proportions. This result fits criteria for a systems approach posited by Waltz. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 58.

⁹¹In so doing, elements of Japanese behavior bears close similarity to game theory. The clarity of U.S. strategic goals at global and regional levels combined with the bilateral nature of the U.S.-Japan relationship to make aspects of their strategic process much like game theory process. See Steven J. Brams, *Game Theory and Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 28. Additionally, the whole circumstance being one of overpowering complexity may have induced Japan's officials to simplify their burdens with behavior similar to that described in John D. Steinbrunner, *Decisions Under Complexity*, Chap. 4. Last, Japan's relationship with the U.S. hardly was a solitary, mutually exclusive arrangement simply because of the U.S. relationship to so many others. This aspect aligns with theoretical commentary found in Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," p. 22, "It may well be that most alliances are never embodied in a formal agreement."

⁹²For several years Japanese officials had been agitating for adjustments in some of the provisions of the treaty. While part of these adjustments were more cosmetic than fundamental in character and some issues had a popular following, by 1957, key U.S. State Department officials had come to the conclusion that the treaty needed amending. Memorandum of Conversation, subject: "Conversation Between Prime Minister Kishi and Secretary Dulles," June 20, 1957, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, "Japan," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 387-92. Hereafter ERUS, [year]. Notably, the tone of the documents suggest the discussions were in keeping with Graham Allison's Model I (or "classical") model criteria. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971), Chap. 1.

⁹³The public announcement of the government's intention to renew the treaty sparked the largest protests in Japan's history. George R. Packard, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 261. The addition of other elements and the maneuvering by Kishi suggest that although Japanese officials attempted to retain control and present the same image as before, the domestic strategic dialogue had shifted to a Model III (or "bureaucratic process") model whose effects they found difficult to control. See Allison, *Essence of Decision*, Chap. 1, and Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, p. 261.

public attitudes;⁹⁴ and the lack of public reaction was anticlimactic. Since then, protests (internal and external) to the alliance declined.

Having begun the relationship under strained, unequal circumstances, success in meeting Japan's national security requirements predisposed Tokyo to maintain a markedly successful course.⁹⁵ Yet, there seems little question that if, on balance, Tokyo has seen the relationship as more dangerous than beneficial to Japan, Tokyo would have sought separation from Washington.⁹⁶ Since this did not occur, it suggests Tokyo maintained the relationship as a matter of prudent choice in an uncertain strategic environment.⁹⁷

⁹⁴There also seems to have been a shift in the level of strategic dialogue and the political model used. The U.S.-Japan dialogue during that decade was characterized by a measured, largely predictable rhythm mirroring Japan's domestic circumstances. The affect of the various Japanese domestic constituencies is apparent and the level of issues seems lower. In sum, the process matches Allison's description of a Model II (or "organizational process") model. Cf.: Allison, *Essence of Decision*, Chap. 1.

⁹⁵There may have been personal and party interests contributing to this maintenance of the status quo. For a discussion of motivations see Richard Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 76-78; and Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 99.

⁹⁶See DOS, Memorandum. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, D.C., August 24, 1955, subject: not given but covers upcoming meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, drafted by Richard Selby, which, in part, states, ". . . the Japanese had made it clear to Embassy officials that in event of a new outbreak of hostilities in Korea or fighting on Formosa the Japanese would not consider themselves bound to afford us the use of our bases and that a new exchange of notes similar to that undertaken in 1951 would be required." in *ERUS, 1955-1957*, Vol. XXIII, Japan, Part 1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 86; see also, DOS, Memorandum. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, October 10, 1955, subject: NIE 41-55: Probable Developments in Japan Over the Next Decade, which includes the statement, "In the event of an imminent threat of general war, Japan might attempt to assume a neutral position . . ." in *ERUS, 1955-1957*, Vol. XXIII, Japan, Part 1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 132-33.

⁹⁷If Japan's domestic environment is an example of integrated structure socially orderly and hierarchically arranged, the international environment with its characteristics of anarchy and chronic violence is very different. If the former being familiar and manageable by Japan's elites is the ideal, then observers should not be surprised by Japan's attempts to adjust their international environment toward that domestic model.

. Questions of Goals

Plainly, Tokyo's course of action was a cognitive one, a deliberate series of steps based on some combination of analyses.⁹⁸ Japanese volition raises several significant questions.⁹⁹ Did the government of Japan wish to enter this arrangement because it saw continued opportunity, because the alternatives were unacceptable, or perhaps both? What particulars were included and excluded in its deliberations? Were other courses of action considered during the period, and in comparison, why and how did Japan's agents come to settle on the juncture with the United States?¹⁰⁰

The general course of the U.S.-Japan security relationship attests to the desire by both partners to maintain their relationship. However, this fact alone does not make clear whether Japan could have accomplished its key strategic goals via other

⁹⁸Rather than analysis, Halperin suggests alternatives (shortcuts) are generally used, especially during periods of stress. In this he may be closer to Japan's actual execution of the process, notably for the period surrounding the negotiation and passage of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In particular, his "51-49" principle (i.e., where if a decision is made on this close a discrimination, the political figure supports it 100 per cent), may explain the contrasting phenomena of great divisiveness on principles within and between parties (e.g., the LDP), yet monolithic party support behavior. Cf., Harold Laski's argument that coherence is achieved if the direction of policy is easily discernable and if responsibility for it is clearly affixed, as found in Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, p. 29.

⁹⁹Although the answers to these questions seem obvious, it may be because of hindsight. "There is no iron law binding historians to the belief that what did happen had to happen. At any moment in time, a number of different futures are possible according to the decisions men take and to the role of chance or luck." Hugh Trevor Roper, in *Times Literary Supplement*, July, 25, 1980, pp. 833-35, as found in Amos Perlmutter and John Gooch, (eds.). *Strategy and the Social Sciences: Issues in Defence* (Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass and Co., 1981), p. 33.

¹⁰⁰One explanation of such typical persistence can be found in Waltz's observation, Matching in importance the fear of erratic movements of policy is dismay born of the thought that once a party had committed itself in the eyes of the country at large to a foreign-policy position, the difficulty of shifting to meet a new situation in the world may be forbiddingly large. . . . Big changes in a people's politics occur infrequently; to work out their effects usually requires decades and perhaps generations.

Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, pp. 64-65.

strategies¹⁰¹ not including a de facto defense alignment with the United States. The extraordinary change in Japan's stature between 1945 and 1983 suggests Tokyo enjoyed a broadening spectrum of options. Yet, the generally unaltered status of the Cold War and regional considerations probably so circumscribed the strategic milieu that Tokyo's options were less broad than might be imagined.¹⁰² The possible variations seem more apparent within rather than between levels of strategic dialogue.

With hindsight, Japan's course of action is the pursuit of national security via a planned strategy. Yet, plainly, this strategy was not unilaterally generated. This raises questions regarding strategic hypotheses, the processes and the dialogues. For example, was this strategy holistically envisioned from the outset, or were the limiting factors of the milieu and competing national interests so strong that the result reflects more the least conflicting response to conditions than the driver of them? If there was an interrelated set of holistic strategic hypotheses in place from the outset, did Japan's strategy of 1983 still essentially reflect the original structure and goals, or had it become something altogether different? If Japan's strategic concept was different from that of Washington, does Tokyo's strategy reflect merely change in hypotheses or

¹⁰¹There are several strategies in being at any given time. For example, each partner had its national strategy, that, when combined, resulted in a joint strategy. The U.S. was part of many other defense arrangements placing it as a key component to other strategies of which Japan was not a direct part. On a larger scale, the rough sum of all nations affiliated with the U.S. constituted a combined strategy of "the West" counterpoised by a strategy of "the East." Taken in a different scaler direction, each nation's strategy had components of political, economic, and military strategies, even of a domestic, internal vice foreign, external strategy. This expansion is not meant to cloud understanding, but to reveal that the defining boundaries are vague in both vertical and horizontal scope. Further, that there is a difference between the ordinary give-and-take routinized business of state affairs and strategy.

¹⁰²Pragmatic basic choices were few, but variations within them were considerable.

process, or that a departure from Western strategic practices has taken place?

IV. STRATEGY

. Definitions

This investigation uses the term strategy in keeping with the following discussion.

Fundamentally, any strategy simultaneously is three distinct things: a theory, a process and a dialogue. As a *theory*, strategy is a comprehensive description noting the resources of power available, the ways and conditions of their use, and specifying objectives and goals. Purposive, strategy should not be confused with a plan or a status which are two of its key components. In execution, a strategy simultaneously alters the set of circumstances, in turn, modifying the theory and, perhaps, its application.¹

Second, strategy is a constantly evolving and adapting *process*, used to accomplish specified ends that, when realized, become part of the platform for the next evolution. In execution, strategy is a process for and of making decisions. The essence of strategy is activity since only through activity can strategy become manifest.

Third, strategy is a *dialogue*. No strategy exists in a vacuum; it both springs from and generates conditions. In this respect, the dialogue of strategy is dialectical.²

However, strategy as dialogue need not be adversative. Indeed, the use of an

¹Cf., Andre Beaufre's definition that, while incorporating other than military means, remains confined to the notion of a plan, in Andre Beaufre, *An Introduction to Strategy* (London: Faber, 1965), p. 22.

²Cf., Robert Osgood's views concerning a dialectical clash of wills in Robert Osgood, *NATO: The Enrangling Alliance* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 5.

opponent's (or ally's) motive or action to aid attaining one's own objectives and goals is a most effective technique in the process.³

Retired Rear Admiral Henry Eccles characterized strategy as "the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives."⁴ In this definition he captured the essence of process with the term direction, for direction implies activity and requires some idea of objectives and the route to their realization. Additionally, this definition incorporates the terms "comprehensive" and "power." Such use suggests strategy springs from deeper sources incorporating broader aspects than those solely military.

With respect to Japan's strategy, these broader aspects of Admiral Eccles' definition seem apt. Since the end of World War II, Japan has been successful in maintaining its security, yet it has kept its military component limited. Tokyo has maintained a sense of direction (including paths it wished to avoid) using its resources in a continuing process and dialogue with the United States.

Notably, Admiral Eccles' definition did not limit the types of power; moreover, it discriminated between power and the direction of power. These are an important points in Japan's case. It is very important to a nation having limited power that it be

³In dealing with an opponent, it is rather the difference between meeting and stopping an assailant's rush, or, by slight deflection, using his momentum (e.g., as in jujutsu) to accomplish one's own purposes. In relations with allies, this is the underlying assumption of smaller states seeking the protection of larger ones, or the motive which establishes credibility between weaker powers uniting for mutual protection when facing a power larger than any of them individually.

⁴Henry E. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 48.

able to influence the direction of power emanating from others. In that way, those positive effects of using power may be obtained without the burdens associated with creating and maintaining it. For over a decade, postwar Japan was relatively weak in all aspects of national power. Yet, by influencing the direction of U.S. power, Japan could and did gain significant advantages. Notably, influencing U.S. power did not necessarily mean remaining perpetually weak. Rather, it implied that Tokyo could gain extra leverage through selectively choosing and applying emphasis to those areas most favorable to Japan's overall welfare and security.

Admiral Eccles also delineated the focus of strategy to be the "control of situations and areas." This specification mixes two very different notions. First, the control of a situation infers the existence of a desired status, but stops short of suggesting that such a status be static. Since, by their nature, "situations" are ongoing events, their control implies more that of direction, pace, and development rather than possession of a fixed entity. Further, control of a situation seems more aimed at being involved in an existing process than at initiating it.⁵

This aspect of strategy seems particularly germane to Japan's case. Tokyo was not in the position of being able to initiate major initiatives. However, through its relationship with Washington, there was much that Tokyo could do to influence the direction, pace and development of matters particular to Japan. Since Japan intended to

⁵Others have noted the power of controlling situations. For example, "[economically advanced states have attempted] to structure or restructure the international environment. The idea is not just to control actors in specific situations, but to gain control over the flow of events, over overall relationships, or over situations." Cheryl Christensen, "Structural Power and National Security," in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager (eds.), *Economic Issues and National Security* (Lawrence, KS: Allen Press, 1977), pp. 127-28.

recover its national stature, its national (and thereby strategic) focus would be on change rather than preservation of the status quo. Yet, it could not aim at recovery of the prewar military status quo; that was unacceptable to the victors, the victims, and the Japanese themselves.⁶ Therefore, directed, paced and focused change, very like Eccles' control of situations, characterized Japan's postwar strategy.

Second, Admiral Eccles's use of the term "areas" carries a strong geographic sense. This is confusing as geographic considerations, as with those of technology, available forces, and economic strength, are factors of situations. Such distinctions are important since the general literature on strategy often focuses on specialized applications⁷ leading to notions (e.g., "space strategy," "maritime strategy," or "nuclear strategy,") that, according to some authors, are not properly termed strategies.⁸

⁶Moreover, it was neither required nor desirable. In this, the changing nature of the military instrument to a largely negative factor and the discarding of notions of value of conquered territory or populations meant that Japan was in step with a major trend in the evolution of power. Thus, while military power may have been needed to protect wealthy societies, the advancement of education, science, technology and domestic saving and investments became the most secure route to wealth and national power. Given the nature of this evolution and the security envelope provided by the U.S., it is hardly credible that Japan would not choose this route if given the opportunity. For a more developed discussion along these lines see Klaus Knorr, "The International Purposes of Military power," in John Garnett (ed.), *Theories of Peace and Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), p. 53.

⁷For example, Colin S. Gray defines strategy as:

"the art of employing or of threatening to employ force for political ends. . . . A more inclusive phrasing . . . is that strategy is the art of employing or of threatening to employ coercion for political ends. Coercion embraces force but admits of policy instruments that have not received extensive treatment in the literature generally regarded as strategic. . . .

The core region of those who study strategy and of those who apply it is force."

Colin S. Gray, *Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky), p. 5. See also Hedley Bull, "Strategic Studies and Its Critics," *World Politics*, Vol. XX, (July, 1968), pp. 593, 596; and Michael Howard, *Studies in War and Peace* (London: Temple Smith, 1970), p. 13.

⁸Luttwak, *Strategy*, pp. 156-74.

Yet, geographic considerations were crucial to Japan's security. Visualizing a Japanese strategy divorced from the geographic considerations of East Asia is fanciful. Similarly, understanding the maritime aspects of the U.S. strategic tradition and the features of containment make plain the geographic influence of Northeast Asia on U.S. strategy. In this sense, the definition's language about controlling "areas" seems apt.

Perhaps more pertinent to Japan is applying the term "areas" in other than a geographical sense. For example, the control of certain areas of technology, finance, or industrial sectors fits within the definition and can provide the same sorts of results that might accrue from military control of a geographic site.⁹

Admiral Eccles' use of the term "comprehensive" suggests additional broad domains of strategic consideration that influence every nation's strategy.

The first domain is the general milieu in which a strategy is formulated. This includes very influential (if less measurable) factors such as culture, the envelope of conflict, historical timing, consensus (national or international) on objectives and methods, and morality (however defined). Yet, the general milieu is not confined to these. It also includes more finite, quantifiable and apparent factors such as military capabilities, economic vitality and capacity, management of perceptions, conflict regulation, and the process and methods of deriving strategy.

A second broad domain is the nature of strategy itself. Important in this domain

⁹For discussion along these lines see the essay by Klaus Knorr titled, "International Economic Leverage and Its Uses," in Knorr and Trager, *Economic Issues and National Security*, pp. 115-25.

is the thought process that underlies all strategic considerations.¹⁰ Since significant differences exist in individual logic patterns, it matters greatly how those who formulate strategy think.¹¹ If significant differences do exist, the strategies based on those patterns may not be in keeping with the general milieu. This heightens the chance for errors and consequent misadventure. Additionally, thought patterns predispose certain organizational patterns (both conceptually and actually). These, in turn, pervasively influence organization and process.¹²

Compounding this difference in thought patterns is the variance in strategy's roles. Since strategy incorporates senses of direction, activity and comprehensiveness, sundry roles, such as strategy as a bridge between resources and objectives, a plan (or system of plans) to the future, as perception management, and as historical philosophy or ideology may be observed. Commonly, several roles are exercised simultaneously.

What all strategies have in common are the focus on attaining goals and the crafting of the process to attain those goals in such a fashion that the process cannot be upset by an opponent, ally or nature. In this, all strategies seek to take into account the potential behavior of all significant actors and render irrelevant their expectations of

¹⁰This aspect is the central theme to other writers on strategy. See Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1987), pp. 7-17, 179-85.

¹¹For example, between the *erabi* and *awase* perceptions. See page 8, footnote 9, *supra*.

¹²Cf., Cheryl Christensen, "Structural Power and National Security," in Knorr and Trager, *Economic Issues and National Security*, p. 127.

one's own behavior.¹³

. Concepts - Convergence and Divergence in Conceptual Approaches to Security

Investigation of the U.S.-Japan security relationship soon discovers both similarities and differences in the two nations' concepts of security. In part, these ideas spring from historical and physical circumstance, the logic of security, and the social values of each nation. For each partner, these notions form a platform of assumptions that serve as ground truth that each uses in forming its strategy.

The single greatest feature in the formation of a strategy is the notion of the national self.¹⁴ This portion of national ground truth is the foundation of a state's national self-perceptions; it is *of* the core fiber of the people. British strategist B. H. Liddel-Hart captured this well,

The ultimate source of strategy lies in the values of the people of a nation. In a free society a strategy that is contrary to the sense of values of the people cannot be expected to succeed. If these values are confused it is likely that the strategy will be confused.¹⁵

¹³There are parallels here to game theory. See Richard C. Snyder, "Game Theory and the Analysis of Political Behavior," in S. Sidney Ulmer, *Introductory Readings in Political Behavior* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1961), pp. 271-75.

¹⁴In Japan's case (as in others) the national self is the primary political interest group. While a self-evident statement, this observation also connotes a priority of political interest with the national interest at the highest level. Combined with notions of the "free rider" tendencies in alliance behavior, these priorities implicitly structure a contradiction if the strategic focus of alliance partners are on different levels, (e.g., regional vs. global). Indeed, by altering the level of processes and dialogue, the same activity takes on a different character. See Alfred Grazia, "Nature and Prospects of Political Interest Groups," in Ulmer, *Introductory Readings in Political Behavior*, pp. 199-203.

¹⁵B. H. Liddel-Hart, *Strategy* 2nd ed., (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1967), p. 347. However, this is not to say that things other than a mismatch between the values of a society and its strategy may cause failure. Inadequacy in any of a strategy's forms (theory, process, or dialogue) may give the same result. The reflexive of Liddel-Hart's point implies that great coherency and power attend strategies which seamlessly meld cultural values, societal structure and political activity. This may illuminate why Japan's government seeks only non-confrontational, incremental adjustments to those features potentially upsetting to

The second basic feature of a security strategy relates to its reason for being. The logic of security requires a search for a strategy that will adequately discount threats and provide reasonable surety of achieving the nation's objectives. To do so, that strategy must address two questions: What does the threat (usually the decision elite of the presumed enemy) find most persuasive?¹⁶ Second, what would be the best course of action (individually or collectively) if those measures fail?¹⁷ For the U.S.-Japan alliance, these two questions require at least a rough congruence of views of the value structures of foreign elites, perceptions of each other, and the risks all would be willing to run to defend those things important to them. Unfortunately, this is an area of inexact evaluation.¹⁸

This observation leads to additional questions about the U.S.-Japan alliance with their dissimilar culture bases, since any alliance is a compromise, the resulting strategy also reflects compromise. This is especially applicable, but difficult where there are

the public, and why, since cultural aspects are so thoroughly entwined, authors like van Wolferen might identify the process as power in the guise of culture.

¹⁶That is, since neither Japan nor the U.S. is territorially expansionist, what measures are most likely to deter aggression?

¹⁷The obviousness of this logic is well expressed by Nigel Howard, . . . there is hardly anything perverse or irrational in choosing to play it safe, . . . Indeed, the players in *Realpolitik* games who fail to grasp this fact, . . . are often the victims of presumptive attacks or losers in arms races; it is precisely these players who are irrational for trusting an adversary without good reasons.

Nigel Howard, *Paradoxes of Rationality: Theory of Metagames and Political Behavior* (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1971), as found in Steven J. Brams, *Game Theory and Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 39.

¹⁸This observation also has been made by others. "Good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology. Some of the greatest military blunders of all time have resulted from juvenile evaluations in this department." Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p.332.

large differences in ethnicity. Yet, it is unclear that national values can tolerate significant compromise.¹⁹ It is even more problematic that such compromises in basic values can be sustained lacking a major external threat.²⁰ Because each alliance member carries this sort of baggage, the greater the number of alliance partners, the greater the likelihood of compromise, and the more difficulty in obtaining a consensus.²¹

This was important to Tokyo as having a single partner reduced adjustment difficulties inherently produced by changes, and by that, functioned as a component of internal security to the regime in power.

A Third characteristic, one of structural difficulty, is the need for clarity in perceptions between alliance partners. Yet this clarity carries a Janus-like aspect. The transparency granted by an alliance partner makes understanding that partner's position easier; it also facilitates the exploitation of that partner.²²

A fourth conceptual point is apparent when the general status of an alliance partner changes, particularly relative to the other. Not only do the terms of the alliance become disproportionate, but the perceptions of one or both alliance partners of themselves, the other partner, and the alliance itself also change. This can cause a change in all three aspects of a strategy. The theory changes because opportunities are

¹⁹See quotation by Liddel-Hart, *supra*, p. 55.

²⁰Notably, the threat need not be a common one, merely one that the alliance offsets. Yet, even this might not suffice. See Tadao Umesao, "Escape From Cultural Isolation," *The Silent Power*, p. 17.

²¹In Japan's case, having a single defense partner may have limited Tokyo's flexibility and strategic options, but it simultaneously reduced the number of variables occasioned by multiple partners.

²²Cf., Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, pp. 69-70.

seen as altered; the process changes because there is a different capability to execute the process; and the dialogue changes because the partners have changed perceptions of themselves and each other.

Some nations in the European tradition of diplomacy (e.g., Great Britain), incorporated such adjustments into their security doctrine by stressing the continuity of interests instead of allies.²³ Japan was familiar with that premise,²⁴ however, the U.S. tradition incorporates some changes, showing significant differences in its origins.²⁵

With the coming of the Cold War, the strategy of the U.S. extended from its tradition, but greatly expanded the base. Thus, the U.S. consistently sought to hold its allies²⁶ and alter the milieu,²⁷ while expecting allied behavior commensurate with U.S.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

²⁴Japan's interests in attaining security and equality (military, economic, and political) seem consistent from the mid-19th Century to the present. Japan's few alliances during that period indicate a pattern in line with those interests, not with particular parties. For example, the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Treaty was in keeping with Japan's dual desires, and made Great Britain and Japan allies during the First World War. But with Japanese expansion during the inter-war period (seen as necessary by Japan's military oligarchy in realizing security and equality) running counter to British goals and policies, the treaty passed and Japan and Great Britain were opponents during the Second World War.

²⁵While the components of the American model show departures from the European model, they are startlingly different from those of the Japanese. For example, if morality in Japan is premised on cultural relativism, that of the U.S. is premised on Judeo-Christian deontological theory. Japanese social constructs are dedicated to homogeneity, those of the U.S. to heterogeneity and pluralism.

²⁶This applied even when the original reason for the alliance seemed to have passed.

²⁷The initial strategy of containment was premised upon strengthening democracy, primarily by economic and political means, but undergirded by military capabilities. This sustained strength would frustrate communist expansion thereby causing the communists to either modify their behavior, or collapse from its inherent, systemic problems. Therefore, although countries might not be as democratic as desired by the U.S., it was important that they not become communist. In this way, denial to Soviet control was the drop-back position when conversion to democracy did not work. NSC 20/4 "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the U.S.S.R. to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security", November 23, 1948; and NSC 68/1 "U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security", September 21, 1950, in reels 1 & 2 respectively of *Papers of the National Security Council, 1947-1977*, microform from University Publications of America; hereafter *NSC Papers, 1947-1977*. UPA.

perceptions.

For example, as Japan gained economic stature, it increasingly sought to restore its international political stature. In keeping with this, the U.S. increasingly sought to have Tokyo bear larger security-related burdens.²⁸ Frictions occurred, in part, because the U.S. perceived (correctly) Japan's increased capabilities to share the (particularly economic) burden and Tokyo's disinclination to shoulder more.

Japan resisted the increased pressure for four major reasons. First, Tokyo preferred not to increase its defense outlays, since doing so came at the expense of other economic programs. Second, Tokyo resented what it perceived as the patronizing manner of the U.S. presuming to tell it what to do. Third, were Tokyo to enlarge its capabilities or roles in defense, the reactions of Japan's neighbors probably would work counter to Japan's overall security. Fourth, Tokyo differed from Washington in its perceptions of threat and the appropriate responses.²⁹

In all, it was an example where the lack of congruity in the perceptions and priorities of defense partners caused an increase in frictions. The urgency with which both Tokyo and Washington addressed such changes, and the mutual restraint they demonstrated, may be a measure both of the value that both the U.S. and Japan placed

²⁸For an example, see National Security Council Report, NSC 5516/1 "U.S. Policy Toward Japan," dated April 7, 1955, which states in a section titled "Courses of Action, Military," "Encourage and assist Japan to develop military forces which will eventually be capable of assuming primary responsibility for the defense of Japan." in *FRUS, 1955-1957*, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, (1991), p. 59.

²⁹It could hardly have been otherwise given the asymmetry of the two in so many areas.

on the relationship, and the constraining nature of the strategic milieu.³⁰ Notably, both were willing to accommodate the other at all stages of their relationship.

A major factor that conditioned the U.S.-Japan relationship was the relative stature of the two partners. The enormous initial disparity in all respects (particularly economic and military) between the U.S. and Japan insured that any bilateral arrangement, specifically any joined security strategy, would be molded within that construct.³¹ Neither U.S. nor Japanese officials seemed to question the foreclosure of Japan assuming certain major military roles; those functions were wholly beyond their capabilities (even if they had been willing to undertake such roles). Only the U.S. could execute those major roles,³² retaining many despite Japan's subsequent acquisition of the necessary capability to discharge them.

The image of Japan as militarily incapable was accepted not only by the U.S. and Japanese officials, but by the other nations in the region.³³ A weak Japan,

³⁰Two aspects pertain here. First, is the so-called "reality principle," i.e., "When the uncertainty of the environment is low and the trade-offs unavoidably self-evident, the decision makers may not be able to avoid realistic calculations and tough choices." Steinbrunner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, p. 110. Second, Robert Merton's observation, "Any attempt to eliminate an existing social structure without providing adequate alternative structure for fulfilling the functions previously fulfilled by the abolished organization is doomed to failure." Robert K. Merton, "Functions of the Political Machine," in Ulmer, *Introductory Readings in Political Behavior*, p. 166.

³¹Japan's activities during the initial occupation and immediate post-occupation periods seem in keeping with the alliance behavior of small states; Japan had little other choice. However, as the situation changed and Japan no longer was a small state, yet retained small state alliance characteristics, it raises questions of why and how this came to pass.

³²See "Remarks by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida at the Ceremony of the United States-Japan Security Treaty," (for a press release), September 8, 1951, p. 8, in reels 8 and 11 of *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

³³It was that unarmed status which those nations wanted maintained, and it remained the fear of a resurgent Japan that made them cautious in their dealings with both the U.S. and Japanese. For expressions that carry this mixture of fear and distrust of Japanese power, see the statements made by a number of delegates

essentially a security ward of the U.S., was acceptable to the other nations in the region because such a status rendered Japan incapable of conducting another aggressive war,³⁴ and because such a role anchored U.S. presence in Asia (and specifically in Japan) serving to buttress the security of smaller regional states.

Recognition of Japan as America's ward placed Japan in the status of what Robert L. Rothstein terms a "small power."³⁵ Once so categorized, "appropriate" Japanese actions were those in keeping with that status. This interaction between status and behavior tended to bound the expectations of the U.S., the Japanese, and the other regional states.

In turn, the recognition and acceptance of Japan as a small power created two circumstances. First, if Japan is faced with the same general threat as is the U.S.

(particularly those representing Australia and the Philippines), at the three plenary sessions for the San Francisco Peace Treaty, 1951. For a sample see "Commentaries of the Australian Delegation" for plenary sessions 1, 2 and 3, Enclosures to basic document titled "Treaty of Peace with Japan" in folder marked "Japanese Peace Treaty, San Francisco, 1951" in reel 11 of *C, US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956, UPA*.

³⁴One indication of this is found in the documents pertaining to the San Francisco Peace Conference of 1951. All of the victims of Japanese aggression (except the U.S.) speak sharply of that aggression. Yet nothing in the treaty itself gives any of those states meaningful leverage with which it might restrain a resurgent Japan. While no document has been uncovered which explicitly expresses the desire by those other East Asian and Oceanic states to see Japan as the long-term security ward of the U.S., the notes and memoranda of the conference make plain their knowledge that there was a U.S.-Japanese security treaty to immediately follow the signing of the general peace agreement. Taken in context with the series of other security arrangements (e.g., ANZUS), and the on-going Korean conflict, the general image is one of the U.S. committed to regional security and stability.

³⁵A "small power" being defined as:

a state which recognizes that it can not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or development to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics.

Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 29.

(identified as expansionist communism led by a militant USSR³⁶), then a whole range of strategic policy options, clearly irrational for the U.S., are quite reasonable considerations³⁷ for Japan. Such options include appeasement, nonalignment, neutrality and isolation, none of which were in keeping with Washington's overall strategy. Yet, Washington still had to consider the possibility of a sovereign Japan, having recovered economic strength and international legitimacy, taking a different tack. This sort of circumstance created potential frictions. Further, it suggested that significant change in alliance member status, the general milieu, or the objectives of either alliance partner must create divisive stress.

Second, since Japan was expected to behave as a small power, there also was created a mirroring expectation of toleration by Japanese, Americans and others for Japan's behaving as a small power. If these perceptions are protracted, they, and the activities ancillary thereto, may be accepted as valid and "normal." If there are reasons for maintaining such an image, even if the image is inappropriate, acknowledging a changed status may be resisted. In particular, there may be significant reluctance to accept responsibilities in keeping with that change in status.³⁸

There were those who wanted no change in Japan's status as a small power; in

³⁶The U.S. was very demonstrative in asserting that this form of communism was a threat to all. The Japanese, in keeping with typical "front line" small power behavior, declined to publicly identify the USSR as an "enemy."

³⁷These are theoretical considerations, not necessarily practical options.

³⁸This behavior follows patterns observed by other authors, although they explain the motivation or mechanism differently. See van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power*, pp. 245-7, Olson, *The Logic of Collective Goods*, pp. 49-50, and Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, pp. 13-16.

particular, regional states wanted Japan to remain weak.³⁹ Nor did the U.S. want another major, independent, Asian military power to emerge. Not only could a significant Japanese military build-up place Washington in difficulties with respect to other alliances, there was the possibility of contending with a resurgent, nationalist Japan acting independently of Washington. Most important, the Japanese (for which everything seemed to be going as well as could be expected in security matters), probably did not want an acknowledged change of Japan's status.⁴⁰ For all these, a Japan behaving as a small power answered important considerations.

The same was true for the possible opponents, (e.g., the Soviet Union). Clearly, contending with Tokyo behaving as a small power was easier than dealing with a resurgent Japan. Since both Moscow and Beijing had little expectation that Japan either small or great would be aligned with them against the U.S., there were advantages in dealing with a weaker state. For Moscow, a completely recovered and rearmed Japan, allied to either the U.S. or an antagonistic China, meant that the USSR could face the bugbear of major, largely self-contained enemies on two, widely

³⁹A weak Japan was less of a threat to them and much more conducive to keeping the U.S. engaged (i.e., committed) to regional security. For earlier expressions of concerns of U.S. disengagement covering both security and economic matters see Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State, subject: "State Department Interest and Participation in Matters Concerning Japanese Rearmament," dated April 7, 1952, in *ERUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, part 2, (1985), p. 1231; and Memorandum of a Conversation, between Prime Minister Kishi and Secretary Dulles, no subject, June 20, 1957, which describes the request of a mission from Australia asking that the U.S. develop Australia as an industrial base in place of Japan. In *ERUS, 1955-1957*, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, (1991), p. 389.

⁴⁰Japan's security arrangements having held in a test (the Korean War) the government had little desire to alter the circumstances and perhaps project Japan into an uncertain arena. This "proof" of the effectiveness of a policy premised on their own weakness reinforced the hope that they might be protected by their own military insignificance. Thus, if Tokyo was able to convince other contending states that Japan was too weak to affect the outcome, then a major conflict might not directly involve Japan.

separated fronts. For Beijing, a strong, rearmed Japan aligned with Washington or Moscow presented similar concerns.

Nor was it necessary for Japan to depart from the small power image. For so long as its security relationship with the U.S. was sound, small power alliance behavior, adequately and at low risk, answered Japan's needs. Alternatively, should Japan have greatly increased its military capabilities or expanded its roles, it risked identification as a probable and capable enemy by both the USSR and PRC. Simultaneously, vigorous growth in Japanese military capabilities would heighten the concerns of smaller regional powers, in turn pressuring Washington and adding strain to the U.S.-Japan relationship. Even in the unlikely circumstance that Washington might be pleased⁴¹ with a resurgent, strong and militarily independent Japan, Tokyo could ill-afford the risks and expenses such a shift entailed.⁴²

Notably, Japan's retention of an image as a small power was sustained by Japan's relationship to the U.S., a disproportionate comparison since the U.S. was both

⁴¹Such a Japan would be in keeping with the U.S. strategy of containment. Indeed, Dulles expressed a strong desire for an exponential increase in Japanese force strength shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War. But, with the refusal of Yoshida and the containment of that war, U.S. expectations and the sense of urgency for such expansion waned. Although Washington's envisioned use of those Japanese forces in a conflict against the USSR was set aside, Washington still inclined toward Japan's carrying the burden for its own defense -- with the USSR identified as the enemy. Yet, as Tokyo placed greater diplomatic distance between itself and Washington to avoid entanglement, the option of an aligned, dependent and thereby controlled Japan probably became more attractive to Washington.

⁴²Yoshida's remarks at the signing of the 1951 MST indicate an awareness of Japan's position. Neither was the U.S. unmindful. See DOS, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1952, subject: State Department Interest and Participation in Matters Concerning Japanese Rearmament, in *ERUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), p. 1231; FEC, Letter. The Chief of Staff, Far East Command (Magruder) to the Economic Counselor of the Embassy in Japan (Waring), Tokyo, August 6, 1954, subject: not given but deals with Japan's need for economic assistance and the low probability of Japan's increasing its defense expenditures, in *ERUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1695-96.

the only multidimensional and most militarily powerful superpower.⁴³ Only rarely were things done that significantly affected the "Western camp" unless countenanced by Washington,⁴⁴ which, as the leader of "the West," had global concerns.⁴⁵ These concerns (especially those dealing with security) were well beyond Japan's immediate interest or capability to influence.⁴⁶ Thus, if Washington wished to treat Japan as a

⁴³This was true for economic, military and political matters. For example, in 1950, at the time that NSC 68 was being framed, the dangers of the Soviet threat were greatly publicized. Yet, William Schaub (a critic of NSC 68), pointing out a number of examples, concluded, "It is hard to accept a conclusion that the USSR is approaching a straight-out military superiority over us . . ." Memorandum, William F. Schaub to James S. Lay, dated May 8, 1950, *ERUS*, 1950, Vol. I, (1985), p. 301. Even NSC 68 pointed out that the GNP of the U.S. was four times that of the USSR. NSC 68 "Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950, reel 2 of *NSC Papers, 1947-1977*, UPA. The point is that the U.S. intended to remain in the superior position. It was not just the then current circumstances with which Washington was concerned, it was the potential for adverse change. Therefore, to gain and maintain Congressional and public support for the extended effort that a containment strategy required (particularly in the form advocated by NSC 68) much was made of Soviet capabilities.

⁴⁴This is not to say that no significant foreign policy initiative could occur without the consent of Washington. However, those events having major impact on the bilateral superpower relationship inevitably would concern Washington.

⁴⁵Indeed, the core of U.S. foreign policy focus and Washington's strategy of containment was built on a global construct denying notions of "fortress America." The explicit rejection of isolationism is evident in U.S. policy documents covering three decades dating from the mid -1940s. For representative examples see Annex, "Initial Summary of United States Post Surrender Policy Relating to Japan," dated 10 August 1945, General Provisions, Objectives 1, 3, & 4, p. 1, as found in reel 1 of *C, US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA, and NSC 5 "The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece," NSC 7 "The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism," NSC 9 "The Position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Union and Other Related Free Countries," NSC 12 "French North Africa," NSC 13 "Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy toward Japan," all found in reel 1 of *NSC Papers, 1947-1977*, UPA.

⁴⁶For example, in a discussion with Secretary Dulles, wherein Dulles suggested that Japan begin acting as a Great Power in its relations with the USSR, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nemoto said, "that is all very well in theory, but that in practice Japan was much too weak and helpless even in relation to [the] ROK to do anything to protect her interests." Memorandum of a Conversation between Mamoru Shigemitsu, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary Dulles, Tokyo, March 18, 1956, subject: "Changes in Soviet Policy, Situation in Southeast Asia, US-Japan Relations," in *ERUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, (1991), p. 159. This exchange is an example of what Robert Rothstein, citing Karl W. Deutsch, points out, that "it is very unlikely that a Small Power can force or even initiate a solution which a Great Power has previously rejected." Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 35.

small power, there were few who had reason to object.⁴⁷

Moreover, the U.S. sustained the stability and vitality of the global system which directly benefited Japan. Thus, Japan could take an independent course only to a degree. A radical shift could upset the general strategic milieu and alter regional priorities in Washington's global calculations. Since global and European objectives carried higher priorities for Washington,⁴⁸ Tokyo could damage its own general security by a radical departure. Thus, while Tokyo attained security and some flexibility through accepting status as a small power, thereby limiting its range of prudent options, the range of viable, attractive options may not have been broader through any other posture.⁴⁹

Since the small power status answered Tokyo's needs, it would have been

⁴⁷Externally, many of Japan's neighbors wanted Japan to be held to small power status, not merely treated in that fashion. Such an unchanging situation serves structural analysis well, however, the change in Japan's stature carried the seed of later adjustment difficulties. In particular, there seems a relationship between role conflict and goal conflict. Although their examples are different, the principles seem applicable to aspects of the U.S. - Japan relationship. See Oscar Grusky, "Role Conflict in Organization: A Study of Prison Camp Officials," *The Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. III, (March, 1959), pp. 452-3, who concentrates on the stresses caused by a shift in goals, C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 3-4, who implies the difficulties associated with a shift in structure incident to a shift in status, and Alvin W. Gouldner, "Approaches to Leadership," as found in *Studies in Leadership*, ed. Alvin W. Gouldner, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 24-30, who notes difficulties posed to leadership figures (and hence their resistance) when a shift in requisite expertise is required.

⁴⁸See NSC 7, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-directed World Communism," and NSC 9, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Western Union and Other Related Free Countries," in reel 1 of *NSC Papers, 1947-1977*, microform from UPA.

⁴⁹There is an echo here of the discussion of complexity, particularly as it pertains to decision making, as found in John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 15-18. Although Steinbruner attacks analytic theories of decision (pp. 25-46), his description of the analytic paradigm (p. 29) and the process depicted by Herbert A. Simon, "The Architecture of Complexity," in Herbert A. Simon (ed.), *The Sciences of the Artificial* (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1968), pp. 84-118, seem apt.

unwise for Tokyo to seek a larger security role,⁵⁰ even if other regional states were accepting. In any event, it was unnecessary; the U.S. assumed the overarching roles.⁵¹ Washington, mindful of the need to hold⁵² Japan in the "Western camp," showed restrained reactions to Japan's more independent actions, mirroring Tokyo's restraint to some U.S. actions. Thus, the U.S.-Japan alliance strategy, and more particularly, Japan's national security strategy, evidenced both accommodation and divergence from that of the United States.⁵³ And Tokyo, like Washington, observed that unnecessary upset of the strategic milieu would serve them both badly.

. U.S. Strategy

An understanding of Japan's postwar security strategy includes an appreciation of America's strategy, since Japan's postwar security strategy developed largely within the wider envelope of Washington's design. Further, since its relationship with the

⁵⁰See Rene Peritz, "The United States and Japan: Questioning the Security Consensus," *Asian Profile*, Vol. XI, No. 5, (October, 1983), p. 462.

⁵¹In assuming these roles in 1945, and maintaining them thereafter through the mechanism of the 1951 MST, the U.S. took Japan's security (external and internal) upon itself. In so doing, and despite wording that suggested it would shed that burden at a later time, it simultaneously created the situation that negated Japan's need to create any substantial defense capability. In the immediate postwar period this was attractive to those who feared a militant Japanese resurgence. However, once Japan became formally allied to the U.S. and America fielded forces sufficient for its own purposes, those same forces covered Japan's obvious and larger needs virtually insuring the permanence of Japan's disinclination to make sizeable military contributions. For a theoretical explanation along these lines see Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," pp. 19-22.

⁵²There was little likelihood that Japan would bolt from Western alignment. Rather, the U.S. concern was maintaining continued access to military bases and facilities in Japan then deemed vital to military portions of the U.S. strategy.

⁵³This was almost inevitable given the grossly different status and roles. See Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, pp. 122-32.

U.S. was Tokyo's key security relationship even prior to the war's end,⁵⁴ the evolution of U.S. strategy affected Japan's strategic processes and dialogues.

.. Overview - America's security strategy, like those of other nations,⁵⁵ shows considerable continuity. Perhaps because generally fixed factors such as geography, demography and culture bound many conditions, basic interests changed slowly.⁵⁶ Changes in administration seemed to change strategy, for the most part, in the methods rather than objectives. Despite the many changes over two centuries, the basic objectives of the U.S. have been to prevent foreign powers from intervening in American affairs, preventing the formation of any overwhelming single power or group of powers hostile to U.S. interests, and maintaining global mercantile access. Most U.S. activity centered on internal development, participating fully in global mercantile maritime trade, and distancing itself from European broils. Although theoretical perceptions could cause considerable strategic shifts by changing process and altering dialogue, the consistency of basic goals usually confirmed America's strategies. Options were usually limited to those in which the means of the strategy did not undo

⁵⁴For example, in 1945, Washington believed a quick end to the war was in its best interest. This notion corresponds to the same viewpoint held by key members of Japan's leadership.

⁵⁵This is not to say that most states are looking for precisely the same things or that they identically prioritize those things they seek and have in common with other nations. Nations wherein the tenants of Islam are the state policies give such countries a quite different cast than Western democracies or East Asian totalitarian regimes like North Korea. However, national survival, the preservation of the national ethos (however defined) and unity all must rank high in priority if a state is to sustain itself.

⁵⁶Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, p. 65.

the desired goals.⁵⁷

Although the U.S. consistency had isolationist aspects, the underlying premise was a shrewd assessment of the European balance of power, deducing from it that U.S. security could be threatened only by the control of Europe, including Great Britain, by any single power or combination of powers.⁵⁸ That U.S. security perceptions included other-than-only-military aspects may be seen from Washington's reactions to the removal of the right of deposit in Louisiana, the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, and the efforts to keep Great Britain from recognizing (and supporting) the South during the Civil War.

In the early 1940s, popular isolationist policies and longstanding historical tradition joined uneasily with the intent of the Roosevelt administration to act in keeping with America's traditional goal of preventing the domination of Europe or other regions by any single power or group of powers. The dichotomy implicit in this

⁵⁷For example, both General MacArthur and Dean Acheson during the Congressional hearings in April 1951, noted the need to match the means and the ends. MacArthur in proposing to end the Korean War by escalating it noted, "the interests of this country are involved in saving the lives of its sons, rather than embarking upon an indefinite, indecisive campaign which will sacrifice thousands and thousands of additional American lives." Acheson, in rebutting the call for escalation, said, "The whole effort of our policy is to prevent war and not have it occur." U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, "Military Situation in the Far East," [Hearings], (Washington, D.C.: 1951), pp. 144-5, 732, 1764. In 1961 Kennedy was to score Eisenhower's strategy for lack of options noting, "We intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear war." Although he was distancing his administration from that of Eisenhower, he also was reflecting that either choice was not in keeping with the strategic matching of means to ends as either ultimately would undo the nation's security. John F. Kennedy, radio-television address, July 25, 1961, *KPP, 1961-1963*, p. 535.

⁵⁸Historian Samuel Flagg Bemis in a chapter titled "The Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 1776-1826" posits fourteen specific points that illuminate the continuity of American objectives. In sum, the accomplishment of these objectives rely upon a European balance of power and, implicitly, the ability of the U.S. to understand it. Samuel Flagg Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), pp. 566-70.

junction persisted until the U.S. was attacked. Late into the Second World War traces still were evident in the policy outlines for the peace to come.⁵⁹

.. *The Postwar Evolution of U.S. Strategic Themes, 1945-1983* - The conclusion of the Second World War ushered in conditions that directly affected the period, spanning from about 1948 (the irretrievable breakup of the "Grand Coalition") through 1983. At the war's end, a U.S. return to military and political isolationism was apparently impossible. Yet, with the defeat of Germany and Japan, notions of U.S. military involvement in postwar strategy (except as a policing agency and a check on the possible resurgence of either former enemy) were resisted. Economic and political measures were to be America's main tools in and for a restored world.⁶⁰ Notably, the U.S. saw its security in a restored world depended on insuring that the key global centers of industrial power⁶¹ were not controlled by a force or group of forces hostile to the United States. However, there was acceptance that the international environment could be a diverse one⁶² instead of a demand for uniformity premised on the U.S.

⁵⁹For representative examples see Annex to "Initial Summary of United States Post Surrender Policy Relating to Japan," dated August 10, 1945, and State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee memorandum subject: "National Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan Proper in the Post-Defeat Period," dated 11 August 1945, both in reel 1 of C, *US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*

⁶¹George Kennan stipulated that the United States, Great Britain, Germany and central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan were the "only five centers of industrial and military power in the world which are important to us from the standpoint of national security." Only in those locations were there the combination of elements which if directed against the U.S. could imperil its security. "Only one of these power centers was, at that time, in hostile hands; the primary interest of the United States in world affairs, therefore, was to see to it that no other fell under such control." George F. Kennan, *The Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 63-5.

⁶²This was a (perhaps the) crucial difference between the strategy of the U.S. and that of the communists.

model.⁶³ The key function of that diversity was that it would insure that the several centers of global power would balance each other.⁶⁴ It was a strategy simple in concept, sparing of resources, and inherently flexible in application.

However, with the onset of the Cold War, the communist use of military power generated a more complex security strategy that placed greater relative emphasis on military aspects and, for the first time, caused Washington to identify the welfare of the U.S. as directly tied to the welfare of the rest of the world (then deemed at risk).⁶⁵ The U.S. national strategy would be a patient, vigilant, long-term containment of communism's expansionist tendencies until the Soviet regime either broke up or mellowed.⁶⁶ The priority of emphasis remained on the economic⁶⁷ and political features. The logic was that once European nations (later also Japan) economically recovered, they would have renewed capabilities (political, military and ideological) to

⁶³This point was stressed by Kennan on a number of occasions and is a key difference between containment as envisioned by Kennan ("point defense" with economics as the primary mechanism) and containment as it came to be implemented via NSC 69 ("perimeter defense" with the military instrument well forward). For an extended discussion see John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 36-51. Hereafter Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*.

⁶⁴JCS document 1769/1, "United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National Security," dated April 29, 1947, U.S. DOS, *FRUS, 1942-1952/54*, 1947, Vol. I, (1961), p. 748.

⁶⁵For an example which includes analysis see Report by the National Security Council, "The Position of the United States With Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism," dated March 30, 1948, part of the materials related to NSC 7, found in reel 1 of *NSC Papers, 1947-1977*, UPA.

⁶⁶George F. Kennan (writing as "X"), "The Source of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4, (July 1947), pp. 575-82.

⁶⁷Most probably, this was done because of several reasons, among which were the perceptions that economic strength was the strongest element of U.S. power, it confronted the ideology of communism with proof of its prognostic failure, and that it was an asymmetric response to Soviet armed forces (which, it was hoped, would keep the U.S. from eventually being forced into either conflict or garrison state activities).

resist communist pressures.⁶⁸ The U.S. military was to serve as guarantor insuring that neither the reconstruction was waylaid nor the political structure hijacked.⁶⁹ However, there were practical and theoretical drawbacks to using military power, including lack of popularity, high expense, uncertainty of results, dangers to democratic freedoms,⁷⁰ and the whole host of deeply disturbing questions associated with nuclear weapons.⁷¹ In short, the application of the strategy of containment did not always go smoothly.

During the next twenty-five years, the U.S. found itself continually trying to

⁶⁸U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, explained that containment meant: first economic recovery overseas and second, military preparedness. The objectives were "economic stability, political stability, and military stability . . . in about that order." He continued, ". . . we are taking a calculated risk [keeping military spending low in the face of large enemy capabilities] in order to follow a course which offers a prospect of eventually achieving national security and also long term world stability." Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 61-2.

⁶⁹NSC 68/1 and 68/2 called for all means short of war to implement containment. NSC 68/1 and 68/2 "U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security," in reel 2 of *C, US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, also reel 2 of *NSC Papers, 1947-1977*, UPA. The authors of NSC 68 noted that "without superior aggregate military strength in being and readily mobilizable (sic), a policy of containment is no more than a policy of bluff." Both will and capability were tested with the Berlin Crisis and the Korean War.

⁷⁰Eisenhower was very conscious of this point and speaking from a perspective incorporating both fiscal and social aspects, denounced the lack of restraint on spending as ruinous to America. He saw that such lack of restraint in spending could lead to an alteration in the very nature of society either through the debilitating effects of inflation or through regimentation in the form of economic controls. The whole idea was that "we must not destroy what we are attempting to defend." "Should we have to resort to anything resembling a garrison state, then all that we are striving to defend would be weakened and, if long subjected to this kind of control, could disappear." Eisenhower press conference, November 11, 1953, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1961*, 1953, Vol. I, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 760. Hereafter EPP, [year]. He saw that economic stability and military strength were inseparable, saying, if "these two are allowed to proceed in disregard for the other, you then create a situation either of doubtful military strength, or of such precarious economic strength that your military position is in constant jeopardy." His secretary of state, John Foster Dulles was more blunt: "If economic stability goes down the drain, everything goes down the drain." Statement by John Foster Dulles to Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees, May 5, 1953, "Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII" (May 25, 1953), p. 737. Hereafter DOS Bulletin. For an expanded discussion see Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 133-6.

⁷¹Report "The Military Implications of Thermonuclear Weapons," found in "Report by the Special Committee of the National Security Council to the President," January 31, 1950, *ERUS, 1950*, Vol. I, (1985), p. 522.

differentiate between support and entanglement.⁷² A series of conflicts drew varied U.S. response, foreign reactions, and levels of domestic support.

In part, the problems were generated by a duality of strategic focus over whether conventional, low-intensity conflicts (such as Vietnam) or the major, high technology threat of the USSR should be the focus.⁷³ This duality of strategic focuses affected both national and international strategic dialogues,⁷⁴ marring strategic process and dialogue.

For example, despite attempts to distance itself, Tokyo found itself increasingly

⁷²This led to attempts to define a perimeter since NSC-68 altered the strategy from a "point defense" of certain key areas to that of a "perimeter defense" requiring strength all along a boundary. These attempts at defining the perimeter lend weight to assertions that the U.S. "drew a line" in East Asia that was interpreted by the communists as a de facto recognition of a communist sphere of influence in Korea which (taken in combination with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula) helped spark the Korean War. Certainly, pre-NSC-68 included Japan, but not Korea; post-NSC-68 containment included both.

⁷³It was unclear that the different foci were incident to different levels of strategic dialogue. It might be simplifying to categorize conventional, low-intensity operations at a lower level, but given the presumed stakes (and the viewpoints of the participants) it seems plain such discrimination is arbitrary.

Nor was this a small debate; the issue seemed to crystallize a number of polarities. For example, if Vietnam was an example of the most likely type of conflict, and general war between the superpowers the most dangerous, for which should U.S. forces be structured, equipped, and trained? If the U.S. does not confront the extension of communism, particularly at low intensity levels, (and risk entanglement thereby) does this not destroy U.S. credibility in its alliance system? If the U.S. guarantee is not perceived as credible, what then happens to the concept of deterrence? The debate was not limited to U.S. perspectives; all of these issues had implications for America's allies. Indeed, if the U.S. was determined not to carry the main burden at all levels, to what extent would the roles, contributions and risks to America's allies be adjusted?

⁷⁴In part, the East-West strategic dialogue caused this mixed focus. Obviously, with the exception of the USSR, there were no states that could match the U.S. technical military prowess. Not surprisingly, nations such as China and Vietnam focused on military capabilities (e.g., insurgency) that avoided U.S. strengths. This shift had the dual advantage of moving the struggle at one strategic level away from economics (the greatest U.S. strength), and adjusting the level of implementation in another (from high to low technology in the military arena). In all, the results were the consequence of strategic considerations, yet, knowing this did not ease U.S. problems.

drawn into Vietnam-related matters either through U.S. policies or reactions to them.⁷⁵ Plainly, an adjustment in U.S. strategy was needed. What followed were three significantly different strategic approaches. Of U.S. allies, perhaps Japan was the most affected.

In 1969, President Richard M. Nixon decreased U.S. military presence located forward, and enunciated a policy (the Nixon Doctrine) that emphasized the operational role of the forces of allies.⁷⁶ For Tokyo, the intimation was plain: Japan would have to do more. Nixon's withdrawal of forces from Vietnam sharply reduced defense spending as well as domestic and foreign criticism. However, adjustments in strategic dialogues were needed to prevent those actions being seen as a retreat. The combination of assurances to allies⁷⁷ and strategic initiatives with China (which divided potential enemies⁷⁸) proved adequate.

⁷⁵For example, the U.S. use of air bases in Okinawa to conduct strikes in Vietnam raised fears of entanglement, while simultaneously generating protests from the Okinawans who either wanted their lands returned, or were opposed to U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Both generated difficulties for Tokyo.

⁷⁶See *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon, 1969*, Vol. I, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 545-49; hereafter NPP, [year].

⁷⁷The anxiety attending the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam was somewhat assuaged by recognition that absent Vietnam's influence, U.S. attention and effort could be more appropriately redirected. Further, the Vietnamese experience might have dual salutary effects in strategic affairs. First, the U.S. would be less inclined to become casually involved in military adventures, and second, since it could hardly retreat from its larger role, Washington would hold closer its valued allies. Both of these directly benefited Japan.

⁷⁸Activities designed to exacerbate Sino-Soviet relations and thereby facilitate the development of divisions between the two communist giants were specifically noted in NSC 48/2:

The United States should exploit, through appropriate political, psychological and economic means, any rifts between the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R. and between Stalinists and other elements in China, while scrupulously avoiding the appearance of intervention. Where appropriate, covert as well as overt means should be utilized to achieve these objectives.

NSC 48/2 "The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia," December 30, 1949, *Foreign Affairs of the United States*, Vol. VII, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 1219; also found in reel 2 of *NSC Papers, 1947-1977*, UPA.

In all, it was a reorientation of strategic process and dialogue, but not a departure from either strategic objectives or the historical strategic pattern. Tokyo might take comfort that the U.S. was not going to expand its roles in Southeast Asia and U.S.-Sino relations might improve. Yet, the opportunities for increased relations with Beijing certainly caused adjustments in Tokyo's strategic dialogues.

The election of James E. Carter, brought another adjustment in strategic tones. Carter sought to cause a change in the general milieu by changing the strategic hypothesis through redirecting the focus of strategic process and dialogue. He seems to have been convinced that strategically refocusing on economic issues and interdependence, turning away from the centrality of the Soviet Union in U.S. foreign policy, and adopting a moralistic approach on armaments and human rights would cause the changes required to restore balance to the United States.

Carter's attempts to alter the strategic dialogue seem to have paid scant attention to the significant differences between his premises and those of others.⁷⁹ In an arena where perceptions are important, the underlying premises on which his notions rested

⁷⁹Indeed, Carter's changes could be seen by Tokyo as a collectively darkening tableau. A refocussing on economics would highlight the U.S.-Japanese trade frictions and by that threaten Japan's very favorable situation. Stressing interdependence would highlight Japan's vulnerability to resource scarcity. A shift in focus away from the USSR had a double danger; the loss of military primacy (since Moscow was ratcheting up its military capabilities), and the psychological and political disengagement implied in such a shift undercut the chief reason for U.S. regional guarantees. The moralist approach championed by Carter had little following in Japan; there was scant precedence within the culture for Carter's sorts of notions. Moreover, applying them as state policy to armaments must have seemed incredible to Tokyo given the continuing regional example of the Korean armistice. In sum, absent any significant adjustment in the global balance of power strategic milieu, there was little that Carter proposed that enhanced Japan's security. That Carter couched his proposals in terms of benefits to America and the world did not help. Tokyo was interested specifically in what benefited Japan.

were neither wholly understood nor accepted.⁸⁰ Monologue is not dialogue; it is unsurprising that since countries such as Japan shared neither Carter's strategic hypotheses nor priorities, the collapse of his strategic notions that depended on allied effort was virtually guaranteed. Thereafter, the tone of U.S. strategic dialogue with Northeast Asian states was less confident.

Little of these shifts comforted Japan; the U.S. image was more that of vacillation than considered adjustment. Moreover, the U.S. actions were confusing. In a major strategic initiative, Nixon had expanded Washington's strategic dialogue with the PRC (which required a deliberate distancing from ideology on both parts). A jolt to Tokyo, the Japanese adjusted their strategic dialogues. Carter's idealistic shifts (that Washington wanted its allies to share and support) seemed like a step toward abandoning the U.S. military guarantee and a deliberate vexing of key foreign relationships (e.g., interjecting human rights issues in the dialogue with the PRC). When, in turn, these were (in part) reversed because of external events, Tokyo found its own strategic dialogues muddled as a consequence. It was a demonstration of how the process of strategy creates changed (often incompletely foreseen) circumstances and that the dialogue of strategy is itself crucial.

The third strategic shift centered on a shift in strategic process. Ronald Reagan

⁸⁰In effect, from a theoretical standpoint, Carter seems to have provided neither a collective good nor an indirect incentive to Japan. Moreover, the language he used and the moral premises in which he couched his argument may have fallen considerably short of being understood when interpreted by Japanese listeners. This condition amounts to impedance in the theoretical construct regarding information and collective goods. For a theoretical discussion that forecasts failure when such conditions are not met, see Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, p. 15-17, 134-5, 145.

(like Carter) believed that a change in strategy was necessary.⁸¹ Reagan concentrated strategic focus on restoring his nation's psychological strength and military capabilities, and seemed to make a clear break with gloom and doom prognosticators.⁸²

In strategic dialogues, the Reagan administration both heartened and alarmed. Japan, like other U.S. allies, had the mixed sense of appreciating a revitalized security guarantor, yet concern that its actions might be rash. Reagan pushed for maximum efforts to attain a clear military superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and got mixed receptions among U.S. allies⁸³ since Washington applied pressure to have them share the burdens.⁸⁴

It was difficult for many U.S. allies to see the value of such an expenditure as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). They saw the most probable military threats to

⁸¹ In time, the strategic milieu was to exert its influence, so, mirroring Carter, the conservative Reagan eventually was supporting more liberal notions than he otherwise would have considered.

⁸² Such prognosticators often cited Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 514-35, as "proof" of America's decline. This historical analysis contains notions pertaining to the cyclic rise and fall of great powers occasioned by "strategic overreach."

⁸³ This reaction fits Olson's theory and the discussions and expansions thereon. See Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, pp. 1-65, especially the discussion of the utility value of purchases by minor alliance members. See also, Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, pp. 14-17, 26-27, 46-47, 122-27.

⁸⁴ In particular, the U.S. wanted Japan to share in the costs associated with the SDI program. Tokyo found itself approached because the system was defensive, expensive, and dependent on high technology (all areas in which Japan could contribute). Yet, gaining Japanese assistance was doubtful. For theoretical explanations that align with Tokyo's reactions see Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, pp. 15-17, 23-24. Moreover, there was the clear probability that economic spin-offs would be generated by this endeavor and that U.S. industry would have some significant access to Japanese technology (both areas of considerable sensitivity to key Japanese constituencies). Thus, rather than providing some sort of indirect incentives, participation in SDI could generate penalties. Another area was sea lane defense. See Osamu Kaihara, "Japan's Sea Lanes Mission is Wishful Thinking," *Wall Street Journal*, August 29, 1983, p. 15.

them largely in the form of conventional military forces, tactical nuclear weapons, insurgency, and terrorism, none of which SDI could address. Further, in the case of NATO, an increase in allied conventional forces alone did not necessarily contribute to greater security at the strategic or tactical levels. There was apprehension that such capability might induce Washington to reduce its conventional force commitment thereby tending to "decouple" the U.S. from Europe. This situation could heighten the probability both of war and the use of nuclear weapons.⁸⁵

Moreover, the central strategic concerns of Japan and the other U.S. allies, (communicated during sequential economic summits), dealt with *economic* matters that Reagan's policies and pressures would not help. In short, Reagan, like Carter, found strategic dialogues to be complex interactions with uncertain outcomes.

Yet, for the entire postwar period, Washington maintained its historical strategic focus on preventing the formation of overwhelming power under the control of a single state or group of states dangerous to the United States. Further, it had gone a large step beyond anything in its history by revitalizing and supporting multiple power centers (largely at its own expense).⁸⁶ Its actions, in keeping with its particular notions of democracy and economics, were statements of the pervasiveness of its

⁸⁵For a discussion along these lines see Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), particularly pp. 14-16; Thomas C. Schelling *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 3-4, 16, 70-1, 112; Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 62-69, 79-84, 113-14.

⁸⁶In retrospect, not all saw that this was advisable or successful. Zbigniew Brzezinski points out that the strategy of containment was less successful than its supporters suggest, and that the resulting international environment saddled the U.S. with burdens it found hard to shed or get others to share. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Japan's Global Engagements," *Foreign Affairs*, (January, 1972).

ideology, while its strategic goals (if not the means to attain them) remained constant.

. Japan's Strategy - Continuity of Goals, Radical Adjustments in Means

.. *Overview* - As with the U.S., over the past century Japan's national goals remained consistent despite being characterized by considerable alterations in strategic behavior.

Within the space of a century, Japan emerged from centuries of self-imposed isolation, overhauled its feudalistic social and governmental systems, essentially disfranchised its dominant social class, abandoned its agriculture-based economic system, rapidly industrialized, expanded via military and economic imperialism, achieved first-rank status as a nation in the international system of states, increased its geographical holdings to the greatest extent in its history, fought and lost its greatest war, sustained the greatest damage in its history, and recovered to a position as a world power.⁸⁷ Such major adjustments in so short a time suggest profound changes in strategic options and actions. Yet, it is unclear that Japan's goals were profoundly different.

.. *The Modern Historical Legacy* - Japan's first strategic period (to the mid-19th century) is characterized by a successful strategy of isolation. As a security strategy, isolation was successful because the general milieu (remoteness from other expansionist states, insular geography and good luck), allowed control of all incursions for several centuries.

⁸⁷If historically startling to Western countries, the stark contrast of Japan's successes (twice) compared to other Asian nations (e.g., China's still-struggling status) probably affected Asian perceptions more profoundly.

However, the technological advances of the West, outstripping those of Japan, changed the strategic milieu and insular Japan was isolated Japan. The distance that Japan put between itself and others left it with neither technological means nor allies, and thus vulnerable. Japan's second modern strategic period opened with demonstrations of Japan's vulnerability.

Japan's answer was a radical adjustment in its strategy. Recognizing isolation could not work, Japan changed its strategic hypothesis, process and dialogues. The isolationist foreign policy was jettisoned and replaced by an outward-focused foreign policy undergirded by those capabilities the West used and respected. The central theme of Japan's second strategic period was to catch up with the Western powers, achieving thereby both recognition and security through development -- specifically military prowess and economic strength.

Making such adjustments required holistic overhauls of Japanese society, economics, and government. It was done, and at a speed that amazed observers. Yet, such enormous adjustments of Japan's society and economy created demands that domestic resources could not satisfy. The changes in posture generated increased expectations in turn altering strategic objectives and dialogue. It was but a small step for Japan to adopt a strategy having the same methods and characteristics as Western imperialism. Within this context, Japan's foreign policy, advancing its security strategy of credible strength, resembled much within the broader currents of international politics.

Once embarked on such policies, Japan was firmly within the international

framework of power politics characterized by great power diplomacy and balance of power paradigms.⁸⁸ In doing so, Japan made a fundamental change in its strategic objectives, from protecting Japan from Western intrusions (via recognition and development), to gaining international recognition of Japan as an equal, a "great power." This theme remained consistent from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 to 1945. In executing this adjustment, Japan shifted the strategic dialogue, the strategic process and the respondents. In short, Japan's adjustments changed the strategic milieu.

Paradoxically, as it adopted non-Asian modes, Tokyo assumed two things. First, Japan assumed that its modernization along Western lines entitled it to lead Asia, and second, that the West would quickly accept Japan as an equal. On both they were mistaken.⁸⁹

That Japan learned from its experience in China and was determined to achieve equal status can be seen from Tokyo's involvement on the side of the Western powers in the relief of the legations in Peking during the Boxer Rebellion, the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and its victories in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-

⁸⁸Implicit in this milieu are two notions: that the weak are ruled by the strong and that military force has valid roles as a major technique of foreign relations and in providing a chief criterion for acceptance of a state in the international hierarchy.

⁸⁹Japan was surprised that many Western powers rejected that notion and the one of equality. Even the "common denominator" of military forces proved less than effective. In the words of one commentator, "The forced retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula under pressure of European diplomacy backed by armed might taught Japan the need of military preparedness to safeguard both national prestige and peace in the Far East." Seiji Hishida, *Japan Among the Great Powers* (Green, NY: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940), p. 123.

1905.⁹⁰ From 1905 to 1930, Japan's strategy was marked by its preference to be a "team member" among the Great Powers, particularly with the other major naval powers of Great Britain, the U.S. and France. By such an alignment, all of Japan's strategic objectives were met and its international status seemed verified.

Yet, the end of World War I found the status among the great powers greatly changed.⁹¹ Although these changes mostly affected Europe, the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 made plain that changes in national status had a global context; Japan's ranking ahead of Italy and France connoted that the strategic milieu had changed.

However, Japan soon learned that acceptance as a great power did not mean equality.⁹² Although failing to realize its goal of full equality, Japan did obtain assurance against the possibility of joint action opposing Japan through a Four-Power Pact, "which constituted a pledge, by the Western Powers, of non-intervention in the

⁹⁰Japan had sound reasons to believe that its victories in the Russo-Japanese War would gain it recognition and international acceptance as a great power since it generally followed the criteria accepted in Europe since the Treaty of Chaumont (March, 1814). Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (London: Constable and Co., 1954), p. 73, and H. G. Schenk, *The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1947), p. 127. Notably, it was President Theodore Roosevelt, a proponent of naval power and the Chief Executive of the only other naval power besides Great Britain that could pose a naval threat to Japan, who served (at Japanese request) as the ombudsman for the Russo-Japanese negotiations.

⁹¹Unlike the European nations who sustained colossal losses in World War I, Japan emerged from the war with enhanced strength and small losses. Japan, unlike the shocked European powers, probably interpreted the lessons of World War I as affordable within the parameters of classic power politics.

⁹²Although Washington and London conceded the creation and maintenance of a Japanese naval force sufficient to meet a threat by either Great Britain or the United States in the 1922 Washington Naval Conference, the ratio of naval capital ships perpetuated a status of inferiority in total tonnage. The ratio (which applied to capital ship in a Mahanian construct) was 5-5-3 for Great Britain, the United States and Japan respectively.

Far East."⁹³ This was strategically significant since the internal conditions of Russia (later, the USSR) and China rendered them incapable of being a threat to Japan. In effect, the only countries able to threaten Japan were the U.S. and Great Britain. In reaching an accommodation with them, Japan accomplished the military component of its security. With continued economic development seemingly assured and its place in the first rank of nations recognized, Japan's strategy adjusted to that of a status quo power.

From 1922 until about 1930, this situation promoted regional stability. Yet, it was also a time when Japan's attentions, like most of the world's nations, were drawn to internal affairs. The coming of the great depression, the closing of markets to Japanese economic efforts and the "almost, but not quite equal" treatment suggested by such policies as immigration quotas, caused changes in the strategic milieu unfavorable to Japan. These changes came at an awkward time; Japan was undergoing considerable internal distress as the military oligarchy moved to gain control.

As the military assumed greater influence, Japan's strategy adjusted by focusing on changing the status quo in Japan's favor. In 1933, Viscount Ishii Kikujiro characterized the whole of Japan's foreign policy as the pursuit of the two "fundamental aims" of "equality and security."⁹⁴ As in the preceding periods, Japan's goals remained the same; the methods changed from cooperation to unilateral action.

⁹³H. N. Vinacke, *A History of the Far East in Modern Times* (New York: Crofts, 1942), p. 422.

⁹⁴Kikujiro Ishii "The Permanent Bases of Japanese Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1933, p. 220.

When Japanese actions were protested, Japan perceived those protests as denying Japan its "rightful place," and coming from the very parties it thought responsible for altering the milieu to Japan's detriment. Thus, it is unsurprising that Tokyo, exhibiting increasingly isolationist and xenophobic characteristics, denounced the protests of the West and (as far as possible) ignored them.

Japan's departure from the League of Nations in 1933, suggests Japan's perceptual basis changed from a premise that international cooperation was in Japan's best interest, to one where such cooperation might be counterproductive. The apparent weakness of the League in restraining unilateral military behavior did little to dissuade Japan from unilateral action. Thus, Tokyo's reversion to an earlier, militant style of international relations seems unsurprising.

The revival of aggressively expansionist policies reached their culmination after 1934 in Tokyo's declaration of Japan's "new mission" in the Far East, a rubric under which Japan sought to transform East Asia into its exclusive preserve. The "Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" may have been a convenient slogan and catchall encapsulation, but as a strategic hypothesis, it was in keeping with Japan's historic strategic goals (and not much different from that used by the British). Moreover, Japan's militant shift in strategic process was not a radical departure from either its historical pattern, or, internally, from popularly held perceptions.

Underlying Japan's paired fundamental aims of international equality and national security, as delineated by Viscount Ishii, was a national self-consciousness that simultaneously and paradoxically manifested a belief of racial and cultural uniqueness,

even superiority, and a sense of inferiority. For three generations, the Japanese people had been driven by a perception that the preservation of Japan's uniqueness, depended upon catching up with the West. Beyond its viability as a government policy or catchy slogan, the phrase "rich country, strong army" (*fukoku kyohei*) evidently was a popular, nationwide conviction. Differences of opinion usually were confined to matters of how best to accomplish these goals, not on scrutinizing their appropriateness, continuity, or priority.⁹⁵

Japan's widespread use and increasing dependency upon the military instrument altered the strategic milieu; in particular, it strained Japan's strategic dialogue with Washington. Thus, Japan's fourth strategic period came to rely principally on military means; the process of strategy was sharply attenuated and the strategic hypotheses and dialogues were obscured by the fog and frictions of war.

It was not long before the failure of that strategy was apparent. As the Great Pacific War assumed its own logic and momentum, Japan found its strategy reduced to very few options until the force of that momentum was spent. Japan's military-centric

⁹⁵This centralization of authority demanded and got unquestioning obedience. But beyond compliance to coercive authority, the Japanese experience was a popularly embraced holistic ethos that could lead, almost simultaneously, to radically different behavior. For example, it was widely accepted that the Japanese, military and civilians alike, would fight to the death against the U.S., surrender being considered beneath contempt. Yet, once the Emperor had broadcast his announcement of decision to surrender, with only rare exception, that decision was wholly accepted and supported. Even in outlying areas, the military, that bastion of Bushido, often disarmed themselves and surrendered. On November 25, 1945, George Atcheson, U.S. Foreign Service Political Advisor in Japan, reported that of the approximate 5.4 million Japanese Army forces, all but isolated detachments had been disarmed within two months. It is incredible that such efficiency would have been possible had there been significant reluctance on the part of the Japanese. Letter No. 73 with enclosure from Atcheson to U.S. Secretary of State, Subject: "Review of Developments of Japan August 26-November 20, 1945," dated November 26, 1945, p. 3, in reel 1 of C, *US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

strategy seems to have varied from fatuity (e.g., assuming that the U.S. quickly would tire of war and negotiate a settlement), to desperation (e.g., scrambling for survival in 1945). The course and outcome of that war displayed the disjunction between the ends and means of Japan's strategy, and the great underestimation of the importance of strategic dialogue (internal and external).

By 1945, Japan's militarist strategy was bankrupt. There was little doubt that if Japan were to survive, a significant change in strategy would be necessary. Yet, the key goals and objectives of the nation remained; Japan still needed security (military and economic) and equality (connoting both sovereignty and international acceptance). But, significantly, Japan's postwar strategy had to exclude the military component; the victors mandated that status and insured, via disarming Japan, its enforcement. Japan's leaders had to craft a strategy insuring key national goals were accomplished, but one in keeping with the radically altered milieu.

Japan's postwar strategic period is the main focus of this investigation. As with the prewar era, the postwar period shows significant strategic themes of continuity in terms of objectives. More novel is that the Japanese appreciation for strategy as a dialogue seems acute and the execution of strategy as a process shows finesse. It is possible to characterize the whole of that period as a slow shift in accession, beginning with complete accommodation of the victors in 1945, through adjustment of terms and conditions in 1951 and 1960, to status as a partner and truncated great power in 1983. To do so would not be incorrect, but it would be incomplete -- as would concentrating on a single event or issue (although such studies have their place). The analyses that

follow seek to divide the postwar period into discrete portions, illuminate the general context, and analyze the largely tacit development of strategic factors.

V. CONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY

. General

Since "security" and "threat" are notional, ultimately subjective assessments, they are difficult to measure.¹ Yet, the importance of the issues and the particular circumstances pertaining to the U.S. and Japanese elites forced them to frame their security perceptions. Circumstances as geography, resource availability, population demography, relative military strength, availability of suitable allies, and the nature of regional relations all played important and more clearly delineated parts. Less measurable² and sometimes underappreciated are cultural features, aspirations, and the sense of appropriate national or international roles. In all, concepts of security go well

¹Moreover, the level which the perceiver chooses, the fact that both "security" and "threat" are variables themselves premised on other variables, and the inadequacy of any consistent, acceptable measuring standard increase this difficulty. See Klaus Knorr, "Military Strength: Economic and Non-Economic Bases," in *Economic Issues and National Security*, ed. Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, (Lawrence, KS: Allen Press, 1977), pp. 192-93.

²This "measure," at the bottom, is a subjective assessment. Despite considerable efforts at scaling and weighing the sundry components, there is no mathematical equation into which measurable values may be inserted to derive a finding of "security." Similarly the concept of threat is subject to this limitation. For example, even the relatively straightforward algebraic expressions such as those used by John Nutter, J. David Singer and Norman Graham fall short of precision measurement since they are expression of the relationship between elements which are themselves difficult to quantify. For an example of discussion on formulation of threat see John Jacob Nutter, "An Analysis of Threat," in *Seeking Security and Development: The Impact of Military Spending and Arms Transfers*, ed. Norman A. Graham, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 31.

beyond a particular military balance.³

Although both security and threats are difficult to measure, the importance of the issues, the severity of the penalties for error and the necessary resources so dear, that extraordinary efforts often are made attempting somehow to bound them. Yet, for all the analytic tools, there remain major variables that frustrate those efforts.⁴ Two of the most significant variables affecting Japan's security situation are the intent of the threat and the awareness and tolerance of those threatened.⁵ The greater the similarity in allied status and threat perceptions, the greater the likelihood of coincidence in goals and courses of action, and (probably) vice versa.⁶

However, over the period of this investigation, the U.S. and Japan were not of even remotely equal status, nor were their threat perceptions coincident. Moreover, because the U.S.-Japan relationship underwent considerable changes, there were constant reappraisals of the threat, security, and the factors of the relationship. The constant adjustments resulting from those reappraisals affected (and largely made up) the U.S.-Japan bilateral strategic dialogue and process.

³See Alan Vick, *A National Strategy Hierarchy*, RAND paper P-7003, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1984), pp. 1-12.

⁴See Ralph Strauch, *Risk Assessment as a Subjective Process*, RAND paper P-6460, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1980), pp. 1-3.

⁵Since Japan was allied to the U.S., the way that America was affected also must be included in these appraisals.

⁶Cf., Robert O. Keohance, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization*, Vol. XL, No. 1, (1986), pp. 1-25. But not all agree. Olson and Zeckhauser point out that, ". . . a decline in the amity, unity, and commonality of interest among allies need not necessarily reduce the effectiveness of an alliance because the decline in these alliance "virtues" produce a greater ratio of private to collective benefits." Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," p. 19.

Japan's security rests on an amalgam of requirements that portray its persistent vulnerabilities and suggest areas in which Japanese activity must remain constantly effective.⁷ Among Japan's needs are sovereignty, economic viability, internal stability, adequate military capability, and a conducive international order. If the U.S. conception of security since World War II seems to consider Tokyo's means of attaining these needs of low utility for its purposes, it suggests that Tokyo and Washington have fundamentally different notions regarding the processes, dialogue, and, perhaps, the objectives incident to national security.

Aside from sovereignty, Japan's most crucial security arena is economics. By maintaining its economic well-being, Japan secures the base for its national security in all other areas. Without stable economic strength, other features of national power are severely attenuated, precluded, or perhaps even reversed. To maintain its economic status, Japan must reach resources and markets. This requires three general conditions: unhindered maritime access, an international financial system conducive to mercantilism, and Japanese participation. Absent any of the three, Japan's well-being is at risk.⁸

⁷Davis B. Bobrow, "Playing for Safety: Japan's Security Practices," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. XXXI, (January-March, 1984), pp. 33-35.

⁸If Japan was denied maritime access the effect is that of blockade, the condition U.S. military activity compelled during the Second World War. In terms of energy, raw materials, commerce and food such a restriction is a mortal danger to Japan. Were there no international financial system, it would be very difficult for Japan to operate its import-export operations and establish a favorable balance of trade. The non-acceptability of Japanese currency, credit, or other Japanese financial instruments (paralleled by similar circumstances for other nations) essentially would create a barter system much to Japan's disadvantage. Lastly, were such systems in existence, but Japan be denied participation in them, the result may be worse than if such systems did not exist; at least Japan's relative position would be more nearly equitable.

To maintain its political well-being, Japan needs internal stability, the ability to control external political interjections, and acceptance in international councils. Again, absent any of these, Japan's security is at risk; upon them are based legitimacy, governance, national coherence, and resource access.

To maintain its military well-being, Japan needs peace (or at least the absence of a war in which it might be involved), a generally stable, balanced international environment,⁹ the absence of any hostile single nation or group of nations with sufficient military power to overwhelm Japan and its ally, and a military establishment of special parameters.¹⁰

These needs require that Japan develop sufficient armed forces to accomplish two primary tasks. The first task is to maintain internal order and suppress any insurgent, terrorist, or separatist elements. The second task is to deflect or defeat any attempt by an external power to subdue Japan through invasion, blockades, or nuclear coercion. Notably, "develop" does not necessarily mean creating, equipping, and fielding of indigenous forces; allied forces, provided they are oriented on the defense of

⁹For a persuasive argument supporting the preservation of the economic order as the key to international security see Gary C. Hufbauer and Kimberly Ann Elliott, "The International Economy with a National Security Perspective," in *Global Security: A Review of Strategic and Economic Issues*, eds. Barry M. Blechman and Edward N. Luttwak, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987).

¹⁰This military establishment specifically needed to provide sufficient security without causing regional distress. For discussion of the theoretical parameters see Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, pp. 8-19; Bernard Brodie, "Strategy as a Science," *World Politics*, Vol. I, No. 4, (July, 1948), pp. 467-88; and Malcom Hoag, "Some Complexities in Military Planning," *World Politics*, Vol. XI, No. 4, (July, 1959), pp. 553-76.

Japan, may serve one or more of these functions.¹¹

Because Japan's military has a history of abusing power, the Japanese Government's policy has been to keep its military small, on a limited budget, subordinated in bureaucratic stature, discretely separated among themselves, and archaic in organization.¹² Further, Japan's historical use of its military arouses distrust and reaction among other Asian states. Of this Tokyo is very aware. Should Tokyo create a major military force (particularly one with a significant power projection capability) a regional arms race, to the detriment of Japan's security, might be sparked. Thus, for internal and external reasons Japan is restrained in creating a military establishment, and by that, somewhat limited in its scope of options.

A stable international environment is a key requirement for Japan's military security. If that environment is unsettled, particularly if it is unsettled to a degree that

¹¹Cf., Herbert Goldhamer and Edward Shils, "Types of Power and Status," and Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," both in Ulmer, *Introductory Readings in Political Behavior*, pp. 334-42, 342-62. Nor did the U.S. object to this notion. See Harold Brown, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979*, by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 79.

¹²Japan's active force structure is modest with respect to its neighbors; the size and structure of its reserves are so small as to be scarcely credible. Similarly, the amount of change in those forces was minimal. For a comparison spanning two decades, see the 1960, 1970 and 1980 editions of *The Military Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies) and page 26, Figure 2, *supra*. Japan's much discussed budget, remained anchored at a set percentage, evidencing no percentage increase relative to the other sectors of Japan's economy even as external threats increased. One example of keeping the military subordinated to the civil authorities is that the Director of the Japan Defense Agency (equivalent to the U.S. Secretary of Defense) oversees an agency, not a ministry. The individual Japanese services are subordinate to no joint organ. Interservice rivalry is chronic. Significantly, despite years of prodding by U.S. military authorities, the Japanese Government has made few substantive moves to correct this state of affairs. Nor has there been much initiative from within the JSDF. Interview of Colonel William Vizzard, HQ, US Forces, Japan, November, 1988.

Japan is attacked,¹³ then Japan would face conditions that could provoke its adopting more militant policies. Further, such a threatening development could come so quickly that there might be insufficient time for a successful Japanese military response.

Finally, Japan's military security needs peace. Specifically, it needs to remove those issues that might spark hostilities between itself and its neighbors, and to deliberately damp those issues that might cause reaction by or to the U.S. and by that, embroil Japan.¹⁴ Notably, this does not require the U.S. to remain at peace, only that the U.S. not alter the general security milieu and that Japan not be directly involved.¹⁵

Strategically, this situation causes some basic problems. The peculiar way that Japan uses its assets to obtain its military security objectives (essentially, via dependence on the U.S.) renders it less capable to independently attain and maintain deterrence or influence other international situations (e.g., through the U.N.). In turn, this forces a greater reliance on the U.S., and, simultaneously, a commensurate ceding

¹³The current proscriptions and limitations Japan has placed on its forces and their activities have been deliberately constructed to prevent any belligerency from occurring except by overt enemy activity.

¹⁴The implicit notion of balance undergirding this requirement carries the theoretical premise that a military imbalance is a source of danger to international peace and security only if the imbalance pertains to a state that is not committed to the upholding of the current structure of order. Thus, as long as the overall balance of military capabilities favors the U.S. and the U.S. remains committed to maintenance of the status quo, the overall milieu tends to guarantee peace. See Colin S. Gray, "Warfighting for Deterrence," *National Security Strategy: Choices and Limits*, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), pp. 196-7.

¹⁵In fact, when the U.S. demonstrates its resolve by firmly but deliberately meeting provocative challenges, the level of deterrence which serves Japanese security interests is enhanced. Cf., Richard C. Snyder, "Game Theory and the Analysis of Political Behavior," in Ulmer, *Introductory Readings in Political Behavior*, pp. 271-75; Jack L. Snyder, *Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence*, RAND paper P-5740, October, 1976 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1976), pp. 1-4; Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*, pp. 60-79; and Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 62-82.

of control.¹⁶

Yet, it is not in the nature of states to cede control of their national security to another unless forced to it, and, even then, they seek to retain as much influence as possible. Thus, Japan has used techniques advancing six different general themes¹⁷ in its attempts to promote peace and its security.¹⁸

The most basic of these themes is deterrence. In Japan's case, the operant aspects of deterrence include both the probability of unacceptably high levels of damage an attacker could sustain (essentially a denial of an opponent's objective through extant military capabilities), joined to the notion of escalating any conflict to higher and less controllable levels of intensity (extreme punishment under extreme conditions). In a fashion, it is the combination of the known and the unknown that deters. The resident U.S. and Japanese forces possess sufficient strength to subdue all but major efforts. Yet, the use of major forces by an attacker would trigger an immediate, major U.S. response and, in time, a similar one by Japan, both of which could rise to

¹⁶For more along these lines, see Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, p. 70.

¹⁷ These six themes have been consistently present; however, they have not all been consistently credible. The major changes which Japan underwent altered their influence. Yet, if only in perceptions of potential, some effect always existed. Notably, none were abandoned.

¹⁸Other authors, perhaps because of their focus on the U.S.-USSR rivalry and nuclear matters, usually focus on one of four theories of how peace and security may be reached. Bernard Brodie focuses on mutual deterrence through fear of unacceptable retaliation. Inis Claude dwells on disarmament by reducing or abolishing the means by which war is waged, while Robert Bowie approaches the topic through arms control via the skillful management of arms policies. Controlling and limiting the amount of military force used in any international conflict is the approach of Morton Halperin and Herman Kahn. Although Japan's case is unusual, there is little about these four theories that is not also applicable to it. This is true even in apparently contradictory situations. For example, Japan, because of its relationship to the U.S., is able simultaneously to use both deterrence produced by fear of U.S. capability and avoidance produced by its military weakness as means enhancing its security.

unforeseeable proportions. The combination of certainty (U.S. involvement) and uncertainty (the form and extent of the response) makes attacking Japan a high risk venture. This combination does not prove deterrence worked for Japan, yet the larger global and historical patterns do suggest the combination had a restraining effect.¹⁹ Notably, both deterrence and restraint (exercised by and applied to all concerned) served Japan's security interests.

As an adjunct to deterrence, Japan has added restraint and balance²⁰ as features of its strategic security process. In keeping with these two, Japan has so arranged the forces in Japan (its own and those of the U.S.) that they are capable of defeating "limited and small-scale aggression," but not capable of mounting a serious invasion elsewhere in Asia. This technique deters all small-scale or limited objective attacks and simultaneously precludes the dangers inherent in an all-or-nothing situation.²¹ Since creating too much force might be provoking and too little might be enticing, the notion and practice of deterrence (a form of strategic dialogue) is characterized by a prudent

¹⁹For a discussion of an Asian example having strong situational parallels see Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*, pp. 84-114; Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Escalation to War," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, (1988), pp. 40-42.

²⁰The description of balance presented by Waltz seems apt.

Policy should ideally be responsive in fine balance, both to internal constituents and to external conditions. What is wanted in foreign policy, is not a set of simple attributes but instead a nice balance of qualities: realism and imagination, flexibility and firmness, vigor and moderation, continuity of policy when policy is good, and the ability to change direction when international conditions make new departures desirable, adaptability of policy without destruction of its coherence or of operability.

Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, p. 16.

²¹One all-or-nothing scenario would have an aggressor mount a major attack on Japan assuming that the U.S. would not use its nuclear muscle to defend Japan (and thereby invite a strike on itself) if the U.S. were itself not directly engaged. In this case, Japan loses if the U.S. does or does not use nuclear weapons.

force balance well below that the U.S. and Japan could jointly field.²² Yet, the perception remained of what could result from the U.S.-Japan partnership if provoked. In this way, the use of restraint and balance served elements of the strategic dialogue, perhaps deterring some activities of nations hostile to the U.S. or Japan.

Moreover, this aspect of restraint is a clear example of strategic interaction.²³

Japan's restraint acts not only on possible opponents, but on the U.S. and other regional powers. For example, a limited amount of military force precludes serious considerations by the U.S. to weigh Japanese forces into the balance when contemplating military actions, while the same restraint damps regional tendencies to military expansion which might damage Japan directly, disrupt economic conditions, or unsettle regional stability. In all, to borrow a phrase from Japanese aesthetics, in exercising restraint, "less is more."

Besides U.S. forces, Japan's deterrence incorporates an additional dimension, the deterrence of an attack by precluding the conditions that could lead to such a crisis. In this way, Japan added an active concept to the essentially static, reactive one of deterrence. This was an important modification. By taking actions that deterred the formation of crisis factors, Japan avoided relying on a single notion of deterrence. In so

²²This constitutes a significant modification to Olson's collective goods theory in that the lower than optimum levels he posits as resulting from a disinclination to pay, may result instead from a shrewd calculation during strategic interaction of the possible enemy's perception of potential power.

²³See Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, pp. 122-32.

doing, Tokyo reduced the (already low²⁴) probabilities of its involvement in a nuclear war.

The second theme Japan used to promote its security is perceived weaknesses;²⁵ weakness evident in that Japan, by itself, was incapable with its current forces of mounting a serious attack on any regional state.²⁶ Japan resolved the conundrum of "being strong while being weak," by excluding from Japan's military capabilities major elements of military power, e.g., nuclear weapons. This theme served to preclude Japan from being placed on lists of possible enemies with proven capabilities, thus reducing the likelihood of Japan becoming a target for weapons of mass destruction.²⁷ However, because Japan has a potent industrial capacity, this perception of weakness is one of military weakness that could change.²⁸ Thus, there is the implication that Japan could become a formidable opponent when forced into that role by outside hostile

²⁴Because of obvious dangers, both the use of nuclear weapons and those conditions that might quickly spiral out of control and lead to their use have been avoided. Beyond avoidance, nuclear capable states have taken measures to prevent hostilities from crossing the nuclear threshold (e.g., creation of the so-called "hot line"). Yet, the possibility of disaster due to misadventure remains.

²⁵This is more at the perception of military weaknesses. See comment by Japanese defense expert, "You must understand that we aren't serious about defense." in Davis B. Bobrow, "Playing for Safety: Japan's Security Practices," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. XXXI, (January-March, 1984), p. 37.

²⁶Seiichiro Onishi, "The Japanese Armed Forces: Strength and Capability," *Military Technology*, Vol. XI, 1983, pp. 38-47; see also Joseph N. Flanz, "Japan," in *Fighting Armies*, ed. Richard Gabriel, (London: Greenwood Press, 1983), pp. 154-59, 165-72.

²⁷Tokyo's use of this theme is in keeping with the characteristics of "small power" behavior.

²⁸Bobrow, "Playing for Safety," p. 42. See also Hiroshi Kimura, "Soviet Policy Toward Japan," *Washington Quarterly*, (Summer, 1984), pp. 23-4.

pressure.²⁹ In effect, this weak-unless-provoked theme serves to deter certain escalatory behavior.³⁰

The third theme is the value of Japan, particularly in a postwar scenario.³¹ Since major modern wars have all resulted in enormous damage, the value of a vibrant, capable Japan assisting in recovery would be immense.³² However, if Japan were destroyed or severely damaged, it would be incapable of providing postwar recovery assistance.³³ Similarly, Japan hardly would be interested in aiding the recovery of any state which attacked it.³⁴ Yet, since Japan must have resources and markets, an undamaged Japan, for its own survival, would have to be actively involved in postwar reconstruction. The nation(s) Japan might choose to assist could recover, the others might not. Therefore, the logical (self-serving) course of action for a belligerent is to

²⁹Masashi Nishihara, while suggesting other roles, inferentially comes to this conclusion. See Masashi Nishihara, "Expanding Japan's Credible Defense Role," *International Security*, (Winter, 1983-1984), p. 205.

³⁰This tactic also serves to damp the possibly adverse comments of other U.S. allies regarding the lack of Japanese military contributions. For example, Korea and Australia both contributed active military forces to the Korean and Vietnamese wars. Japan made no contribution of active forces. Yet, neither Seoul nor Canberra made much issue of the lack of Japanese active participation. There are tones here of Japan's "free riding" on more than merely Washington.

³¹Cf., Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 250-51.

³²This echoes notions of the change in value of military operations and the recognition of surer paths to national power; see Garnett (ed.), *Theories of Peace and Security*, p. 53.

³³For discussion of significance along these lines cf., Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, pp. 1-10.

³⁴This raises notions of coercion (including so-called "nuclear blackmail"), but this is not a new idea. See Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1954), pp. 58-59.

"leave Japan out of it."³⁵ Thus, portraying Japan as a technological leader, possessing great wealth for capitalizing regenerating industry, and deeply involved in the well-being of many states (for its own welfare), helps to create an image of "Japan as a valuable commodity" and deter hostile actions.

The fourth theme is reducing (even abolishing) the means with which war is waged. This is most specifically true in terms of nuclear weapons.³⁶ Because it is impossible for Japan to force its neighbors to abolish their means of making war, Tokyo's actions have taken the form of unilateral applications of policy (e.g., the "three non-nuclear principles") and supporting various disarmament fora.³⁷

The fifth, and related, theme is management of arms control policies. Again, unilateral actions, (e.g., prohibiting arms export, limiting the arms acquired for its own use, and supporting arms control measures) are the methods employed.

The last theme is controlling and limiting the amount of military force used in any international conflict.³⁸ Japanese disinclination (for the period of this investigation) to dispatch members of the Self-Defense Forces abroad, even for peace-keeping

³⁵This argument ignores the importance of Japan's geostrategic position which might insure Japan would not "be left out" of a major general war in the region. See I. P. S. G. Cosby, "Whither Japanese Defence Policy?" *Military Technology*, Vol. XI, (1983), p. 29.

³⁶For example, Japan would be the unfortunate recipient of much of the radioactive fallout from a Sino-Soviet nuclear exchange. Additional collateral effects could be equally devastating. In this regard, every weapon reduction is an absolute gain for Japan.

³⁷However, behavior in keeping with this particular poses incongruities. Decrying nuclear weapons, evidencing a "nuclear allergy," and such activities clashes with the need to insure the maintenance of the guarantee of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Thus, official support by the Japanese Government endorsing "nuclear free zones" are more muted than might be expected from the only victim of nuclear weapons.

³⁸There is an overtone here of the proportionality principle as found in Augustinian "just war" concepts.

missions of the UN, is an example of this tack.³⁹ Further, if Japan is to keep the pacific image of weakness backed by latent strength credible, directly involving itself in military deployments with forces whose conception rest wholly on self-defense would be incongruous.

Therefore, although Japan's security situation is a peculiar one, it would not be true to say that Japan has been either heedless of those influential factors or passive in exercising them.

. The U.S.-Japan Alliance - Perceptual Value to the Participants

.. *The Value of the U.S. to Japan* - The value of the U.S. to Japan as a security partner is extraordinary and has been so since its de facto existence during the Occupation.⁴⁰ In the immediate postwar period, Japan's condition was characterized by high levels of destruction and dislocation, regional animosities, and general defenselessness.⁴¹ The support provided by the U.S. in all areas of national power not

³⁹There is some discontinuity in this. The question is whether the prompt administration of military force might preclude the formation of a larger and more menacing situation. This raises the question that since the general welfare is of importance to Japan, should not Japan make more sizable direct military contributions. Japan seems to have adopted policies that suggest that its preservation of a pacific image is more important than any minor development, and in the event of a major one, Japan can offer nothing that cannot better be provided by others.

⁴⁰As the chief occupying power the U.S. undertook to sustain the Japanese population, reorder and support its governmental processes under Japanese officials, and provide for its security. For its part, Japan provided (chiefly logistic) assistance to the U.S. during the Korean War, both before and after regaining its sovereignty.

⁴¹Letter No. 73 with enclosure from [George] Acheson to U.S. Secretary of State, subject: "Review of Developments of Japan August 26-November 20, 1945," p. 3, in reel 1 of C, *US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

only prevented internal collapse,⁴² but preserved Japan from major territorial dismemberment,⁴³ provided resources, markets, and capital to revitalize industry and commerce,⁴⁴ conducted the external defense effort for Japan,⁴⁵ and acted as Japan's ombudsman in international fora.⁴⁶ All of these directly bore on Japan's security.

Japan's basic, vital needs of food, energy, peace, economic revitalization, sovereignty, internal order, and security all vied for predominance.⁴⁷ The absence of any one damaged societal stability; if the absence became protracted, the effects had a crippling or fatal potential. None of these needs were assured, and some, (e.g., food

⁴²There are several documents which come at this from different angles (e.g., economic distress and political upheaval). Nor was the danger unforeseen by the U.S., the Japanese or, evidently, others. Willis Church Lamont, "What of Postwar Japan?" *Asia* (October, 1942), p. 575, Institute of Pacific Relations, *Security in the Pacific* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), pp. 23, 25, John W. Dower, *Japan in War and Peace* (New York: The New Press, 1993), p. 107, Memorandum of Conversation subject: "Situation and Problems in Japan," dated March 2, 1948, by Dr. Fine, Economic Advisor, Economic Section GHQ, SCAP, in reel 2 of *C, US DOS CF, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949*, UPA.

⁴³DOS Enclosure to Dispatch #1380, dated November 6, 1947, from POLAD, Tokyo to DOS, Washington, D.C., Subject: "Memorandum of Conversation with members of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 31, 1947," signed W. Henry Lawrence, Jr. in reel 2 of *C, US DOS CF, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949*, UPA, Toshio Kimura, "Japan 25 years After World War II," *Japan in Current World Affairs 1970-1972*, ed. Kajima Institute of International Peace, (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd., 1972), p. 48.

⁴⁴DOS, Telegram, Dulles to Allison, June 17, 1954, *ERUIS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, pp. 1661-2. See also Editorial Note on Minnich's "Supplementary Notes" on the Legislative Leadership Meeting held June 21, *Ibid.*

⁴⁵This was more than just posture; increasing Soviet violations of Japanese air space were met by American fighter aircraft which eventually resulted in a clash in which a Soviet Mig-15 was downed. Thereafter, Soviet air patrols skirted Japanese air space.

⁴⁶Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Remarks made before National Editorial Association, June 22, 1954," in *EPP, 1954*, pp. 585-90. For a more expanded discussion see Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 523.

⁴⁷The sense of intensity can be seen from a request from the Japanese Government on August 16, 1945, (two days after the surrender) that the U.S. provide large quantities of food and medicine (and not occupy the cities with troops). *ERUIS, 1945*, Vol. VI, pp. 664-9. See also Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 456.

and energy), were in desperate short supply.⁴⁸

Yet, Japan's position, although hardly flexible, was not impossible. In the presence of two vying global powers, Tokyo was in a typical "small power security dilemma."⁴⁹ Both the U.S. and USSR wanted Japan in a specific form, one that fit their specific ideological and military needs, neither being what Japan wanted.⁵⁰ Similarly, it was unclear to what extent the two contending powers would be willing to go in Japan in pursuit of their interests. In short, Japan would have to make adjustments, since in its prostrate condition, its requirements for security, internal and external,⁵¹ were beyond its own means.

Only the generally benign, if curiously ideologic, American presence assuaged hunger, provided energy, and assured order, security, and peace.⁵² In the immediate postwar period, only the U.S. could have helped Japan. Probably, only the U.S. would

⁴⁸Bobrow, "Playing for Safety," p. 42.

⁴⁹This dilemma occurs when a small power needs protection from a larger ally, but fears absorption by it. Other characteristics also apply. See Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, pp. 29, 34-5, 42, 44.

⁵⁰However, Japan was to use the opportunities caused by the war's dislocations and *in situ* policies that carried strong aspects of both systems dating from the period before and during the war to accomplish long-wanted adjustments. Takafusa Nakamura, *The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure*, trans. Jacqueline Kaminski (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), pp. 14-20, and G. C. Allen, *Japan's Economic Recovery* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 4-6. See also Dower, *Japan in War and Peace*, chapter 1.

⁵¹Japan developed the capabilities to discharge the internal security function by the time of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and by 1957 was actively seeking to remove from the 1951 Security Treaty the provision that U.S. forces could, if asked, be used to suppress internal disorders fomented by an external power. By about 1965 there is little question that Japan could, if it so desired, have undertaken many of the roles required for its external security. Although such efforts would have left Japan far short of superpower status, it was within Japan's capabilities to develop a military structure exceeding, for example, that of France. Yet, it is unclear that by doing so Japan would have increased its overall security.

⁵²Shigeru Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, trans. Kenichi Yoshida (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1961), pp. 230-3.

have helped Japan. However, there were those states, notably the USSR,⁵³ which, if they could have, would have helped themselves to Japan. Of the victors and victims of Japan, only the U.S. focused on Japan's recovery instead of exacting revenge.⁵⁴

There were two basic options for Japan's recovery: recovery with assistance (preferably massive and non-invasive) from another state, or recovery via indigenous efforts alone (most probably slow and difficult). In neither case was the decision within the full control of Japanese officials. Foreign assistance would come only if and how Washington chose to provide it. Similarly, an indigenous recovery required Japan's favorable international acceptance⁵⁵ (at least in international commercial circles) to restore its mercantile activity, yet minimal meddling by foreign powers in Japan's internal affairs.⁵⁶ Only the U.S. could provide the sort of assistance required by the

⁵³The Soviets tried both overt and covert means. Soviet Lieutenant General Kusmo Derevyanko's blustering demands for a Soviet occupation of Hokkaido were paralleled by the industrious efforts of the hundreds of communist "embassy staff members" in labor union organization and protest activities. MacArthur's rebuff of the former, and his edict which forbade the activities of the Communist Party in the latter effectively snuffed both. So effective were MacArthur's tactics that Stalin recalled Derevyanko complaining that he had been "treated as a piece of furniture."

⁵⁴Most of Japan's victims were interested in reparations, although negotiations sometimes took decades. The chief exception was the U.S. which could hardly expect to be rebuilding Japan while simultaneously taking reparations from it. The initial U.S. goals for conquered Japan had punitive and prophylactic intent; Japan was to be deprived of its ability to make war. But this goal was to be accomplished by recasting Japan in a democratic mold; Japan would not be crushed by the Occupation and following peace, but restored.

⁵⁵Japan was rebuffed by several nations when it sought to open relations or establish mutually beneficial trade relations. Often such a rebuff focused on Japanese behavior during the imperial period and began with a demand for reparations as a necessary precondition to any further bilateral exchange. Japan sought the assistance of the U.S. as ombudsman in resolving this situation. For examples see notes of Aichi Talks (Mr. Kiichi Aichi, Minister for International Trade & Industry), First Plenary Meeting, October 24, 1954, p.4; notes of Stassen-Yoshida Meeting (Governor Stassen, Director of Foreign Operations Administration and Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida), November 8, 1954, pp. 1-3; and Summary Minutes, United States-Japan Talks, November 9, 1954, pp. 2-4; all in reel 13, of *C, US DOS, SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

⁵⁶This raised certain unresolved difficulties that tended to meld emotional, subjective and objective elements into significant intrastate problems. For example, the emotional carryover from the war, removal of Japanese imperialist control (and latent fear of its revival), rising nationalism, the need for capital to promote

first option,⁵⁷ and only with the consent of the U.S.⁵⁸ could significant progress be made on the second.

Moreover, beyond the population's basic necessities, Japan needed to recover the active and increasingly independent use of the tools of governance and diplomacy. Control of internal affairs, restoration of sovereignty, and reintegration into the international community all depended upon those tools, yet, as with other requirements, obtaining them would be at the behest or sufferance of the U.S.⁵⁹ In an ironic twist, if Japan wished to recover its sovereignty and retain its special national character during recovery, it would have to be in a closer rather than more distant relationship with the

domestic development, and the desire for reparations from Japan could all combine (as they did in the Philippines) to not only foreclose Japanese access to resources and markets, but to demand payments from Japan at precisely the time it was least able to meet such demands.

⁵⁷Beyond capability was the unwillingness of other states to assist Japan. Many had been victims of Japanese aggression, sustained major damage, and faced significant postwar problems that taxed available resources. It was at Japan's doorstep that the origins of many of these problems were laid. It is unreasonable to expect that those states would be forthcoming, particularly to a former enemy, with assistance that would come at the price of foreclosing other domestic needs, and that might result in a resurgent Japan acting in ways inimical to their interests.

⁵⁸This was true because not only was the U.S. the dominant occupying power, it also was the leading global economic power. To the U.S. all others looked for varying degrees of assistance. For example, as late as 1960 this perception was still sharp to states as powerful as Great Britain. Writing in the aftermath of Suez, Christopher Hollis remarked, ". . . that without American support we could not sustain the most tin-pot of campaigns for more than three days." Christopher Hollis, "Ten Years of NATO," *Spectator*, No. 6862, (January, 1960), p. 8.

⁵⁹Japan's leaders were acutely aware, that until a peace treaty was signed, Japan remained under the yoke of unconditional surrender, and thereby did not have decision authority for policy. See English summary of interpellations and answers on international affairs at meetings of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives for the period March 8 to April 10, 1950, in enclosure 2 to DOS Dispatch, dated May 23, 1950, subject: "Interpellations and Answers on International Affairs," in reel 3, C, *US DOS CF, Internal Affairs, 1945-1954*, UPA.

U.S.⁶⁰ Beyond a limited arrangement, Japan's strategy required having the U.S. as a full partner.

The alternative prospects (a solitary recovery effort by Japan) were dangerous and problematical. The communist threat (internal and external) was real, while Japan's abilities were minimal. Further, there was the clear possibility that the recovery efforts (even without communist-generated difficulties) might fail. Seeking foreign assistance from any other than the great powers hazarded a likely rebuff, or, at best, inability.

Japan's only acceptable option, and the only one that truly counted in the balance, was the United States. In basic terms, the U.S. had everything that Japan needed, and was the only nation likely to provide it to Japan. Further, without the assistance of the U.S., it was improbable that Tokyo could soon obtain assured access to food, resources and markets; Japan's situation was desperate. If Japan were to avoid a general collapse, the assistance of the U.S. was more than highly desired; it was a vital requirement.⁶¹ With the assistance of Washington all things for Japan's recovery

⁶⁰There was another aspect to this, the common perception of the undesirability of dealing with Moscow. Aside from the Cold War, Japanese antipathy for Russia has a long history. The Russian declaration of war despite an existing, valid non-aggression treaty, evidently convinced the Japanese leadership that the Soviet regime was untrustworthy. The retention and crude enslavement of Japanese prisoners of war (about 370,000) deepened negative impressions. Lastly, Soviet expansion with its heavy military component, gave Japanese leaders considerable reflection regarding Japan's future as an independent state should the Russians gain a substantial lodgement in Japan. DOS Dispatch #310 from USPOLAD, Kobe Branch, to DOS Washington, D.C. dated December 21, 1951, signed Ralph Blake in reel 3 of C, *US DOS CF, Internal Affairs, 1950-1954*, UPA.

⁶¹MacArthur found conditions for food so desperate that he immediately order the importation and distribution of 3,500,000 tons of stockpiled military food in 1946. As he explained in justifying his actions to the Appropriations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives,

"Under the responsibilities of victory the Japanese people are now our prisoners, no less than did the starving men on Bataan become their prisoners when the peninsula fell. . . . To cut off Japan's relief supplies in this situation, would cause starvation to countless Japanese - and starvation breeds mass unrest, disorder and violence. Give

were possible, while without Washington's assistance, the scale tilted to improbable.

To Japan the value of the U.S. as an alliance member was nearly absolute.

.. *The Value of Japan to the U.S.* - The U.S. concept for global order in the postwar period and the emerging situation of the Cold War explain Japan's value to Washington. In these terms, Japan's value to the U.S. was indirect and prophylactic.

Before the conclusion of the war, U.S. officials had sketched the outline of the peace to follow⁶² based on a particular rationale seeking to prevent a recurrence of those conditions seen to have brought forth militarism and war. These notions were combined with capitalism, democratic development, and active involvement⁶³ by U.S. officials in restructuring Japan⁶⁴ into a pacific, responsible and productive member of the international community.⁶⁵ In all, it was to be an unparalleled political experiment at grafting culturally alien processes onto a temporarily prostrate nation.⁶⁶

me bread or give me bullets."

See Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 350-1. Hereafter MacArthur, *Reminiscences*.

⁶²U.S. Government, "Initial Summary of United States Post Surrender Policy Relating to Japan," dated 10 August 1945, p. 3, in reel 1 of *C, US DOS, SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

⁶³DOS Dispatch #73 dated November 26, 1945, Subject: Review of Developments in Japan August 26-November 20, 1945, as found in *Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files, Japan, 1943-1957*, microform from University Publications of America. Hereafter, *C, US DOS, CF, Japan, 1943-1957*, UPA.

⁶⁴Letter dated November 30, 1948 from Embassy Tokyo to DOS Washington, D.C., subject: "Review of Japanese Constitution by FEC," in reel 1 of *C, US DOS, SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

⁶⁵The adjustments to Japan were to democratize it in ways "which will be compatible with United States principles of liberal and representative government" and "deemed likely to stress the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people." U.S. Government, "Initial Summary of United States Post Surrender Policy Relating to Japan," dated 10 August 1945, p. 1, in reel 1 of *C, US DOS, SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

⁶⁶In this, U.S. determination lent a coercive tone in the sense described by Thomas Schelling. See Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 3-4; but note the care to preserve (or replace where preservation would not serve) social and institutional structure; cf., Merton, "Functions of the Political Machine," in Ulmer,

With the onset of the Cold War, Japan and the U.S. faced a changed strategic milieu. The ideological competitor in the doctrine of communism, backed by aggressive militancy, decreed major changes in methodology. All states, particularly those George Kennan defined as making up the international power centers,⁶⁷ were perceived by the U.S. as threatened by the political force of communism. As one state after another fell into communist control, the U.S. came to feel that the international system was being subverted and oriented toward ends inimical to the interests of itself and those other democratic nations.⁶⁸

The revitalization of Japan (and other states) was seen to provide a solid foundation establishing each participant as a more powerful and interrelated entity. The creation of multiple centers of power⁶⁹ would, in turn, help prevent major wars, because combinations of power would preclude the creation of one overwhelming power. Simultaneously, the multipolar aspects would aid in preventing the formation of two polarized alliance systems that could (as in World War I) drag allied states into unwanted conflicts. There were overtones that participants, cooperating for a

Introductory Readings in Political Behavior, p. 166.

⁶⁷Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 59-61.

⁶⁸In 1949, the "loss" of China to Mao's communists perhaps was the most significant in its effect on U.S. officials.

⁶⁹The goal was a world of diverse sovereign states, each capable of withstanding the pressures of change without resorting to communist solutions, and among which no single state was predominantly powerful. Kennedy was later to state, "The independence of nations is a bar to the Communists' "grand design;" it is the basis of our own." John F. Kennedy, *State of the Union Address*, January 11, 1962, *Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961-1963* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 12. Hereafter KPP [year].

protracted period, eventually could see themselves as bound together for a common fate in which war damaged all the participants individually and the larger arrangement of states.

Washington, having concluded that in all of East Asia only Japan was positioned to rapidly become the type of independent power center needed for its global strategy of containment, envisioned Japan playing a crucial role.⁷⁰ The choice of Japan was dictated by several specific conditions including extant industrial base, sufficient and educated human resources, geographical location, and (because of its defeated status) its possible acquiescence of major changes in domestic or foreign policy.⁷¹ There seems to have been the conclusion that if Japan was left to develop on its own, either reversion to aggressive militarism or ideological conversion to communism could result; both were intolerable alternatives. Moreover, with the decline in colonialism, other states might fall into the same distress.

Moreover, with a solid East Asian example of a revitalized Japan, other

⁷⁰Report for the President, "Strategic Importance of Japan," dated 31 May 1948, pp. 1-9. prepared by intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army and the Navy in reel 1 of *C, US DOS CF, Japan, 1946-1957*, UPA. Hereafter Report to the President, "Strategic Importance of Japan," dated 31 May 1948. Much of the same material, to include exact phrasing, is also found in a more lengthy report to President Truman titled "Japan," dated 14 September 1948, Section V, pp. v-1 to v-4, as found in the *President's Secretary Files*, Harry S. Truman Library, microform from University Publications of America. Hereafter Report to President Truman, "Japan," 14 September 1948. Although George F. Kennan receives the majority of historical attention for the notion of containment, from about 1943 on W. Averell Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, General John R. Deane, head of the American military mission in Moscow, and Charles E. Bohlen a State Department expert on Russia all were moving toward a general U.S. policy that held these principles. For an extended discussion see Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 9-26.

⁷¹The U.S. insistently pursued this tack. For a concise, revealing pattern see DOS, Dispatch #460, from the Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State, Washington, D.C., Tokyo, September 3, 1953, subject: American Leadership and Japan, in *ERUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1491-96.

regional states might be persuaded to develop along similar lines. The eventual successes by new members would expand and solidify the entire system. In any event, if the conditions of the inter-war period were to be precluded, the U.S. saw it would be involved in sponsoring a restructuring of key portions of the global states system,⁷² and in policing activities detrimental to its notions of international order.

This grew in significance, because the defeat of Japan created a power vacuum that the U.S. and the USSR only partially filled. The remainder of the Far East was in a state of dynamic flux. Part of this turmoil resulted from the attack of indigenous nationalist movements and Communist-dominated forces on those elements that were attempting to restore the order existing in the Far East before Japanese aggression. Further, since Moscow seemed expansionist in its activities of occupation and control (either directly or through surrogates),⁷³ weak, rudderless Japan (one on her own), might prove irresistibly enticing.

By 1948, with the Cold War in the forefront of U.S. strategic considerations, the U.S. options for Japan seem few: build up Japan and protect it during the interim,

⁷²The Marshall Plan and the Bretton Woods Conference both focused on this objective.

⁷³Kennan, among others, and in agreement with Roosevelt, argued that Soviet hostility stemmed from insecurity. But unlike Roosevelt, he saw that the Soviet regime had a vested interest in maintaining the notion that the USSR was surrounded by implacable enemies. It was these enemies that gave the excuse for rule by oppression. Thus, with the reduction of Germany and Japan, this need for external threat could only be filled by denoting the U.S. and Great Britain as opponents. An extension of such a perception is that security lies in the suppression of all possible threats, particularly those geographically close at hand. Although Roosevelt may have attempted to assuage such insecurities by initiatives to integrate the USSR into the U.S. vision of a postwar international order, by 1946,

[the U.S. is] up against the fact that suspicion in one degree or another is an integral part of [the] Soviet system, and will not yield to any form of rational persuasion or assurance. . . . To this climate, and not to wishful preconceptions, we must adjust our diplomacy.

DOS Telegram, George F. Kennan to the DOS Washington, D.C., March 20, 1946, in *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VI, (1961), p. 723.

support a neutral Japan (armed or unarmed), abandon Japan to whatever fate evolved, or keep Japan weak, (which would require occupying it with military forces for an indefinite period).

It was clear to U.S. intelligence authorities, and they so advised the President and the National Security Council in a report dated 31 May 1948, that abandoning Japan was tantamount to its falling into the Kremlin's orbit.⁷⁴ Further, there was the sense that a neutral Japan entailed too much near term risk, given the aggressiveness and successes of communism in North China, Manchuria, and Korea.⁷⁵ This left but two alternatives that, in the near term, were indistinguishable in a military sense.

The interests of the Department of State and the U.S. military in Japan were defined chiefly in economic and military terms, with economics taking precedence. The May, 1948 report delineated the conflict of U.S. and Soviet Far Eastern interests, envisioning possible U.S.-Soviet hostilities with the control of Japan pivotal to both.

" . . . Japan, while militarily defenseless at present, possesses a large reservoir of trained manpower, which, if mobilized and provided logistic support, could become a potent factor in determining the outcome of any future armed conflict embracing the Far East."⁷⁶

The report's discussion goes far enough to suggest that Japan would be an active

⁷⁴Report to the President "Strategic Importance of Japan," dated 31 May 1948, pp. 1-9, and Report to President Truman, "Japan," 14 September 1948, pp. V-1 to v-4.

⁷⁵Public demonstrations (such as the large, 250,000, food riots on May 19, 1946), the dire warnings of MacArthur suggesting Japan teetered on revolution ("Give me bread or give me bullets"), and the general strike scheduled for January of 1948 which threatened general instability under the control of communist-dominated unions, all projected a less-than-reassuring image of Japan's political stability and ability to stand alone against communism.

⁷⁶Report to the President, "Strategic Importance of Japan," dated 31 May 1948, p. 3.

military ally of the U.S. in such a war.

Militarily, the U.S. identified Japan's geographical location as crucial to the interests of both the U.S. and the USSR.⁷⁷ Japan's islands formed an arc that, under U.S. control, closed off the entire eastern end of the USSR while simultaneously providing locations from which to prosecute a war against the USSR or its Asian allies. If the islands were in Soviet control, then they provided a bastion for the continent and access to the greater Pacific, possibly to support expansions southward.

The military psychological factor was also noted; specifically if North China, Manchuria, and the whole of Korea were lost to Soviet domination,

"... [it] would result in an incalculable loss of US prestige throughout the Far East. Such a condition might greatly ease further Soviet extension into Japan itself, which in turn would facilitate Communist expansion in Asia against diminishing resistance."⁷⁸

The U.S. perception was that the nation that controlled Japan controlled the Far East. Further, if the U.S. did not control Japan, the communists would find a way to do so; the chance for independent survival by a neutral Japan, particularly in its defenseless condition, was slight. Thus, Japan could not be left alone in its recovery; the risks were too great.⁷⁹ From global and regional security perspectives, the U.S. was

⁷⁷See the remarks of President Dwight Eisenhower before the National Editorial Association, June 22, 1954, in *EPP, 1954*, pp. 585-590; also found in *ERUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1662-63.

⁷⁸*Ibid.* See also Report to the President, "Strategic Importance of Japan," dated 31 May 1948, p. 1.

⁷⁹To a great extent, this could be said about many other states in the aftermath of the war. Certainly the U.S. did not make its strategic decisions based primarily on Japan; the conditions for Japan were part of a general pattern that subsumed the Japanese case within the overall global construct.

obligated to an active role.⁸⁰ In so doing, the U.S. embraced extraordinary international involvement and through that, profoundly altered the security milieu.

For Japan, this meant a U.S. role either of converting Japan or controlling it for an indefinite period.⁸¹ Of the two options, only the conversion of Japan offered reasonable prospects of limiting commitments and realizing the strategic global pattern.

.. *A Shifting Strategic Milieu Alters Strategic Process* - Washington's chief mechanism was economics. U.S. interests had economics taking precedence because it was believed that with a sound, revitalized economy, Japan would remain outside the control of the USSR.⁸² The general economic refocusing of the public,⁸³ Japanese antipathy for Russia, a viable (but modest) military establishment, and the U.S. guarantee, were expected to preclude all but full-scale Soviet military aggression.

In addition, U.S. policy makers considered two additional economic factors, the continuing costs of supporting Japan, and the possibility of creating an economic competitor that might be detrimental to long-range U.S. economic objectives.

⁸⁰The strategic hypotheses in place, the processes and dialogues adjusted accordingly.

⁸¹In the case of both Japan and Germany there were to be significant controls during the occupation period, wherein both were to be demilitarized. These controls were shared in the case of Germany but virtually unilateral in the case of Japan. The peace treaties to be imposed on Japan and Germany were to function as guarantees by including provisions which would prevent resurgent control by militant elements.

⁸²*Ibid.* Report to the President, "Strategic Importance of Japan," dated 31 May 1948, pp. 1-9. Yet, there is the tacit recognition that without meeting certain social needs, public support would not be strong, leaving the Japanese vulnerable to ideological influence. "National security goes beyond physical security; internal security requires certain levels of welfare and stability to retain support for the state as constituted." Janet Kelly, "International Monetary Systems and National Security," in Knorr and Trager, *Economic Issues and National Security*, p. 237.

⁸³For discussion of incrementalism applied to domestic affairs see Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), pp. 82-85.

The former was of enough concern that a key portion of Secretary of the Army Royall's address to the Commonwealth Club on January 6, 1948,⁸⁴ specifically addressed the fiscal burden that the support of Japan placed on the U.S. taxpayer. In itself, this was a strong motivation for restoring Japan's economic viability.⁸⁵ It was also inferential rationale for discarding notions of keeping Japan weak and perpetuating the American military occupation.⁸⁶ Secretary Royall's comments suggest that the list of general U.S. options for Japan had been reduced to a single choice. He maintained that the true economic recovery of Japan was impossible without including heavy industry in the process, arguing that Japan was incapable of supporting itself as a nation of shopkeepers or as an agrarian state.

This surfaced the second economic particular. If Japan were to recover, it must do so by participating in the international mercantile process. Lacking many raw materials and needing external markets to insure appropriate capital flows, Japan could not sustain itself as a complete economic cycle. With the loss of most of its prewar Asian trading areas, it was clear to U.S. officials that Japan would have to develop

⁸⁴Speech by Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the U.S. Army to the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, *American Policy Towards Japan*, January 16, 1948, in *Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan*, Vol. II (Political, Military, and Cultural), (Tokyo: Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, 1949), pp. 4-10. Hereafter Royall, *American Policy Towards Japan*, January 6, 1948.

⁸⁵The pressure was not just from the public or Congress; President Truman was quite definite about having a balanced budget and placed considerable emphasis upon the formation of policies and control of programs to insure that balance. His efforts were successful for three years of his presidential tenure, remarkable given the aftermath of the greatest war in history, the onset of the Cold War, and the usual historical pattern of post-conflict economics.

⁸⁶Obviously a weak Japan would have to be economically supported at U.S. taxpayer expense, and a protracted military occupation would incur additional expense. In short, the U.S. would have the main burden of Japan's defense and much of the economic one, clearly an unacceptable situation.

markets elsewhere and probably be supported in the interim.⁸⁷ By March, 1948, the shift of the U.S. perception of Japan from defeated enemy to partner in economic fora was virtually complete.⁸⁸

Secretary Royall's remarks suggest the economic revitalization of Japan was not a question of if, or when, but of how. Here was the rub; how to revitalize Japan without risking its eventual reversion to an aggressive militant or an economic competitor. This circumstance was exacerbated by the continuing degradation of the situation in China. By the end of February 1949, the National Security Council (NSC) had taken up the problem of trade with a communist China. In particular, they considered the impact that China's trade, or the lack of it, would have on Japan and the U.S.⁸⁹

By late fall of 1949, NSC considerations on China ceased to be hypothetical. Mao's success made all U.S. strategy more difficult, but particularly the weaving of Japan into the strategic fabric of the Western alliances. The envisioned role for Japan (an economically recovered, Western aligned, East Asian anchor) now became a vital

⁸⁷Evidently, it was the perception of Japan's weakness and the permanent loss of China that convinced U.S. decision makers that the chances of Japan becoming an economic rival were remote. There seems to have been the tacit assumption that Japan's economic recovery, managed by the U.S. within a democratic construct, would preclude such a development, and economic dependency on the U.S. would keep both the recovery on track and Japan responsive. In the meantime, there was an appreciation of higher potential for adverse developments incident to a weak Japan than from a strong one.

⁸⁸There were a number of studies which recommended this shift. Three of the most notable are the Pauley Mission in the fall of 1945, the proposals of Overseas Consultants, Inc. in the fall of 1947, and most conclusive, the Draper-Johnson Mission which filed its recommendations in March, 1948. For more detail see Eleanor M. Hadley, *Antitrust in Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 144-46.

⁸⁹Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on "United States Policy Regarding Trade With China," NSC 41, February 28, 1949, copy #38, in reel 1 of *NSC Papers, 1947-1977*, UPA.

U.S. strategic requirement. This shift foreclosed certain idealistic notions, lent a sense of urgency to developments and predisposed U.S. policy makers to accept abridgements of other policies. The changes in the strategic milieu were driving developments in strategic hypotheses and dialogue. The perceived value of Japan to the U.S. was rising.

It was in response to strategic developments, and despite their unpopularity, that the U.S. adjusted its policies.⁹⁰ For example, the pragmatic U.S. decision to attenuate the purge was unpopular everywhere except in Japan. Moreover, since Japan's revitalization required Japanese industries and markets to be protected from external competition until they became sufficiently robust, it was necessary to abridge the capitalist free market process.

If dealing with Japan's war leaders and abridging its own economic principles rankled U.S. policy makers, they were small considerations compared to possible allied reactions.⁹¹ While Washington perceived that the retention of Japan within the anticommunist camp was extremely important, it saw as crucial the maintenance and

⁹⁰This behavior seems to reflect Steinbruner's "reality principle;" see Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, p. 110.

⁹¹For example, the Koreans objected to U.S. assistance to Japan from several points of view. See DOS, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., July 30, 1953, subject: The Situation in the Far East with Particular Reference to Japan and Korea, in ERUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1463-67; DOS, Letter by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to John C. Houston, Jr., Vice Chairman for Stockpile and International Programming Munitions Board, Washington, D.C., March 3, 1952, subject: not given but pertains to the U.S. acquisition of items produced in Japan and destined for Korea or other sites, in ERUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1210-11; DOS, Memorandum of Conversation by Roderic L. O'Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, New York, March 10, 1953, subject: not given, but covers Korean fears of Japan's intent to take over Korea, in ERUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1389-90.

creation of sundry alliances forming the deterrent portion of its containment strategy.⁹²

Disaffection among allies could be fatal to U.S. designs beyond those for the Far East.

Retention of Japan within the anticommunist camp, particularly given the extenuating provisions, was a calculated risk for the United States. With widespread regional antipathy toward Japan,⁹³ the U.S. was in the awkward position of supporting a recent enemy against the interests of loyal allies.⁹⁴ There were bitter comments.⁹⁵

For Japan, the developments were extremely fortuitous. Japan's whole recovery depended on the U.S. actively supporting and protecting Japan. Preservation of Japan's culture depended on the willingness of the U.S. to forego certain aspects of its ideologic occupation policy, and Japan's future international status depended on the U.S. successfully acting as Tokyo's ombudsman. The emergence of a situation that propelled the U.S. into all these roles must have seemed like a breath of divine wind. In short, although there was risk of entanglement (perhaps unavoidable in any event), the U.S. shifts answered all of Japan's strategic requirements.

⁹²John M. Allison, Letter. From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, Washington, D.C., April 1, 1952, subject: not given but covers the functions of the various U.S. security alignments within the greater Pacific area, in *ERUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1223-24.

⁹³For example see Memorandum of Conversation, between Roderic L. O'Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Dr. Young Tae Pyun, Foreign Minister Republic of Korea, in New York, March 10, 1953 until December 1954, in *ERUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1389-90.

⁹⁴This apparent contradiction seems the direct result of strategic dialogues on multiple levels wherein the priority of goals and the identification of threats (or objectives) were not coincident.

⁹⁵W. Macmahon Ball, *Japan - Enemy or Ally?* (New York: John Day Co., 1949), pp. 130-3, 164-182 for a representative critique. See also Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, pp. 521-528, where they depict the British reaction to the October 1949 SCAP removal of price floors on exports as a demand that the U.S. allow Japan to resume access and trade with China, its historical natural market. Such redirection of Japanese exports would relieve some of Britain's economic pressure since China also would be open to British trade.

Although the Cold War altered the general goals of the Occupation that the U.S. envisioned for Japan,⁹⁶ few (if any) of Tokyo's goals changed. U.S. policy changes⁹⁷ caused some of Washington's goals for Japan to be abbreviated, while the use of programs to accomplish many democratic goals⁹⁸ were slowed, halted, or reversed.⁹⁹ Vigorous and pervasive Communist subversion showed the possibility that democratic reform could be hijacked; it was feared that without U.S. military forces in Japan, the Japanese Government would fall.¹⁰⁰ U.S. official perception of Japan's importance was reinforced by the hostile posture of communist China. Soon to follow (after some policy vacillation) was the U.S. commitment to Korea. To Japan, these developments indicated that the U.S. was unlikely to allow a permanent, leftward (or reactionary) Japanese political orientation, but was amenable to other alternatives so long as they insured Japan's continued U.S. alignment. It was a development highly attractive to Japan's

⁹⁶Kenneth C. Royall, "American Policy Towards Japan," January 6, 1948, pp. 4-10.

The objectives of our policy were stated to be, first, 'to bring about the earliest possible establishment of a democratic and peaceful government which will carry out its international responsibilities, respect the rights of other states, and support the objectives of the United Nations.'

The underlying idea was the prevention of future Japanese aggression - direct prevention by disarmament, and indirect prevention by creating a type of government unlikely to develop again the spirit of aggressive war. The real well-being of Japan - or her strength as a nation - was decidedly a secondary consideration: secondary to protection of ourselves against Japan, and secondary to payment of reparations to the victorious Allies for the damages inflicted upon them.

⁹⁷Policy changed, but the core U.S. strategic goals did not. This strategic adjustment seems to be the alteration of process and dialogue at lower levels to the shifts in the strategic milieu at global levels. That it could be done (and smoothly) speaks highly of the bilateral strategic dialogue and resulting process.

⁹⁸DOS Dispatch # 73 dated November 26, 1945, subject: "Review of Developments in Japan, August 26-November 20, 1945," as found in *C, US DOS CF, Japan, 1943-1957, UPA*.

⁹⁹Royall, "American Policy Towards Japan," January 6, 1948, pp. 4-10.

¹⁰⁰Report for the President, "Strategic Importance of Japan," dated 31 May 1948, p. 6, and Report to President Truman, "Japan," 14 September 1948, Section V, pp. v-1 to v-4, .

leadership which wanted the same things.¹⁰¹

In sum, the U.S. response was a reorientation such that the denial or frustration of communist designs became a strategic policy.¹⁰² Japan, like other states, perceived the superpower struggle for influence and sought to take advantage of this competition by playing one superpower off against the other in the hope of obtaining concessions from both.¹⁰³

Significantly, Japan's value to the U.S. was broader than Japan itself. Japan, essentially a ward of the U.S. since surrender, had enjoyed unstinting U.S. support. Japan was a showcase specimen for liberal democracy economically premised on mercantilism. If Japan failed, rejected the U.S. mode or, worse, its people opted for communism, Japan would be a showcase specimen of U.S. failure. It would be a major setback in multiple areas that no U.S. administration could easily sustain.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹It may have been at this juncture that Japanese officials understood the depth of the U.S. commitment and realized the opportunity to ride the wave of U.S. momentum while negotiating (with increasing vigor) sundry adjustments to processes. See also footnote 102, *infra*, for a sense of American official ideological commitment.

¹⁰²Even neutrality was suspect; with respect to the Cold War, Secretary of State Dulles characterized neutrality as ". . . an immoral and short-sighted conception." in John M. Guhin, *John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 252-64.

¹⁰³See DOS Memorandum to Butterworth from U. A. Johnson dated May 15, 1950, on Telegram # 461 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo to DOS Washington, D.C., ". . .the Prime Minister is probably attempting to try his hand at the game of playing the U.S. and the USSR off against each other." in reel 2 of *C, US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA. U.S. officials foresaw and never took such Japanese initiatives toward Russia very seriously, being well aware of Japanese antipathy towards the Russians. For details see Report to the President, "Strategic Importance of Japan," dated 31 May 1948, p. 1, and Report to President Truman, "Japan," 14 September 1948, p. 9.

¹⁰⁴The "loss" of China (along with the other revelations such as the Hiss and Chambers spy cases) occasioned considerable reaction (e.g., Senator Joseph McCarthy's anti-communist brouhaha), and government officials (particularly in the State Department) were still nervous. If Japan, wherein the U.S. (and particularly the State Department) had invested heavily in prestige, were lost to communism, the hostile domestic reactions to U.S. officials could be far worse. China might be explained away since the U.S. never

A similar situation attended military affairs. The U.S. Joint Chiefs had concluded before the Korean War that Korea was not only strategically unimportant, but probably a military liability in case of conflict with the USSR.¹⁰⁵ Yet the political aspects of the coming of war in Korea resulted (somewhat unexpectedly) in the commitment of major U.S. forces entailing expenditures of life, treasure, and political capital.

Japan, in contrast to Korea, consistently had been identified as strategically important, not only from a geographic point of view, but from the potential of Japan as an expected active ally in a superpower conflict.¹⁰⁶ What was geographically plain was that the U.S. capability to support military operations in Korea would be significantly (perhaps fatally) impaired, should major conflict on the peninsula recommence and the U.S. be denied basing in Japan.¹⁰⁷ In this case, the status of Japan could lead to the fall

"had" China; the same could not be said of Japan. Interview, Colonel W. Homer Switzer, Dunn Loring, VA, May, 1990.

¹⁰⁵ NSC 8: "The Position of the U.S. with Respect to Korea," April 2, 1948 in reel 1 of *NSC Papers, 1947-1977*, UPA. However, not all were in agreement. See Central Intelligence Group ORE 5/1, "The Situation in Korea," 3 January 1947, Section IV, "Strategic Considerations Affecting US Security," pp. 1-2, in reel 1 of *Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary File*, microform from University Publications of America. Hereafter *HST, PSF*, UPA

¹⁰⁶ Notably, such appraisals of Japan's potential did not mention the *probabilities* of Japan's participation. For an example, see information paper produced by joint effort of the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Army and the Navy, "Strategic Importance of Japan," 31 May 1948, pp. 3-4, in reel 1 of *HST, PSF*, UPA.

¹⁰⁷ If war came, the conventional assessment was, "We can hold Korea if we have Japan; we can't hold Japan if we only have Korea. If we hold Japan, we can remain a force in Asia. If we can't hold Japan, our defense line runs through Guam, and forward basing in the Pacific through allies becomes secondary to maritime defense." Conversations with members of the CINCPAC J-3 (Operations) staff, November 12-13, 1983, Honolulu, HI; consultations with members of the International Security Affairs Division of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, January, 1984, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.; and discussions with Lieutenant Colonel Charles Guthrie, Deputy C3, HQ, Combined Forces Command, Republic of Korea, January, 1984. The political side to this issue suggests that Japan's concerns about entanglement were so

of Korea, in turn leading to the isolation of Japan and its subsequent subjugation. Thus, Japan's security was key to preserving Korea's and, to a lesser extent, vice versa. Yet, arresting any negative development, once it began, could entail commitments the U.S. was averse to making or military options that could spiral out of control.¹⁰⁸

Alternatively, to write off such back-to-back losses would engender far more than domestic disgust; such abandonment could discredit every alliance to which the U.S. stood guarantor.

In all, the U.S. stake in Japan's success was so important that it suggested Washington would take considerable steps to insure Japan's recovery would not miscarry. It also was plain that the U.S. would go to similar lengths to keep Japan out of the communist camp.¹⁰⁹

Yet, there was one military context involving Japan that remained essentially unresolved, a general war between the superpowers. Japan's value as a U.S. ally in the

high that basing might be denied regardless of the cause of a conflict involving Korea or Taiwan. ". . . the Japanese had made it clear to Embassy officials that in event of a new outbreak of hostilities in Korea or fighting on Formosa the Japanese *would not consider themselves bound to afford us the use of our bases . . .*," (Emphasis added.) See Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, D.C., August 24, 1955, drafted by Richard R. Selbey, subject: not given but covers the upcoming visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, in ERUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, pp. 84-88.

¹⁰⁸John M. Allison, Letter. From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, Washington, D.C., April 1, 1952, subject: not given but covers the extent of U.S. commitment in the various U.S. security alignments within the greater Pacific area, "Thus, the United States would not be automatically drawn into a war involving these three countries." in ERUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1223-24.

¹⁰⁹The U.S. was prepared to fight to prevent this from occurring. See Memorandum by the President (Tab A) subject: Interim Policy with Respect to Japan, February 20, 1952, enclosure to NSC 125, "Interim Policy With Respect to Japan," in ERUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1160-63.

context of a superpower war is unclear.¹¹⁰ Certainly, as the general circumstances changed, the original assumptions subsumed in NSC 13 should have undergone modification. Yet, there is little evidence to suggest this was ever formally done. Instead, there are vague, general allusions to Japan assuming a greater share of the defense burden or acquiring additional military roles.¹¹¹ For its part, Japan grudgingly entertained and ceded greater financial contribution,¹¹² but deflected and declined significant relative military expansion.¹¹³ Yet, the consistency of the positions of both parties suggests that major strategic factors ensured the fixed character of the relationship.

¹¹⁰The original document (NSC 13: "Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy toward Japan," June 2, 1948), cites the rationale as essentially Japan's contribution in military manpower, industrial production, and basing from which air and naval operations against the USSR would be conducted. However, this document was drafted before the USSR had acquired nuclear weapons, Japanese industry had been rebuilt, the Self-Defense Forces had been constituted, or any arrangements for mutual security established. The document seems to subsume the availability of bases in Japan and the behavior of Japan as a willing wartime ally of the U.S. Later documents dealing with the importance of Japan in various superpower confrontation scenarios, do not specifically cite the contributions assumed in the original—but *neither do they refute them or offer others*. NSC 13: "Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy toward Japan," June 2, 1948, reel 1 of *NSC Papers, 1947-1977*, UPA.

¹¹¹Virtually every bilateral U.S.-Japanese conference from the mid-1950s forward contains commentary by U.S. officials which reflect expectations of Japan's assuming more responsibility for its defense as demonstrated by a greater military structure and more forthright efforts. The notes of those conferences also make clear the unwillingness of the Japanese to make those efforts, even if prodded. For a typical example see the notes for the Aichi Talks (Mr. Kiichi Aichi, Minister for International Trade and Industry) First Plenary Meeting, October 24, 1954, p. 2; in reel 13 of *C, US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

¹¹²For example, the both the percentage and amount in real terms of the funds provided by Tokyo and used to support U.S. forces in Japan increased through repetitive renegotiation.

¹¹³After the initial surge to establish and equip the Self-Defense Forces, both the percentage of the budget and of Japan's GNP devoted to defense declined, remaining anchored at low levels. (This is in terms of percentages; in real terms Japan's defense budget consistently has ranked among the top 10 since the mid-1950s. See p. 25, Table 1, *supra*.) More importantly, relative to other regional states, Japan's defense establishment has remained very modest; see p. 26, Figure 2, *supra*. Japan declined to meet many of the improvements in military capabilities of other states (particularly in the nuclear arena) with similar efforts of its own.

The lack of specificity and the peculiar exchanges suggest there may have been a tacit recognition that Japan's value in superpower confrontation lay in the pre and post conflict phases. Japan's posture contributed to deterrence, but should that fail and a superpower conflict develop, Japan's largest contribution would not be made during such a conflict, but in recovering from it.¹¹⁴ Obviously, an undamaged Japan would have immense value in such a scenario. If this is the case, then the pro forma choreography of modest U.S. pressure followed by empathetic demurrals may be explained as a function of managing perceptions tangentially related to the core issues.¹¹⁵ If Japan's value were baldly stated and linked to a postwar recovery situation, a public (and probably damaging) debate could emerge that neither Tokyo nor Washington seem interested in addressing.¹¹⁶

Significantly, the superpower war scenario has been at the core of the mutually

¹¹⁴For more on the value of industrial capacity in the recuperation phase of nuclear warfare see Charles Hitch and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Atheneum, 1975), pp. 320-3.

¹¹⁵This is a unique alternative to the notions posited by Olson and others regarding the "free rider" aspect of lesser alliance members. In this regard, the joined concepts of time and changing value apply to strategic estimates which, in turn, alter the hypotheses, processes and dialogues. This notion is supported by the concepts of extended deterrence (see Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 120-96, 250-51; and Knorr and Trager (eds.), *Economic Issues and National Security*, pp. 180-90), the notion of "rules" of sociological conflicts (see Richard C. Snyder, "Game Theory and the Analysis of Political Behavior," in Ulmer (ed.), *Introductory Readings in Political Behavior*, pp. 272-73) and constantly evolving situations (see S. I. Hayakawa, "Language and Behavior," in Ulmer (ed.), *Introductory Readings in Political Behavior*, pp. 320-24).

¹¹⁶Although the answers to such questions could be disturbing, even framing the questions (which would require some sobering assumptions) would invite public reaction in both the U.S. and Japan with uncertain results. In this regard, having a conventionally acceptable explanation (e.g., the collective goods theory) to use as a shroud to actual motivations could be extremely useful.

identified threat.¹¹⁷ Since both Japanese and U.S. actions in bilateral security affairs have continued in the same vein for decades, it begs the question whether this topic has been privately raised, and, if so, with what result.

VI. THREATS

. General

A threat is both a perception and a reality. The level of perceived threat will rise as the ability to frustrate antagonistic forces declines and as the relative value of that imperiled increases. The perception of a threat is the opposite of the perception of security and varies inversely. The central feature of Japan's security is its allied relationship to the United States. With such close bonding, threats may be deterred, yet threats to the U.S. also may be threats to Japan.

. Japan's National Security Situation

Every nation has a unique combination of strengths and weaknesses that place it in a relatively stronger or weaker situation vis-a-vis their neighbors. Japan usually is considered a "strong" state, but its circumstances and behavior differ so significantly from the pattern of other strong states that its inclusion in that company is qualified. In some respects, this mixed image of Japan was deliberately created by Tokyo, for by comparison to Germany, Great Britain, or France, Japan is neither small nor weak. However, by comparison to the USSR or China, Japan's regional military stature

¹¹⁷For an example see Hisahiko Okazaki, "Basic Strategy for the Defense of Japan," *Voice*, (Tokyo), (September, 1983), pp. 64-81, as found in *Japan Report*, FBIS, October, 1983, pp. 1-21.

seemed small. Japan's security situation remains a combination of formidable capabilities, juxtaposed with startling vulnerabilities in economic, political, and military arenas.¹¹⁸

One key element of a strategy is an assessment of one's own security situation, of which geographic, demographic and relational aspects are important factors.

.. *Geography* - A significant mold of Japan's security situation is its geography. At basic levels, the land of Japan has strict limitations. In terms of extent, variety, quality, quantity, and proportion, Japan is constrained, a condition that has curtailed domestic capabilities and molded its policies.

The first limit is geographical extent which has several important subdivisions:

- a. the ability of the land in peace and war to support the population's survival and the nation's industrial production requirements;
- b. the configuration of the land with respect to military operations;
- c. the physical relationship of the land to other states;
- d. the demography of the nation's assets (affecting the nation's ability to marshal its resources and its vulnerability to concentrated enemy activity); and
- e. the climate and its interaction with the topography.

In its present demographic form, Japan does not feed itself.¹¹⁹ Despite intensive

¹¹⁸ An additional area which might be considered is culture, but because Japanese culture is monolithic in character and manifests no significant presence elsewhere, its function as a component of the Japanese security equation is that of a constant rather than a variable.

¹¹⁹ The vulnerability of Japan to food shortage is discussed by several authors. See Frank Gibney, *Japan: The Eragile Superpower* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), for a representative point of view.

efforts in agriculture and fishing, Japan depends on the import of food¹²⁰ from many nations. Paralleling the potential vulnerability in food resources, Japan's natural energy resources are very limited. There are no significant oil,¹²¹ natural gas, or nuclear ore¹²² deposits.¹²³ Moreover, key minerals are in similar short supply. In sum, Japan depends on foreign sources for its very life.¹²⁴

This dependency upon outside sources places Japan vulnerable to any

¹²⁰In 1936, with a population of 72 million, Japan depended upon outside sources for at least 20 per cent of its food. Memorandum of Conversation subject: "Situation and Problems in Japan," dated March 2, 1948, by Dr. Fine, Economic Advisor, Economic Section GHQ, SCAP, in reel 2 of C, *US DOS CF, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949*, UPA; hereafter Fine, Memorandum, "Situation and Problems in Japan," March 2, 1948. Since then the population has expanded by 70 per cent (to 120 million), land has fallen out of cultivation, and mortality rates have been significantly reduced.

¹²¹Fuel shortage, particularly oil, was a key factor to Japan's disaster in the Pacific War. This awareness was strongly reinforced by the "oil shocks" produced when OPEC suddenly and sharply raised the price of petroleum, making clear that severe economic pressure could be brought during time of peace. Tomohisa Sakanaka, "Military Threats and Japan's Defense Capability," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XX, No. 7, (July, 1980), pp. 763-75; Albert Wohlstetter, "Japan's Security: Balancing After the Shocks," *Foreign Policy*, (Winter, 1972-1973), pp. 171-91; and Yuan-li Wu, *Japan's Search for Oil: A Case Study on Economic Nationalism and International Security* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1977), pp. 25-7.

¹²²Japan's consumption of nuclear energy continued to grow. Multiple sources of supply rendered Japan less vulnerable to supply interruption. Current nuclear fuel providers include the U.S., Canada, Australia, France, and South Africa. Yuko Nakamikado, "Japan Tiptoes Ahead on Peaceful Nuclear Energy" *Christian Science Monitor*, October 4, 1977, p. A2; Office of the Prime Minister, [Japan] Bureau of Statistics, *Japan Statistical Yearbook* (Tokyo: Bureau of Statistics, annual issues, 1961-1983); "U.S. Agrees to Japanese A-Plant Plans" *Monterey Peninsula Herald*, September 1, 1977, p. 1.

¹²³As a consequence, Japanese efforts in economic and political fora (e.g., the Middle East) to insure continued and uninterrupted access have been and are likely to remain intense. This is particularly likely since the Oil Crisis targeted Japan despite Japan's naive assumption that the rest of the world would accept its notions of the separation of economics and politics. Yoshi Tsurumi, "The Oil Crisis in Perspective: Japan," *Daedalus*, Fall, 1975, Vol. 104, No. 4, p. 113. Consultations with Indonesia, Vietnam, China, the (then) Soviet Union and Australia continue alongside exploration and survey efforts. Wu, *Japan's Search for Oil*, pp. 62-74.

¹²⁴Nathan N. White, *A Preliminary Analysis of Japan's Dependence on Selected Imported Raw Materials* (Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1973), pp. v-xvi.

interruption of outside supply.¹²⁵ An interruption need not be the product of military action; merely a refusal of nations to trade with Japan equates to a severe quarantine, even a blockade.¹²⁶ The direct correlation between the criticality of the material and the number of independent suppliers on the one hand, and the extent of Japan's vulnerability on the other,¹²⁷ was made plain during the Oil Crisis. However, Japan's vulnerability is not limited to curtailment of needed raw materials. Japan must trade to maintain its economy. Should there be an entente among nations to embargo Japanese goods, traders, capital, or shipping, the consequences could be severe.¹²⁸ The military environment does not improve this condition of vulnerability.

.. *Geo-military Considerations* - Japan's geography, considered in terms of the military capabilities of regional powers, renders Japan militarily vulnerable. Although it would take a major effort to invade Japan successfully, much of it lies within

¹²⁵See Minore Genda, "Japan's National Defense," *Pacific Community*, Vol. II, No. 1, (October, 1970), p. 42; Philip J. Miller, *Japan's Economic Policies and Security Options* Air War College Report No. 142, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, 1977), pp. 10-14.

¹²⁶The Oil Crisis drove home this point. Additionally, it revealed the link between economic conditions and political pressure, pressure that could be brought to bear by OPEC on those countries dependent upon their oil. Yuan-li Wu, *Japan's Search for Oil: A Case Study on Economic Nationalism and International Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977), pp. 20, 25-8.

¹²⁷In 1972 Japan was dependent upon a very restricted circle of exporting countries and was therefore vulnerable to coercion in a way it would not have been if it had succeeded in achieving a greater degree of diversification in its sources of supply. For seven of its ten key commodities, more than 90 percent of Japan's import requirements were met by five states or less. White, *A Preliminary Analysis of Japan's Dependence on Selected Imported Raw Materials*, p. xvi.

¹²⁸Japan generally faced such a situation from 1945 until December 1949. According to Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, despite heavy diplomatic pressure from the U.S. no country (except the U.S.) would accept Japanese traders. Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, p. 523. However, other information indicates that at least by February 1948, Japan was trading cotton textiles to the Netherlands East Indies for some metals and oil, and had gotten raw cotton from India and Egypt. Fine, Memorandum: "Situation and Problems in Japan," March 2, 1948, reel 2 of C, *US DOS CF, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949*, UPA.

increasingly easy reach of several classes of weapons launched from land, sea, or air. Similarly, Japanese dependence upon import and export places Japan at considerable risk to any nation possessing sufficient power to interrupt Japan's sea lines of communication (SLOC). Combinations of surface vessels, air power, and submarines in any proportion are clear threats to Japan's national security.¹²⁹

A major (if unlikely) danger is the nuclear threat. With its demography and limited depth (the islands afford insufficient space for dispersion), Japan's geography does not provide the same advantages as those enjoyed by larger states. Nations such as the U.S., USSR, or PRC could absorb a "limited" nuclear strike (e.g., ten thermonuclear detonations) and not only survive the disaster, but strike back.¹³⁰ The same scale strike on Japan would be a multidimensional national catastrophe from which recovery would be problematic.¹³¹ Since Japan possesses neither the ability to

¹²⁹Japan, even prior to the Pacific War, was aware of this vulnerability. The strangulation of Japan imposed by the U.S. during that war confirmed the scope of that vulnerability. Wu, *Japan's Search for Oil*, pp. 25-26. The recent Iraqi mining of Middle East shipping lanes brought into focus the ease of interference in commerce, and the difficulty and high expense in regaining and maintaining safe passage.

¹³⁰As a product of nuclear war preparations all three states have made plans for continuity of government, hardened key facilities, and provided protection for vital resources. Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler and Mose L. Harvey, *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy* (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974), pp. 118-24; Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," *Soviet Military Thinking* ed. Dertek Leebaert, (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1981), pp. 56-7; Alice L. Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962); Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study*, ed. Douglas J. Murray, and Paul R. Viotti, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 134-45.

¹³¹This estimate is premised on "counter-value" nuclear targeting. Because of the virtual co-location of Japanese industry and population and the wide areas of destruction produced by nuclear weapons (especially MIRVs), the majority of Japan's cities, industry and population are immediately and simultaneously at risk. Tomohisa Sakanaka, "Military Threats and Japan's Defense Capability," *Asian Survey* Vol. XX, No. 7, (July, 1980), pp. 764, 767. The literature on nuclear weapons and Japan is extensive, but that on Japanese preparations to survive a nuclear war are sparse. Most literature seems to assume that Japan is indefensible in terms of a nuclear threat and instead focuses on whether Japan will acquire nuclear weapons. There are

passively protect¹³² its population, nor actively defend it,¹³³ its vulnerability is real.

Additionally, with the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear questions in Japan have dimensions of intensity found in no other country.¹³⁴ The nuclear weapon anathema in Japan is so strong that any administration that might acknowledge abandoning the "three non-nuclear principles" risks being turned out of office. No Japanese administration has made a known move toward acquiring military nuclear capabilities, and all have avoided mentioning considerations of acquiring them. This sensitivity adds weight to assertions of Japan's vulnerability to "nuclear blackmail."

Japan is vulnerable with respect to its neighbors in two ways: capability and animosity. In terms of military capability, Northeast Asia has three great powers and

virtually no indications of industrial preparations, public or private programs for fallout shelters, or budget allocations which could serve this function. Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Atheneum, 1965), pp. 312-332; Jerome H. Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 31-4. For works which approach the general conditions that must be addressed in such programs see Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), and *Thinking About the Unthinkable* (New York: Horizon, 1962); Gary E. McCuen, *Nuclear Winter* (Hudson, Wisconsin: McCuen Publications, 1987).

¹³² Protection is a composite of sufficient warning time of attack, adequate blast and fallout shelters to protect the population and key facilities, adequate dispersed and protected stockpiles of key regeneration materials and a plan to execute national recovery. Such protection would require a fiscal outlay too large to be easily concealed within other portions of the budget. There is no indication of any such construction or funds that might have been diverted to such use. *Defense of Japan* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd., 1983), pp. 198, 267, 273. Neither is there any indication of the existence of a key personnel evacuation plan, military dispersal plan or any of the other major subordinate portions that would be necessary to execute a post-nuclear strike national recovery.

¹³³ In this case, defense is the ability to detect, engage and defeat an incoming nuclear strike. Although Japan has some detection means (forms of radar) and a limited interception capability (Patriot missiles), there is no system which can defeat other than token numbers of ICBMs, IRBMs, SLBMs, or ALCMs. Japan has no equivalent to a space-based "Star Wars" or "Brilliant Pebbles" program, nor did it construct a relatively close-in ABM protection system despite a disinclination to ratify the ABM treaty (which sharply limits such actions).

¹³⁴ Just to mention that the U.S. might have nuclear weapons on board a submarine (the duty of which includes the protection of Japan) *transit* Japanese waters has been sufficient to generate a public protest and raise a political squall in the Diet.

four powers of lesser rank. For the postwar period (1945-1983) the total military structure of Japan has been the weakest.¹³⁵ In 1983, the world's three largest nuclear powers, and five of the world's seven largest military organizations were Japan's neighbors.¹³⁶ The closest friendly¹³⁷ nation, South Korea, has ground forces several times the size of those of Japan.

More pertinent is that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF): a. lack personnel having actual combat experience; b. possess an outmoded organizational structure; c. are operationally hobbled by existing laws and regulations; d. possess insufficient supplies to conduct modern operations for any extended period; e. even owe the legitimacy of their very existence, not to any domestic mandate, but to the Charter of the United Nations.¹³⁸

In terms of regional animosity, Japan remains vulnerable. Because of its actions during its imperial period and its present extraordinary potential for major rearmament, most Asian states remain concerned about Japanese motives. Although the passage of time continues to soften memories, visceral dislike of Japan still was evident in China,

¹³⁵The conclusion in the text is based upon information compiled from *Defense of Japan* (1983 and 1989 editions), (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd.), *The Military Balance 1983-1984* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), and Stuart E. Johnson and Joseph A. Yager, *The Military Equation in Northeast Asia* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979). Only within the last decade has the JSDF passed Taiwan in *overall, active* military capabilities. Comparisons with the Koreans are skewed because of the asymmetrical formation of the military establishments of both the ROK and DPRK; both predominately are land powers, where Japan has a large component of its military power in maritime forces.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*

¹³⁷Although both are allies of the U.S., considerable mutual antipathy and resulting tension is evident.

¹³⁸See Flanz, "Japan," pp. 153-76.

both Korea, and Southeast Asia in 1983. Despite Tokyo's decades of effort at improving public relations, school texts and museums in those countries continued to perpetuate this animosity, and their relations with Tokyo often have been marked by a marriage-of-convenience attitude, which did not necessarily include trusting Tokyo's motives.¹³⁹

It is the question of motives where Japan finds itself in another difficult situation. Japan cannot build a military force with the same justifications or liberty used by other states without inviting strong reactions.¹⁴⁰ The sources of these reactions are both internal and external.

Civil memories of Japan's military in control of the state and the ensuing disasters remain strong. Nor is the Imperial period seen as an aberration. The current administration and the Japanese public are of one mind; there will be no allotment of power to the military that could endanger the government.¹⁴¹ Although this sharply

¹³⁹ Robert M. Orr Jr., "The Rising Sun: Japan's Foreign Aid to ASEAN, the Pacific Basin and the Republic of Korea," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XLI, No. 1, (Summer/Fall 1987), pp. 39-62; James P. Sterba, "Japan Tightens Her Economic Grip on Nations of East and South Asia," *New York Times*, August 28, 1972, p. 1; Masataka Kosaka, "Japan's Major Interests and Policies in Asia and the Pacific," *Orbis*, (Fall, 1975), pp. 793-808; Akira Onishi, "Japan's Interests in Southeast Asia: A Japanese View," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XI, No. 4, (April, 1971), pp. 413-21; Richard Ellingworth, "Japanese Economic Policies and Security," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 90, (October, 1972); Robin H. Sakoda, *Economic Factors of Japan's National Security Policy* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1988), p. 23.

¹⁴⁰ See extract from memorandum of Conversation between General Matthew Ridgway and Prime Minister Yoshida held May 23, 1952 in Washington, in *FRUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1218-19.

¹⁴¹ The intensity of this feeling may be deduced from the dismissal of General Kurisu Hiroomi, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, for stating the following obvious reality during a press conference:

"... to the effect that, in case of an emergency, when the Prime Minister's employment order is not timely, there can be a possibility of a situation arising in which unit leaders act at their own discretion beyond the law... frontline commanders have no choice but to take extra-legal actions in time of an emergency."

Asahi Shimbun, July 20, 1978, p. 1.

reduces the chances of a military usurpation, it also hampers the military's acquisition of capabilities adequate to deal with a major threat.¹⁴² Such restrictions chafe military professionals. Yet, for internal (and external) reasons, Japan's civil authorities have insured that significant obstacles to the acquisition of potent military capabilities have remained in place.

Nor is the situation any better with respect to Japan's regional neighbors. Almost all have bitter memories of Japan's imperial period; some have historical animosities dating back centuries. Japan is viewed with distrust, especially as its capabilities to create and field another major military force have grown. Although regional states are comforted by the U.S. military presence in Japan, (which, some believe, acts as a ball-and-chain on Japanese militant proclivities¹⁴³), Japanese statements and activities routinely are closely scrutinized for any hint of a revival of Japanese militarism.¹⁴⁴ For over four decades, several regional states (e.g., China, North Korea, and the USSR) cited growing Japanese military potential as a rationale for their own military increases. While it well may have been that this rationale was an

¹⁴²This point may be a significant strategic finding. Since the limitations on military capabilities limit Japan's strategy and these limitations are the product of larger national policy, the combination suggests Japan's restraint serves the goal of reducing the measure of threat that regional states might accord Japan.

¹⁴³Gist of statement made to the author by Colonel H. M. Brownell, Australian Army, during conduct of Quinquartite Conference, November, 1984, Canberra, Australia.

¹⁴⁴The negative reaction of then President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines to Prime Minister Suzuki's allusions of Japan taking responsibility for defending sea lanes for 1,000 nautical miles from Japan is a typical example. In this case, 1,000 nautical miles from the southernmost Japanese island would place Philippine territory within the patrol sector of Japanese naval assets. Marcos found this notion disturbing until soothed by a visit by the new Prime Minister Nakasone (who also substantially increased Japanese aid to the Philippines).

excuse, this pattern suggests considerable depth in regional anti-Japanese feelings.

Partly because of this situation, Japan has no military ally save the United States. Nor is Tokyo likely to find one with which there would be as significant a degree of mutual comfort. Even with their consuming mutual hostility, neither South nor North Korea seem disposed to regard Japan as a potential ally.

Clearly, in such an environment, reliable allies are crucial. Yet, beyond a status as allies, Japan needs reliable friends. The premises of an alliance based upon commonality of a threat could change, leaving Japan to seek regional security through stability imparted by a partnership based on mutual advantage rather than shared fears. This situation mandates crafting foreign policy along lines that would allow rapid, perhaps radical, shifts in national affairs (e.g., a quick shift to some form of neutrality), or development of an alliance premised on broader concepts than a common threat. Should it not do so, Tokyo could find itself essentially isolated with respect to both East and West.¹⁴⁵

Thus, U.S.-Japan relations for the first four postwar decades take on a singularly important aspect for Tokyo. Japan must have good, broadly-based, security relations with the U.S., or else Tokyo might not have any good security relations. With its vulnerability in relative capabilities, the virtually certain negative reactions throughout the region which rearmament would spark, and the absolute need of Japan

¹⁴⁵See Hideya Aoto, *Strategic Options of Japan Under the Tri-Polar Structure of Northeast Asia* a paper prepared for the USAWC (mimeographed), (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1980), pp. 10-11; and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, *Why Japan Enters Into Alliances: Its Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance* a paper presented at the Conference on Japanese Comprehensive Security, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., February 25, 1980, pp. 1-4, 17, 19-21, 24.

to reach out to the rest of the world for its vital basics, Japan's position has not been enviable.

.. *Geo-demographic Aspects* - Yet, Japan's situation is not all somber; the stature attained by Japan bespeaks some effective combination including industrial might, technological advances, national will, and a productive population. Of Japan's resources, the most important is its population. Numbering 120 million, a literacy rate of nearly 100%, and perhaps the most conforming socialization pattern in the world, Japan has perhaps the most suitable tool of human dimensions for undertaking national efforts available to any state.¹⁴⁶

Denied many other factors of national strength, Japan was forced to rely upon its population. If the so-called "law of the tool"¹⁴⁷ applies to Japan, then the core of Japan's strength, its primary vehicle of effort, and chief component of its strategy will continue to be its people. A nation's strategy combines diverse resources, but most lack effectiveness if the will of the people is lacking.¹⁴⁸ Kenneth E. Boulding lays stress on

¹⁴⁶See Edwin O. Reischauer, "Their Special Strength," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. XIV, (Spring, 1974), pp. 142-151; George De vos, *Socialization for Achievement: Essays on the Cultural Psychology of the Japanese* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 37-50, 170-5, 190-4; Kiichi Miyazawa, "To Meet the Challenge," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XX, No. 7, (July, 1980), pp. 677-682.

¹⁴⁷This "law" states that if a party has a single tool available, it uses that tool for everything regardless of appropriateness. Further, if it has several, but one has proven most successful, it also will use that tool for everything.

¹⁴⁸Klaus Knorr puts the matter thus,

In a manner of speaking, economic resources and processes and administrative competence measure a nation's ability to fight. Motivation determines the will to fight. Military strategists have long honored this distinction, They know that victory can be won by shattering the one or by breaking the other - by incapacitating the enemy or by demoralizing him. Ability and will to fight are not entirely independent factors.

Klaus Knorr, "Motivation for War," *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), p. 295.

the factors that bond individuals together as a group as most important.¹⁴⁹

Boulding's observation and assertion may infer the strategic rationale for the degree of priority given by Tokyo to creating, nurturing, and maintaining certain social mechanisms. Similarly, it suggests why several sorts of ameliorating mechanisms continue to be employed by the Japanese Government when confronting publicly contentious issues.¹⁵⁰ Should key sectors of the Japanese polity become disaffected, not only is the grip of the LDP loosened, but the key national strength factor of Japan's strategy is adversely affected.

Shinkichi Eto, in his discussion of Japanese perceptions of national threats,¹⁵¹ makes a similar point in his description of the conditions that underlie Japan's prosperity. The third of these necessary conditions, maintenance of domestic social and

¹⁴⁹Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," *Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, ed. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, (New York: David McKay Co., 1971), p. 98.

¹⁵⁰Some of these are more visible than others (e.g., the restraint shown in the Diet by the LDP towards minority parties). Others suggest the pacification of possible resistance by the use of political "pork," (e.g., the domestic production of military end items, such as tanks, at costs several times the purchase price of equal of better items from foreign sources). In these cases, both letting the political opposition "sound off" and the lucrative defense contracts serve as private-good incentives (after Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, pp. 46-60, and Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, pp. 39-40, 136-37, 139-141). That such arrangements commonly are made, but are neither necessarily consistently effective nor logical from the standpoint of economic efficiency, see the discussion of the collapse of the Nixon-Sato arrangement concerning a quid pro quo of U.S. textiles and the reversion of Okinawa in Stephen D. Krasner, "Domestic Constraints on International Economic Leverage," *Economic Issues and National Security*, eds. Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, (Lawrence, KS: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), pp. 168-69, and the more general discussions in I. M. Destler et al. *Managing An Alliance: The Politics of US-Japanese Relations* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1976), p. 39.

¹⁵¹Beginning with the presumption that what the Japanese want to preserve is their status quo, Eto posits three conditions as necessary to that end: a peaceful international environment, a world system of free trade, and the maintenance of domestic social and economic efficiency. In keeping with his premise, Japan's national goals and strategy must support the maintenance of these three conditions. Shinkichi Eto, "Japanese Perceptions of National Threats," *Threats to Security in East Asia-Pacific: National and Regional Perspectives*, ed. Charles E. Morrison, (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Co., 1983), pp. 53-64.

economic efficiency, would be damaged by social disorder or significantly altering fundamental behavior norms. Therefore, there is a strong motivation to maintain the status quo and damp those elements that might disaffect public opinion. This concern for the public's opinion may, in part,¹⁵² suggest why Japan's leadership has diligently worked at reducing the vulnerabilities imposed by nature. National programs are in place to defray the impact of possible food and energy shortfalls, ideological estrangement, or military confrontation. Because these efforts aid in securing Japan's key national resource, they are more than supplements to Japan's economy; they are part of Japan's national security strategy.¹⁵³

If the great strength of Japan is its population, then its greatest vulnerability is also that population. The extent of vulnerability is perhaps best understood by noting that the population need not turn hostile, but merely change some of its norms to alter the factors of strength. For example, if the Japanese work force had refused to accept long work days or adopt strong savings patterns, or if quality of life expectations had

¹⁵²There also are other, more self-serving reasons; e.g., a quiescent public allows the LDP to govern as it wishes.

¹⁵³For several examples of the relationship between Japanese policy and the assured access to raw materials and markets see J. J. Kaplan, "Raw Materials Policy: Japan and the United States," *The Japanese Economy in International Perspective*, ed. Frank Isaiah, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), pp. 231-247; Masataka Kosaka, "Japan's Major Interests and Policies in Asia and the Pacific," *Orbis*, (Fall, 1975), pp. 793-808; Richard Ellingworth, *Japanese Economic Policies and Security* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972); William S. Borden, *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), pp. 104-5, 120-1, 221; Robert S. Ozaki and Walter Arnold (ed.), *Japan's Foreign Relations: A Global Search for Economic Security*, a part of *Westview Special Studies of East Asia* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); Robin H. Sakoda, *Economic Factors of Japan's National Security Policy* (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 1988), pp. 91-3; Richard Ellingworth, "Japanese Economic Policies and Security," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 90, (October, 1972); David Hitchcock, "Joint Development of Siberia: Decision-Making in Japanese-Soviet Relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XI, No. 3, (March, 1971), pp. 279-300.

taken the forefront in the public's values, Japan's economic power would have different scope.

Maintenance of domestic social order and economic efficiency requires a balance between individual rights and social responsibilities. Tokyo was fortunate that Japan's workforce was compliant and assisting. This was critical, because with the refurbishing of its industry Japan could not readily restore the balance of trade that was her economy, while simultaneously answering a long-suppressed domestic consumption demand. Similarly, it probably was necessary for Japanese authorities to encourage retention of a nationalist ethos based upon culture¹⁵⁴ to preclude a division of the population due to ideology, or its indiscriminate adoption of alien norms.¹⁵⁵ However, (if Japan was to gain and retain the good will and assistance it needed) it was equally important for the government to damp development of the avid nationalism that characterized the imperialist period.

In all, the handling of issues affecting motivation of the population required a deft sense of balance and proportion. Fortunately for Tokyo, Japan's population (in its role as a national strategic resource) retained characteristics of patience, dedication, and acceptance of guidance through periods of uncertainty, characteristics serving a status

¹⁵⁴In part, this may explain why certain myths (e.g., the uniqueness of the Japanese on racial grounds or the superiority of rice raised in Japan) are maintained despite considerable evidence to the contrary. Although some see a less benign aspect to this (e.g., van Wolferen's notion that it is but the exercise of power in the guise of cultural ideology), one result of such myths is to reinforce standard social norms, the most important being that foreign notions and the changes they might bring are suspect.

¹⁵⁵There also were reasons more germane to the political realities of the times, i.e., the retention and exercise of power. See Herbert Goldhamer and Edward A Shils, "Types of Power and Status," *Introductory Readings in Political Behavior*, ed. S. Sidney Ulmer, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1961), pp. 334-42, for a discussion of the relationship between power holders and political legitimacy.

quo regime well.

.. *Geo-historical Aspects* - Geography played an additional, crucial role. The insularity which protected Japan for centuries simultaneously limited it. Japan received piecemeal and spasmodic infusions carrying unsettling aspects. This led Japanese to regard all foreign developments with suspicion. Further, there was the general cultural anxiety that certain foreign developments were superior (in a dangerous sort of way), requiring Japan to work extra industriously to defuse unsettling aspects. Combined with the insularity that led to holistic racial and social homogeneity, this perception resulted in Japanese primarily defining themselves not as individuals, but as members of the general group "Nihon-jin." Culturally defined over centuries, group distinctions are the accepted social norms. Thus, cultural changes were slow in developing and often opposed as unacceptable.

This perspective, greatly influenced by geo-historical aspects, was and is fundamentally different from the Western tradition.¹⁵⁶ That perceptual difference affects notions of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of individuals and society leading to different conclusions and decisions. Thus, to speak of Japan as a "member of the West" is different from speaking of Japan as a "Western nation."¹⁵⁷

This perceptual combination of national vulnerability and cultural difference creates a general conundrum; Japan's very existence depends upon contact with the

¹⁵⁶See footnote 25, p. 58, *supra*.

¹⁵⁷For this reason, the language used by Prime Minister Nakasone at Williamsburg in 1983 (i.e., "Japan is a member of the West . . .") is important.

outside, yet the society and culture are generally suspicious of foreign notions. By defining themselves as racially, linguistically, geographically and culturally different from (often superior to) others, yet depending on other states that neither accept nor recognize such notions, the Japanese are odd partners. Moreover, this raises the question if the Japanese perceive of alliances in the same terms as Western nations.

VII. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In seeking and winning parity with the Western Imperial powers for both equality and security Japan became imperialist. By pursuing policies it believed necessary to perpetuate those two goals, Japan ruptured its strategic dialogue and alienated itself. That alienation ultimately led it into the disaster of the Pacific War. In part, because of the intertwined nature of Japan's institutions, the shattering effect of that war was profound. For the first time, many in Japan had to individually assess fundamental aspects of their society never before questioned. It was a milieu that Japan's leaders had never faced.

. Conditions in 1945

At the surrender ceremony in 1945, General Douglas MacArthur said, "A new era is upon us." He compressed into very few words both an acknowledgment of the end of one historical period and the beginning of another. Already familiar with the objectives and plans that the U.S. Government had for Japan, and knowledgeable of the Orient as few other Westerners, MacArthur may have been one of the very few who understood how much had been compressed into and was connoted by those words. The

remainder of MacArthur's address verbalizes the recognition of a new age of destruction via atomic weapons, a desire by the world's multitudes to set aside warfare, and a call for Japan to begin a new era. In all, MacArthur defined the transition point in national strategies, some of the basic forces that would drive them and extended a call to the Japanese to be a key part of that effort.

There was no doubt of the end of an era for Japan. World War II was its first defeat as a nation, and it was a crushing defeat of a whole nation, not merely the defeat of military forces. The Emperor, speaking as the divine voice of and for the whole people in accepting surrender, forestalled any notion of a "stab in the back" plot.

The defeat suggested the end of some ideas by which the Japanese defined themselves. For example, beyond the losses of legitimacy to rule and the confidence of the people, the military found its spiritual core, Bushido, debunked and its honor sullied. With the renunciation of divinity by the Emperor,¹⁵⁸ Shinto's role declined.

The physical conditions affecting Japanese society were stark and brutal, a combination of ruins, hunger, unemployment and misery. Yet, at least the population was saved the destruction and suffering which a land campaign would have entailed.¹⁵⁹

This stark finality loosened the cultural anchor points of Japan's strategy and made it

¹⁵⁸Hirohito made this announcement public on January 1, 1946. Clifton Daniel, et al. (ed.), *Chronicle of the 20th Century* (Mount Kisco, N.Y.: Chronicle Publications, Inc., 1982), p. 606.

¹⁵⁹The American invasion of Okinawa provided a graphic, brutal example of what that experience was like. The *civilian* fatalities may have been as much as 25 percent of the whole population of the island, despite the fact that 80,000 had been removed to Japan prior to the battle and another 60,000 were essentially hiding in caves outside the battle area. Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950* (Army Historical Series), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 37-42. A popular history of the battle by William L. Belote is appropriately entitled *Typhoon of Steel: The Battle for Okinawa* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

possible in the transformed strategic milieu to radically alter the strategic process and dialogue. If it was a time of distress and danger, it was also a time of opportunity.

This was scant comfort for the Occupation authorities; as the resident authority, Japan's problems also were their problems. Additionally, the Occupation authorities had to satisfy the practical and ideological goals and expectations of several Washington constituencies, not all in agreement with each other.¹⁶⁰ Some of these goals added to the difficulties of the authorities in executing their responsibilities.

On the Japanese side, the situation was similar. They too had practical and ideologic goals, a varied constituency and structural difficulties. In addition, they were hampered by the lack of administrative, managerial and financial tools, and required to deal with an alien, occupying power.

Yet, through the scourging of war and the recovery from defeat, there has emerged a powerful Japan whose ambiguous position between "West" and "East" invites commentary and speculation.¹⁶¹

In implementing their strategy, the victors' undergirding philosophy and their occupation policies were democratic; however, the main mechanism (the U.S. Army) and the central personality of the power in residence were not. General Douglas

¹⁶⁰For example, Henry Morgenthau had in mind a punitive peace which, although directed primarily at Germany, was to be applied to Japan even more rigorously. For a sense of public support for such measures see Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal* (New York: Macmillan, Inc. 1987), pp. 24-31.

¹⁶¹One curious manifestation has been the emergence within the recent nationalist movement of scattered voices asserting that a "postwar period" did not exist. Rather, they assert, that the war years were sort of a historical vacuum after which the general course of Japanese history was resumed. These sorts of notions are succinctly debunked by Toshio Kimura. Toshio Kimura, "Japan 25 Years After World War II," *Japan in Current World Affairs 1970-1972*. (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd., 1972), pp. 44-5.

MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), functioned more as a messianic, idealistic viceroy¹⁶² than as a democrat. That his policies and reforms were liberal and his reluctance to autocratically intrude into what he saw as functions properly within the democratic process are unique.¹⁶³ However, he vigorously and successfully resisted meddling from his own and foreign governments¹⁶⁴ in what he believed was his personal charge.¹⁶⁵ This unencumbered authority¹⁶⁶ was effectively

¹⁶²This term was used not only by William Manchester in his biography of MacArthur, but by the British in communications to the U.S. Department of State representatives in Tokyo. William Manchester, *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978), p. 4, and Memorandum of Conversation, dated May 6, 1950, no subject given, but the substance of which focused on the British position in Japan, p. 2, in reel 2 of *C, US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA. MacArthur himself drew an analogy to Julius Caesar in his discussions with George F. Kennan, then Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department. George F. Kennan, "Kennan Report," draft copy, no date, section 1, p. 7, in reel 6 of *C, US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

¹⁶³For example, despite the advice of both his own staff and the members of the Japanese government, MacArthur resisted (until it was almost too late) issuing an order forbidding a general strike by the 2,600,000 member Government Workers Union and communist-dominated transportation, communications and electric industries set for February 1, 1947. Notably, the order was obeyed and the strike failed.

¹⁶⁴For example, MacArthur's rebuff of Soviet representative Lieutenant General Kusmo Derevyanko's insistence on the partition of Japan (Soviet military occupation of Hokkaido) in the Fall of 1945, is paralleled by MacArthur's insistence of his authority vis-a-vis U.S. State Department. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 376-85. For an example of MacArthur's resistance to U.S. State Department machinations, in this case a separate cryptographic system for the Political Advisor (USPOLAD), see Memorandum of Conversation dated March 29, 1950, subject: "Separate Cryptographic System for USPOLAD; Discussion of Telegram From DA (SAOUS-OUSFE) to SCAP, Cite No. w81210, March 29, 1950," pp. 1-2 in reel 1 of *C, US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA. For an example of MacArthur's disinclination to consult allies see Memorandum of Conversation dated May 6, 1950, no subject given, but the substance of which focused on the British position in Japan, p. 2, in reel 2 of *C, US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

¹⁶⁵Although MacArthur's actions carry a strongly personalized cast, it remains that his actions were strong support for the thrust of American strategic goals. From a theoretical perspective, MacArthur's actions align well with both balance of power and collective goods theory. In this, MacArthur's role as a viceroy is perhaps appropriate and the economic decisions (e.g., the so-called "reverse course") also theoretically align. Indeed, whether dealing with the Soviets, counseling on the advisability of trying Hirohito, or distributing food to a hungry populace, MacArthur's actions effectively advanced strategic process and dialogue.

¹⁶⁶For example, MacArthur was supposed to consult with and be advised by the Allied Council, an organ of the Far East Commission. He attended only the first meeting and thereafter ignored it. He later castigated it as having provided "not one constructive idea to help with the reorientation or reconstruction of Japan" and

abetted by several features that enhanced the Occupation reforms.

First among these was the discrediting of the legitimacy of the old political order. The disillusionment of the Japanese people with their military-dominated government was deep. In the aftermath of the war, the Japanese had difficulty understanding how such a thing had occurred.¹⁶⁷ This loss of legitimacy created vacuums which MacArthur, his staff, and those attendants with him were present to fill. In short order, his entourage included Japanese officials whose activities, combined with those of SCAP, facilitated the grafting of strategic themes to Japan.

The second feature was the acceptable character of MacArthur, perhaps best shown by his being credited by the Japanese with the preservation of the person and the institution of the emperor.¹⁶⁸ Although the position of emperor was divested of all real

described its sole contribution as "being that of nuisance and defamation." Letter to Mr. John M. Allison signed McClurkin, Subject: "Corrections to Professor Liatourette's Book," dated November 15, 1951, p. 3, in reel 3 of *C, US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956, UPA*; and MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p. 336.

¹⁶⁷When war with the United States was announced in Japan there was a strong current of disbelief that there was any real hope of victory. At several levels of society there were people who doubted the wisdom of such a war. Kimura "Japan 25 Years After World War II," *Japan in Current World Affairs 1970-1972*, p. 42. Although many were resigned to the situation, ("it can't be helped"), it produced odd reactions. For example, among high school students whose entire lives had been conditioned by Japanese nationalism and victory, many took to keeping Japanese-English dictionaries inside their clothing so as to be able to speak the appropriate language of the victors. Personal interview with Mrs. Kim Chun Ga, a student in Japan 1942-45, January 17, 1994.

¹⁶⁸Notably, instructions to General MacArthur regarding the Emperor give the impression of control vice elimination. The linking of efficiency in accomplishing surrender terms and the retention of some form of Japanese Government to the person of the Emperor indicate the authority of the Emperor, but not his life, was in MacArthur's hands. "From the moment of surrender, the authority of the Emperor and Japanese Government to rule the state will be subject to you and you will take such steps as you deem proper to effectuate the surrender terms." Enclosure "C" to "Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers," dated 12 August 1945, p. 2. This is in keeping with the provision of section "B", II, of the "Initial Summary of United States Post Surrender Policy Relating to Japan," dated 10 August 1945, p. 3, which defines three periods of Japan's post-war development. The third stage, Japan's being "a responsible member of the society of nations," is introduced by "The encouragement of liberal political elements and the development, *under the Emperor*, of representative political institutions founded in free popular elections . . ." (italics added). In reel 1 of *C, US DOS*

authority, the fact that the institution was preserved was a positive statement for MacArthur. Although the U.S. seemed committed to allowing the retention of the institution of the emperor,¹⁶⁹ the person of Hirohito was less sacrosanct. That his retention was probationary is plain from the instructions communicated to SCAP.¹⁷⁰

MacArthur's reply, without waiting for a request "in due course," argued persuasively while leaving the decision in Washington's hands. On the first page, "He (Hirohito) is a symbol which unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate." On page 2, should the decision be made to remove and try Hirohito,

. . . it would be absolutely essential to greatly increase the occupation forces. It would be quite possible that a minimum of a million troops would be required which would have to be maintained for an indefinite number of years.¹⁷¹

Considering the reverence with which the Japanese regarded the Emperor, had MacArthur remanded Hirohito to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, there is little doubt his other efforts would have met more difficulties.¹⁷² Thus, the decisions to retain

SF, NEA, 1943-1956, UPA.

¹⁶⁹Despite expression of "unconditional surrender" as the popular basis for peace, it seems that the U.S. did negotiate with the Japanese concerning the surrender terms. Amos Yoder maintains that the Japanese were willing to accept the Potsdam Accords with the proviso that the declaration did not compromise the prerogatives of the Emperor of Japan "as a sovereign ruler." President Truman, after consulting with former Ambassador Grew, accepted the wording: "The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers . . ." This wording was acceptable to the Japanese. Amos Yoder, *The Conduct of American Foreign Policy Since World War II* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1986), p. 31.

¹⁷⁰Message, War Department, JCS CSP2405 WD dated 29 Nov 1945 From JCS to MacArthur in reel 5 of C, *US DOS CF, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949, UPA.*

¹⁷¹Message from CINAFPAC to War Dept. Nr. 57235, dated 25 January 1946, in reel 5 of C, *US DOS CF, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949, UPA.*

¹⁷²By way of comparison as late as February 2, 1950, Soviet Ambassador Panyuchkin was still trying to get Hirohito tried as a war criminal. This continual attempt was causing the Japanese Communist Party problems because of the general unpopularity of such a notion. DOS Telegram from Department of State

Hirohito as Emperor and not bring him before the International War Crimes Tribunal resulted from the perception that it was in the best interests of the U.S. to retain him.

Considering that these matters were discussed at the highest levels and were couched in terms of U.S. strategic goals and objectives, evidently the fate of Hirohito was directly tied to implementation of strategic modes. In short, Hirohito's person was a strategic value that could weigh for or against strategic designs.¹⁷³

The third feature was the assistance provided to the Japanese public and businesses.¹⁷⁴ This assistance was noted and appreciated at all levels of society.¹⁷⁵

#106, Tokyo to Washington, D.C. dated February 2, 1950, signed Sebald in reel 1 of C, *US DOS CF, Japan, Internal Affairs, 1950-1954*, UPA.

¹⁷³Not surprisingly, his person and office were preserved for so long as he had value, and this set the precedent for the later remission of others also deemed war criminals. For a discussion on the rationale undergirding the restoration of World War II elites to positions of authority despite the purge directives see Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), and Lewis J. Edinger, "Post-Totalitarian Leadership: Elites in the German Federal Republic," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LIV, (March, 1960), pp. 58-82.

¹⁷⁴MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, pp. 350-2, 358.

¹⁷⁵In this the U.S. acted from several motivations. MacArthur's viewpoints (e.g., on providing food) included the practical (maintenance of order) and the moral (which he illustrated with an example from the Philippines). Certainly maintaining societal stability, easing public suffering, and encouraging entrepreneurial activity in keeping with capitalism all served U.S. strategic goals. See U.S. Government, "Initial Summary of United States Post Surrender Policy Relating to Japan," dated 10 August 1945, p. 3, in reel 1 of C, *US DOS, SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

Additionally, the behavior of U.S. troops assigned occupation duty¹⁷⁶ was temperate.¹⁷⁷ From all accounts, the postwar occupation seems to have been humane and generous,¹⁷⁸ marked by restraint and forbearance on both sides.¹⁷⁹ Although this was surprising given the savagery of the war and its attendant propaganda, the authorities for both sides had excellent reasons for damping abuses and encouraging harmonious relations. Clearly, harmonious relations facilitated accomplishing the near-term objectives of both SCAP and Japanese officials.¹⁸⁰

The fourth feature was the assistance provided to the Occupation by Japanese officials. The influence of these officials was considerable since there were few Americans who had ability with the Japanese language and even fewer who had any experience with government in an oriental culture. The rapid introduction and use of

¹⁷⁶For a variety of reasons the U.S. rarely assigned occupation duty to units whose combat experience was with those whose country they were occupying. While this eased the administrative work of Occupation authorities, (who experienced a greater incidence of frictions when this policy was not followed) it is unclear that any larger (strategically related) considerations were involved. In any event, the results were helpful. See Operational Directive No. 7, for the Military Government of the Commanding General, 10th Army, 6 January 1945, subject: Military Government, p. 1, in RG 407, National Archives and Record Service, Suitland, MD.

¹⁷⁷DOS Monthly Political Report for May, 1951, from Sapporo Branch USPOLAD, subject: "U.S. 45th Infantry Division," dated May 31, 1951 signed D. L. Osborn, Vice Consul, pp. 1, 5; in reel 2 of C, US DOS CF, Internal Affairs, 1950-1954, UPA.

¹⁷⁸Kimura, "Japan 25 Years After World War II," *Japan in Current World Affairs 1970-1972*, pp. 48-9.

¹⁷⁹This is not to suggest that the Japanese were fawningly supine or the U.S. unengaged. David Kowalewski in examining the 167 protest demonstrations in Japan during the period 1945-1978 concludes, The Occupation was no less dissent-prone than subsequent Japanese administrations. The size and militancy of demonstrations in this era equaled those of the following three. Clearly, the immediate postwar Japanese citizenry was less subservient to the foreign occupation than conventional wisdom has it.

David Kowalewski, "Political Protest in Postwar Japan: A Diachronic View," *Asian Affairs*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, (Spring, 1986), pp. 12-13.

¹⁸⁰Cohen, *The Remaking of Japan*, p. 27.

Japanese officials were a direct result of two mutually reinforcing forces; the Occupation authorities wanted to use "orientals" [sic] (i.e., Japanese) for administering the Occupation,¹⁸¹ and Japanese officials wanted to exercise as much leverage as possible during the period. The obvious shortfall in the number of qualified "orientals" serving at appropriate levels in the U.S. Government mandated the use of "cleared"¹⁸² Japanese nationals. This use of Japanese officials allowed some modifications of the reforms to be made at the initiation level by the Japanese dealing with the Americans.¹⁸³ Further, it allowed additional amelioration or mitigation as the reforms were carried out.

Obviously, Japanese officials sought interface positions not only for patriotic reasons,¹⁸⁴ but also because such positions directly enhanced the political fortunes of

¹⁸¹U.S. Government, "Initial Summary of United States Post Surrender Policy Relating to Japan," dated 10 August 1945, p. 3, in reel 1 of C, *US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

¹⁸²Initially this meant persons known to have opposed the war or Japan's imperial policies; specifically, persons not on the purge lists. In time, as the purge categories were diluted and unacceptable categories redefined, many more Japanese nationals were "cleared." Simultaneously, with the great upsurge in militant Communist activities, persons of known or suspect communist sympathies were screened out. One result was a change in political tenor away from leftist politics, (and ideology generally) and toward nationalist and economic focus.

¹⁸³The Japanese were not slow in maneuvering to gain whatever leverage they could. For example, on August 16, only two days after the Emperor's surrender rescript, the Foreign Office, as though it were negotiating instead of unconditionally surrendering, advised the US that the best way to occupy Japan *in the interest of the Allies* was by use of the Japanese forces themselves, not occupy the cities with foreign troops, provide great quantities of food and medicine and speedily transport home those Japanese troops overseas. The next day the Foreign Office rejected the remanding into custody of the Allies of Japanese embassies and legations in neutral foreign countries, arguing that to do so was not in keeping with the provisions of the Declaration of Potsdam accepted by the Japanese Government. *ERUS, 1945*, Vol. VI, pp. 664-9. President Truman was not amused. Truman. *Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 456.

¹⁸⁴For example, that leverage Japanese officials might exercise through SCAP officials to reduce the power of the Communist Party served Japanese national interests, since, as Yoshida asserted, the Communist Party "had for its design, from the first post-war days, the obstruction by every means of the economic recovery of Japan. It was this fact that placed the Liberal Party diametrically in opposition to the Communists throughout the years following the termination of the war." Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, p. 232.

their party¹⁸⁵ and themselves.¹⁸⁶ Such gains in political power depended upon a good relationship with the Americans on the SCAP staff, particularly the governmental section, and that meant assisting in the basic democratic reforms. Thus, modifications were attempted and gained by Japanese officials simultaneously with the advancement of the goals of the Occupation.¹⁸⁷

The fifth feature that directly aided the occupation reforms was success at keeping the Russians out of official Japanese affairs. The successful rollback of communist control of trade unions and key industrial labor organizations abetted Occupation efforts to exclude Soviet influence.¹⁸⁸ The Americans and Japanese were

¹⁸⁵For example, in its desire to see SCAP suppress the labor unions and outlaw strikes, the Yoshida government gained more than stabilization of significant economic sectors. Japan's leaders also saw the suppression of domestic political rivals in the form of the Japanese Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party. Similarly, other potentially troubling groups, such as the Koreans who constituted a large percentage of the restive coal miners, could be brought under control via the same techniques.

¹⁸⁶From a theoretical standpoint, Japanese officials were both reaping and developing "private goods" and tangential incentives. In part, this may explain the degree of energy and effectiveness of those officials.

¹⁸⁷This pattern is a case of strategic interaction within the collective goods theory. "A small subset of members, just as an individual, will take concerted action to supply the good only if they feel they can thereby maximize their expected utility from the good." Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, p. 147.

¹⁸⁸Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, pp. 232-242. However, the extent to which the Communists were able to take over groups of all types was very disturbing to U.S. officials. In "A Review of Communism in Japan," a lengthy, detailed contemporary study done by Hillis Lory (a Foreign Service officer serving in Japan), he lists 154 leftist organizations and the degree of control of them exercised by the Communist Party in Japan. His primary source for this list is a report from GHQ, Far East Command, Civil Intelligence Section, "Periodical Summary No. 34," Nov. 15, 1948, Appendix pp. 1-9. Lory notes that these organizations touch all aspects and geographical areas in Japan. The list of organizations show especially heavy concentrations of Communists in basic industries, education, among Koreans and youth groups. There is the distinct image that the majority of Communist organization effort was expended in attempting to influence/control the young, impressionable intelligentsia and wed it to the blue collar masses. Originally circulated in Japan, this document was forwarded to the Secretary of State. Memorandum to Bishop from Lory dated 15 December 1948, subject: "Communism in Japan Study by Hillis Lory," March 25, 1948 "A Review of Communism in Japan," pp. 61-6, in reel 5 C, *US DOS CF, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949*, UPA. Hereafter Memorandum, 15 December 1948, "Communism in Japan Study by Hillis Lory."

very effective in reversing gains made by communists throughout the Japanese labor organizations.¹⁸⁹ Besides having a cultural distaste for Russia, the Japanese leadership elite had endured bad scares generated by Moscow. These scares came in the forms of a threat of territorial dismemberment (Soviet insistence on a partition of Japan with the Soviets occupying Hokkaido), and national paralysis possibly leading to an internal communist-led government takeover (the communist inspired and led attempt of a general strike). At all social levels, there was mistrust of Soviet motives.¹⁹⁰ Further, it was unclear that the communist platform was likely to lead to economic success.¹⁹¹ Strike tactics worsened the general economic condition (as the communist leadership planned), but did not lead to revolution, the fall of the government, general resistance to the Occupation, or even notably harsher Occupation policies (except against the

¹⁸⁹Despite their extensive penetration and early pervasive control of a large number of highly influential organizations, by December, 1949, the tide had turned against the Communists and SCAP was reporting on the continuing decline. A representative report notes: "The Japanese Communist Party is currently hard-pressed and on the defensive. . . . Practically all the Communists have been removed from the Central Executives of the Railways and Communications Workers Unions. . . . In the Agrarian Committee elections of August 1949, for which the JCP had made extensive preparations, the JCP succeeded in obtaining less than 1% of the 110,723 seats." Office Memorandum to Allison and Moseley from Green dated 22 December 1949, subject: "Tokyo's 844 of Dec. 3, 1949," in reel 5 of *C, US DOS CF, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949*, UPA.

¹⁹⁰See DOS Dispatch #310 from USPOLAD, Kobe Branch, to Department of State, Washington, D.C. dated December 21, 1951, signed Ralph Blake, in reel 3 of *C, US DOS CF, Internal Affairs, 1950-1954*, UPA, as a representative sample of numerous similar reports and observations.

¹⁹¹As already mentioned, Yoshida was convinced that just the opposite would be the case. U.S. officials were of a similar mind. Hillis Lory's report "A Review of Communism in Japan" makes the same conclusion. "Communist techniques for strikes had become so efficient and had given them such a dangerous weapon the SCAP was of the opinion that if the Communists directed strikes were left completely uncontrolled they would seriously delay Japan's economic rehabilitation." Memorandum, 15 December 1948, "Communism in Japan Study by Hillis Lory," pp. 23-4.

communists¹⁹²). Largely, the obstructionist tactics backfired and the communists were tarred with the brush of worsening the public's lot.

From a strategic perspective, it is plain that the Japanese leadership saw the Soviets as a multiform threat to Japan's sovereignty. Worse, the forms of this threat were such that the Government of Japan had few tools with which to combat them. Almost without exception, the power necessary to successfully resist and defeat Soviet initiatives lay within U.S. control. Nor was the threat confined to governments or institutions; the fates of the national leadership in several Soviet-occupied eastern European countries probably were sobering reminders of personal destinies in the event of a communist takeover.

When MacArthur took an uncompromising stance against the bluster of Soviet Lieutenant General Derevyanko's demands for a Soviet occupation of Hokkaido and forbade the strike scheduled for February 1, 1947, he assuaged many fears.¹⁹³ While larger U.S. motives and MacArthur's personal ones played important parts in his decision, there is no doubt that the Japanese were pleased to support a strong figure and

¹⁹²Even these were mild. For example, although the notion of declaring the Communist Party illegal gained some advocacy in U.S. circles, the Japanese officials had reservations about the practicality of the policy. Office Memorandum to Rusk from Bishop dated 21 September 1949, no subject given but contents envision outlawing the Communist conspiracy and prohibiting its reorganization, in reel 5 of *C, US DOS CF, Internal Affairs 1945-1949, UPA*. In the end, various forms of suppression were used, e.g., the Organization Control Law, but the Communist Party was never outlawed. Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, pp. 234-5; George F. Kennan, "Kennan Report," section 2, pp. 16-18; and MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, pp. 353-4.

¹⁹³The importance of this aspect remained salient to informed Japanese observers twenty-five years later. For example, Toshio Kimura stated, "However, . . . the United States rejected the Soviet demand that they be permitted to occupy Hokkaido can only be described as a most fortuitous development indeed and was destined to have immeasurable effects on the future development of this country." Kimura, "Japan 25 Years After World War II," *Japan in Current World Affairs 1970-1972*, p. 48.

policies preventing any expansion of Soviet power at Japan's expense.¹⁹⁴

Thus, the U.S., personified by MacArthur and his staff, filled a vacuum in Japan with an alien, but acceptably legitimate, power. This power, perceived by Japanese at multiple levels as acting in the best interests of Japan, invoked considerable respect. It was this aura of respect and power that lent itself to any major pronouncement made by MacArthur or the United States.

. The 1951 Security Treaty

.. *Background* - The 1951 Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan was signed in San Francisco a mere five hours after the San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded between Japan and forty-nine other nations. The Peace Treaty, providing for the end of the Occupation and restoring Japan to the community of independent nations, was signed in consideration of several points. By 1951, the goals of the Occupation¹⁹⁵ largely had been achieved. Japan's military machine had been wiped out, her war-torn economy restarted, and a democratic form of government established.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴Enclosure to DOS Dispatch #1380, dated November 6, 1947, from POLAD, Tokyo to Department of State, Washington, D. C., Subject: "Memorandum of Conversation with Members of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 31, 1947," signed W. Henry Lawrence, Jr., Second Secretary, in reel 2 of C, *US DOS CF, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949*, UPA.

¹⁹⁵"United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," dated September 6, 1945, "Statement on Disarmament, Demobilization, Disposition of Enemy Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War," dated September 10, 1945, and "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan," dated November 8, 1945, in reel 8 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

¹⁹⁶For reports of Japan's progress in meeting U.S. occupation objectives see U.S. Department of State "Policy and Information Statements" (generally issued annually 1945-1951) in reel 8 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA. See also U.S. Department of State "Recommendations to National Security Council," dated May 25, 1948, a Letter (no subject) dated June 16, 1949 from General MacArthur to Secretary of State regarding press reports from Washington, and a Memorandum of Conversation, dated July 16, 1949 between General MacArthur and Mr. Houston, Charge d' Affaires, Office of the Political Advisor that

Imposing a longer occupation or vindictive peace might have destroyed the gains made during the Occupation or left a residue of bad feeling in Japan.¹⁹⁷

It is against the background of the Cold War that the strategic aspects of the peace settlement of 1951 and the attendant Mutual Security Treaty can be best understood. The series of events that framed and tightened the embrace of the Cold War, culminating in the Communist offensive in Korea in 1950, forced Cold War considerations into every U.S. foreign policy decision. Nor were the intensities of such considerations to abate.¹⁹⁸

Already beleaguered, the U.S. found it had to make a greater commitment of its own military strength along the vast arc stretching from the Aleutians through Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and Taiwan to the Philippines.¹⁹⁹ The shift in strategic scope heralded problems. For example, there was a "new" sort of shooting war in Korea. Not only

focuses on questions surrounding the peace treaty. (These latter three also in reel 8 of *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56, UPA.*)

¹⁹⁷MacArthur emphasized this point through military and Department of State channels on several occasions. For one example see Memorandum of Conversation dated November 2, 1949, subject: "General MacArthur's Views on a Japanese Peace Treaty," pp. 1-2, 5, signed Butterworth in reel 10 of *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56, UPA*; hereafter Memorandum, "MacArthur's Views on a Japanese Peace Treaty," November 2, 1949. See also DOS "Trip Report: A Summary Report Regarding the Trip of Mr. Allison and Myself to Japan," by J. F. Dulles, dated July 7, 1950, document #750001-2416, pp. 1, in reel 6 of *C, DOS CF, Japan, Internal Affairs 1945-1949, UPA*; hereafter Dulles, "Trip Report," July 7, 1950, *C, DOS CF, Japan, Internal Affairs 1945-49, UPA.*

¹⁹⁸The psychological impact of the scale and potency of this threat evidently was most profound when Communist China entered the Korean War on the side of North Korea. Narration by Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army, 1950-1953, in "Korea: The Forgotten War," Part IV: "An Entirely New War," documentary videocassette film from Thames Video Collection, a division of HBO, Inc., 1980.

¹⁹⁹See the discussion papers prepared for conference participants and planners as background for the U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty 1951 in reel 10 of *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56, UPA.* This arc (amended to include Korea) was described by both MacArthur and Dulles.

was this conflict deeply disturbing to the military's point of view on doctrine,²⁰⁰ it placed the U.S. against a nationalistic, hostile China allied with the Soviet Union.²⁰¹ In terms of scale alone, there seemed few limits to which the struggle might expand.

Adequately confronting the communist surge in Asia required a powerful, flexible position; Japan's crucial geo-strategic position was the most suitable place to anchor America's Asian defense. A strong defensive position in Japan meant stationing American forces there,²⁰² particularly air and naval components, at least until an independent Japan could muster sufficient²⁰³ indigenous defensive strength. Washington believed this military development would have to be paralleled by two other particulars, a Japan with an admitted stake in the free world, and a willingness by other Asian nations to accept Japan as a friendly, collaborative, military force. From the

²⁰⁰The jolt which U.S. military personnel received from recognizing that the U.S. possession of atomic weapons had not only failed to deter war, but that such weapons fundamentally were not useful in such conditions, is suggested in the comment made at the conclusion of the initial situation briefing on the North Korean invasion at the Pentagon, June 25, 1950. After a terse politico-military assessment by JCS Chairman General of the Army Omar Bradley, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins acidly commented to Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg, "Let's see you solve this one with an atom bomb." Others present at this meeting included the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretaries of each military service. Personal interview with the Army Staff intelligence briefing officer, then Major W. Homer Switzer, August 2, 1994.

²⁰¹The "loss" of China was felt at a much deeper level than the souring of relations with the USSR. The U.S. had befriended China for a protracted period prior to as well as during the war, and the scale of the loss was so large.

²⁰²For a concise summary see JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject: "Japanese Peace Treaty," dated 22 December 1949, pp. 1-2, signed Omar N. Bradley. Noting the condition of and threats to Japan, this memorandum spells out the need for the continued presence of U.S. military forces stationed in and about Japan after the conclusion of the peace treaty in reel 10 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

²⁰³The term "sufficient" was soon (and has remained) a point of some disagreement, carrying with it the implicit questions of "Sufficient for what?" and "Sufficient according to whom?" Almost immediately Prime Minister Yoshida and Secretary of State Dulles were to disagree on the necessary size of Japanese forces. Since then, the size, composition and expense of those forces have remained points of consultation, debate, and (exacerbated by balance of trade deficits) friction.

U.S. perspective, meeting these conditions required two Japanese activities. First, the U.S. wanted Japan to be an engaged member of the world community, i.e., contributing in all ways to international stability efforts. Second, Washington saw it desirable that Japan develop sufficient military strength to merit serious consideration from potential allies and enemies.²⁰⁴

In 1951, there was little indication that Japan then could or soon would²⁰⁵ meet these particulars.²⁰⁶ Japanese security forces at the time of the signing of the Security Treaty of 1951, were incapable of meeting any significant military threat, a point clearly apparent to U.S. and Japanese officials. When the Korean War erupted and the U.S. indicated a desire for Japan to create an military force of some 350,000, the reaction of Prime Minister Yoshida (despite statements clearly more pro-military than many of his contemporaries) was to resist not only the size, but the envisioned scope of use of those forces.²⁰⁷ More broadly, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty and

²⁰⁴Informal Memorandum (document no. F760006-0327) handed by Secretary Acheson to British Ambassador dated December 24, 1949, (marked personal and confidential) which discusses many of these issues in a Cold War context and solicits British assistance in arranging the peace conference in reel 10 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

²⁰⁵By 1951, the U.S. had made plain its resolve to retain Japan within the construct of the West and, if necessary, confront communism in Asia with military force. Japan, the chief benefactor of that resolve, would have little incentive to either bear greater costs or disturb the circumstances which stimulated American largess provided its security was adequate and its sovereignty was realized.

²⁰⁶See Informal Memorandum (document no. F760006-0327) from Acheson to British Ambassador dated December 24, 1949, in reel 10 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

²⁰⁷John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigen and the Japanese Experience, 1879-1954* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 365-400. The size of the forces that Dulles suggested was far in excess of what Japan needed for internal purposes, and, since the U.S. already had committed itself to the external threat, few were needed for that mission. Tokyo's (and specifically Yoshida's) behavior in this respect aligns with theoretical expectations. See Brams, *Game Theory and Politics*, pp. 28, 39; Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, p. 3,

Security Treaty of 1951 were executed, the public reaction in Japan hardly considered Japan as making a military contribution; the national focus was on economic recovery. Military enterprises, having been completely discredited, foreclosed notions of collaborative military efforts from the Japanese side.²⁰⁸

Further, there were indications that Japan had little interest in fully meeting the wording of the treaty calling for greater Japanese international engagement or military development.²⁰⁹ Yoshida (as leader of the Liberal Party) explained the clause in the preamble in which the U.S. expected Japan to increasingly assure responsibility for its own defense as "an expectation" that had no binding force in international law.²¹⁰

As to acceptance as a military ally by other nations, there was little indication that such a condition would be forthcoming. No East Asian nation wanted a resurgent

15-16, 34, 125; Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, p. 14; and Rapoport, *Fights, Games and Debates*, pp. 121-29.

²⁰⁸*Ibid.*

²⁰⁹Indeed, there were powerful drawbacks. Such development was of marginal value in meeting an external threat, constituted a potential domestic challenge, was politically unpopular, consumed financial resources better used elsewhere, discounted regional relations, made more negative the strategic dialogue with the communists, and set precedents that might pose continual future problems.

²¹⁰See Liberal Party's official position in statement of September 20, 1951, as reported in the *Nippon Times*, September 21, 1951. For further discussion see George R. Packard III, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 21. In all, Yoshida's comments are behavior characteristic of the "free rider" phenomenon and express a specific intent for Japan to remain the small power in an alliance.

Japan,²¹¹ and none were willing to fight for her.²¹²

If the U.S. were to realize its global strategy of containing communism, it would have to do two things: retain Japan within its sphere of influence, and simultaneously assuage the fears of potential allies. This meant insuring Japan's security while simultaneously insuring the security of potential allies from a resurgent Japan. Largely because of Secretary of State Dulles's successful efforts in crafting a series of military alliances (e.g., ANZUS), the U.S. could mediate the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Given these circumstances, the security treaty was an essential part of the larger peace settlement.

Most significantly, Japan wanted a security treaty with the United States. Japanese officials became convinced that a separate peace settlement (one without communist participation) was inevitable, if not ideally desirable. It seemed plain that such a settlement required a U.S. guarantee of Japan's security through military bases in Japan.²¹³ The visit of Mr. Dulles, Secretary Johnson and General Bradley to finalize the particulars was in progress when major hostilities erupted in Korea on the 25th, the

²¹¹The commentaries of many of the attending states at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference are stuffed with references, allusions and admonitions hostile to any form of Japanese military power. For representative samples see the Commentaries of the Australian Delegation for Plenary sessions 1, 2 and 3, Enclosures to basic document titled "Treaty of Peace with Japan" in folder marked "Japanese Peace Treaty, San Francisco, 1951" in reel 11 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

²¹²The U.S. had been trying (without success) to arrange a Pacific alliance structure that included Japan. See DOS, position paper, "Position of the Department of State on United States Policy Toward a Japanese Peace and Security Settlement," undated, but contents indicate May, 1950, p. 9, in reel 10 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

²¹³This was accomplished, but the details still remained the subject of intense negotiations. See DOS, Telegram #1649, from the United States Political Advisor to SCAP (Sebald) to DOS, Washington, D.C., Tokyo, February 8, 1952, subject: [not given but covers details of disposition of U.S. forces in Japan pursuant to the Administrative Agreement], in *ERUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1141-44.

UN acted with respect to that outbreak, and the entry of U.S. forces galvanized opinions.

The outbreak of major hostilities in Korea on June 25 brought home to the Japanese as nothing heretofore has done the real problems involved in maintaining national security. The gradual trend toward a more realistic consideration of the peace treaty and security questions, . . . assumed almost overnight a concrete, positive expression. . . . virtually the entire press, with the exception of "Asahi," had swung to the view that the Korean war was a graphic object lesson to Japan and that hereafter, however desirable an over-all peace and permanent neutrality might appear, Japan's only salvation lies in a treaty settlement with those powers willing to conclude peace and in unqualified dependance upon the armed strength of the United States for security.²¹⁴

From a security point of view, the Japanese regarded the outbreak of hostilities in Korea with mixed feelings. While they thought the conflict might increase their bargaining leverage during peace treaty negotiations, they also were discomfited because the hostilities might draw Japan into another conflict.

There were other features of strategic import. For example, the outbreak of hostilities illustrated that the military aspects of Japan's security were real. It was no longer a question of whether military forces were need, only whether suitable military capabilities (forces and bases) were provided by Japan or another. The already heavy U.S. involvement insured U.S. attention would be directed primarily at keeping access to the bases in Japan thereby providing the requisite support for sufficient forces in the theater to meet military requirements. Moreover, a sense of urgency would attend negotiations. In all, Japan's security needs were going to be met without Japan bearing

²¹⁴DOS, Dispatch, [no number], subject: Reaction to Top Level Tokyo Talks, Tokyo, July 14, 1950, pp. 4, in reel 2 of C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956, UPA.

any real expense, since the bases used by the U.S. would have to be used in any event by some military force securing Japan.²¹⁵

In some ways, the outbreak of hostilities simplified issues. For example, it rendered largely academic issues of neutrality and basing since U.S. forces already were flying missions out of Japanese airfields. Similarly, the strong U.S. response evaporated doubts about the U.S. willingness to uphold its Far Eastern policies, a development clearly enhancing Japan's security. However, those U.S. actions simultaneously polarized the Japanese. Those who saw alignment with the U.S. as protective were opposed by those who saw it as entangling.²¹⁶

To the Japanese Government, Korea probably seemed but a closer geographical example of communist expansion, to which a defenseless Japan was more enticement than deterrent. U.S. and communist actions in the Far East had made it plain that Japan would not, could not, be "left out of it." Although there was danger of entanglement from being aligned with the U.S., there was danger from entanglement in any event. Clearly, it was better to chance entanglement from a position of strength than from a position of weaknesses.

Not surprisingly, Yoshida's government took a pragmatic course in supporting the treaty. As the details became better known and supported, Yoshida's government

²¹⁵In a sense, the bases were a collective good which Japan could hardly deny, while the U.S. forces and the use of the bases were a reciprocal collective good. This arrangement continued to function, indeed, was formalized by, the 1951 Security Treaty. With its going into force, both the U.S. and Japan achieved their strategic aims.

²¹⁶There is wishful thinking here. Because Japan was where it was and what it was it was already involved.

gained backers. However, the war's outbreak compelled a step that Japanese officials, particularly political officials, hoped to avoid, i.e., publicly²¹⁷ acknowledging their recognition of complete dependence upon the U.S. for security.²¹⁸ This acknowledgment surrendered to the Socialists the *principle* of an overall peace treaty and lent an appearance of the Socialist Party as more nationalistic (if less practical) than the Liberal Party.²¹⁹

Thus, deeply imbedded in the peace-making process was a conundrum. Japan needed an alliance with the U.S. for its security. Yet, a U.S.-Japan military alliance seemed to run counter to the main democratic reform of the Occupation, the Japanese Constitution. In effect, the U.S. was placed in the position of being seen as renegeing on idealistic objectives.²²⁰

And, there were other disturbing aspects. There were influential Japanese who

²¹⁷Privately Japanese officials had not only acknowledged this, they stressed Japan's *inability* to change it. See DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, document # F68806-0360, subject: Discussion of Japanese Peace Treaty with Mr. Ikeda, Finance Minister of Japan, Washington, D.C., May 2, 1950, in reel 10 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA; hereafter Memo of Peace Treaty Conversation with Minister Ikeda, 2 May 1950, DOS #F68806-0360. Nor were they to stray far from this theme during ensuing years. The rationale is transparent; for so long as Japan's security needs were met and the regional security situation involving the U.S. and its other allies unchanged, there was little incentive for Japan to do more. Indeed, there were drawbacks.

²¹⁸*Supra*, p. 152.

²¹⁹DOS, Dispatch, [no number], subject: Reaction to Top Level Tokyo Talks, Tokyo, July 14, 1950, pp. 4-7, in reel 2 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

²²⁰This may not have been an altogether unfortunate or very difficult development. Already having gone through the "reverse course" in economics and enduring the criticism for stringently curtailing the punishing aspects of the Occupation, (e.g., cancellation of reparations and reclassifying war criminals), U.S. officials may not have been overly concerned with apparent dichotomies of a policy shift having as its justification a local, ideologic, UN-sanctioned war. Elements within the U.S. Government (as well as Japan) may have regarded the outbreak of war in Korea as an opportunity that could economically stimulate Japan's economy.

favored active assistance (so-called "behind-the-lines assistance") to the U.S. and UN. Their rationale (and some concrete suggestions) for such assistance, as expressed by former Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida, was, "Unless Japan pursues an active part on the side of the United Nations in the present crisis, Japan may find itself in *complete isolation* when the Korean conflict is eventually settled." (Emphasis added.)²²¹ Among the suggestions put forward by Ashida and other influential Japanese were the formation of a Japanese volunteer force, Japan's rearmament, and the establishment of an expanded Japanese police reserve. In some degree all of these were attractive to the U.S., but (with the exception of the expansion of the police) resolutely opposed by Yoshida.²²²

At the opposite pole from Ashida was the Japanese public which wished for no revival of military features, yet, confronted by the Korean War, had no practical, widely acceptable alternative. Understanding the political unpopularity of reestablishing the military organization, politicians steered clear of supporting it. Business interests, despite needing the orders, were blocked by both internal and external restraints. And the Japanese taxpayer, still struggling to recover from the effects of military adventure,

²²¹DOS, Dispatch #220, subject: Views of Former Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida, Tokyo, August 8, 1950, p. 1, in reel 2 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

²²²DOS, Dispatch #249, subject: Japan Political Summary, July, 1950, Tokyo, August 14, 1950, p. 1, in reel 2 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA. In this matter, Yoshida may have had a better grasp of the strategic advantages accruing to Japan by its remaining dependent on the U.S. Alternatively, Ashida may have believed that being valued as a capable alliance member would enhance Japan's bonding with the U.S., which should it dissolve for whatever reason, would leave Japan with some measure of independent capability. Notably, Japan was to follow Yoshida's course, while the tack of the Federal Republic of Germany generally parallels Ashida's recommendations. Although Yoshida and Ashida were political opponents, there is also the possibility that Ashida's suggestions were ploys designed to gauge the depth of U.S. feeling regarding Japanese movement toward an independent posture.

felt there were better things on which to spend his tax monies. Japan's officials naturally resented being placed in a position that might exacerbate the already strained relations between Japan and its regional neighbors. There seemed no avoiding the problem, nor finding an immediately satisfactory solution.²²³ Yet, the Cold War, particularly the outbreak of a shooting war in Korea, allowed neither U.S. nor Japanese officials the luxuries of extended deliberation and wide choice. The military alliance became a necessary precaution²²⁴ for any peace settlement in 1950-1951.

Signed September 8, 1951, the 1951 Mutual Security Treaty, despite some misgivings and a small but vocal opposition in Japan,²²⁵ was ratified by a large majority in both Houses of the Japanese Diet. It entered into force with the peace treaty on April 28, 1952.

²²³The postwar conditions seemed to put Japan in an awkward position vis-a-vis military forces, (i.e., "can't live with them, can't live without them, "). It was a problem defying immediate and complete resolution since any accommodation was certain to be opposed to some degree by every major group, and thereby be regarded as temporary. Further, since this problem was perceived as originating from and framed by external conditions, it became a burden to the partners (particularly to the Japanese from their perspective), yet beyond their unilateral resolution.

²²⁴The preamble to Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan states, in part, Japan has this day signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers, On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed. There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore Japan desires a security treaty with the United States of America.

and,

The United States of America . . . is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

U.S. Department of State, "Security Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan, Signed at San Francisco, September 8, 1951, Coming into Force, April 28, 1952," *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, TIAS 2491, Vol. III, Part 3, 1952, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 3329-40, hereafter *U.S.-Japan 1951 MST*.

²²⁵DOS, Memo of Peace Treaty Conversation with Minister Ikeda, 2 May 1950, DOS # F68806-0360.

Only one part of complex set of agreements engineered by John Foster Dulles, the Security Treaty was a notable accomplishment embedded in the larger and more remarkable, intricate complex of similar achievements that included the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the implementing Administrative Agreement for the 1951 MST, The Treaty of Mutual Defense between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (ANZUS Pact) of 1951, and the Treaty of Mutual Defense between the United States and the Philippines (1951).²²⁶

This set of agreements enabled the achievement of three major strategic objectives. First, the U.S. provided for its own strategic security in the Far East.²²⁷ Second, the agreements gave Japan the foundation for its national security strategy.²²⁸ And third, the arrangement provided the mechanism for supporting other, possibly vulnerable, states.²²⁹ A complex amalgam interweaving a balance of fears and aspirations,²³⁰ this set of agreements had as its linchpin the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

²²⁶The final version of the San Francisco peace treaty may be found in U.S. Department of State, "Treaty of Peace with Japan," *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, TIAS 2490, Vol. III, (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 3169-3328. Earlier drafts and proposals negotiated with the other departments (especially Defense) and with other countries can be found in reels 9 and 11 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

²²⁷This was a necessary precondition since the U.S. stood as guarantor to all the others.

²²⁸In so doing, it not only directly served Japan's security strategy, but that of the U.S. as well. Indirectly, through regionally anchoring the U.S. and implicitly restraining Japan while folding Tokyo into the Western Camp, it served to secure the interests of other regional states.

²²⁹Aside from the direct benefit to those states, this arrangement facilitated Washington's implementation of its global strategy of containment.

²³⁰One example incorporating both are the arrangements made with Australia hammered out in a series of meetings during 1949-51. Particularly enlightening are the U.S. Department of State notes and memoranda of the early 1951 Presidential Mission headed by Secretary Dulles found in a folder titled "U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty," and a summary contained therein titled "Renewed Efforts to Conclude a Peace Treaty with Japan," pp. 4-5, in reel 8 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

Yet, without the other agreements (such as the ANZUS Pact) that linchpin could not have been fixed. Facing the need to placate allies, all of which Washington needed for its strategy of containment, regarding a recent enemy,²³¹ the U.S. would act both as guarantor and buffer for them all through the treaty's complex balancing mechanism. It was an odd combination, a superpower playing the necessary roles of ombudsman, guarantor, linkage and buffer.²³²

For Japan, the 1951 MST was a major strategic success. Through it the Occupation would end and Japan's sovereignty would be restored. But, more importantly, U.S. military power would remain. In this way, Japan would be protected from external and internal threats, the means to reintegrate Japan into the international community was at hand and a means to insure U.S. commitment was in place. In all, the basic framework for Japan's whole security strategy existed in that agreement. That adjustments and negotiations might refine the arrangement and that sundry efforts at maintaining stability were necessary was plain. But, as important as they might be, they remained secondary and necessarily supportive of the basic structure.

However, the Security Treaty raised questions and presented problems from the beginning. Part of these problems stemmed from the differences in understanding how,

²³¹For representative samples see the Commentaries of the Australian Delegation for Plenary Sessions 1, 2 and 3, Enclosures to basic document titled "Treaty of Peace with Japan" in folder marked "Japanese Peace Treaty, San Francisco, 1951" in reel 11 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56, UPA*.

²³²In part, this situation had structural origins since the U.S. had to actively operate strategically on several levels simultaneously, whereas Tokyo needed only be a (militarily) passive entity. This multiplicity of U.S. roles, the mandate for action, and the interconnected nature of the whole, created a "tar baby" effect which made any notion of U.S. withdrawal improbable. This profile fits Olson's criteria for a state valuing the collective good more than the costs of providing that good and, in keeping with that theory, ensured the U.S. would continue to bear the burdens.

once the treaty was in place, that the shifts in burden sharing and roles would be accomplished. Some, reading into the language, saw only the impacts and implications for their own country. Others seem to have focused on the global design without understanding the differences in national goals, while some of shorter vision were fixed on resolving issues below the strategic level. Pragmatists, both Japanese and American (and perhaps allied), understanding the strategic aspects, strove to keep the agreement intact for the obvious short and long term benefits.

In sum, the success of the negotiations suggest the strategic hypotheses of the U.S. and Japanese interlocked strategies coincided on a process and a dialogue, which permitted the successful execution of co-joined national strategies. The simplicity of the overall design of the bundled document belied the complexity of the multiple dialogues and processes it encompassed. In turn, this returned the focus of actors at several levels to the Administrative Agreement wherein lay the elements not only framing the bilateral effort, but those features that might cause its collapse.

It was the balancing of the strategic processes, largely through the medium of dialogue between dissimilar cultures, which became the primary common task of strategists on both sides. The immediate problems were the particular provisions of the 1951 MST and the effect they had on those not comprehending the overarching value of the arrangement.

Some of these problems were inescapable. Both those opposed and favoring the

treaty pointedly noted that Japan entered it while still an occupied nation.²³³ Thus, despite the rhetoric used,²³⁴ the extent to which Japan freely entered the arrangement was cast under a cloud. Additionally, the preamble noted that,

The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan. The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.²³⁵

The notation that ". . . all nations possess the right of individual or collective self-defense . . ." and that the United States expected Japan to, ". . . increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression." obviously raised questions about Article IX, the arms-renouncing clause of the Japanese

²³³Memorandum of Conversation with Minister Ikeda, 2 May 1950, DOS # F68806-0360. In the final version the wording of the preamble included, ". . .the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan." U.S. Department of State, *U.S.-Japan 1951 MST*.

²³⁴The U.S. went to some pains to portray the treaty as a request of the Japanese. "It [the treaty] stems from a freely-reached decision on the part of the Japanese Government and the Japanese people to seek protection for an unarmed Japan against the threat of aggression." "Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, Secretary of State at the Ceremony for the Signing of the United States-Japanese Security Treaty," (for a press release), dated September 8, 1951, p. 1, in reels 9 and 11 of *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

²³⁵*U.S.-Japan 1951 MST*.

Constitution.²³⁶

The priorities assigned security considerations were implicit in the sequence of the document. The second sentence of the introduction provides the rationale for what is to follow, "On the coming into force of that treaty [of Peace with the Allied Powers] Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed." The following paragraph implicitly places the security of Japan within a larger (global) construct that primarily is the responsibility of another (the U.S.).

There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Japan.²³⁷

Yet, "irresponsible militarism" could apply to Japan (an obvious recent example), and this lent a reflexive cast to the provision which permitted the U.S. to use its forces (on request) in Japan. Moreover, there was an echo effect with respect to the rationale undergirding the other U.S. guaranteed regional treaties (e.g., ANZUS). Thus, the articles which afterwards follow reflect a priority more germane to the U.S. and its wider scope of responsibilities, than to Japan. For example, Article I states:

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East

²³⁶Even MacArthur, the chief U.S. proponent of Article IX, was vague in specifying the particulars of how this ideal was to be achieved and maintained under the conditions then existing or likely to evolve. "MacArthur's Views on a Japanese Peace Treaty," DOS Memorandum, November 2, 1949.

²³⁷U.S.-Japan 1951 MST.

and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale riots and disturbances in Japan caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.²³⁸

Granting the U.S. the right to station troops in Japan, this article also lists the two purposes for using those troops: to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East, and to the security of Japan. There is the implication that the "security of Japan" is a lesser task subsumed within the "peace and security of the Far East." This construction gave the U.S. freedom to use its forces or supplies located in Japan to meet trouble anywhere in the Far East, a necessity if the U.S. were to convince other regional states of its sincerity and capabilities.²³⁹ But there was no specific commitment to defend Japan. This seemed to place Japan in the exposed position of a minor power bearing certain risks, yet not achieving deliberate assurances of protection.

In 1951, with Washington committed to East Asian defense in Korea, (whose political, economic, and military importance were deemed secondary to those of Japan) the problem was slight. There was very little chance that the U.S. would or could

²³⁸*Ibid.*

²³⁹Obviously, the stationing of military forces in Japan reduces their time of deployment to any point in the Far East. Similarly, the basing of a combined force (ground, air, and naval elements) underscores both flexibility and commitment under varied circumstances. Lastly, the presence of U.S. military forces in Japan serves to dampen Japanese proclivities towards resurrection of a military establishment with the potential to upset regional stability, and, should such a development begin, places the U.S. literally atop it. Informal Memorandum handed by Secretary Acheson to British Ambassador, dated December 24, 1949, pp. 1-3, in reel 10 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

disengage.²⁴⁰ Nor was there much chance that war would expand off the peninsula.²⁴¹ In 1951, Japan was too weak to do much besides focus on recovery; of all things, it wanted to be left out of military struggles. By the late 1950s, Japan's stature had changed and Tokyo sought adjustment. Specifically, in the negotiations leading to the revised treaty of 1960, Japan insisted on gaining explicit U.S. assurances²⁴² for Japan's defense and a hedge against entanglement by being consulted before U.S. troops stationed in Japan became involved in a crisis outside Japan.²⁴³

Another friction was found in Article I that, in part, states,

²⁴⁰ A situation that would be underscored by history over the ensuing decades.

²⁴¹ The communists did not have the military means and probably no interest in provoking the Japanese with whom they had just closed over a decade of conflict. The U.S. administration did not have the will to expand the war, as evidenced from MacArthur's dismissal. Probing for armistice talks began in mid-summer, 1951.

²⁴² Motivations (theoretical and otherwise) for this are mixed. Greater asset value requiring greater insurance is one, as is the need to formalize de facto shifts in practical sovereignty. There is the echo of Japan's continuing drive for equality and security in seeking the same sorts of specificity found in NATO arrangements. There is also the sense of wanting the adjustments without taking on the responsibilities ordinarily incident. In this, there is a tone that in regarding Japan's circumstance as an exceptional case, that Tokyo wished to formalize that notion through an agreement with the U.S. and thereby perpetuate the considerable advantages Japan enjoyed.

²⁴³ The first exchange of notes relating to the new treaty, (exchanged January 19, 1960, between Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and Secretary of State Christian A. Herter) spelled this out.

". . . the following is the understanding of the Government of Japan concerning the implementation of Article VI thereof:

Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States Armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.

U.S. Department of State, "Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan," *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, TIAS 4509, Vol. XI, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1646-7. Notably, prior *consultation* does not constitute *concurrence*. Yet, this is a long-standing agreement (over three decades as of this writing) that caps an additional nine years of Japan allowing the presence of U.S. forces in a sovereign Japan. It seems that Japanese fear of a U.S. (particularly military) threat to Japanese sovereignty is minor and the tolerance of those forces is high.

Such [U.S.] forces may be utilized to contribute . . . assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale riots and disturbances in Japan caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.²⁴⁴

This provision was aimed at the Communists; yet, despite the caveating language, this provision rankled patriotic Japanese.²⁴⁵

However, in 1951, the Japanese Government probably saw utility in the provision, (provided it was not abused), and thus, did not strenuously object.²⁴⁶ The non-confrontational management of this provision was a significant success. By the late 1950s, with the domestic strategic political, economic, and security factors assured, Tokyo successfully sought to remove the unnecessary provision.

Article I and Article III left the practical arrangement for the stationing of troops in Japan to a subsequent administrative agreement.²⁴⁷ Since the details of stationing foreign troops were more likely to generate objections, the government's

²⁴⁴U.S.-Japan 1951 MST.

²⁴⁵Negative reaction to this point seems somewhat surprising considering the caveats governing its implementation seem to protect Japanese sovereignty. This provision was never invoked and no U.S. troops were called to suppress any internal disturbances after the 1951 Peace and Security Treaties were signed. Yet criticism of and agitation against this point, predominately from the left, never ceased.

²⁴⁶The Japanese Government had been badly frightened by the demonstrated potency of the communists. The just-averted general strike, the pattern of internal subversion observed in other countries, their own political fragmentation and the extreme weakness of the Japanese police force combined into a pattern of vulnerability. Additionally, the political activity of the left was drawing a following and creating political rivals. A mechanism that could underwrite any of several forms of suppression (should the situation become serious) was a distinct advantage to the incumbents. Memorandum to Bishop from Lory dated 15 December 1948, subject: Communism in Japan Study by Hillis Lory, March 25, 1948, "A Review of Communism in Japan" pp. 23-4, Reel 5, C, *US DOS CF, Japan, Internal Affairs 1945-1949*, UPA; see also Dulles, "Trip Report," July 7, 1950, pp. 1-4, C, *US DOS CF, Japan, Internal Affairs 1945-1949*, UPA.

²⁴⁷U.S. Department of State, "Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan," Vol. III, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, TIAS 2492, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 3341-3419.

tactics were to lower visibility and, as much as possible, prearrange agreements.²⁴⁸

Thus, as an executive agreement between the two governments, the Administrative Agreement did not come before either the Diet or the Senate. It automatically went into effect with the Security Treaty, on April 28, 1952, the same day it was officially signed and publicized in entirety.

As an example of the still tentative nature of their relationship, the term of the treaty was indefinite. Of the various proposals tending toward insured commitment or avoiding entanglement, only the one of indefinite tenure was satisfactory to all.²⁴⁹

One of the greatest potential frictions was the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. Although this had unattractive aspects to everybody, there was no way around the issue. There was no other solution that provided Japan the surety of American commitment, nor was there any other geo-strategic location from which the U.S. could base and insure Japan's denial to the communists. In negotiating the Administrative Agreement, the U.S. was sensitive to Japanese sensibilities,²⁵⁰ yet resolute in insuring the minimum objectives of the U.S. were met, i.e., that none of the provisions of the

²⁴⁸This aptly fit the Japanese cultural pattern. As Michael Blaker points out, ". . . a preference for behind-the-scenes maneuvering; a penchant for meticulous planning; and . . . decision-making meetings that have been artfully rigged ahead of time," Michael K. Blaker, "Probe, Push, and Panic: The Japanese Tactical Style in International Negotiations," *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, ed. Robert A. Scalapino, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 60-7.

²⁴⁹This is hardly surprising. Tokyo, having gotten its core strategic concerns satisfied, had a very real interest in retarding any development that might increase Japan's vulnerability. The U.S., looking to global and regional concerns, could not compromise its position.

²⁵⁰DOS Dispatch #415, "Japanese Reluctance to Concede Total Jurisdiction Over the American Security Force," September 20, 1951, in reel 11 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA; hereafter DOS Dispatch #415, "Japanese Reluctance," September 20, 1951.

agreement would hamstring U.S. activities in meeting its strategic objectives. At the time the agreement was negotiated, Special Ambassador Dean Rusk noted the U.S. force "must have the capability of carrying out its military mission." Yet, he also maintained, "we shall willingly try to find arrangements for the U.S. forces in Japan which will impose the least practicable burden upon the commercial, industrial, and agricultural process by which the Japanese people must earn their livelihood."²⁵¹ The two statements effectually frame major strategic considerations. The first related to immediate military strategy, the second to the larger bilateral and regional relationship in which Japan's economic recovery was the first priority.

Rusk's statements were in keeping with Washington's overarching security objectives²⁵² which required a supportive Japan in its own, anticommunist camp (or at least not in the communist camp).²⁵³ In turn, this required a significant U.S. military

²⁵¹U.S. Department of State, "Statement by Dean Rusk, January 29, 1952," *DOS Bulletin*, Vol. XXVI, No. 659, February 11, 1952, pp. 216-217.

²⁵²These are found in NSC 13 and NSC 48/2, *NSC Papers, 1947-77*, UPA, and reiterated in DOS Memorandum "Position of the Department of State on United States Policy Toward a Japanese Peace and Security Settlement," pp. 1-12, 10-14, in reel 10 of *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA. See also National Security Council, "Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Japan," April 22, 1952, pp. 1-9, in reel 1 of *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

²⁵³The primary security objectives are found in several places. See U.S. Department of State "Japan: Policy and Information Statement," dated February 15, 1947, pp. 1-6, 15-18 and June 21, 1948, pp. 1-3; JCS "Joint Chiefs of Staff Review of United States Control Needed Over the Japanese Islands," (undated, but contents suggest September, 1947), pp. 2-4; in reel 8 of *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA. See also NSC 13/3, "Recommendations With Respect to U.S. Policy Towards Japan," dated May 6, 1949 (hereafter NSC 13/3), and NSC 49 and 49/1 (hereafter NSC 49/1), "Current Strategic Evaluation of U.S. Security Needs in Japan," in Reel 2 *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA, and reels 1 & 2 of *NSC Papers, 1947-77*, UPA.

presence in Japan.²⁵⁴ Yet, the very fact of U.S. troops being in Japan was sure to generate some friction tending to undo the objectives.²⁵⁵ Thus, officials on both sides hammered at an agreement²⁵⁶ that permitted sufficient flexibility to accommodate strategic process and dialogue spurred by the knowledge that without the lodgement in Japan, the U.S. roles in the interwoven Pacific alliances could be undermined, a dire development for the security of all. Thus, the Japanese and American officials had to negotiate and carry out an agreement meeting the strategic needs of a number of nations, be supported by the Japanese people, and protect Japanese sovereignty. And all of this must be done in a way that precluded bitterness and rejection.²⁵⁷

Not surprisingly, the agreement allowed for a good deal of flexibility and consultation between the two governments. In the end, the U.S. was granted ". . . the rights, power, and authority within the facilities and areas which are necessary or

²⁵⁴JCS "Joint Chiefs of Staff Review of United States Control Needed Over the Japanese Islands," (undated, but contents suggest September, 1947), pp. 2-4; in reel 8 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA. See also NSC 13/3 and NSC 49/1, in reels 1 & 2 of *NSC Papers, 1947-77*; and memorandum from Admiral Louis Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations to Brigadier General C. V. R. Schuyler, subject: "Need for U.S. Bases in Japan Subsequent to the Withdrawal of the Army of Occupation," dated 20 February 1948, in reel 8 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

²⁵⁵Department of State and MacArthur were aware of this problem. See U.S. State Department file marked "United States Policy Toward Japan," which contains a chronological history titled, "United States Policy Toward Japan," Phase Two, Section I, B, pp. 6-8, and C, pp. 4-8, in reel 9 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

²⁵⁶The documentation of the period seems consistent in portraying a determination by both sides in finding some workable combination. It is clear that both the U.S. Department of State and Prime Minister Yoshida's administration went through considerable effort in negotiating within their own bureaucracies to distill the basic elements and find some common solution even as they negotiated with each other. Certainly such a detailed document (preamble and twenty-nine articles) would not have emerged without persistence by both parties. Additionally, the tactics of publicly revealing it only after it essentially was unstoppable suggests determination.

²⁵⁷DOS dispatch #415, "Japanese Reluctance," September 20, 1951.

appropriate for their establishment, use, operation, defense, or control," and some other rights that gave it a strong hand in carrying out the terms of the treaty.²⁵⁸

Although there were mechanisms in place that served to redress unilateral U.S. aspects, some features could be interpreted as thinly disguised extraterritoriality.²⁵⁹ Prime Minister Yoshida was (for a Japanese politician) uncharacteristically frank,

What's wrong in giving extraterritoriality rights to the American garrison forces? It is only natural that the garrison forces should be given special privileges in return for their mission of defending Japanese independence.²⁶⁰

But this did not still the opposition.²⁶¹ And, not surprisingly, it remained a recurring theme in communist propaganda.

.. *World Communist Reactions to the U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty of 1951* - U.S. objectives and maneuvers with respect to the Soviet Union during the period leading into the San Francisco Peace Conference are an interesting display of gestures toward gaining Soviet acceptance and (perhaps) agreement, while simultaneously displaying

²⁵⁸ However, even the Administrative Agreement did not complete the security arrangements. It was not until July 26, 1952, that an agreement was reached (after five months of talks) by the Joint Committee on the question of the number (not more than 1,400) and location (those currently occupied by U.S. personnel) of bases to be used by U.S. forces.

²⁵⁹ Japanese negotiators struggled against several of these, notably the proposals under Article XXII that would give the U.S. control over Japanese forces in the event of a war in the "Japan area," and Article XV dealing with criminal jurisdiction. They were successful in changing the wording or limiting the scope in most cases. See DOS Memorandum with attachment Washington, January 22, 1952, subject: Memorandum of Telephone Conversations with Mr. Lovett and the President," *ERUIS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, pp. 1110-12; DOS Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, Washington, January 22, 1952, *ERUIS, 1952-54*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, pp. 1112-13; DOS Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State, Washington, February 9, 1952, subject: "Collective Defense Measures with Japan," *ERUIS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, pp. 1147-49; and DOS Memorandum, Tokyo, February 23, 1952, subject: "Informal Discussion with Japanese Delegation Concerning Administrative Agreement Negotiations," *ERUIS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, pp. 1188-90.

²⁶⁰ DOS Dispatch # 1297, (no subject) March 20, 1952, p. 2, in reel 11, C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

²⁶¹ DOS Dispatch #415, "Japanese Reluctance," September 20, 1951.

determination to prevent Moscow from gaining any significant point of influence or leverage by way of the settlement.²⁶² Although U.S. officials deliberately "left the door ajar" for any Soviet overture, hostile communist reactions and their attempts to derail the conference insured the Cold War would deepen and further solidify in the Far East. After NSC 13/3 (Recommendations with respect to U.S. Policy toward Japan), and in conjunction with a series of other NSC documents, U.S. considerations of legal niceties vis-a-vis the USSR were rendered progressively less probable.²⁶³

Moscow's objections were made in such way as to portray the pact as an Anglo-American imperialistic plot having the further exploitation of Asians as its goal. The communists objected that the PRC was not a participant, that the treaty lacked guarantees against future Japanese aggression, and that it should have awarded Taiwan to the PRC.²⁶⁴ Moscow objected to the U.S. disinclination to press for reparations, and played on Japanese fears about involvement in another war and on the U.S. tiredness for the Korean War. For example, on December 12, 1951, the head of the Soviet

²⁶²U.S. Department of State documentation in this theme is extensive. A comprehensive assembly is found in the folder titled "Peace Treaty with Japan, San Francisco, 1951," which makes up the majority of reel 11 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA. See also "MacArthur's Views on a Japanese Peace Treaty," Memorandum, November 2, 1949, in reel 10 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

²⁶³For examples, see NSC 20/4 (U.S. Objectives with Respect to USSR to Counter Soviet Treats to U.S. Security), NSC 48/2 (The Position of the U.S. with Respect to Asia)[covering the control of trade with communist countries], and NSC 49/1 (Current Strategic Evaluation of U.S. Security Needs in Japan). *NSC Papers, 1947-77*, UPA.

²⁶⁴Pressing for a U.S. accommodation of the communist Chinese while the Korean War was in progress is an improbable consideration. Similarly, it is illogical that the U.S. post-treaty force, which Washington was determined to maintain in as well as near Japan and which was objected to by the Soviets, did not provide a guarantee against a resurgent Japanese military. It seems clear that the USSR had a major intent to use the conference as a propaganda platform with hopes either of wrecking the conference, or causing disaffection among the Western allies.

delegation A. Gromyko asserted to the Second Plenary Session of the San Francisco Peace Conference that he had received a petition representing five million Japanese who had objected to a unilateral peace treaty imposed on Japan. He warned ominously that the treaty ". . . sowed the seeds of a new war in the Far East." ²⁶⁵ Washington expected such maneuvers and was prepared to rebut possible Soviet ploys and arguments. ²⁶⁶

As for the security treaty, the communists claimed that it revealed the aggressive U.S. design on the world, and aimed at reviving Japanese militarism. ²⁶⁷ They maintained that Washington sought to keep Japan in a state of semi-colonial subordination. The bases in Japan, they maintained, were proof of this design. ²⁶⁸

As an alternative, the Soviets offered several changes to the treaty that would

²⁶⁵"Comments of A. Gromyko, Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," in file marked "Japanese Peace Conference Briefing Book, 1951," pp. 37-60, in reel 11 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA; hereafter "Gromyko Remarks at Second Plenary Session," December 12, 1951.

²⁶⁶In a series of background and policy position papers the U.S. identified notable issues, likely arguments, probable Soviet positions and tactics, and made recommendations as to U.S. actions. It is notable that only the position of the Soviets merited a separate paper for each topic; other nations' views, positions and U.S. responses thereto were folded into the initial background document. See Section a. (Policy Review Papers) of Part III (Background Papers) in file folder marked "Japanese Peace Conference, 1951, U. A. Johnson," Intelligence Estimate No. 25, dated August 14, 1951, subject: "Implications of Soviet Participation in the Forthcoming San Francisco Conference," and CIA Memorandum from Office of Intelligence Research Estimates Group to Mr. Johnson, (undated), subject: "Estimated International Reaction to Soviet Decision to sign the US/UK Draft Treaty," in reel 11 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

²⁶⁷For an example see the text of an address titled "Comments of Mrs. Sekaninova, Representative of Czechoslovakia," presented at the Fifth Plenary Session of the San Francisco Conference, attachment to "Treaty of Peace with Japan: The San Francisco Peace Conference, 1951," in folder "Japanese Peace Conference Briefing Book, 1951," pp. 4-24, in reel 11 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

²⁶⁸The echo effect between the communist salvos and the Japanese Socialists and others opposed to U.S. military presence is obvious. DOS Dispatch #415, "Japanese Reluctance," September 20, 1951, and DOS Dispatch # 1297, March 20, 1952, p. 2, in reel 11, C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56*, UPA.

have altered the basic character of the U.S.-Japan relationship.²⁶⁹ The chief Soviet representative, A. Gromyko in his address to the Second Plenary Session of the conference specified the following: Japan was to be peace-loving and democratic in character; the democratic rights of the Japanese people were to be guaranteed (specifically by insuring that the Japanese military was limited and under complete control); the Japanese military should be limited in size and that this should be specified in the treaty (thereby guaranteeing the foregoing); there should be no limitations concerning development of Japan's peaceful economy; all limitations on Japan's trade with foreign countries should be removed; the treaty must provide that Japan will not enter any coalition directed against any of the states taking part with its armed forces in war against militaristic Japan; the treaty must precisely specify that after it is signed, all foreign troops will be removed within one year and no foreign power would have bases in Japan; and all states signing the peace treaty with Japan would support Japan's entry into the United Nations. These points were echoes of those forwarded to the U.S. by note on May 7, 1951.²⁷⁰

Although the U.S. assumed these specifics were a combination of Soviet

²⁶⁹These suggestions (which later became demands) did not surprise Washington. In the May 7, 1951, note the USSR forwarded points they deemed requisite to Soviet agreement. During the conference in San Francisco these points were revisited in detail by all communist representatives. Despite the validity of some Soviet points, the U.S. was able to push through its own positions (as it had forecasted). See translation of note from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, to Embassy of the United States of America, dated May 7, 1951, attachment to Japanese Peace Conference Briefing Book, 1951, and CIA Memorandum from Office of Intelligence Research, Estimates Group to Mr. Johnson, subject: "Estimated International Reaction to Soviet Decision to sign the US/UK Draft Japanese Treaty," in folder titled "Japanese Peace Conference, 1951, U. A. Johnson," both in reel 11 of *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56, UPA*.

²⁷⁰*Ibid.*

negotiating points and diplomatic tactics designed to scuttle U.S. efforts, these specifics also frame Soviet strategic objectives about Japan. Obviously, the objectives and positions of the USSR (and other states) were of interest to Japanese policy makers, constituting thereby strategic dialogue.²⁷¹

Several Soviet points, such as support for United Nations entry and the removal on all limitations of trade, were inducements to Japan. Others play upon Japanese fears and popular themes. Taken literally, they seem defensive in nature, in keeping with Japanese aspirations, and in tone with UN ideals. They also convey three major alterations of the Soviet position. First, the proviso that there should be a limitation on the size of the Japanese military is an inferential acknowledgment that Japan may have an armed force. Second, that Japan should be a member of the UN, connotes sovereignty. And third, failing to secure for themselves a lodgement in Japan, Moscow was resigned to an attempt at forcing a similar condition on all other parties.

All the points aligned somewhat with Japanese views, although the formalization of abridgements of sovereignty was not likely to prove popular.²⁷² In all, the Soviet points convey the message: "We'll get along provided you are peaceful, you

²⁷¹The Soviet note and address (which have essentially identical points) are examples of strategic dialogue simultaneously conducted at the global and regional levels seeking to alter both strategic process and hypothesis. As an example of strategic interaction (see Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, pp. 126-27) the Soviet-Japan activity seems plain. Moreover, the Soviet address so plainly touches on points important to Japan, that it is apparent the Soviets were working within a framework of assumptions characterized by rational-logical expectations. Yet, since the Soviets proposed some points that probably were not in their own best interest (e.g., inferential recognition of Japan's right to an armed force), there is a theoretical incongruity with the expected behavior delineated in collective goods theory; cf., *ibid.*, pp. 25-32.

²⁷²Perhaps the Soviets believed that these would prove more acceptable to the Japanese than the presence of foreign troops on Japanese soil.

don't threaten us in any way, and you focus on economics." To underscore its message, the Soviets sent top caliber representatives to the San Francisco Conference²⁷³ who pointedly reiterated each element.²⁷⁴ In short, the U.S. may have had its way at the conference, but the Soviets had their say.

The importance of this general Soviet theme to the Japanese should not be underestimated. Prime Minister Yoshida's remarks after the Peace Conference and signing the Security Treaty²⁷⁵ take no issue with the Soviet points. Instead, his remarks imply that the security provisions were inescapable at that time. In following years, Japanese activity (and lack of it), (e.g., the expansion of Japanese military capabilities and the consistent reluctance to identify the threat as the Soviet Union), was in keeping with the Soviet message.²⁷⁶ Indeed, the major message of the Soviet points was

²⁷³"Soviet Reply to Invitation," Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 27, dated August 12, 1951, subject: "Soviet Acceptance of Invitation to Attend San Francisco Peace Conference," Moscow, from DOS Dispatch #108, dated August 13, 1951, in file titled, "Japanese Peace Conference Briefing Book, 1951," in reel 11 of C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56, UPA.

²⁷⁴"Gromyko Remarks at Second Plenary Session," December 12, 1951.

²⁷⁵Prime Minister Yoshida, in addressing the opposition to the Security Treaty (particularly the clause in the preamble wherein the U.S. expected Japan to increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense and the provision allowing stationing of U.S. forces in Japan) noted that the matter of Japan's rearmament *should* be submitted to the will of the people *at some later date* when Japan's economy *permitted* its consideration (emphasis added). The Liberal Party made its official position known in a statement in the *Nippon Times* (September 21, 1951), pp. 1-2. The Government followed on September 21, 1951, making its statement through the Foreign Office, and in explaining the treaty terms, unambiguously asserted that the treaty ". . . did not *require* Japan to rearm." (emphasis added).

²⁷⁶Other measures in keeping with this theme include Tokyo's reluctance at including in its peace treaty with China the Beijing-desired proviso identifying the USSR as a hegemonist power, Japan's holding its defense expenditures to 1 per cent of its GNP, and its decision to forgo acquisition of nuclear weapons. Nor was Japan's course short-lived or much altered by administration. As an example of continuity, Yasuhiro Nakasone, in his inaugural address before the Diet on Dec 3, 1982, said,

Our fundamental stance concerning security is to maintain the Japan-U.S. security structure and work for building up higher-quality defense capability within the limits of our self-defense needs. Meanwhile, we will see to it that *Japan will not become a major military power or cause a military threat to our neighbors* (emphasis added). Moreover, we will maintain our basic policy of

precisely the tack Japan wished to take.²⁷⁷

As expected, Communist China, while adding its own particulars, echoed the Soviet attack. China's new leaders could not be comforted by the vision of the U.S. (with which China was engaged in conflict) united with and rebuilding Japan (with whom they had just finished a decade of conflict). There seemed little prospect of any developments favorable to China in such an arrangement. Beyond the obvious military advantages of U.S. forces removed from Japan (which would hamper U.S. support for the Korean War or any other confrontation in East Asia), other points (e.g., limits for Japanese forces, territorial reversions, open trade with Japan, and the recognition of the Peoples Republic of China as the sole, legitimate China) all favored evident Chinese policies. That the U.S. frustrated all these while folding Japan into its camp discomfited Beijing.

Neither could the Soviets be comforted. By the early 1950s, it was plain that Japan could and probably would economically recover. Yet, there was little which the USSR could do to derail that recovery.²⁷⁸ Of additional concern to the communists was that with the assistance of the U.S., the direction of Japan's recovery suggested most of

peaceful diplomacy and contribute to international efforts for disarmament. Eitaro Masuyama, "Nakasone's Foreign Policy," *Asia Pacific Community*, (Winter, 1983), pp. 122. In all, there was the deliberate attempt to play the situation on both sides as safely as possible.

²⁷⁷In this, the Soviet strategic dialogue much resembled that of the U.S. to Japan, both offering what Japan wanted. However, where Soviet influence was essentially negative, the U.S. could and did offer positive inducements; the negative pressure the U.S. might bring was never overt (it did not have to be). Herein the U.S. and the Soviets were similar in framing their dialogues with Japan within a rational-logical construct, and Japan's response was in similar vein.

²⁷⁸At that point the communists' chances were nil; they had tried earlier with union penetration, labor agitation, ideological indoctrination of prisoners of war, and the general strike, and failed.

the economy would feature industrialization and mercantile activity. Coming at a time when most other Asian nations were still in the initial steps to modernity, the reestablishment of Japan's regional economic primacy became matters of time, scale, and continuing contrast.²⁷⁹

Facing its own serious recovery problems in the aftermath of the war, Moscow could not be pleased by the prospect of a rising, possibly hostile, power on its border. That Japan's focus was economic only partially compensated for its potential as a threat. As Japan continued to vigorously expand its economic strength, so did the nightmare version of a solid U.S.-Japanese, military-economic axis.²⁸⁰

Yet, there was an additional strategic facet. A recovered, economically-oriented and vibrant Japan was of far more value than an unimproved one. If Japan could be made to support the communist effort, its capabilities might defray all manner of shortcomings experienced by either the USSR or PRC. Accordingly, Soviet ploys were to accentuate Japanese opportunity (which was ongoing anyway), seek a militarily impotent Japan (which the other regional powers and many Japanese wanted), and attempt to decouple the U.S.-Japan military junction (which some Japanese supported).

²⁷⁹This projection was in accord with Kennan's forecasts regarding major power centers that would be capable of resisting communism through economic, political and military strength.

²⁸⁰Since economic primacy is a necessary, but not a solely sufficient condition for strategic and military primacy, the extreme vigor of Japan coupled with the considerable strength of the U.S. (with its unequaled status as an economic and military world leader) suggests that a combination between the two would have the economic and military might to dominate the region. Further, should Japan greatly expand (with or without extensive rearmament) the combination (particularly with NATO already firmly tied to the U.S.) potentially would be able to outpace any technical or economic weapon that the Soviets (or other hostile power) might choose to deploy. The vision of what a solid U.S.-Japan joint effort might threaten or actually deploy, if hostile moves warranted such a response, must have been enough to give Soviet planners pause. The obvious Soviet tactic was to do all it could to rupture or degrade the U.S.-Japan relationship.

Thus, it is unsurprising that the security treaty was a target for constant Soviet and Chinese attacks during the 1950's.²⁸¹

The primary hope of the communist effort seems to have been to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Japan. Soviet tactics varied from the dangerously subtle (e.g., propaganda emphasizing themes such as Japanese nationalism and Asian separatism that could backfire on the USSR) to the blunt (e.g., no Soviet-Japanese peace treaty until the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was abrogated). Until 1956, Moscow used the existence of the treaty as a pretext for preventing Japan from joining the United Nations.²⁸²

During the 1950's, China took an approach that mixed threats and promises in a hot-and-cold relationship with Japan. Tokyo was warned that dangerous militarism under the treaty meant forfeiting all potential advantages (e.g., trade²⁸³ and cultural exchange) and would lead Japan into disaster. Successive governments in Tokyo were reminded by Beijing (and hundreds of visiting Japanese hectored) that harmonious and

²⁸¹For example, a Radio Peking broadcast to Japan on September 25, 1951, claimed that there were eleven secret clauses in the treaty giving the U.S. complete control over Japan. This report caused enough stir in Japan to warrant a denial by Prime Minister Yoshida on September 27, 1951. Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, p. 10.

²⁸²Another reason for this Soviet tactic was the desire to prevent yet another state strongly linked to the U.S. from becoming a member. Notably, by 1956 Stalin had passed from the scene, and that year saw a deliberate effort by the USSR to come to closure with Far East issues. Peace treaty talks with Japan stalled with the Japanese insistence on the return of four islands in the Kurile chain (the so-called Northern Territories); the USSR refused to offer more than two.

²⁸³By comparison, Japan's trade with China in 1950 totaled some \$19.6 million or about 2 per cent of Japan's total export trade that year. This compares with about 33 per cent of Japan's trade in the prewar 1930s. The growth potential was obvious as were reciprocal commercial aspects such as raw material supply, manufacturing capabilities, actual and potential markets, and technology flows. Inferentially, other reciprocal aspects has significance. DOS, Memorandum subject: Japan's Trade with China, June 23, 1951, in reel 2, C, *DOS SF, NEA 1943-1956*, UPA.

profitable relations could result if the security treaty were terminated.²⁸⁴ The intention of this anti-treaty propaganda was to appeal to the pacifist and neutralist sentiment in Japan, goad Japan's national pride, and appeal to Japan's economic needs.²⁸⁵

.. *Popular Japanese Reaction to the Treaties* - By 1951, (with the boost provided by Korean War orders) Japan was making a remarkable economic recovery. A new kind of nationalism (liberal and anti-imperialist) was beginning to emerge. The period of shock, tragedy, and the struggle for survival was past.²⁸⁶ Yet, in 1951, the Japanese people lacked national consensus on about almost everything except being Japanese, generating and maintaining economic growth, and avoiding military entanglements.²⁸⁷ The loss of the war had created political and social vacuums that all types of extremists rushed to fill. It was a time of great flux, and, necessarily, weak national ideological defenses. Meanwhile, the vast majority of Japanese ignored (as far

²⁸⁴ Abolition of the security treaty was only one of the changes demanded by the PRC; others, had they been accomplished, would have isolated the U.S., Korea and Japan in Asia, and given Beijing a free hand with Taiwan. Although Chinese suasion was effective with a sector of Japan's business and political elite, nothing that China could offer could exceed the advantages of maintaining the U.S.-Japan relationship. Further, nothing that the Chinese could threaten could exceed that which the U.S. might bring to bear. Last, the U.S. could protect Japan (economically, militarily, and politically) from China; the reverse was not the case.

²⁸⁵ The effectiveness of suasion based on these interrelated themes was a serious topic to Washington. Nineteen NSC documents between 1946 and 1952 touched on China-related matters, and three specifically addressed trade with China, noting the strong pull economic matters exercised by the complimentary aspects and prewar situation. NSC 41/1 (United States Policy Regarding Trade with China), NSC 69 (Export Controls and Security Policy), and NSC 92 (The Position of the United States Regarding a Blockade of Trade with China) in reel 2 of *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56, UPA*; see also reels 1-2 of *NSC Papers, 1947-77, UPA*.

²⁸⁶ DOS, draft policy document, subject: United States Policy Toward a Peace Settlement With Japan, September 17, 1947, pp. 2-4, in reel 8 of *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56, UPA*.

²⁸⁷ This was a source of comment by U.S. Department of State observers of the Japanese Diet process who noted the incoherent aspects of Japanese political parties, including Prime Minister Yoshida's government. DOS, Policy and Information Statement, subject: Japan, Tokyo, June 21, 1948, p. 4, in reel 8 of *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-56, UPA*.

as they could) the extremists, politics, and the inflow of new ideas and customs.

Culturally conditioned to accept reforms and government policy as "handed down" rather than springing from below, the Japanese people accepted the treaties as they had the Occupation reforms, passively and obediently.²⁸⁸ As the first, important and independent step in putting the defeat and aftermath behind them, the peace treaty was welcomed.²⁸⁹

The security treaty, clearly a condition of the peace treaty, was accepted by the Japanese with resignation and in the belief that it could not be avoided.²⁹⁰ The fact that the treaty seemed unavoidable made it less obnoxious to many Japanese. As for the presence of American troops and bases, there was the feeling that Japan could not²⁹¹ insist on the removal of the very forces that were "giving" her the peace treaty.²⁹²

²⁸⁸ During a conversation on October 31, 1947, Dr. Hitoshi Ashida, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Takizo Matsumoto Parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed the hope for an early peace treaty, but both were given to believe that it would not be negotiated; it would simply be announced and Japan would sign it. Enclosure to DOS Dispatch #1380, dated November 6, 1947, from POLADV for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "Memorandum of Conversation with Members of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 6, 1947," reel 3, C, *DOS CF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

²⁸⁹ Press release comments of Prime Minister Yoshida at the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference, enclosure to "Japanese Peace Conference Briefing Book, 1951," in reel 11 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

²⁹⁰ The Japanese press was pragmatic. The September 10, 1951, issue of the *Tokyo Shimbun* said, "There will be misgivings, both within and outside Japan about the stationing of troops on our territory, but it is also clear that there is simply no other way to protect Japan's security today." The *Yomiuri* (September 10, 1951) felt that Japan's security had been guaranteed against the danger created by the power vacuum and added that "A certain part of the world still acts with Machiavellian tactics, stopping at nothing to gain its ends."

²⁹¹ DOS, Dispatch (number illegible), subject: Reaction to Top Level Tokyo Talks, Tokyo, July 14, 1950, p. 4, in reel 2 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

²⁹² MacArthur may have had much to do with the formation of this attitude. His personification of imperial authority, direct intervention in drafting the Japanese Constitution, and deliberate personal isolation were historical echos of the autocratic power of the shogunates. Citing other reasons to the Department of State through their representative H. Borton, he attempted to secure for himself a role as "an advisor and chief

Those forces were accepted by some simply as part of the price to be paid for defeat in war. But acceptance is not necessarily willful partnership, nor is public opinion considered government policy.

For many officials, concluding the security treaty was not just resignation or prudence; Japan was fortunate to gain the U.S. as a security partner. Prime Minister Yoshida bluntly commented, "I hope you are convinced that Japan can be assured of its national independence and security *only* by means of concluding the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the subsequent Administrative Agreements in implementation of the Treaty."²⁹³ (Emphasis added.)

Absent from popular Japanese attitudes toward the treaty were the feelings that this would be a good way to contribute to the defense of the free world or to strengthen the cause of democracy. Those who looked to Japan to recognize and bear its share of burden of a common stake in the world order were in for a disappointment. It seems more that Japan, in looking after its own interests from the narrow perspective of a weak, maritime and insular state, sought to insure that it would be a protected participant in the future.²⁹⁴

That this would be the case is unsurprising; such action aligned with the two

contact with the Japanese Government." DOS, Memorandum, from H. Borton to General Hilldring and Mr. Vincent, subject: "General MacArthur's Views on Procedure for Japanese Peace Treaty," May 6, 1947, pp. 1-3, in reel 8 of C, *DOS CF, Japan, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949*, UPA.

²⁹³DOS, Dispatch # 1297, subject: (not given, but concerns domestic Japanese political affairs), March 20, 1952, p. 2, in reel 11, C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

²⁹⁴DOS, Dispatch #220, August 8, 1950, subject: "Views of Former Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida," p. 1, reel 2 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

consistent strategic themes of Japan's diplomatic history. Too, there was the same reluctance to become involved in the East-West confrontation after the war (as in purely Western confrontations before it). When added to the deep postwar desire to avoid militarism and war, neutralism seemed to many as the best strategy for Japan. Yet, others, perhaps recognizing the interlocked and interdependent natures of their strategies understood that neutralism hazarded a distancing from Washington dangerous to Japan's military security and its reintegration into the world's economic community.

Thus, if Japan were to gain military security and economically recover, treaties were necessary. If the treaties initially were lopsided, perhaps a later renegotiation might redress inequities. In this, it seems that Japan and the U.S. were very aware that change would come and that through strategic dialogue and processes, adjustments would be made. It was a testament and a commitment to common effort. It was, perhaps, these factors that underlay the statements by the treaty's leading Japanese proponents, since they all emphasized the treaty was a provisional, unconventional, irregular, but unavoidable step for Japan. Not to take the step was to perpetuate the occupation status quo, itself a unsatisfactory option.

Thus, one would expect, the security treaty with its asymmetries and foreign troops,²⁹⁵ would be tolerated, but only for a brief period and as part of a process toward

²⁹⁵Initially, it seemed that no one would be happy about U.S. soldiers staying on in Japan. The Truman administration sought to cut budget expenditures that retaining troops in Japan would frustrate. The American public continued the popular clamor to "bring the boys home." Japanese (of whatever political complexion) had little desire to have foreign troops on their soil. See DOS Dispatch, #415, USPOLAD, Tokyo to DOS Washington, D.C., September 20, 1951, subject: Japanese Reluctance to Concede Total Jurisdiction Over the American Security Force, in reel 3 of C, *US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA; hereafter DOS Dispatch #415, subject: Japanese Reluctance to Concede Total Jurisdiction. The communists'

national recovery. However, what was absent was any other workable option.

Because this step was necessary and unavoidable, it also was necessary to prevent any opposition from frustrating its passage or compromising its structure. One technique used was by publicly revealing the treaty in stages. This prevented it from being seen in entirety until well after all arrangements had become *faits accomplis*. The treaty's final text was kept secret until it was signed,²⁹⁶ and then it rode the wave of satisfaction that greeted the peace treaty and the coming of independence.²⁹⁷ This second tactic was used with similar effect for the Administrative Agreement, but there the criticism, which was sharper, was effectually vented by administrative slight-of-hand. Critics directed their fire against the "one-sided peace" rather than at the security arrangements. It is not surprising that Prime Minister Yoshida was criticized for his "vague and arrogant" responses in the Diet; as a key figure in the entire process, his

opportunities were foreclosed by U.S. troop presence. Other Asian states had very mixed feelings, sensing that while U.S. troops served to restrain Japan and commit the U.S. to regional security matters, their presence also demonstrated a broad U.S. commitment to Japan that more rightfully was due them.

²⁹⁶In part, this was not just skullduggery. It also was a function of negotiation tactics and national politics. The speed, accuracy and comprehensiveness of "leaks" to the press tended to compromise positions taken by one or both sides. U.S. officials were to complain of Prime Minister Yoshida's use of such leaks to advance domestic political agendas, but his actions accord with theoretical expectations as suggested by Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, pp. 138-42, and the observation, "'Disinterested' groups and politics are impossible. . . insofar as politics is the politics of groups, all politics is the politics of interest groups." Alfred de Grazia, "Nature and Prospects of Political Interest Groups," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. CCCXIX (September 1958), p. 113. See also Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 145; Herbert Goldhamer and Edward A. Shils, "Types of Power and Status," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XLV, (1939), pp. 171-76.

²⁹⁷Although discussed in terms of a political figure rather than an issue, this technique seems to be a variation of phenomena related to "peaking" and "bandwagon effects" sketched in Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, pp. 109-14, and Japanese officials functioning much as dual entrepreneurs with not only the negotiated issues dependent on the outcome, but the authority within Japan's bureaucracy.

special knowledge and that he had much at risk in the effort virtually assured that stance.

Popular objections to the treaty tended to focus on practical aspects such as the danger of Japan's being dragged into a new war.²⁹⁸ Doubts also were expressed over the inconsistency between Japan fully independent yet having foreign garrisons on her soil.²⁹⁹ Some, with an eye to economics (and perhaps regional balances), regretted that the treaty would make relations with Communist China more difficult. Other questions focused on typical "small power" considerations such as how much help the United States could be to Japan in case of a nuclear war (and vice versa), and a linked concern about becoming America's first line of defense. Yet, despite these anxieties, there was surprising support for the treaty.³⁰⁰

In all, these were significant issues as each of them related to a national goal and, implicitly, the attendant strategic considerations. Yet, once these issues were stripped to basics, Yoshida and the newspapers may have grasped the core issue in

²⁹⁸It was precisely this concern (and tangentially that of sovereignty) that led Japanese representatives to make their greatest arguments against Article XXII (Defense Measures) during the negotiations of the Administrative Agreement. In some respects the issues of this article sum up the needs of the U.S. and the fears of the Japanese regarding security. For two revealing conversations see Telegram, from the U.S. Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald), Tokyo, to the DOS, Washington, D.C., dated February 17, 1952, summarizing a ". . . most serious talk with Okazaki and Nishimura sub Art XXII."; and Memorandum of Conversation, by Counselor of the Mission in Japan [Bond], subject: "Informal Discussion with Japanese Delegation Concerning Administrative Agreement Negotiations," dated February 18, 1952, wherein Okazaki mentions that a public commitment to that effect would sound the "death knell" of the Liberal Party, in *ERUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, part 2, (1985), pp. 1171-3 and 1175-9 respectively.

²⁹⁹See DOS Dispatch #415, subject: Japanese Reluctance to Concede Total Jurisdiction.

³⁰⁰See DOS Dispatch #661, from USPOLAD, Tokyo, to DOS, Washington, D.C., October 26, 1951, subject: Japan Political Summary, September 1951, pp. 1-6, in reel 3 of *C, US DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

recognizing that there was no other way.

Asserting extensive connectivity between the treaty and a whole range of domestic and foreign problems is tempting. True, those connections exist, but gaining a treaty restored sovereignty, a necessary first step for a recovering nation. Yet, the treaty was more than a formality; its details and strategic implications made it the first great choice in the postwar era. In that regard, it affected the social, economic, and political character of the nation for years to come. Moreover, as conditions changed, Japan's leadership worked at maintaining its strategic links with Washington, and the wisdom of the initial strategic hypotheses were borne out.

On both sides, security considerations permeated all aspects of the U.S.-Japan relationship. The focus on process and the clear requirements for dialogue with the U.S., makes clear that the peace treaty, the security treaty, and the administrative agreement, all necessary elements, formed segments of Japan's national security strategy. The related questions dealing with the nature and extent of the threats to Japan, U.S. assistance, and the degree of domestic control all pertain to strategic process. Additionally, the host of questions about Japan's security, clearly connected to the treaty both before and after its signing,³⁰¹ suggest not only its role as a step in strategic process, but lend a pervasive sense of urgency to the whole matter.

It was those unresolved issues, whose solutions had to be worked out in some future process, that explicitly describe this period of Japanese activity as strategy.

³⁰¹Ibid., pp. 3-14.

Notably, Japan's external and internal dialogues continually posed and addressed questions and challenges; all of which led to the same end. Thus, at multiple levels, a dialogue and a process emerged focusing on how, not if, these goals would be accomplished. Moreover, having set the basic design and structure of their strategies, both Tokyo and Washington were concerned lest some twist might compromise the balances achieved.

Japanese officials quickly realized the bulk of their efforts would not focus on the U.S. officials, rather on managing perceptions of their own public. In this they were successful, but the path hardly was smooth.³⁰²

The stakes for Japan's officials were significant. Already committed by treaty and with U.S. forces resident at bases throughout Japan, Japan's officials had to be successful lest major goals of sovereignty be abridged, security imperiled, and economic progress stunted. Thus, Tokyo strove to accommodate the particulars of its varied constituencies, but not jeopardize the very favorable strategic structure.³⁰³

³⁰²Criticism was widespread. U.S. officials in Japan commented that, "comment from [Japanese political] opposition unfavorable, generally critical, sometimes bitter." Newspapers such as *Mainichi* and *Asahi* attacked it on basis of not accurately reflecting Japanese national sentiment and sovereignty; "there is not a clause in [the] agreement that reminds us of [the] appearance of [an] independent Japan." Telegram from the U.S. Political Advisor to SCAP (Sebald), Tokyo, to DOS, Washington, D.C., February 17, 1952, in *ERUS, 1952-1955*, Vol. XIV, part 2, (1985), pp. 1194-5.

³⁰³This placed the Japanese Government in the unusual position of presenting the presence of U.S. troops as a collective good the price for which was public inconvenience to be largely paid for by the Japanese polity. Fortunately, in its efforts, Tokyo was aided by U.S. actions. The U.S. support of Japan immediately after the war and the support for Korea, a consistently sensitive area in terms of Japan's security, were perceived by many Japanese as demonstrations of U.S. commitment and sincerity. Indeed, in the late 1960's, the importance of Korea to Japan's security was openly acknowledged by Prime Minister Sato both in the Nixon/Sato communique and in a major political speech, "[In the event Korea were attacked] the security of Japan would be seriously affected, . . . that the policy of the government of Japan towards prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition." Richard L. Sneider, *U.S.-Japanese Security Relations: A Historical Perspective* (New York: Occasional Papers of

Moreover, although Japan enjoyed a highly advantageous security milieu with the U.S. serving as guarantor and international ombudsman, should public reaction or domestic political opposition sour the considerate attitudes of U.S. officials (like Rusk), the atmosphere could change. Negative reactions could generate a U.S. backlash fueled by Cold War tensions and not long quiet animosities. The reality of the situation was driven home by war on Japan's doorstep. The brooding violence of the international situation made some sort of defense arrangement prudent, and the most prudent option for a small power is being on the side of the winner.³⁰⁴

The opponents to the security treaty used attacks premised on self-interest, nationalism or local considerations that inevitably appealed to Japanese across the political and social spectrum. Much of their effort focused at the individual level where, despite all the efforts and good will on both parts,³⁰⁵ U.S. forces in Japan were

the East Asian Institute, 1982), pp. 35-6.

³⁰⁴Because Japan was vulnerable, this had an absolute sense to it. For example, at a later time Nguyen Van Thieu rejected the agreement for ending the war in Vietnam that Dr. Henry Kissinger and the North Vietnamese worked out with the following:

You are a giant, Dr. Kissinger. So you can probably afford the luxury of being easy in this agreement. I cannot. A bad agreement means nothing to you. What is the loss of South Vietnam if you look at the world's map? Just a speck. The loss of South Vietnam may even be good for you. It may be good to contain China, good for your world strategy. But a little Vietnamese doesn't play with a strategic map of the world. For us, it isn't a question of choosing between Moscow and Peking. It is a question of choosing between life and death.

As found in John D. Stoessinger, *Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 68.

³⁰⁵The U.S. troops had not turned out to be the "savage fiends" of which the Japanese militarists warned. For a representative sample of contemporary sources see DOS, Monthly Political Report for May, 1951, from Sapporo Branch USPOLAD, subject: "U.S. 45th Infantry Division," dated May 31, 1951, signed D. L. Osborn, Vice Consul, pp. 1, 5; in reel 2 of C, *DOS CF, Japan, Internal Affairs, 1950-1954*, UPA.

foreign troops on Japanese soil.³⁰⁶ This fact was the root of the usual frictions and surfaced broader and more difficult problems.³⁰⁷ Since the administrative agreement (as distinct from the security treaty) was poorly received, even by non-leftists, it remained a source of public resentment and a political liability the resolution of which was difficult to attain within a domestic frame.³⁰⁸ Last, and most significantly, there was the tacit assumption the agreement was temporary. This was true not just on the Japanese side; such a notion coincided with the expectations of U.S. officials.³⁰⁹ Yet, it was precisely this assumption that was impossible.

The rub was that although there was general consensus over the temporary nature of the arrangement, there was no such consensus over a suitable alternative to follow. No one could seem to come up with a means to address objectives and concerns

³⁰⁶DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, D.C., August 24, 1955, part of the preparation for Secretary of State Dulles for the visit of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu to Washington (Aug 25-Sep 1), in ERUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, (1991), p. 86.

³⁰⁷For example, that of criminal jurisdiction, as was highlighted in the case of Private Girard, a firing range guard, who shot and killed an elderly brass picker. The importance of this case, which went to the U.S. Supreme Court, was that the transfer of trial jurisdiction to Japan was made principally on political grounds. Thus illustrating the degree to which occupation rights and policies were accommodated to political realities in Japan. See DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, President's Guest House, Washington, June 19, 1957, subject: "Girard Case," and Telegram from DOS, Washington to U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, dated July 11, 1957, no subject, but contains substance of Supreme Court Decision in Girard Case, in ERUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, (1991), pp. 368-9 and 425-6.

³⁰⁸For example, during the course of a conversation with U.S. State Department officials, Nobusuke Kishi (then Secretary General of the Democratic Party) went to some length to spell out three major sources of friction. Two of them (presence of U.S. forces and haggling over Japan's defense budget) concerned the administrative agreement. His solution was for the U.S. to leave those matters to Japan, in effect, nullify the administrative agreement. DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, D.C., August 31, 1955, subject: "Purpose of Mission to Washington; official discussion with Secretary; US-Japan relations," in ERUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, (1991), pp. 104-10.

³⁰⁹National Security Council Report, NSC 5516/1 "U.S. Policy Toward Japan," dated April 9, 1955, stated in a section titled, "Courses of Action, Military," "Encourage and assist Japan to develop military forces which will eventually be capable of assuming primary responsibility for the defense of Japan." in ERUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, (1991), p. 59.

except by stationing U.S. forces in and about Japan.³¹⁰ There were advocates of alternatives such as rearmament, neutrality, a rapprochement with the Communists, and various shades and combinations,³¹¹ but there seemed to be no single course or workable combination that had any prospect of success, and satisfied (even minimally) all major constituencies better than the concluded agreement.³¹²

Eventually, broad public agreement emerged, focusing the pursuit of improving economic conditions, keeping U.S. troops and occupied bases as few and as unobtrusive as possible, minimizing costs to Japan, sometime revising the treaty,³¹³ and insuring Japan would not get tied to a Pacific-wide pact that might lead to involvement

³¹⁰On the U.S. side, the outbreak of the Korean War dispelled notions of security that were not underwritten by military power. Even before then, there was strong consideration given to retention of access, if not bases, in and about Japan. see DOS, Memorandum to Department of Defense, October 3, 1949, subject: "Essential Security Requirements of the United States in a Peace Settlement," in reel 8 of *C, DOS CF, Japan, Internal Affairs, 1945-49*, UPA. On the Japanese side, the combination of Soviet attempts to partition Japan, the communist-led unions' threat of a general strike, the Korean War, and Japan's weak, unarmed condition presented Japan's leadership with few options and very limited negotiating room.

³¹¹DOS, Telegram #905, from U.S. Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the DOS, Washington, D.C., September 11, 1952, no subject given, marked "for Allison," in *ERUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, part 2, (1985), pp. 1329-30.

³¹²To successfully execute its global strategy, the U.S. needed Japan, and to sustain its sovereignty and be of value to the West, Japan had to again become strong. However, the smaller states, also part of the "Western Camp," feared a possibly resurgent and aggressive Japan, thus stunting the independent role Japan might play and effectually capping the capabilities, curtailing the uses and proscribing the responsibilities of Japan in the military arena. Thus, U.S. forces present in Japan was the crucial factor for which there was not substitute.

³¹³ . . . we have concluded a security pact with the United States, under which American land, sea, and air forces, at our request, will be stationed within and about our territory. Obviously such an arrangement cannot be continued indefinitely. That is why we must undertake to build up a self-defense power of our own . . .

Prime Minister Yoshida, from his comments at the signing of the security pact, as found in Press Comments of Prime Minister Yoshida at the Conclusion of the Signing of the 1951 Mutual Security Treaty, Enclosure to Japan Peace Conference Briefing Book, 1951, in reel 11 of *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA.

in a war over another's interest.³¹⁴ For the moment, the international milieu was not so invasive as to challenge any of these, and both Japanese and U.S. officials were able to come to closure. Yet, the tentative nature of conditions suggested two things. First, there would be attempts to adjust those points more favorably for the Japanese. Second, the champions of those points would be acting as spokesmen of the basic anxieties permeating the whole nation. The task for Japan's officials was simultaneously to manage the adjustments and the U.S. so as not to upset the intricate balances.

. The 1960 Security Treaty

.. *Background* - In the period between the 1951 Mutual Security Treaty and the contentious passage of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan underwent major changes in national status unmatched by adjustment in its security arrangements.³¹⁵ So altered was the relative status of the partners that by the end of the 1950s, it was not a question if the security arrangement would be changed, but how and to

³¹⁴In part, this probably is what lay behind the disinclination of Japan to tie its fate to regimes like that of Formosa's Chiang Kai-shek or South Korea's Syngman Rhee. Other considerations included the difficulties with reparations, property claims and personal animosities at high official levels. Japanese officials sought to have the U.S. act as ombudsman in resolving these problems. For an example of such efforts and mention of the sorts of problems encountered see Memorandum of Conversation between Second Secretary of the Mission in Japan (R. B. Finn) and Mr. Kumao Nishimura, Chief of Treaty Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, subject: "Diplomatic Problems Faced by Japan: Administrative Agreement," April 23, 1952, in ERUIS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1250-55.

³¹⁵Both the U.S. and Japan were aware of this asymmetry. The awareness on the part of the U.S. State Department made them (particularly the North Asia branch) conducive to altering both the Mutual Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement. DOS position paper for visit to Washington of Prime Minister Kishi June 19-21, 1957, [undated, but other documents part of same packet dated June 14, 1957], subject: Security and Defense, p. 1, in reel 14, C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA; hereafter DOS position paper "Security and Defense," for Kishi Visit of June, 1957, UPA.

what extent.³¹⁶ Characteristic of the record of this period are the adjustments toward equal status various Japanese constituencies wished to make, but the absence of Japan assuming a greater portion of the security burden. Indeed, there seems to be two very different objectives held by U.S. and Japanese officials regarding the motive for the negotiations. The U.S. saw Japan's increased stature and requests for adjustment as normal, and, in keeping with those changes and as called for in the 1951 MST, a greater burden sharing role by Japan. Japanese officials seem not to have joined the two features; the record of discussion seems to indicate they deliberately avoided the nexus.³¹⁷

In keeping with expectations posited by the collective goods theory, Japan's internal and bilateral exchanges, Washington's activities, and the interactions of both with the international milieu, show this behavior as important strategic dialogue and process simultaneously occurring at several levels. At each of these several levels the asymmetrical relationship is an important factor. Moreover, while the protests and adjustments are part of strategic process, so are the efforts of those Japanese and American officials who managed, with ultimate success, to keep the strategic framework fundamentally unaltered.

The combination of basic security issues and great intensity suggests the significance of the period leading into the signing of the 1960 Treaty. Clearly, the passage of the 1960 Treaty became Japan's international avowal of wilful alignment with the West.

³¹⁶Ibid., pp. 1-4.

³¹⁷The behavior of both parties seems symptomatic of the differing cultural perceptions between East and West described by Kinhide Mushakoji (i.e., *awase* and *erabi*) and Masao Kunihiro's assertion of the lack of agreement in cultural dialogues. See Kinhide Mushakoji, "The Cultural Premises of Japanese Diplomacy," The Silent Power, pp. 35-49; and Masao Kunihiro, "The Japanese Language and Intercultural Communications," The Silent Power, pp. 60-61.

Yet, in its reservations, it stands as a unique application of strategy both in the Cold War and the larger history of security affairs.

.. *Strategic Process* - The changes, arguments, and evolution of the events themselves describe the strategic process. Japanese domestic alignment in this debate polarized with the LDP (representing maintenance of the status quo with adjustments) opposed by the Socialists (advocating abrogation of the treaty and neutrality). If the opposing sides each thought the other was leading Japan into an abyss, then each, in forming a general strategic hypothesis, accomplished the first portion of a national strategy. Significantly, the crucial aspect devolved to the U.S. military presence in Japan -- an almost irreconcilable difference.

Domestically, each Japanese political faction used a process they believed would advance their notions. In seeking to fix their strategic hypothesis as Japan's national course, both Japanese groups simultaneously enacted domestic and international strategies, signaled, in part, by their reaching out to other entities (domestic and foreign) in ways that would anchor their notions once formalized as Japan's national policy. This joining of group through dialogue and accommodation caused a shift from a pervasive, if ill-defined, public consensus for change to a polarized confrontation. Both sides, despite unexpected developments, persisted in their efforts until the matter concluded, (in effect, closing one chapter of the process portion of strategy).

The processes themselves largely made up the strategic dialogues conducted through several mediums. If, in Japan, the dialogue medium of the (generally leftist) students and the labor unions was demonstrative action, the persistence of the government

in pushing through the treaty was its side of that exchange. That the anti-treaty demonstrations were Japan's largest in fifty years suggests the volume of the anti-government dialogue. That the government persisted and succeeded despite such huge protests suggests the intensity of its determination.

Yet, both sides modified their processes and dialogue because of the other. The students found that they had overstepped their mandate³¹⁸ when the (generally left-of-center) major newspapers spoke out against their violence and in favor of the due process of government.³¹⁹ This reaction (along with Kishi's announcement of intent to resign) effectively took the steam out of the students. The government also was chastened. Even as the Diet ratified the treaty, the extensive police protection that surrounded its building was a reminder of misjudged political process. Prime Minister Kishi (despite some political maneuvering) resigned, and the government found it had to cancel the imminent state visit of President Eisenhower. Yet, by the time ratification occurred, the crisis was over, the after shocks were under control, and Japan had concluded a significant step in its strategic evolution. Thus, in all three particulars, hypothesis, dialogue and process, Japan was in the

³¹⁸This was the case with more than just the public; the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) castigated the students of the Zengakuren (abbreviation for en Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sorengo, or the All-Japan Federation of Student Self-government Associations) as being adventurists and tools of American imperialism, while attempting to portray itself as a responsible political party working to free the Japanese people from oppression. Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, p. 171. While there were theoretical differences between the JCP and the Zengakuren, the core reason probably was power. The students were adopting a vigorous mode attractive to labor and actively recruiting the very base to which the JCP looked for support. In effect, the Zengakuren was a competitor for leadership, and not one which was likely to look abroad for guidance from the Communist International, Moscow or Beijing.

³¹⁹It is an intriguing question as to whether the success that the Korean students enjoyed earlier that year in aiding the ouster of President Rhee might not have provided an example and heightened expectations for their Japanese contemporaries. Interview, December 20, 1994, of Mr. Tad Nakamura, a student participant in the clash.

midst of strategy focused on its national security. It also was a significant statement of commitment by Japan's key security officials who narrowly averted derailment of Japan's security strategy. In all, the process, largely played on the public stage, provided notice to all and a warning to American and Japanese officials.

.. *Changes and Trends* - There were a number of factors that promoted adjustments of Japan's national security strategy; nine of the most significant were: a. change in Japan's national economic condition, b. the rise of a new nationalism, c. opening of an indirect strategic dialogue with the communists, d. growth of Japan's populations, e. creation of a viable, popularly-based, political alternative to the LDP, f. a new generation of Japanese students, g. increasing tension in the world situation, h. a sense of unreality regarding security affairs, and i. dissension among the conservatives. In part, these factors were the result of strategic emphasis by both the U.S. and Japan. Their success presented an altered domestic strategic milieu, and by that called into question the appropriateness and proportionality of Japan's security relationship with the United States.

.. *The Change in Japan's Economic Condition* - Of all changes, Japan's economic recovery was the most significant. In great measure, this was a product of a great emphasis by both the U.S. and Japanese Governments; creating a vibrant Japanese economy was the most important Japan-related objective for the security strategies of both nations. From the first, dark, hungry post-war years, and despite setbacks, Japan's economic situation continually improved. By the mid-1950s, the signs of a pervasive economic boom were everywhere.

The first boost of Japan's economy came through the procurement orders for

military operations in Korea³²⁰ that went to Japanese sources.³²¹ When the Korean War ground down and orders sharply declined, Japanese officials and businessmen were exceedingly anxious that the streams of profit not dwindle simultaneously. They prevailed upon the U.S. State Department effectually to act as Tokyo's agent and sustain Japan's continued economic development.³²² Stimulated by the contracts of the Korean War for "special procurement" and afterwards intensely managed, Japan's actual gross national product between 1952 and 1958 grew at an average annual rate of 7 percent; between 1957 and 1961 it averaged almost 13 percent, the highest in the world. Between 1952 and 1960 imports more than doubled and exports tripled.³²³

³²⁰FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part 2, p. 1210.

³²¹FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 1137.

³²²In this respect, the Japanese found the U.S. quite willing to aid them. For a lengthy summation of positions and tactics to be used to assist this effort see DOS, Telegram, from Secretary of State (Dulles) to American Ambassador in Japan (Allison), Washington, D.C., June 17, 1954, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part 2, p. 1661-62. President Eisenhower, convinced of the soundness of this effort, was determined that Congress not derail it. See Editorial Note on Minnich's "Supplementary Notes" on the Legislative Leadership Meeting held June 21, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), p. 1662; see also Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Remarks made before National Editorial Association, June 22, 1954," in EPP, 1954, pp. 585-590. This effort by the U.S. led to much controversy because the U.S. sought to have the forces of the Republic of Korea rebuilt with material and supplies procured in Japan (Off Shore Procurement). DOS, memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., July 30, 1953, subject: The Situation in the Far East with Particular Reference to Japan and Korea, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1464-67. The Koreans, understandably, thought it better that capital be invested in Korean industry and that they take charge of their own procurement needs thereby answering both national defense and economic requirements simultaneously. In addition, Korean antipathy of Japan, perhaps epitomized by the implacable hostility of President Syngman Rhee, virtually insured resistance to Japan getting any "off shore" contracts. Japan strongly pressed the U.S. to induce the Koreans to accept the contracts, but with little success. In the meantime, the U.S. Government was explaining to Congress why it was necessary for the U.S. to protect Japan's industries rather than its own, when Japan clearly was making large inroads, in part due to the asymmetrical application of regulations. FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), p. 1662.

³²³James Abegglen, "The Economic Growth of Japan," Scientific American, Vol. CCXXII, No. 3, (March, 1970), pp. 31-35; Louis Kraar, "How the Japanese Mount That Export Blitz," Fortune, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, (September, 1970), pp. 127-39, 156-72; Office of the Prime Minister, Bureau of Statistics, Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1961, (Tokyo: Japan Statistical Association, 1962); Jon Livingston, Joe Moore, and Felica Oldfather, (eds.), Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present, (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 428-29.

By the late 1950s, the need for the economic prop provided by U.S. forces in Japan had declined.³²⁴ Over the years the U.S. continued to withdraw forces from Japan and consolidate and close bases,³²⁵ and a commensurate contraction occurred among Japanese who depended on U.S. military personnel. Thus, by the late 1950s, the number and relative impact of persons who might object to the withdrawal of U.S. forces declined.³²⁶

.. The Growth of Nationalism - The growth of Japanese nationalism was the logical result of the Japanese and U.S. strategic emphasis that sought to restore Japan stature. As the dependency upon the U.S. for economic support declined, public pride in Japan's accomplishments increased. Awareness that this recovery was greatly due to the

³²⁴Locally, bases were still economically important; at the national level, the sources of income were much greater from the reviving import-export process and the expansion of major industrial enterprises. Both of these were greatly and favorably improved by both the "reverse course" of the Occupation economic policies and the surge of orders provided by the Korean War. The most important economic aspect of the U.S. troop presence was the influx of dollars (averaging some \$570 million a year for the period 1953-1957) and were crucial to Japan's balance of payments. DOS Telegram #862, Tokyo, September 20, 1957, subject: [not listed, but contents cover conversations with Kishi on September 18], in *FRUS, 1955-1957*, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, (1991), pp. 479-83. See also DOS Telegram #740, Washington, D.C., September 25, 1957, subject: [not listed, but covers conversation with Japanese Minister of Finance Hiyato Ichimada with Treasury Secretary Anderson on September 23, 1957], in *FRUS, 1955-1957*, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, (1991), pp. 507-08.

³²⁵This was encouraged by the Japanese Government. It is worth noting that at the same time that Japanese officials were seeking continued U.S. assistance and special consideration with respect to foreign trade deficits, differential regulations, currency controls, and repayment of U.S. loans, Tokyo was (and remains) quite willing to allow the local U.S. authorities at the bases to be the lightning rods for local frustrations properly the responsibility of Japanese officials. Interview of Mr. Irving Eisenstein, U.S. Secretary and Permanent Representative to the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee, HQ, US Forces, Japan, November, 1989, Yokota Air Base, Japan.

³²⁶Local politicians did not complain, nor was there complaint from Japanese Government officials. Although this may be interpreted as a reflection of the general unpopularity of foreign troops on one's own soil and reflections on sovereignty, the reduction of U.S. military presence in Japan (provided the overall commitment remains sound) acts to enhance Japan's security in two ways. First, it reduces the likelihood that those places will become targets of any enemy with whom the U.S. might become engaged. Second, the reduction of the U.S. military presence enhances the degree of Japanese leverage in "prior consultations" should the U.S. and Japan disagree and the U.S. opt to act unilaterally from locations in Japan.

U.S.³²⁷ faded as the Japanese focused on their achievements.³²⁸

In international settings, Japanese diplomats and politicians were beginning to speak with new confidence. In 1956, Japan joined the United Nations. By 1958, it had been elected to a seat on the Security Council. Other developments ran apace. In 1956, Japan and the USSR signed a declaration ending the state of war and reopened diplomatic relations. Showing increasing independence from the U.S. in its relations toward Communist China, in 1957, Japan departed from the Chinese Communist (Chincom) trade controls, liberalizing the list of exportable items.³²⁹ On the issue of nuclear testing, Japan spoke out against the U.S.,³³⁰ Great Britain, and the USSR.

Still, the new prestige and national pride clashed with the realities of dependence upon the U.S. for military and economic security. Frustration caused by perceptions of limited independence, self-sufficiency and security, the security treaty (with its attendant

³²⁷ Considering the history of treatment of other defeated states by most victors, it is difficult to imagine that the occupation policies of the Soviets, British, French, Chinese or Dutch would have allowed, set aside provided, such a recovery. If the Great Pacific War was Japan's greatest military disaster, its occupation and under U.S. control was probably the greatest good fortune it could have experienced thereafter.

³²⁸ Nevertheless, neither Japanese efforts nor perceptions diminished the two strategic features that made it all possible, the U.S. military presence (which relieved Japan of great domestic and foreign burdens and underwrote regional stability), and continued U.S. economic benevolence (which underwrote Japan's economic enterprises). See Editorial Note on Minnich's "Supplementary Notes" on the Legislative Leadership Meeting Held June 21, in *FRUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), p. 1662; see also Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Remarks made before National Editorial Association, June 22, 1954," in *EPP, 1954*, pp. 585-590.

³²⁹ In this, Japan followed the British precedent. Yet, as an example of new confidence, when the U.S. and Britain seemed to disagree on the Chincom issue, Japan's offer to mediate between them seems hard to top.

³³⁰ This was not merely public rhetoric. Japan approached the U.S. during the Karachi Conference in March, 1956, and stressed its desire that the U.S. cease nuclear testing. Japan opposed the testing because of environmental and economic reasons, and admonished the U.S. that its actions gave the impression that the U.S. was unwilling to take opening moves to outlaw nuclear weapons. DOS Memorandum, "Conference Discussion Points," in folder marked "Karachi Conference, March, 1956," in reel 23 of C, *DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, microform from UPA.

Administrative Agreement) became the symbol and focus of this frustration.³³¹ The treaty of 1951, in the view of many Japanese, was simply unsuited to the Japan of 1957;³³² it was a legacy of defeat and a constant reminder of subordination. Oddly, for they were already negotiating potentially volatile matters, the Japanese and American officials evidently had a low awareness of the political squalls forming in Japan. Seeking to manage strategic adjustments via a government-to-government process, the communications of the period give scant mention of public volatility.

Because the Socialists championed major revisions touching on sovereignty and opposed the treaty, they became identified with nationalism in a way that the old militarists would not, and the conservatives could not. It gave the left a popular base to which they could graft their idealistic notions. Additionally, through the students and labor unions, action-oriented arms were available. By 1957, that orientation to action focused its attention on the treaty.

Yet, whether modified or abolished, strategic security considerations, for which the Japanese Government would have to bear responsibility, remained. Not the least of these was that if Japan abrogated the treaty, then the twin pillars of Japan's military and economic security that the U.S. provided, also might disappear. The consequences were unpalatable.

Alternatively, if Japan were to strengthen its alignment with the U.S. then Tokyo's

³³¹Kihachiro Kimura, "Effects of the Administrative Agreement," *Contemporary Japan*, Vol. XXXI, No. 1-3, 1952, pp. 113-117; Masamichi Royama, "The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty: A Japanese View," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 3, (July-September, 1957), pp. 284-95.

³³²DOS position paper, "Security and Defense," for Kishi Visit of June, 1957, microform from UPA.

recently warming relations with Moscow and Beijing probably would cool. This, too, was unattractive.

.. Strategic Dialogue with the Communists - Since 1951, the Soviets had objected to the U.S.-Japan MST as an aggressive one aimed at the Soviet and Chinese peoples.³³³ However, as the 1950s progressed, the thrust of communist propaganda altered, maintaining, that while Japan's signing of the 1951 Treaty was forced, the choice in 1960 would be voluntary. The communists warned, that in voluntarily aligning with the U.S., Japan hazarded potential disaster.

Before both Kishi's Washington trip for the signing of the 1960 Treaty and the Japanese ratification, the Soviets were to express their feelings, On December 2, 1958, the Soviets shifted their policy toward Japan, calling for Japanese neutrality (guaranteed by the Soviets) along with a nuclear-free zone (NFZ) in East Asia.³³⁴ By January, 1960, Moscow's tone was ominous and blunt; to it the Soviets added demonstrations by conducting firings of long-range missiles that passed over Japan en route to targets sited in the distant Pacific. Once Japan had signed (but not yet ratified) the treaty, the Soviets were even more blunt.

Is it not clear to everyone today that in conditions of a modern, rocket-nuclear War all Japan with her small and thickly populated territory, dotted moreover With foreign war bases, risks sharing the tragic fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

³³³Indeed, in their treaty, the Soviets and the Chinese responded by identifying Japan and those allied to it as their potential aggressors.

³³⁴Japan Times, December 14, 1958, p. 1.

In the very first minutes of hostilities?³³⁵

The Chinese, following Mao's thesis of the balance of world power tilting toward the communist powers (the so-called "East Wind Prevailing"), made their feelings known and simultaneously encouraged treaty opponents (particularly the JCP).³³⁶ Their advocacy of Japanese neutrality guaranteed by regional powers³³⁷ was the same as Moscow's notions.

However, the Chinese approach to Japan markedly differed from that of the Soviets. China could and did appeal to the economic side of Japan in a way that the USSR could not.³³⁸ This gave Beijing a powerful positive lever.³³⁹ This inducement was particularly important because the effectiveness of negative factors was muted.³⁴⁰

³³⁵Soviet Memorandum handed by Foreign Minister of the USSR A. A. Gromyko to Japanese Ambassador in the USSR Kadowaki in connection with the signing of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, January 27, 1960, Contemporary Japan, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, (May, 1960), pp. 593-95.

³³⁶Kuo Mo-jo, "Resolutely Crush the Military alliance Between the U.S. and Japanese Reactionaries," Peking Review, No. 4, (January 21, 1960), pp. 14-19.

³³⁷In fact, the Chinese public announcement of this position preceded the Soviets by some 13 days (November 19, 1958, and December 2, 1958, respectively).

³³⁸In this particular, the Soviets were trebly vexed. First, prewar trade between Japan and the Eastern USSR had not been on a scale commensurate with Sino-Japanese trade. Second, when they overran portions of the Far East, the Soviets so plundered them that the requisite economic infrastructure was virtually destroyed. The absence of this infrastructure insured that any development would require large sunk costs before the industry-specific capital investments could be made. This discouraged both foreign investment and domestic allocations, a difficulty worsened by the Soviet European focus. Third, the economic development desired by the USSR and Japan were at odds. The development that each most desired was that which could threaten the other directly or indirectly. Moscow did not wish a rival's regeneration on its distant eastern borders; Japan did not want an eastward focused or more capable USSR.

³³⁹The potential power of this lever was well know to Washington. See NSC 13/3, NSC 34/2, NSC 41/1, in reel 1 and NSC 48/5 and NSC 49/1 in reel 2 of *NSC Papers*, microform from UPA.

³⁴⁰The inability of China to do more than fight a strategically defensive war with the U.S. and the clear willingness and ability of the U.S. to confront communist intrusions in Korea, Greece and Berlin, offset negative leverage. Obviously, the Koreans, Greeks and Berliners, with the assistance of the U.S., withstood sundry communist assaults. Considering these failures, its seems illogical that attempts at coercing Japan by

Yet, once Japan ratified the treaty, proving by that the failure of all communist tactics used to thwart its passage, Beijing unleashed a vindictive propaganda barrage. Although deeply colored by ideological rhetoric, the content of the barrage also betrays significant frustration at the foreclosure of strategic options for China.³⁴¹

.. Changes in Population and Demography - While Japan made its economic and political recoveries, its population grew and the demography of that population shifted. This first effect was to spread urbanization widely, and the second was the concomitant coming of age of a new generation of Japanese.

The first was so gradual and general in developing that it hardly was noticeable. As businesses grew and the economy improved, construction needed to meet economic and recovery needs was ongoing everywhere. The urban spread soon engulfed once remote bases and training areas.³⁴² The rising demand for space made clear that areas occupied by

threats would succeed.

³⁴¹For China to become strong, large, sustained assistance in industry, agriculture and manufacturing were required. The largest source (the U.S.) being closed to it, China would look to nations where a reciprocal arrangement might be attained. The obvious choice (besides the USSR) was Japan. Although the USSR might provide considerable aid, with the USSR as the single source, many of China's policies became distorted by Soviet designs. Moreover, although nearly invisible to the U.S. at that time, there were significant fissures in the Sino-Soviet alignment. If China had two non-aligned sources, it gained independence in its policies, enhanced its leverage in all its relations, and simultaneously reduced its threats. The passage of the 1960 Treaty seemed to close the door on these opportunities while simultaneously giving the U.S. the key to that door. To China, there was more at stake than the probability of a resurgent Japan; there was sovereignty, freedom from external influence, and the wherewithal that would confirm and anchor the current political regime. Thus, the vindictiveness of the post-treaty propaganda barrage is not surprising.

³⁴²For example, the air base at Tachikawa, a distant, rural suburb of Tokyo in 1960, was largely enveloped by housing, industry and specially set aside parks by 1983. Not only did such building prevent expansion of base facilities or capabilities (such as lengthening the runways to meet the demands of larger and heavier planes)(a point which proved volatile in 1957), but the problems produced by having heavy concentrations of people collocated with high noise levels (incident to jet engines) predictably produced complaints. Similarly, the U.S. depot at Sagami-hara was so densely enveloped by civilian housing that the available road space became impassable to vehicles of a size sufficient to transport military equipment. Road movements in and out of the facility became a mutual irritation.

U.S. forces would be the objects of demands for reversion to Japanese control.³⁴³

Although often welcomed by local politicians, such reversion were of mixed benefit to the landowners.³⁴⁴ Additionally, the increased urbanization heightened the profile of U.S. forces, making them convenient targets for frustrations real and imagined.³⁴⁵

As Japan's population grew and spread, a commensurate generational shift occurred, bringing with it memories of successful recovery, not war and failure. Thus, nationalism (itself a factor of change) grew among the young, further separating them from older Japanese to whom fervent nationalism went hand-in-hand with disastrous militarism.

³⁴³This was a point of consistent pressure and effort on the part of Japanese at local, prefectural and national levels. Worthy of a study in its own right, it is beyond the scope of this investigation to explore more than very briefly, but in essence, the trend has been to confine U.S. forces and their activities evermore closely until utility becomes marginal, and then request reversion to Japanese control on the premise that the facility or area is no longer needed (a specific provision of Art. II, para. 3, of the "Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan," signed January 19, 1960).

³⁴⁴The landowners collected rents, but often were able to make use of the property anyway, thereby realizing a dual income. Should the U.S. give up the use of the land, then the rent the owner received would end, and he would be forced to either sell his property or accept a decline in income. In areas where land had a high value, reversion was not hard to accept; in other areas, e.g., rural Okinawa, the circumstances were less favorable. Notably, the Japanese Government has not usually returned the land directly to the owner; they retained the facilities for their own uses.

³⁴⁵In part, it was this aspect which led to an incident which sparked one of the most notable security debates in Japan's postwar history, the Sunakawa Case. In short, the trial of some seven leaders of a group of 300 that broke through a barbed-wire fence at Tachikawa Air Base (protesting runway extension) on July 8, 1957, resulted in the acquittal of all seven and the denial of the constitutionality of the Security Treaty. Judge Date's ruling referred to the pacific intent of the Japanese Constitution and concluded that the presence of U.S. troops constituted "war potential," and was thereby unconstitutional. The explosion in the press was immense, and the Socialists rallied. The Japanese Government immediately appealed the decision to the Supreme Court which handed down its decision on December 16, 1959. Unanimously rescinding the Date verdict, the court took the position that Article IX of the Constitution did not prevent Japan from taking measures necessary to preserve its existence, rather that it forbade the maintenance of potential for waging wars of aggression. Specifically stating that U.S. troops in Japan did not violate the peace intent of Art. IX, the court did not rule on the question of whether the Security Treaty was valid or whether Japan's own Self-Defense forces were constitutional. For a fuller explanation see Alfred C. Oppler, "The Sunakawa Case: Its Legal and Political Implications," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXXVI, No. 2, (June, 1961), pp. 241-63. For Japan's strategists, it was an unforeseen management problem threatening to derail Japan's strategy.

.. The Socialist Political Alternative - Yet, not every older Japanese was politically reticent. Those who sought political power created political factions championing alternatives of mixed popular appeal. Of the various groups, the socialists proved the most able, creating a viable, broadly-based popular political movement. They combined the members of a new generation, shifted the political focus toward the empowerment of the population, blended idealism with realistic concerns, and made a clear break with the conservatives. Placing themselves, an established, experienced political leadership, at the head of a popular political movement, they became a viable alternative to the Liberal Democratic party (LDP).

Present, too, were the unconverted militarists, extreme conservatives and the newly assertive national figures within the government. All maintained low profiles (but incessant pressures) aimed at bringing Japan into the first rank of nations. Finally, their intensity belying their small numbers, were the varied ideologic extremists. All had strong nationalist characteristics, but, narrowly based, were hampered in their broad, public appeal. In part, it was its relatively broad base which gave the Socialists (like the later LDP) their influence.

The Socialists denounced all that was old and conservative, championed peace, neutrality and a greater distribution of wealth. They echoed widespread feelings present in Japanese society about the war and a peaceful (non-militant) national orientation. Their social programs, following the trends pursued during the Occupation,³⁴⁶ enjoyed

³⁴⁶Many aspects of the Occupation bore strong similarity to the so-called "New Deal" programs prevalent during the Franklin Roosevelt administrations. See Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal, ed. Herbert Passin (New York: Macmillan, Inc., 1987), Chapters 2 and 3.

popularity among the larger bases of their power, the labor unions.

Complaining that the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty was inequitable and dangerous, they asserted it could involve Japan in a war in which the Japanese had nothing to gain, everything to lose, no point of principle, and (in the all-but-disarmed state decreed by the Constitution and Peace Treaty) little military value to the outcome. In short, the Socialists asserted the MST was illogical, dangerous, and patronizing.³⁴⁷ For reasons of political ideals and of economic practicality, they objected to Cold War tactics being forced on them, particularly, the strictures on Japan's trade with China.³⁴⁸

In all, the Socialists considered the presence of U.S. forces in Japan detracted from both the military and economic security of Japan. In this, their views were an inversion of those of Yoshida. To these arguments, the Liberal (conservative) Party was not fully prepared to respond.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁷In these respects their feelings were not far removed from the arguments made by Japan's representatives during the negotiations of both the Peace Treaty and the Administrative Agreement. DOS Memorandum, subject: Record of Japanese Government's Position During Course of Negotiation of Administrative Agreement, Washington [?], undated, [presumed February 28, 1952], FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1985), pp. 1197-1206.

³⁴⁸This was a powerful argument because Japan had to trade to survive, and approximately one-third of Japan's prewar trade had been with China/Manchuria. In 1950, approximately 2 per cent of Japan's trade was with the PRC and efforts by the end of that year limited it even further. Given the focus of the population on economics, the stress on its primacy by Prime Minister Yoshida, and the leverage exercised by the rapidly revitalizing large industrial firms, the linking of Sino-Japanese trade to the Socialist political platform commanded attention. That the Socialists (among others) attempted to deny the link between politics and economics is unsurprising. DOS, Memorandum, Washington, D.C., June 23, 1951, subject: Japan's Trade with China, in reel 2, *C, DOS SF, NEA, 1943-1956*, UPA; DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, D.C., November 16, 1951, subject: Discussion of Matters of Current Interest in Regard to Japan, pp. 1-2, in reel 4, *C, DOS CF, Japan, Internal Affairs, 1943-1956*, UPA.

³⁴⁹Nor could they fully respond for two reasons. First, they had many of the same inclinations in their own ranks, and second, enmeshed in a milieu which they could influence, but not control, to confidently preserve Japan's security that had to have a solid relationship with the U.S. That left little choice but to take a side, as the Cold War "lines" were pretty clearly drawn. Not to have chosen the U.S. side (e.g., going neutral") would mean considering alternatives even more difficulty and unpalatable. Thus, Tokyo sought adjustment, not radical change, in its security relations with Washington. This, in turn, meant that the Japanese Government sought a

.. The New Generation of Japanese Students - The Socialist's themes had special appeal to Japan's students.³⁵⁰ Partially resulting from the influence of their professors, generational change, and a heightened sense of expectation produced from improved economic circumstances, nationalism (in the socialist form) was expressed actively and sometimes violently by the student-generated masses, and focused on the American presence. Further, the students did more than bring themselves; they actively proselytized, recruited and organized.³⁵¹ By their energy the students re-energized a nationalism that sought to distance itself from the uncomfortable past, took pride in the Japanese rebuilding of Japan, and sought an independent, strong, and secure Japan on the world's stage.

The U.S. military presence in Japan visibly rebutted the key particulars of that nationalism. The negative focus on the U.S. military presence made all aspects of it the targets of protests alleging that it was only the U.S. forces that vexed regional political and economic relations³⁵² (particularly with the communists). Additionally, the U.S.

low level of publicity to enhance the chances of negotiations with the U.S. and concurrently damp the rise in expectations among the Japanese public.

³⁵⁰This is not surprising given the change in generations, the tendency of youth to be liberally inclined, and, perhaps, most importantly, because the great density of college instructional staff was socialist or communist in orientation. The extraordinary extent of this infiltration and presence on the college campuses is best appreciated by noting the simultaneous relationship between these communist efforts with those in labor and other movements. See DOS, Memorandum, 15 December 1948, "Communism in Japan Study by Hillis Lory," pp. 61-6.

³⁵¹This did not always work to their advantage. Local personalities, particularly those in rural areas, resented urban youth with little experience and much arrogance appearing, demanding to be heard, and attempting to take control of local efforts. Such tactics could be especially irritating when the focus or objectives of the two groups differed. Packard, Protest in Tokyo, p. 39.

³⁵²There was some logical inconsistency in this. The animosity of most of Japan's Pacific neighbors stemmed from first-hand experience with the Japanese military and a desire to prevent its resurgence. The Socialist ideal was for a disarmed neutrality with Japan's security guaranteed by major powers. This notion ignored two important points. First, Japan's national security did not merely (even primarily) depend upon military power, rather it depended upon the whole stability of Japan which meant that economic matters were the first priority.

presence in Japan sometimes transferred to the Far East tensions originating elsewhere since U.S. obligations were global.

.. Rising Tensions in Security Affairs: Tensions in Japan - U.S. troop presence was a focal point for Japanese frustrations. Foreign troops stationed on one's own country are hardly ever popular, even less so in times of peace.³⁵³ The cramped conditions of Japan's demography and geography made the presence of 100,000 Americans, who looked and acted differently from Japanese, obvious.³⁵⁴ The U.S. presence could not help but be prominent despite the comparatively good behavior of the troops in Japan, strong, positive reaction by the U.S. command to infractions, and the action of the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee.³⁵⁵ Further, broader, inescapable aspects insured unfavorable feelings.

If Japan departed from a close relationship with the U.S., it was unlikely Washington would continue to pursue policies favoring Japanese economic development (particularly at their own expense), or would long see it in the U.S. interest to unilaterally provide military protection for Japan. Second, guarantees of security from communist powers were of dubious value. Many Japanese, mistrusting the USSR, saw unarmed neutrality as an increased opportunity for Soviet meddling. Both of these aspect placed Japan in a more vulnerable position than did maintaining the status quo. Moreover, and overly strong Japan was precisely the sort of Japan feared by its neighbors. Attempting to assuage their anxieties through unarmed neutrality was an incomplete solution since Japan's potential remained. Thus, a strong Japan was neither more secure nor a positive factor for regional stability and Japan's security. In sum, both neutrality options were flawed.

³⁵³This also was the case from the U.S. point of view. Documents spanning the period seem consistent in mentioning the desire by various American military commanders to return American troops home. Two reasons are consistently mentioned: the expense involved, and the awareness that for so long as the U.S. provided troops which protected Japan (particularly at the expense of the U.S.), the Japanese were unlikely to provide for themselves. Despite a desire to insure that the U.S. commitments were perceived as completely credible by friends and foes (which forces deployed forward tended to demonstrate), American commanders consistently advocated a withdrawal of U.S. forces as the Japanese forces were built up. U.S. frustrations grew as the Japanese dragged in meeting "commitments" and repetitively failed to meet U.S. expectations.

³⁵⁴This could not be helped. Aside from the obvious racial difference, the Americans came from a pluralistic society focused on individuality, while Japan's case was just the opposite. The situation was not helped by the nearly universal inability of Americans to speak Japanese. The result was that even when on the best of behavior, Americans were oddly out of place around Japanese.

³⁵⁵The U.S.-Japan Joint Committee was set up under Article XXVI of the Administrative Agreement which followed the 1951 Mutual Security Treaty.

For example, U.S. military presence was a reminder of a catastrophic failure of national policy. Key persons of the previous era still active in political and business circles³⁵⁶ wanted no reminders. Neither did their successors want connections drawn for fear of being tarred with the brush of association. Additionally, those troops made up a foreign version of what many Japanese believed they should not pursue as a state policy; their presence seemed a logical inconsistency.

Apart from political idealism, some questioned whether the U.S. military presence in Japan was necessary. Peace had come, even with the Soviet Union,³⁵⁷ Korean and U.S. troops held the line on the Korean peninsula providing Japan military and political buffers. The U.S. Navy controlled the waters off China, indeed, throughout the Pacific. U.S. aircraft, operating out of Korea, Okinawa and off carriers, provided a credible air shield. Longer ranging U.S. bombers contributed to a credible deterrence shield. In all, the conventional military threats to Japan seemed remote. Moreover, many locations used by these U.S. military assets were outside the main islands of Japan. This situation begged the question if removing most, if not all, those forces from the main islands of Japan was

³⁵⁶This was one reason why the Japanese sought, from the outset, to remove *categories* of persons from the purge list, and why even after sentence had been passed, they sought to get portions of the sentences remitted or mitigated. To a significant degree, this constant effort was successful, explaining, in part, why persons like Kishi (depurged in 1952) could move in thirteen years from Tojo's Cabinet during the war (1941-1944), to the position of Prime Minister in democratic Japan (March 21, 1957).

³⁵⁷Japan and the USSR signed a peace agreement in 1956. Although not wholly satisfactory to either side, it served to regularize relations. Coming during the post-Stalin period when the USSR attempted to settle a number of outstanding issues (particularly in the Far East), the Soviets made the return of a number of Kurile Islands (the so-called "Northern Territories") contingent upon Japan foregoing its security treaty with America. Japan declined, and the unremitted islands remain a point of constant irritation.

advisable.³⁵⁸

The increases in range and lethality of military technology made the entanglement argument more potent, since this ominous shift made bases (and all close to them) more vulnerable.³⁵⁹ With the examples of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it took little effort to raise Japanese public concerns over the dangers inherent in having a resident U.S. military presence in Japan.³⁶⁰

- *Tensions Outside Japan* - Perhaps this sort of development would have had muted effect were it not for the general increase in Cold War tensions that marked the

³⁵⁸Initially, this seems logical, but from the military point of view it is untenable. First, the overarching Japanese and U.S. strategies called for Japan firmly aligned with America. Japan's security relies on deterrence which is fundamentally premised on surety of involvement. Having the major islands in the status of a secure area decouples Japan from deterrence and thereby degrades both its security and America's. Second, the resources of Japan, its location, and its potential if actively involved, would provide the U.S. a significant margin of strategic superiority. This enhances deterrence and simultaneously increases capabilities should deterrence fail. If sites in Japan are not available to the U.S., Japan's security via deterrence is degraded and the U.S. is placed in a defensive posture throughout the theater. If Japan and its resources become available to the communists, the U.S. posture is heavily pressured and its global strategy (containment) may be at risk. Third, the facilities on the smaller islands are insufficient for the scale of military operations required in so vast a theater. Similarly, locations outside of Japan's main islands did not have the facilities needed to sustain these forces in peace and war. Fourth, since the general rationale for the removal of the U.S. forces from Japan probably would be sovereignty, the political energy necessary to remove them from some sites likely would create sufficient momentum to remove all U.S. forces from all Japanese territory. This would in turn create problems associated with the U.S. retaining what sites it could (e.g., Okinawa) which were unremitted Japanese territory, or being dramatically hampered in the theater. Neither Tokyo nor Washington wanted to face either option. Moreover, should the withdrawal of U.S. forces occur, then other alliances the U.S. maintained would be in jeopardy. For example, the loss of the major facilities in Japan would make the support of military operations in Korea (or elsewhere in East Asia) very difficult. More generally, the U.S. ability to support its allies is the foundation of the U.S. guarantee in a number of alliances, and thereby undergirds regional stability.

³⁵⁹While Japan was more vulnerable to the actions of those enemies the U.S. might have, the vulnerability of the potential enemies of Japan, the U.S., and other U.S. allies also increased. Thus, Japan's fate was tied to that of the U.S. and the larger global strategy which it pursued. When Sputnik was successfully launched in 1957, the jolt to the U.S. sense of invulnerability was shared by Japan. Moreover, considering the antipathy of many states for Japan, it is unclear that those states which were hostile to Japan would have been friendly to a Japan not teamed with America.

³⁶⁰Nuclear testing in the Pacific and unfortunate accidents like the "Fukuryu Maru" incident did not ease matters. DOS, Telegram #2853, from American Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to DOS, Washington, D.C., May 20, 1954, subject: Fukuryu Maru, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part 2, (1958), pp. 1643-48.

later 1950s. U.S. reluctance to be directly involved (e.g., in the Hungarian Revolution) suggested that the U.S. would be careful in potentially escalatory and explosive situations; the lack of U.S. involvement also suggested that the U.S. might be reluctant to back its ideals or its allies in other situations. In 1958, a series of events directly affected Japan. In May, the Chinese Communists abruptly cut off all trade with Japan; Washington was not sympathetic to Tokyo. In July, the Americans and British landed troops in Jordan and Lebanon, seeming to confirm a secondary status for Far Eastern affairs in the U.S. strategic calculus. In August, as if to illustrate Japan's security writ large, the Taiwan Straits Crisis billowed.

The Taiwan situation greatly heightened Japan's concerns since to support the Nationalists, the U.S. used elements of its Seventh Fleet based in Japan. Tokyo feared the use of these Japan-based assets could entangle Japan in a war in which its interests were not at issue.³⁶¹ Moreover, because of its treaty with the U.S., Tokyo would be tied to (indirect) support of the Nationalists,³⁶² and threatened with destruction, the PRC being allied with the nuclear-capable USSR in an alliance specifically naming Japan.

Perhaps as much as anything else, Tokyo's sensitivity was heightened with the realization that while Japan was not obligated to support U.S. operations, the security

³⁶¹See Memorandum of Conversation, DOS, Washington, D.C., August 24, 1955, subject: not given but covers the upcoming visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, in FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, pp. 84-88.

³⁶²There is irony here. The Japanese and the Nationalists had attempted to destroy each other for years. That Western, pluralistic America might succeed in joining the efforts of the two seems perverse.

arrangements gave Tokyo little influence in the applicable policy decisions.³⁶³ The Taiwan Straits Crisis highlighted the difference between the differing views of China held by Washington and Tokyo.³⁶⁴ It also made plain a crucial issue in Japan's strategic dialogues.

.. *The Sense of Unreality in Security Affairs* - Of the factors that affected the period, perhaps the most difficult to measure but the most socially pervasive was the Japanese public's sense of unreality attending security affairs. Largely a product (as were the other factors) of significant success in attaining strategic objectives, the continued effect of a generally stabilized global and regional milieu, unchecked peaceful growth in Japan's international stature, and the lack of any meaningful direct challenge to Japan's security created an atmosphere almost without parallel in Japan's recent history. Having borne hardly any defense burden for more than a decade (and ill disposed to do so), it was perhaps, a logical step to believe that such a burden might not have to be borne at all. If great comfort and security could be achieved as a small alliance member where larger contestants struggled, perhaps balancing them all off against each other could result in perpetual institutionalization of all the advantages and almost none of the disadvantages. It was a strategic hypothesis partially built on idealistic hopes and partially on nagging fears over entanglement. In part, this notion sprang from those same sources which move all

³⁶³Nor was the U.S. likely to give way on this crucial point. In the Far East, the entire U.S. defensive strategy of containment hinged upon its ability to respond directly. U.S. forces in Japan were there precisely because that was the best strategic position for deterrence as well as from which to respond. Granting the Japanese the equivalent of a veto in the form of prior consultations at a moment of crisis, was placing the whole strategy of the Far East (including ANZUS and SEATO) in danger of being made hostage to internal Japanese politics.

³⁶⁴Foreign Minister Fujiyama was to characterize the Taiwan Straits crisis as an "internal affair" of China, and remark "The United States policy toward Communist China has not always been successful in our eyes." Robert Trumbull, "Japan Will Seek U.S. Pact Change," New York Times, August 31, 1958, p. 19; Robert Trumbull, "Japan Seeks Voice on U.S. Bases' Use," New York Times, September 2, 1958, p. 5.

minor states to suppose they will be so minor or special that in the event of war, they will be “left out of it.”

In Japan’s case, this situation was abetted by wishful thinking and, perhaps, selective recollection. Among socialists, there had always existed a collection of liberal notions that, while stopping short of embracing the communists, disposed the socialists toward a position equidistant between Washington and Moscow. Quite at difference from their conservative opponents, the socialists were disinclined to ascribe so dark a cast to communist motives. Indeed, they were far more ready to depict the danger to Japan being a product of association with Washington. It was as though the source of the danger (militarily and otherwise) lay in the U.S. reaction rather than the provoking incident. Perhaps there also was a residue of ill feeling from the days when SCAP seemingly reversed itself on politically liberal policies and, in so doing, insured the domestic victory of the conservatives.

The second sense of unreality was in forgetting the value of Japan in military terms. Just the location of Japan between the two superpowers ensured Japan would not be left out of such a war.³⁶⁵

The third sense of unreality was apparent from the notion that Japan could make changes, but all other factors would remain the same. This ignored the fact that the changes envisioned would alter the regional and global strategic milieus, as well as interlocked strategic hypotheses, dialogues and processes. There seems to have been a willful disregard of the fact that the U.S. might reject any arrangement that moved its

³⁶⁵Evidently, cases such as Norway, Greenland and Belgium were not given much relevance.

forces out of Japan, since doing so damaged a host of security arrangements, and most specifically degraded its own security. Since Japan had no power to remove those U.S. forces, U.S. reluctance could force the situation to a crisis that would damage all aspects of Japan's security.

Moreover, there was discontinuity in the socialist logic. An independent, disarmed Japan was not stronger, but more vulnerable. Peace for Japan was no more secure than in an allied status since the strategic dialogue of conflict was between others and out of Japan's reach. Further, where a minor alliance partner has some influence with its larger partner through the mechanism of the alliance, a disarmed neutral has no direct leverage with any of its balanced guarantors. Neither does the non-aligned, unarmed neutralist position readily accommodate changes.³⁶⁶

The fourth sense of unreality pertained to the communists. The economic strength upon which the socialists depended was built through Japan's integration in the capitalist world economic system. Eventually, the difference between the communist ideology and Japan's economic process must clash. It hardly is credible that either the USSR or PRC relished having a dynamic example of success of an opposing ideology on their doorstep. Further, the sense of unreality was apparent in matters of state. The autocratic regimes of the USSR and PRC had little tolerance for deviance or pluralism. Given the mutual antipathy of Russians, Japanese and Chinese, it is difficult to imagine a long-term

³⁶⁶Should one guarantor fail to keep in balance or the majority of guarantors collude, the neutral's security is at risk. Only by abandoning its position could neutral preserve itself in such a circumstance. The situation is quite different for a minor alliance member. Should its guarantor decline in capability, the minor member can still adjust in several ways, yet if the opponent declines, the minor alliance member need do nothing.

alignment with Japan remaining non-aligned and disarmed.

Last, the Socialists, in stretching their strategic dialogues, probably overestimated their responses. Those outside of Japan who were aligned with the West had good reason to want Japan to remain in its arrangement. The communists hardly could make any overt arrangements, for to do so might have jinxed the Socialists' chances and probably would have required some consistency of joint effort. (This would have been difficult since already there were tensions in the Sino-Soviet relationship.) There was no support forthcoming from other student groups (such as the Koreans), nor was there any other external constituency that offered support. In short, if the Socialists expected significant external support, they were disappointed. There was none; indeed, for both sides, the struggle was almost wholly a domestic one.

The strategic importance of this sense of unrealism was plain; if transformed to action and thence policy, the results could decouple the single most important stabilizing relationship in East Asia. Far more than domestic power was at stake, more even than Japan's security. Yet, to many Japanese, these aspects and the causes of their unreality evidently were not apparent. It was remarkable that Japanese officials were able to manage, deflect and eventually confront and overcome the effects.

Interested in modest adjustments to the U.S.-Japan security arrangement, Japanese officials evidently sought bilateral alignment of policy courses, rather than perpetuation of enforced coincidence or radical departures. Thus, when the Socialists and others intruded into the strategic dialogue with Washington, Japan's officials probably were embarrassed as well as surprised and hampered.

.. *Dissent Among the Conservatives* - Domestic politics affect the debate over which course Japan's security policy ought to take.³⁶⁷ The internal factionalism of the LDP caused part of the problem. In 1958, the LDP was more an aggregation of separate political leaders and their followers than a single unified whole.³⁶⁸ Prime Minister Kishi's personal characteristics and political tactics probably worsened the environment for Tokyo's negotiators. Exercising his office by playing factions off against each other, he lacked both a general political mandate and a faction of his own sufficiently powerful to compel submission to his agenda as did Yoshida before him.³⁶⁹

Neither did Kishi enjoy the generally polarized political situation that helped Yoshida. Yoshida held political middle ground by advocating primary themes of economic revitalization and conservatism in foreign affairs via close affiliation with America. However, Kishi's political middle ground was badly fragmented because of political infighting that he exacerbated. Moreover, his expedient political maneuvering, such as shuffling cabinet members, created opponents.³⁷⁰ Further, Kishi faced dissent with LDP ranks, The resurgence of Yoshida (aged 80) as a power within the LDP (which he had

³⁶⁷All national strategies are so affected. However, in this case the effect was so pronounced that it significantly and publicly affected the international strategic dialogue, managing to so sharpen and heat the debate that the process of strategy almost escaped the bounds of suitable hypotheses.

³⁶⁸A case may be made that this has always been so and has not proven particularly significant in strategic fora, provided the dialogues do not become politicized or emotionally laden. In this case, both occurred.

³⁶⁹Yoshida was not popular for his autocratic manner. Yet, in the distress and dislocations of the war's aftermath, his firmness was an asset. Still, this spared neither him nor his political faction from attack. He held much of his support together by adhering to two themes, focus on economic recovery and the awareness that his agenda was less risky than that of the more extreme political elements (e.g., the communists).

³⁷⁰For example, by the end of January, 1959, many key politicians, often former holders of high government positions, were without jobs. These included Kono, Ikeda, Ishii, Miki, Matsumura and Ishibashi who, even without high official positions, continued to exercise considerable power.

refused to join after 1954) exacerbated this party dissension.³⁷¹

However, these largely were internal matters; the negotiating agenda with the U.S. and Japan's position in those negotiations remained unchanged. The most important strategic consideration of these power shifts within the party was placing members of the so-called "Yoshida School"³⁷² (specifically Ikeda as Minister of International Trade and Industry, and Sato as Finance Minister), in negotiating positions crucial to concluding the 1960 Treaty. They had significant bilateral strategic impact and simultaneously confirmed Yoshida's influence.³⁷³ The presence of these persons, served to anchor the government in a revision mode characterized by conservative adjustment. Ultimately, their inclinations insured Japan's security strategy was sustained and the difficulties successfully managed.

While the presence of "Yoshida school" officials divided the LDP along factional lines, threw into public view the LDP factional struggles, heightened the Socialist rhetoric, and turned the issues of the strategic debate on Japan's security into domestic political footballs, little of this bled into bilateral negotiations. Japan's negotiators found their domestic dialogues more challenging than those with their U.S. counterparts. In this

³⁷¹This was virtually inevitable; Kishi had been part of the group which had overthrown Yoshida in 1954, and was allied to Kono (a political enemy of Yoshida). Kishi's actions, which were politically costly to him, suggest behavior in keeping with Allison's so-called Model I - Rational Actor, rather than his Model II - Organizational Process or Model III - Bureaucratic Politics models; cf., Allison, *Essence of Decision*, pp. 82-85, 88. In particular, the motives for Kishi are murky, Japan's officials dealt with problems (domestic, bilateral and regional) simultaneously, and despite considerable pressures, negotiations with the U.S. were seen through essentially unaltered.

³⁷²This "school" was characterized by conservative nationalism, alignment with the Anglo-American Bloc in world affairs, deep mistrust of leftist notions, and placing as the first national priorities economic recovery and mercantilism.

³⁷³This was considerable. Recognizing the need to retain the solid link to the U.S., Yoshida counseled against trying to place too many restrictions on the U.S. forces because more general U.S.-Japan relations could be harmed. Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, p. 72.

respect, Washington's restraint and cooperation stands as an example of the U.S. determination to preserve the strategic arrangement.

An overview of the period discloses a pattern marked by great change in Japanese stature, an unchanging and progressively more peaceful regional security environment, and an empathetic U.S. Government. The domestic political struggle that marked the negotiation and passage of the 1960 TMCS was strategic dialogue and process below the bilateral level over whether Japan would adopt a different strategic hypothesis. From a theoretical perspective, this suggests several things. First, the machinations of Kishi, his LDP rivals and JSP opponents, while adding energy to the process, seem to have been part of the more general strategic process than its drivers. The lack of control that marked the students, the inability of Kishi to control even his intra party dialogues, and the muted personification of the JSP leadership are indicative of momentum not characterized by a dominant personality. Moreover, the continually hardening behavior of the JSP seems to discount theoretical notions of political entrepreneurship, "band wagon" effects, or negotiations leading to shared power. Moreover, there is difficulty in ascertaining the number and identity of the actors; certainly other than governments were involved. This places at risk those theories that posit strategic activity as only properly the function of states. Further, there seems to be a definition problem in that if security is considered a collective good, then there was considerable perceptual difference as to what form and that good would take and the appropriate means to realize it.

Similarly, the domestic pronouncements and the perspectives of the Japanese negotiators with their American counterparts are generally devoid of commentary

explaining Japan's continued alliance with the U.S. as conducive to the security of any entity except Japan. Yet, it is hard to imagine that such considerations were not crucial to all major points. U.S. officials thought they were (as NSC documentation and conference position papers illustrate). This suggests that the notion of a larger-scale collective good was either coincidentally identified and assumed as a portion of the undergirding negotiation parameters, or that there was clearly understood differences that the U.S. insisted be retained in any arrangement.³⁷⁴

Additionally, there is a reciprocal process underway between the U.S. and Japanese officials. If Washington seems understanding and assisting regarding Tokyo's domestic concerns, it is not because the issues were unimportant. This U.S. tenor is echoed by Japanese understanding and support for Washington's larger, broader strategic concerns. This bilateral reciprocity seems to define not only levels of activity and roles, but is tacit acknowledgment of the interactive nature of strategic affairs between and within levels.

Whether the results of the bilateral negotiations were precisely those expected is moot. The key points of the accomplishment of the 1960 TMCS were the ability of both sides to manage their domestic arena, the stabilizing effect each had on the other, and the results which ensured the attainment of each party's key strategic goals. In all, the passage

³⁷⁴The tone of Special Ambassador Dean Rusk's commentary suggest the firmness of the U.S. position, but acknowledges the difficulties faced by Japan's officials, implying that the source lay in the perceptions of the Japanese public, not it its officials. See DOS, "Statement by Dean Rusk, January 29, 1952," in *DOS Bulletin*, Vol. XXVI, No. 659, February 11, 1952, pp. 216-17. Since Rusk's comments touch two different strategic levels, he may have been conducting strategic dialogue on more than one level in full appreciation that Tokyo's officials were involved in all three forms of strategy on multiple planes. His allusion to U.S. sensitivity of Japanese hurdles further suggests the U.S. concern that certain arrangements be maintained (which his commentary, as a form of strategic dialogue, would influence).

of the 1960 TMCS was the second great postwar strategic decision and officially anchored Japan's relationship with the West, the U.S., and theoretical constructs incorporating both balance of power and collective goods aspects.

. 1960-1976 The Testing of the Relationship

. *Background* - Significant events bearing on Japan's security mark the period from the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to the publication of Japan's 1976 Mid-Term Program Outline. Having concluded a domestically contentious but very favorable security treaty with the U.S., Japan seemed to have laid a solid platform for its national security. Further, with a specified term of ten years, the treaty promised a domestic respite. However, well before that time passed, the impact and implications of other events tested Japan's relationship with America.

.. *Frictions in the Communist Camp* - One of Tokyo's major strategic considerations was the increasingly obvious rupture and growing hostility in Sino-Soviet relations.³⁷⁵ This conflict remained a continual and generally worsening backdrop throughout the period.³⁷⁶ This conflict tested the U.S.-Japan relationship by

³⁷⁵For example, on June 8, 1960, the Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions met in Beijing, where the Chinese publicly echoed many of the charges they leveled at Khrushchev's "revisionism" in April. Also in June, at the meeting of the Romanian Communist Party in Bucharest, Khrushchev attempted to mobilize support against the Chinese (and failed). These were but the latest features to a long-standing disagreement between the Soviet communists led by Stalin and Khrushchev and the Chinese communists led by Mao. This disagreement, with a complex mixture of ideology and nationalism at its core, had a record of acrimonious events stretching back decades.

³⁷⁶Bitter personal attacks on Mao and Khrushchev in 1963, by 1965, had developed into a spurning policy by China and an isolating campaign by Moscow. In 1966, Soviet diplomatic personnel and students were expelled from China and the Soviets responded in October by expelling Chinese Students. In 1967, the Soviets began increasing the number of divisions along the Sino-Soviet border so that by 1970 they had added fifteen to the original fifteen already in place. In 1968, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine justifying it were both denounced by Beijing. The failure of the Soviets in their attempt to use the Moscow Conference of World Communist Parties in June, 1969, to isolate the Chinese within the

potentially altering the strategic milieu, the dialogues and the processes; eventually it served to confirm Tokyo's strategic alignment with Washington.

Because the U.S.-Japanese relationship provided Japan security, Tokyo could stand apart from the Sino-Soviet altercation that otherwise might have driven it into one camp or the other. Further, Tokyo's relationship to Washington allowed Japanese authorities to weaken the effects of both communist giants on Japan,³⁷⁷ and, to a limited extent, play one against the other. Simultaneously, Tokyo benefited from the divisive effect the schism had on Japan's domestic communist movement.

Yet, the communist altercation was not comforting to Japan. The clash had nationalist, racist, and ideologic overtones suggesting major, deep-seated antagonisms. Such antagonisms could erupt into open warfare³⁷⁸ and readily spill over into areas of great concern to Tokyo. Further, the effects of such a clash were almost certain to involve matters of great concern to Washington. If the U.S. became involved, Japan could become entangled through the mechanism of Japan's U.S. alignment. Were the

communist movement was balanced by more success at improving relations through conventional diplomacy with those states that directly bordered China. Probably the worst relations were reached in August-September 1969, when Soviet and Chinese armed forces in divisional strength clashed in two locations (near Druzhba along Xinjiang's border, and at Damansky Island in the Ussuri River near Jaoho along the Manchurian border). China, increasingly isolated diplomatically, emerging from the Cultural Revolution and threatened militarily, responded to the initiative of Prime Minister Kosygin to reopen negotiations, and by the end of 1970, had again exchanged ambassadors. However, this last effort did not restore the fundamental strategic position, as China remained separated from the USSR. This was unambiguously clear when Beijing announced in July, 1971, that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had arrived secretly in Beijing and had arranged for a visit to China by President Nixon.

³⁷⁷ Japan was in the position of being able to stand apart from both, be coerced by neither, and yet be courted by both.

³⁷⁸ Indeed they did, but as it was not in the best interests of either Moscow or Beijing to continue pursuing such a course of action, it seems that after the affair at Damansky Island, both resolved to choose less violent alternatives if possible.

U.S. and Japan able to avoid direct involvement, the particular military configurations of the two communist giants suggested that a war between the two might be characterized neither by moderation in means nor brevity.³⁷⁹ There seemed ample opportunity for such a conflict to evolve in ways detrimental to Japan.

Moreover, the Sino-Soviet conflict contributed to a pervasive rise in East Asian militarization, a development not beneficial to Japanese security. Since the Cold War was very real, the U.S. increasingly involved in Vietnam, and both Koreas building up their forces, the deepening Sino-Soviet conflict underscored Japan's military vulnerabilities. Some developments had an ominous aspect. For example, the improvements in Soviet regional forces expanded an operational envelope that could include targets other than those in China. None of these aspects were conducive to scenarios abetting Japan's security. Yet, only to a minor extent could Tokyo adjust the circumstances to its own benefit without making large changes to its relations with Washington and the region..

In all, Japan was reminded of its vulnerabilities, and the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 were to provide the first two of several stark, ominous lessons.

.. Strategic Tests of the U.S.-Japan Security Relationship

³⁷⁹Both communist giants had very large military establishments, primarily configured for ground combat, but beyond this were asymmetrical. Both sides would have difficulty in conducting offensive operations in the other's territory, yet protracted operations (which were probable) would be exhausting to both sides. Weapons of mass destruction could be used by either side with little compunction; the leadership of both sides had ample experience with war and often demonstrated a willingness to expend human life in large quantities. Should the conflict include nuclear weapons, the resulting fallout would drift over Japan with unfortunate results of an indeterminate scale.

- *Berlin and Cuba* - The Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 are related strategic episodes of the Cold War that confirmed crucial aspects of the U.S.-Japanese relationship. In both cases Moscow chose to challenge Washington on issues bearing directly on U.S. strategy.

The first test was in Europe where the challenge also was directed at NATO. The second test was oblique; the USSR challenged the U.S. through a surrogate, communist Cuba. In both cases, the U.S. responded forcefully with very prominent military capabilities³⁸⁰ to preserve the status quo. But the strategic situation was not the same after Berlin. Besides the physical evidence (e.g., the Berlin Wall), public attitudes changed. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the attitudes of the leadership of both superpowers changed.³⁸¹ The Cuban Missile Crisis is the subject that has attracted the greater attention of the two. U.S. histories of that crisis focus on the U.S.-USSR exchange, in a superpower context;³⁸² scant mention is made of other matters because the speed and significance of the events and possible consequences consumed U.S. decision makers. Under those circumstances, the U.S. officials relegated considerations

³⁸⁰It was this prominence which in the opinion of some experts, was the central reason why the USSR backed down in Cuba. See "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, July 25, 1961," KPP, 1961, p. 535; and remarks of Robert S. McNamara, U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, Hearings. 88th Cong., 1st. sess. (1963), part 1, p. 31.

³⁸¹Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 893.

³⁸²For a comprehensive analysis see Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), and Jerome H. Kahan and Anne K. Long, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Study of its Strategic Context," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXXXVII, (December, 1972), pp. 564-90.

of allied states like Japan to the level of the immediately inconsequential.³⁸³ It is that sense of inconsequentiality that is important to Japan.

Japan could view the Berlin Crisis as evidence of the U.S. commitment to defend its defense partners. If a U.S. president could journey to Berlin and galvanize emotions and commitment by identifying himself as a Berliner, Japan could take comfort that Washington would similarly regard the U.S. commitment to other allies. If the demonstration of commitment included tough talk, then this was unremarkable; such a tactic was standard fare. In effect, Washington was conducting strategic dialogue and process with the USSR and its own allies.

The Berlin crisis had another favorable effect. With the focus of the superpowers on Berlin, their attention was diverted from Northeast Asia. Having endured two inconclusive crises centered on the Taiwan Straits (1954 and 1959), Tokyo may have been relieved when tensions shifted elsewhere.

However, the Cuban Missile Crisis was clearly different in tone and risk.³⁸⁴ The Cuban crisis seemed to develop with frightening suddenness, reach intense proportions with few discrete stages, and threaten the coalitions of the West and East

³⁸³ Clearly, if the crisis should pass, then U.S. allies like Japan would be unaffected. However, should the crisis detonate a superpower war, then all considerations for allies might be subsumed within the context of this overarching conflict. Should the conflict open with a nuclear exchange (or rapidly escalate to one) as seemed possible at the time, then no amount of after-the-fact consultations would suffice. See *Evaluation of Recent Trends*, Address by President Kennedy at the University of Maine, Orono, Maine, October 19, 1963, as found in *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1963*, Richard P. Stebbins, (ed.), (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 162-7.

³⁸⁴ Allison, *Essence of Decision*, pp. 64-5. See also Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p. 125.

with thermonuclear catastrophe. Influencing any of these stages was beyond Tokyo's ability. Although the U.S. shifted its conventional military forces, suggesting behavior designed to avoid nuclear war, it seemed prepared to take a frightening degree of risk, particularly nuclear risk.³⁸⁵ Kennedy indicated his determination to order an air strike, an action that could ignite just that sort of war.³⁸⁶ This sort of maneuvering by the U.S. President was quite different from the "brinkmanship" practiced by any other high U.S. official (e.g., the Secretary of State).³⁸⁷

Arguments over the importance of getting the Soviet missiles removed from Cuba and the degree of nuclear risk the U.S. was prepared to take, ignore how these issues affected Japan. Obviously, Soviet missiles in Cuba were of little immediate concern to Japan. Further, as with Berlin, Tokyo may have regarded it as an advantage to have the superpowers focused elsewhere than in Northeast Asia. Moreover, while

³⁸⁵This was not merely the concern of what would happen to Japan's guarantor, but the direct negative effects to Japan if the risk became a reality.

³⁸⁶Indeed, the core of the President's message to Khrushchev transmitted by Robert Kennedy on October 27, 1962 to Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin was that if the U.S. did not receive a Soviet commitment to remove the bases, that the U.S. would remove them. Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: New American Library, 1969), p. 108.

³⁸⁷The crucial differences between the President and any other U.S. official making such unequivocal statements lie in the realm of strategy. First, the concept of the situation and what it requires is held by a single individual. Because of his position, it is difficult for subordinates to alter this perception. Thus, there are few other perceptions that can modify the view held by the decision authority, and all of them reactive. Second, the U.S. President is both the decision (national command) authority and the ultimate director of the process. He is in the position to initiate, terminate, guide and pace all strategic process. Because he is the primary release authority for any significant military power, and the only one who can release nuclear weapons, the speed of evolution of a crisis can easily outrace external perceptions of how the process is developing. At his level, there is no further check or balance mechanism. Third, the strategic dialogue on one side narrows almost to a single individual, his criteria, and his sense of timing. In short, in crisis conditions, a presidential statement, especially one expressed in stark, if-then language and having a specified time limit, constitutes a national commitment from which it would be very difficult to retreat. When such statements are made publicly, "slack" is removed from the process and rigidity results.

Japan had to endure a geographical nearness to the USSR, Soviet firings of missiles over Japan, and Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories, the U.S. endured no paralleling circumstance. Japanese officials may have believed that if Washington were forced to consider the permanent, unpalatable presence of nearby enemy forces, U.S. officials might be more sensitive to Japan's circumstances in the future.

The crises of Berlin and Cuba gave Tokyo two examples of a mixed message. On the one hand, the U.S. commitment to allies seemed credible and firm, the very characteristics that Tokyo sought from the U.S. for deterrence. Alternatively, those firm commitments from the U.S. and its demonstrated credibility were precisely those characteristics that could heighten the risk of Japan's involvement in a conflict not directly germane to Japan's interests.

These perspectives were echoes of the debates immediately preceding the 1960 Treaty. Yet, Japan made no move seeking treaty revision or further limits on U.S. forces. If the number of conversations with U.S. officials, articles or books on the subject suggest the importance of the crises in bilateral security affairs, then the subjects seem minor to the Japanese. This is unlikely. Japanese officials probably realized that by attempting to interject themselves into the process, or by tinkering with the U.S.-Japan relationship in the aftermath of the crises, they could do little to improve their position and much that might harm it.³⁸⁸ Considering the general

³⁸⁸One notable difference was apparent; there was a change in the voting patterns of Japan's representatives to the UN regarding resolutions calling for the non-use of nuclear weapons. In 1961, Japan voted for the measure, from 1962-1979, it abstained, and from 1980-1982, it voted against the measure. The pattern of timing suggests that in 1962, Japan came to accept the concept of deterrence, but as a superpower arrangement. Since Japan was protected by this concept but still deeply sensitive to nuclear issues, publicly it

situation, no attainable alternative more suitable than the status quo was available. Thus, Cuba was a test of the relationship (and of Japan's strategy) that had been effectively addressed by inaction. Whatever reason there was for this inaction, the result was the perpetuation of the status quo in the U.S.-Japan relationship.

- *Vietnam* - The Vietnam War was a protracted strategic problem that tested the U.S.-Japan relationship and Japan's strategy in multiple ways.³⁸⁹ Yet, restraint marked the substance of Japanese reactions to this uncomfortably close war. The reactions of Japan's ministries were muted, the developments in defense capabilities cautious. Yet, the Vietnam War was clearly a different sort of event for Japan than the Berlin or Cuban Crises; it was the sort of event to which Japan could and would respond.³⁹⁰

One element facilitating Japanese response was time. The duration of the Cuban crisis was weeks, the Berlin Crisis was months and the Vietnam War was years. With its long interval, the Vietnam War gave the Japanese the opportunity to develop opinions and respond through multiple means. The protracted interval meant Tokyo

could neither condemn nor support the concept. By 1980, in the aftermath of U.S. reductions in Asia, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the large buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East, it seems apparent that Japan was willing to take more pragmatic measures to maintain the nuclear shield that provided deterrence.

³⁸⁹ Despite many (often acerbic) accounts of that protracted event, relatively little attention has been paid in America to the war's effects on Japanese affairs. Most accounts seem to focus on public protests to U.S. involvement or the large economic benefits which Japan reaped from the war; Japanese strategic concerns seems to be considered as a subset of U.S. policy for Asia, or simply ignored.

³⁹⁰ It is the lack of response by Japanese officials in the aftermath of Berlin and Cuba that is most remarkable. Other nations, e.g., France and China, were quite sensitive to the evolution of those events. Yet, discussion held with Japanese officials during the period 1962-1964, overwhelming reflects the primacy of economic matters and the seeming content of the Japanese to concentrate on economics.

could gauge the feelings of its polity and those of other nations, and thereby avoid committing itself to an uncharted course. This facilitated Japan's efforts in its strategic dialogues.

Another key difference to Japan was the location. To Japan, Berlin and Cuba were geographically remote, a situation that contributed to Tokyo having a detached perspective of developments. This was not so with Vietnam, a point underscored by the U.S. use of Okinawa as a base for B-52 bombers striking targets in Vietnam. It was this use that raised Japanese concerns of entanglement should the war expand.

Third, neither the issues nor the alignments of those powers involved in Vietnam were unmixed. Within and among all who were engaged, considerable incongruities existed and affected developments. Regarding U.S. involvement, Japan had mixed feelings. Besides the question whether the U.S. involvement ultimately would improve or snarl Japan's security, the war generated great profits for Japan.

Fourth, both the USSR and PRC supported the North Vietnamese communist regime. Military material flowed from and through these two sources into North Vietnam which the U.S. sought to curtail. However, this placed Japan in awkward circumstances.³⁹¹ Tokyo wanted to pursue its economic agenda, present a low and

³⁹¹Not that it was a new development. The issue of Japan's trade with communist nations, particularly China, had been in the open since early 1964.

The Japanese Delegation explained that it was Japan's policy to carry out its trade with Communist countries on a commercial basis, in accordance with the principle of separating the political and economic aspects of Japanese relations with countries of the Communist bloc and acting in consonance with the practices of free world countries.

See Section III of "Communique of the Third Meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs," Tokyo, January 28, 1964, text from DOS Bulletin, February 17, 1964, pp. 237-8.

generally acceptable profile to its Asian neighbors, and yet retain the fulsome U.S. commitment to Japan's security. Tokyo's policy was to avoid irritating anyone. Yet, pressures from all sides seemed to force Japan to a decision, and any decision was a guarantee of friction.³⁹² The issue festered over the many sorts of goods (e.g., communications supplies) that were directly applicable to both civilian and military use. Japan declined to prohibit the export of these "dual use" items despite being made aware that their respondents (e.g., the Chinese) were transshipping many of them to North Vietnam.³⁹³

Fifth, the evident inability of the U.S. to resolve the war to its favor damaged the perception of the U.S. as the invincible security guarantor. It raised the poignant question of whether the U.S. could meet its treaty obligations successfully with respect to a large, powerful enemy when it clearly was having trouble with a small, weak one.³⁹⁴

³⁹²There was little Japan could do about the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The U.S. entered that arena voluntarily, escalated, expanded, and limited it unilaterally, and removed itself all in due course. Even the involvement of U.S. allies (e.g., the Australians and Koreans) were at the behest of Washington. In any event, there was no mechanism for the Japanese to be involved in Vietnam (in the wholly improbable event they might have wished to be engaged), thereby foreclosing any chance of policy negotiation among allies. Japan, although protected by the U.S., found itself incapable of significantly influencing events because of the nature of its alignment with Washington.

³⁹³Personal experience of the author who found a variety of medical supplies and electronic parts still bearing Japanese labels and brand names in the possession of North Vietnamese Army captives and casualties. That such transfers to communist control were known to the Japanese at the time was confirmed some eighteen years later by Japanese officials on the understanding that such confirmation would not be attributed on an individual basis. See also *supra*, footnote 172, p. 197, and footnote 191, p. 204.

³⁹⁴This point assumed a greater sense of urgency with China's detonation of an indigenously developed nuclear bomb on October 16, 1964. For the official Chinese announcement and general policy statement thereon see *Peking Review*, October 16, 1964, Supplement. For the U.S. reaction see White House Press Release, October 16, 1964, "Statement by President Johnson, October, 16, 1964;" *DOS Bulletin*, November 2, 1964, p. 612.

Sixth, U.S. military policy had changed with respect to military forces generally and nuclear weapons in particular. The results were to affect Japanese security.

The Eisenhower administration reduced conventional forces and simultaneously developed the ability to respond with overwhelming force - "massive retaliation." Kennedy, assuming the leadership from Eisenhower, added the concepts of "flexible response" and "controlled response," and expanded conventional forces.³⁹⁵

Kennedy used the increases of conventional forces to force a favorable showdown with Khrushchev seemingly vindicating the doctrine of flexible response. However, with the deepening quagmire of Vietnam, these employment concepts evidently were less than precise or prescient.³⁹⁶ This development suggested that the U.S. regional estimates, military and otherwise, were flawed. As this conclusion solidified, it inferred two particulars. First, it showed a need for Japan to develop its own estimates; second, that Tokyo should more actively consult with the U.S. regarding matters germane to Japan's security. Yet, despite these and U.S. expectations and urging, from 1964 to 1971, Japan showed little interest in either a more active role or expanded military development. Japan's military development was deliberate, measured, and minimal. Tokyo's actions seemed more an exercise of studied restraint

³⁹⁵The concept of "flexible response" called for sufficient conventional forces to meet contingencies with other than nuclear options. "Controlled response" called for multiple levels of so-called strategic forces, specifically including those nuclear-capable, permitting graduated responses throughout the spectrum of conflict. In effect, these changes provided flexibility rather than limiting the President's choices to inaction or the destruction of the enemy's country through an all-out, probably disproportionate response.

³⁹⁶This is not to suggest that they were inherently flawed from a theoretical point of view, or were, from a doctrinaire perspective, inappropriate in addressing conflict at multiple levels; rather that they inferred both precision and discrete applications that the conditions of employment were to dispute.

than proportionate response to an expanding strategic milieu.

.. *Nixon at Guam, July 25, 1969*³⁹⁷ - The reluctance of Japan to do more for its own defense began to publicly emerge as a major contentious issue at the same time as the U.S. disillusionment with Vietnam became a major domestic issue.³⁹⁸ By 1969, President Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger, his Assistant for National Security Affairs, were determined to withdraw major U.S. forces from Vietnam. However, maintaining the fabric of the strategy of containment was crucial. This required prevailing on other allies and members of the Western Coalition to increase their shares of the common defense burden and bearing the primary burden of their own security.

Specific enunciation of U.S. intentions came during a trip through several Far East nations. At a stopover on Guam on July 25, 1969, Nixon held an informal news conference in preparation for which the various media representatives had been given background information papers. During the course of the President's informal remarks several policy propositions were made. The first was the intent for America to remain significantly involved in Asian affairs. "As we look at Asia, it poses . . . over the long

³⁹⁷See *NPP, 1969*, pp. 545-9.

³⁹⁸U.S. perceptions of Japan's security roles underwent significant alteration during the period from 1963 to 1971. In 1963, the U.S. view was that Japan was to make no regional military contribution. Its main role was to be an economic and political model to the rest of Asia. See *Japan, the United States and Europe*, Address by U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, before the Chicago Conference on Agricultural Trade with Japan, March 28, 1963, as found in *DOS Bulletin*, April 22, 1963, pp. 606-612. By 1971 the U.S. view was for

. . . the countries of East Asia to maximize their contributions to their own security and development as well as to support the security and development of their neighbors. I have also stressed the need for other developed countries, notably Japan, to carry more of the burden of economic assistance to the developing countries of East Asia.

See *The Nixon Doctrine: A Progress Report*, Address by Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Before the Far East-America Council, New York, January 19, 1971, as found in *DOS Bulletin*, February 8, 1971, pp. 161-5.

haul . . . the greatest threat to the peace of the world, and, for that reason the United States should continue to play a significant role."³⁹⁹ The second was that the United States would keep its treaty commitments, but with certain caveats.

However, I believe that the time has come when the United States, in our relations with all of our Asian friends, be quite emphatic on two points: One, that we will keep our treaty commitments, our treaty commitments, for example, with Thailand under SEATO; but, two that as far as the problems of internal security are concerned, as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.⁴⁰⁰

As applied to East Asia, the doctrine

. . . sets a state of mind, a style of diplomacy, a way of conducting our programs abroad, which reduces our direct responsibility and calls upon the nations of the area, individually and collectively, to assure an increasing role in providing for their own internal defense.⁴⁰¹

Clearly sensitive to the perceptions of other Asian nations, Nixon was deliberate in his attempt to assure American allies and shore up U.S. strategy.

. . . one of the reasons for this trip is to leave no doubt in the minds of the leaders of non-Communist Asia that the United States is committed to a policy in the Pacific--a policy not of intervention but one which certainly rules out withdrawal--and regardless of what happens in Vietnam that we intend to continue to play a role in Asia to the extent that Asian nations, bilaterally and collectively, desire us to play a role.⁴⁰²

³⁹⁹See NPP, 1969, pp. 547.

⁴⁰⁰See NPP, 1969, pp. 549.

⁴⁰¹ See Marshall Green, *The Nixon Doctrine: A Progress Report*, Address made January 19, 1971, as found in DOS Bulletin, February 8, 1971, p. 161.

⁴⁰²See NPP, 1969, pp. 551.

There were several reasons for Nixon's policy pronouncement, and each had an effect on Japan. First, there was great public (and official) disillusionment with the inability of the U.S. to resolve the situation in Southeast Asia. With Japanese protests against U.S. involvement in Vietnam growing, Tokyo found itself tarred with the brush of association and increasingly pressured by domestic ideologic groups. In response, Japanese officials indicated to their U.S. counterparts Tokyo's increasing reluctance to support U.S. policy on Vietnam.⁴⁰³

Second, Congress and key U.S. Government figures were aware that many U.S. allies did not concur with Washington's assessment of the communist regional threat. This difference led to a lack of active support, even a reluctance to meet proportional defense budgets (despite obvious capabilities to do so and benefits derived from U.S. security policies). The most notable nation in this respect was Japan. Frustrated by the lack of support (and, perhaps by its inability to press its allies to its cause) Washington probably thought a unilateral step appropriate.

Third, the fundamental feature of the U.S. strategy of containment called for a U.S. role that provided favorable conditions for development, served as guarantor and support for the efforts, and a shift into an overarching, but secondary, role once the several power centers could manage on their own. The great economic, political and

⁴⁰³Evidently, Tokyo found the costs of supporting the U.S. higher than the value of the atmospherics and capital derived from supporting the U.S. military efforts. Significantly, the pressure of Japanese officials did not become specific until after public and official U.S. disillusionment was apparent. There are theoretical parallels in this to the collective goods notions of the so-called decision rule, band wagon effect, and strategic interactions. See Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, pp. 1-65, and Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, pp. 17, 23-29, 33-34, 78-79, 113-14, 124, 126-29.

military recoveries of the members of the Western Coalition suggested that shift was imminent, perhaps even overdue.⁴⁰⁴

Yet, Washington's strategic notions were not necessarily accepted by Tokyo. Japan's interests lay in using the U.S. strategy to advance its own, simultaneously avoiding the risks inherent in becoming a more active part of the U.S. strategy.

Fourth, several forms of distress in the communist camp seemed evident, and Nixon's initiative took advantage of them. Washington's strategic shift in roles served to remove the onus of the U.S. as an imperialistic power and debunk communist propaganda that labeled regimes aligned with the U.S. as Washington's lackeys. Further, it reduced the singular focus of the communists on the U.S., effectually removing the cohesive effect provided the communists by a common enemy. This feature enhanced Tokyo's strategic posture by increasing its flexibility, reducing domestic pressures on Tokyo, and acknowledging the lack of a unified communist bloc. Yet, it placed Tokyo in the position of being directly responsible for its policies and indicated that a reassessment of its security was in order.

Fifth, the U.S. had to encourage the maintenance of deterrence, which if Washington did not provide, then someone else must. Although the U.S. could (and did) assert the provision of the "nuclear shield," maintaining deterrence at lower and

⁴⁰⁴It was nearly twenty-five years since the end of the war, and every Western nation had recovered. The "economic miracles" had occurred to both Germany and Japan. Korea was beginning a major economic surge. With the exception of Britain, all European and Asian belligerents who were aligned with the West in the postwar period were in better condition than at any time before the war. The Western international community remained remarkably stable despite the extraordinary changes in Africa and South Asia, and despite some success in military fields, the communist coalition seemed shackled to chronic contradictions. From a U.S. perspective, there was little reason why the burden could not be shared more broadly.

more conventional levels were perhaps just as important.⁴⁰⁵ Those nations most affected by threats at these levels could provide such deterrence. Further, it would be difficult for those governments to explain to their polities why they were unwilling to take such measures.

This posed no difficulties for Japan. Low-level threats were easily within Japan's capabilities, and geography eliminated the cross-border insurgencies that bedeviled others. Moreover, the means was at hand to damp any criticism through Tokyo's policies of exclusive self-defense and omni-directional foreign affairs.

Sixth, the implicit U.S. call for a show of good faith by its allies inverted the argument used by its allies who had insisted on the presence of U.S. forces as a show of sincerity.⁴⁰⁶ This implied that if an ally's response was inadequate, then other bilateral relations might be adversely affected.

To Japan, the U.S. announcement came as a clear warning that its unique relationship with Washington was in jeopardy. Should Japan not display sincerity concerning its own security and the value of the U.S.-Japan security relationship, then Washington might be more skeptical of other aspects, perhaps even of the whole

⁴⁰⁵This was most especially true since both Khrushchev and Mao asserted the communists would support "wars of national liberation," a mode of conflict that nuclear weapons cannot address.

⁴⁰⁶These demands by U.S. allies led to the maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe and Korea far longer than envisioned. Although U.S. forces were drawn down, combat and reconnaissance units, in numbers significant enough to insure "linkage," were maintained well forward in Germany and Korea. These forces served as a so-called "trip wire" insuring any significant attack would involve the U.S. as a belligerent. In addition, supply points, logistic heads, and a rapid reinforcement capability were maintained (usually with high visibility) to debunk notions of a possible quick victory.

relationship.⁴⁰⁷ There was the distant chance, in the aftermath of the Vietnam experience, that an outright refusal to respond might crystallize latent U.S. isolationist tendencies with broad, unfortunate results.

The problem for Japan's officials was what to do.⁴⁰⁸ If Japan followed the lead of South Korea and provided troops (even non-combat troops), major negative domestic and foreign reactions would result.⁴⁰⁹ Doing more to provide basing and support directly benefiting U.S. military operations, opened Japan to charges (never completely dismissed⁴¹⁰) that Japan was merely an occupied U.S. military colony. Worse, if others saw the support as willful, Japan might be seen as being in partnership with the U.S. to subdue fellow Asians.

Should Tokyo unilaterally seek to increase its share of the costs associated with maintaining U.S. forces in Japan, Tokyo would set a precedent (that could be difficult to rescind) for such payments. Further, such a unilateral action opened the government

⁴⁰⁷The was particularly worrisome since by comparison to the Republic of Korea, Japan's demonstrations of sincerity looked anemic. For example, the Republic of Korea had sent troops to fight in Vietnam, and solidly supported the U.S. in trade sanctions with respect to communist nations. See Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1973), p. 152.

⁴⁰⁸Some Japanese opinions bordered on the fantastic. For example, Hisahiko Okazaki, relates an exchange with a Japanese political scientist who said, "If Japan cannot do as much as the United States would like Japan to do in the defense field, we should not agree with the United States on the assessment of the Soviet threat." Okazaki inquired in return, "Does that mean that we should tailor our estimate of the Soviet threat to the Japanese defense budget?" To Okazaki's surprise the answer was "Yes." Hisahiko Okazaki, *A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), p. 132.

⁴⁰⁹This would be especially worrisome since any combat had the potential of expanding and escalating (as it did when the U.S. entered Cambodia). If Japan was aligned as a belligerent and such an expansion or escalation occurred, Tokyo could find itself embroiled in an affair not of its making and in which it had no vital interest save maintaining its relationship with the United States.

⁴¹⁰This is a perpetual problem. Japan's alliance with the U.S. is regarded by some as lacking independence and, therefore, humiliating to Japan. However, the options are few and no other partnership than that with the U.S. is acceptable. In part, the perception may be accurate, but the pejorative implication is undeserved.

to charges of treating U.S. forces as mercenaries, might whet the U.S. desires for payment in other areas, and would damage Japan's strategic dialogue with communist states.

Japanese officials probably realized that no attainable alternative was as suitable as the status quo. As it found on other occasions, Tokyo could do little to better their position and, by tinkering with the relationship, might do much harm to Japan's security. Considering the general situation and Tokyo's desire to preserve the proven, highly advantageous strategic structure, Japan could and would do little besides making marginal qualitative improvements to their Self-Defense Forces and seek to be supportive in other fora.⁴¹¹

Thus, another test of Japan's strategy had arisen that Tokyo effectively addressed by maintaining the status quo. The results echoed those of the Berlin and Cuban Crises.

.. *The Shanghai Communique* - As a minor alliance member, Japan's strategic milieu was affected by the interactions of larger regional powers, often over issues that Tokyo hardly could influence. Such large power interactions were not necessarily hostile, degrees of accommodation also could have significant effects. Perhaps the altered status of the PRC reflected in the Shanghai Communique had the most effect

⁴¹¹Japan was to do both and add a third (which was suggested by the U.S.), increase foreign aid (called Overseas Development Assistance, later Official Development Assistance by the Japanese) for economic and political development. Yet, even these efforts did not meet fulsome approval. The qualitative military upgrades were cited as being too little and only marginal in terms of technological level, the support in other fora was seen as unnecessary, and the foreign aid was seen as tied to Japanese business. In essence, all these efforts were perceived to some degree as palliative or self-serving.

during the period. Certainly the U.S. efforts associated thereto dramatically altered the global and regional strategic milieus, and, in so doing, caused a shift in the relative factors of the U.S.-Japan relationship.

In the process of withdrawing major forces from Southeast Asia, the U.S. sought to alter its relationship with China. The timing was propitious;⁴¹² continually worsening Sino-Soviet frictions had reached a point where armed clashes had broken out in 1969.

Only part of a generally worsening Sino-Soviet relationship,⁴¹³ these clashes and Soviet intimations that a preemptive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities was strongly considered, reportedly combined to convince Chinese leaders of the need for a fundamental, agonizing reappraisal of security policies. Despite regaining some stability and immediately reopening a diplomatic dialogue, neither effort reversed the shift caused by the Soviet militarization of their conflict, nor dispelled the bitterness generated by the exchanges.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹²During a news conference on November 30, 1971, Henry Kissinger confirmed that much of the initial groundwork for this change in policy was done during 1969. See News Conference Statement, "Purposes of the Visit," by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, November 30, 1971, in "Presidential Documents: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, [weekly] Dec. 6, 1971), pp. 1585-6; hereafter *Presidential Documents*.

⁴¹³See *supra*, footnote 219, p. 220.

⁴¹⁴These developments seem a clear case of strategic dialogue modifying the strategic process. For example, Soviet planners may have seen the transfer of troops to the Sino-Soviet border as precautionary, prudent, and not unduly provocative. However, it is unlikely that Beijing took such a benign view. More likely Chinese leaders viewed the growth of such a hostile, superior, military force on their northern border with alarm, dramatically affecting the debate within China over strategy and foreign policy. In China's case, the threatening external environment combined with a still unstable internal domestic situation in such a way as to strengthen the military component in various deliberative councils. In turn, this shift in membership was to cause a vacillation between Chinese national priorities and occasion increased intensity in the power

Additionally, China was undergoing a series of internal disturbances all of which were directly related to its national goals, objectives and policies. How these particulars emerged would decisively shape China's security strategy. Although this internal process clearly was apparent in 1969, (the struggle for power as Mao's successor was well underway), it was not apparent in the early 1970s when, how, or in what way China might be disposed.⁴¹⁵

The first clear indication that China (and the U.S.) were considering a significant change of strategy was the shift in dialogue coming in the form of an announcement by President Nixon on July 15, 1971, indicating his acceptance of an invitation to visit the People's Republic of China.⁴¹⁶ The announcement shocked Tokyo (even as it surprised others). The popular notion is that this shock occurred because it was a surprise to Tokyo that Washington merely informed but did not extensively consult or coordinate with Tokyo prior to the announcement of acceptance.

Yet, a bigger shock followed as China's strategic disposition became clearer with the issuance of the Shanghai Communique, publicly acknowledging a shift in U.S.-Chinese relations. After some lengthy assertions of separate viewpoints, the

struggle developing between the potential heirs to an already ill Mao.

⁴¹⁵After Zhou En-lai's and then Mao's death in 1976, a struggle, a purge, and finally a resolution emerged in 1978 when Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng were able to repair much of the internal political damage and anchor programs in such a way as to enhance continuity and stability. These became official policy during two crucial meetings, the Fifth National People's Congress in February-March and the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December. See "Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Peoples' Republic of China" (hereafter "FBIS-PRC,") Supplement, March 16, 1978, for translations of the documents of the Fifth Congress, and "FBIS-PRC," December 16, 1978. pp. E1-13 for the developments during the Third Plenum.

⁴¹⁶See NPP, 1971, p. 819.

communiqué addressed the particulars of agreement.

. . . the two sides stated that: Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the best interests of all countries. Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict. Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other States. [sic] Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.⁴¹⁷

The extent of publicly acknowledged agreement came as a shock to the Japanese. The U.S. shift probably was particularly disturbing to Tokyo since it had resisted considerable domestic pressures to fully normalize relations with China partly in deference to American wishes. However, significant strategic reasons for Japanese distress also are evident.

The Shanghai Communiqué was a public statement by two governments signifying major adjustments in the strategies of each. On the Chinese side was the plain acknowledgment of the distancing between Beijing and Moscow, a distancing that was likely to remain.⁴¹⁸ Although stopping short of any arrangement beyond normalization with the U.S., the communiqué expressed a more independent role for China.

⁴¹⁷From a joint Sino-American statement issued by U.S. President Richard M. Nixon and China's Prime Minister Chou En-lai on February 28, 1972 (popularly called the Shanghai Communiqué) as found in J. A. S. Grenville, *The Major International Treaties 1914-1973, A History and Guide with Texts*, (London: Longmans, 1974), pp. 524-27.

⁴¹⁸The speed at which U.S.-PRC relations were improved after more than twenty years of bitter hostility suggests that both sides were eager to come to an accommodation. That both sides were able to step away from ideological poles suggests that key elements of the national strategies of both depended upon a successful *quid pro quo*.

However, China's adjustment was not without cost. Reaching this sort of normalization with the U.S. required Beijing to essentially abandon ideological premises laying at the core of its political theory, acknowledging that peaceful coexistence was acceptable, and tacitly accepting the U.S. regional presence and roles.⁴¹⁹ Further, the shift indicated a belief that greater potential benefits for China lay in accommodation with the West (vice remaining linked to the USSR,⁴²⁰) and being willing to act "responsibly" in international fora (e.g., the UN).

The possible ramifications for Japan were significant. Clearly, a stable and economically oriented China enhanced Japan's security by both balancing the Soviet presence and reducing the frictions with the U.S. Beijing's stance in opposition to Soviet hegemony, removed any united communist threat. The estrangement between Moscow and Beijing provided Tokyo with the opportunity to use its position with each as leverage with the other. More importantly, it enhanced Tokyo's flexibility by gaining greater latitude from Washington, and simultaneously reduced the chance of Japan's involvement in a Sino-U.S. quarrel.

Yet, for Japan to realize the greatest benefits from this change required careful

⁴¹⁹ Initially this was unspoken, but as the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam became certain and no re-entry contemplated, the Chinese became more explicit. Eventually, Beijing was to accept the presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet based in Japan as being in China's interests.

⁴²⁰ Economic issues were never at the forefront of Sino-Soviet relations. Other writers have suggested that both China and the USSR could establish a total embargo on their mutual trade without any serious danger of that embargo having much effect on either's development programs. Dewight Perkins, "The Economic Background and Implications for China," in *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective*, Herbert J. Ellison, ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), p. 98. However, the same could not be said of other states, in particular Japan, with which trade continued to grow until by 1979 constituted twenty-three percent of China's total trade.

and coordinated action. Washington's unilateral action increased Tokyo's difficulties in realizing its strategic objectives with China and the USSR. Further, Washington's action suggested a lack of responsibility for an ally whose whole security strategy was linked to it.

Beyond jolting its relations with Tokyo, there also were more general costs for Washington. Most fundamental was the perception that the U.S. sought political arrangements it would not otherwise have considered because of its weakened condition. Such a perception suggested a declining power, one whose role as the guarantor of the West might be questionable.

Second, the U.S. essentially was forced to abandon its singular support for the allied Republic of China which perceived the U.S. policy change (at least initially) as a mortal threat to its political and diplomatic position.⁴²¹ Despite the American reassurances throughout the Pacific area, it was difficult for U.S. allies not to be concerned about their security relationships with Washington.

Third, these changes occurred in close affiliation to other events, thus accentuating their psychological impact. The disappointing U.S. involvement in Vietnam was paralleled by America's largest domestic political upheavals since its Civil War. Not surprisingly, Washington's allies were concerned lest the U.S. be detracted from its external responsibilities. Simultaneously, the USSR was increasing its military presence in the Far East, even as the U.S. was drawing down its regional troop

⁴²¹This perception deepened when the UN General Assembly voted to oust Taiwan's representatives in order to seat those of the PRC.

strength.⁴²² The inference from these developments was for U.S. allies, including Japan, to increase their own military capabilities. Yet, this was precisely the avenue Japan was intent on avoiding.

Nor were U.S. announcements and adjustments limited to diplomatic or security considerations. Following the announcement of Kissinger's visit to China and the pending one by President Nixon, the U.S. announced a major adjustment in its economic policies that sought to redress monetary and commercial imbalances. These adjustments removed the U.S. (and its gold-backed U.S. dollar) from the roles of financial guarantors as arranged in 1945 at the Bretton Woods Conference.⁴²³ Since it altered the value of the yen and by that, all of Japan's foreign trade, the effect on Japan was significant. Many saw this action as a heavy-handed U.S. response to Japan's unwillingness to redress its balance of trade with America.⁴²⁴

In all, there was an impression of Washington as a beleaguered ally, adjusting its relationships to suit its own goals and giving scant consideration to other Asian governments. It was with some understatement that President Nixon mentioned in his 1972 annual report on foreign policy, ". . . Regardless of how it was achieved, the

⁴²²See "Agreement on Troop Reduction and Modernization," Joint Statement Issued in Washington and Seoul, February 6, 1971, *DOS Bulletin*, March 1, 1971, p. 263, and "Progress of the Republic of Korea," Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *DOS Bulletin*, May 4, 1971, May 31, 1971, pp. 716-17.

⁴²³For details see DOS Publication No. 2866, *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 22, 1945*, 2 vol. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948).

⁴²⁴The behavior of both Tokyo and Washington seem to support aspects of the collective goods theory as described by Olson and others; particularly in the sense that the good attained compared to the costs incurred explain Washington's behavior with the "free rider" aspect describes Tokyo's actions.

change in the U.S.-Chinese relationship after 20 years of animosity was bound to be unsettling.⁴²⁵

Although the Japanese may have welcomed the prospect wherein the probabilities of a Sino-U.S. conflict had dramatically lessened,⁴²⁶ there were disturbing aspects. First was the probability that in normalizing their relations with the other, both Beijing and Washington saw a greater flexibility in dealing with Moscow.⁴²⁷ Yet, it was unclear that such flexibility would result in greater stability or improved security for Japan.⁴²⁸

Second, the U.S. treatment of Taiwan (echoing Vietnam) suggested U.S. guaranteed security arrangements might be vulnerable to expediency. Of deeper concern was the notion that U.S. purposes might be less immutable than supposed. Dealing with an ally whose intentions were clear and who, for idealistic reasons, would forego immediate advantages to assist its friends provided a certain comfort. It was less comforting to realize that ally might be willing to degrade its alliance relationships for

⁴²⁵Richard M. Nixon, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace-A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 9, 1972" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 33. See also *NPP, 1972*, p. 218.

⁴²⁶The chances of again reopening a crisis focused on the Taiwan Straits seemed considerably more remote, and with it, the chances that Japan might be dragged into a conflict against its wishes. Similarly, it suggested the probability of a reticence on the part of the Chinese to automatically support North Korea in the event the armistice on the Korean peninsula ruptured.

⁴²⁷From this perception come the theories of the U.S. "playing the China card," (or China "playing the American card"). Indeed, there are aspects of this. President Carter may have successfully used the psychological and political leverage of normalized U.S.-Sino relations to make significant strides in detente and SALT.

⁴²⁸There was the possibility (albeit remote) that having removed one threat (the U.S.), Beijing might be unduly emboldened in its relations with the USSR.

more parochial reasons.

Third, many Japanese perceived the U.S. adjustments in economic policy as directed against Japanese commercial and monetary interests. In particular, the floating of the U.S. dollar and the imposition of a tax on imports had a major impact on Japan's ability to export to the U.S.⁴²⁹

Fourth, the contrast between the way the U.S. dealt with the PRC and with which it dealt with Japan caused an unsettling effect. Although finalization of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement generated considerable good will,⁴³⁰ it required ten years of negotiations and twenty years for resumption of full sovereignty over the islands. In the end, the U.S. retained significant basing entitlement. To the Japanese, the U.S. sacrificed little, delayed and negotiated for an inordinate period, and then signed when it was apparent that it had other major regional adjustments in the offing.

In contrast, the U.S. dealings with China, a bitter enemy, went very quickly and the U.S. sacrificed much (a large portion of which seen as being at the expense of

⁴²⁹The U.S. was making plain its conviction that the policies of economic nationalism which were appropriate to Japan when it was weak and recovering nation were inappropriate to its present and projected status. During the ten years between 1961 and 1971, Japan had tripled its GNP, quadrupled its exports, tripled its foreign exchange reserves, and shifted its balance of trade from a middling deficit to a sustained surplus. Its per capita income was on par with Great Britain and it had a larger trade with the U.S. than any other country except Canada. The U.S. perceived Japan as slow to change its policies and advised Tokyo that retaining them would only result in other nations adopting similar policies directed against Japan. U. Alexis Johnson, "Trends in United States-Japan Relations," Address by U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Before the International Business Outlook Conference, Los Angeles, October, 18, 1971, as found in *American Foreign Relations, 1971: A Documentary Record*, Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam, ed., (New York: New York University Press, 1976), pp. 371, 374.

⁴³⁰See "Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, Signed at Washington and Tokyo June 17, 1971," *Treaties and Other International Acts Series* 7314, Vol. XXIV, Part 1, (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), hereafter TIAS.

its allies). Further, the U.S. insistence on basing in Okinawa to oppose communism seemed suspect if the U.S. was accommodating the PRC. It suggested that the U.S. motives might flexibly self-serving.⁴³¹

Yet, despite the sobering effects of these two shocks, the Japanese were not altogether displeased. With the adjustment of U.S.-Chinese relations, the door clearly was open for Japan to reestablish more comprehensive relations than were possible during the prior two decades.⁴³² In addition, since Japanese firms had been conducting business with communist Chinese firms for some time, Tokyo could hardly complain that the U.S. had prevented all contact or acted precipitously to grab economic opportunities ahead of Japan.⁴³³

The U.S. opening to the PRC also gave Tokyo an opportunity to avoid pressure from the USSR. Moscow did not view enhanced Sino-Japanese relations as an

⁴³¹Indeed, to some extent they had to be so. If U.S. interests were not served, there was no reason for America to stand guarantor for the West. Moreover, U.S. regional military presence remained the linchpin for regional security, undergirding alliances other than that with Japan. Further, the notion of altering strategic positioning solely because of recent perceptions of changed intent hardly would be prudent. In all, this notion smacks of the unreality that pervaded the Japanese public in the late 1950s.

⁴³²The Japanese desire to have much more extensive relations with mainland China were longstanding. For example, in 1953, an unofficial trade pact was signed between Japanese businessmen and the People's Republic of China; in the 1960s, Japanese officials informed their U.S. counterparts of their decision to trade with the communist countries (specifically the PRC). See *supra*, footnote 125, p. 179, and footnote 192, p. 204.

⁴³³There is a sense that while Japanese businesses wanted more access and less restriction on doing business with China, they did not want any (particularly U.S.) competition. China's resources and needs when compared to Japan's resources and needs form a complementary set. For Tokyo, there is the sense that Japan's economic policies are at the core of Japan's security strategy and that Chinese matters have and will continue to play an important role. Additionally, since China was second only to the U.S. in Japan's postwar security considerations, it may be that Japanese officials saw the U.S. initiative as one to prevent the formation of a Tokyo-Beijing relationship that could place Washington at a disadvantage. It is apparent that soured Sino-Soviet relations left only the U.S. or Japan with the resources that could assist China in reaching modernity, a point probably not lost on the USSR. Of the two, China needed the U.S. as a balance to the USSR in the short term, but probably preferred Japan for its national development in the long term.

advantage.⁴³⁴ With the international fora already receptive, Tokyo needed to expand relations with Beijing, for not to do so could generate results (e.g., a Japan increasingly isolated from Asia) more detrimental than any nonmilitary pressure that Moscow might bring to bear.⁴³⁵

In sum, the Shanghai Communique served as a signal that Japan's security was more directly under Tokyo's control than at anytime since the end of the war. It suggested the strategic milieu was changing and that Tokyo must take a new and comprehensive look at its security relationship with Washington. It reminded Tokyo that enjoying the protection of the U.S. security shield depended upon maintaining good relations with a U.S. government increasingly less tolerant of what it perceived as inequitable contributions to a common security. The communique also implied both opportunities and risks in Tokyo's dealings with China.

The aggregate of the shocks, the considerations, and the opportunities was to spark a considerable debate among influential Japanese. Notably, the debate did not lead to a shift in official security policy or relations with Washington. The problem was, as before, specifically what Japan could do that would maintain the U.S. security guarantee, enhance relations holistically, and yet not vex relations with regional

⁴³⁴ Although there were few initial efforts by Moscow to impede relations, by 1975, when the Japanese and Chinese earnestly began negotiating for a peace and friendship treaty, the USSR moved to active obstruction. For a Japanese perspective of these measures see Shinkichi Eto, "Recent Developments in Sino-Japanese Relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XX, No. 7, (July, 1980), pp. 726-43.

⁴³⁵ Indeed, Moscow did attempt to pressure Japan away from "tilting" toward Beijing. Largely heavy-handed and inept (e.g., sending several thousand new troops to garrison the Northern Territories), these attempts were abortive and counterproductive. For a discussion see Peggy L. Falkenheim, "Some Determining Factors in Soviet-Japanese Relations," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. L, No. 4, (Winter, 1977-78), pp. 604-23.

states.⁴³⁶

.. *The Oil Crisis* - If the Shanghai Communique and the U.S. adjustment of its economic policies were shocks to Tokyo, the Oil Crisis of 1973-74 was a body blow. Delivered by an organization neither controlled by nor aligned with either superpower, it came with scant warning, and conveyed the message of national vulnerability to the Japanese. Notably, this message of vulnerability was from outside the military arena. Its upset of Japan's security strategy suggests Japan's unbalanced dependence on imported Arabian oil was paralleled by Tokyo's political dependence on the U.S. economic guarantee. For all its impact, the Oil Crisis of 1973-74 is neither complicated nor extensive. Perhaps the combination of simplicity, starkness and the arena is what produced a cohesive Japanese effort in confronting this national crisis.⁴³⁷

The success of Japan's efforts is apparent from the reduced impact that the 1978 crisis had on Japan and the much lower intensity of Japanese reactions at all levels. It was Japan's reaction to this threat form which suggests that Japan's exercise of a national security strategy maintained both cohesion and continuity. That the crisis of 1978 passed with a remarkable lack of distress (compared with 1973-74) is a testament to the conceptual soundness, flexibility and maturation of Japan's strategy.

⁴³⁶ Eventually, Japan was to adopt a program incorporating expanded defense planning, very moderate expansion and qualitative improvements to its Self-Defense Forces, increased negotiations on defense cooperation between the U.S. and Japan, and an aggressive anti-Soviet publicity campaign focused on the Northern Territories as mechanisms to deflect U.S. criticism.

⁴³⁷ But this did not include following the argument produced by the U.S. that Japan accept an enlarged military role in protecting East Asian sea lanes. In fact, even when Afghanistan was invaded and Washington revisited this theme, Tokyo demurred.

When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled the price of oil in 1973, there was a pervasive, massive, and immediate impact on Japan's economy. Wholly dependent upon imported oil, Japanese industries found they faced a shortfall in four particulars that might have permitted them to lessen the impact.

The first shortfall was in insured access to alternative petroleum sources. Excessively tied (as were others) to Middle East sources when the crisis broke, quick relief was not available. The second shortfall was the lack of adequate petroleum reserves. Japan had sufficient refining capability, but its storage of both crude and refined products was limited.⁴³⁸ This lack of sufficient usable reserves prevented Japan's government and industry from finding sufficient supplies in time to prevent dislocations. The third shortfall was the inability of industry to use alternative types of energy; a problem worsened by the limited availability of other sources of energy to meet a sudden change in requirements. Had Japan's industries been able to switch from one energy source to another (e.g., from oil to coal), dislocations might have occurred, but they would have been limited. The fourth area was the lack of foresight in recognizing mutual vulnerability.⁴³⁹

⁴³⁸Until the crisis, industry was reluctant to hold more than a month's supply since the value of that oil in storage was the equivalent of unproductive capital. Second, the industrial process in Japan is marked by close timing which prevents the accumulation of large inventories at any stage of production. Although this prevents the costs associated with storage, capital flows and delays, such a system is also vulnerable to disruptions due to material delays or transportation difficulties. It is notable that between the crisis of 1973-74 and the one of 1978, the extent of stockpiling for both industry and government dramatically increased. See also Steinbrunner's "reality principle," in Steinbrunner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, p. 110.

⁴³⁹Foresight and preparation in any of these would have provided inherent flexibility, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of oil as an economic weapon, and lessening the probability of its use (then or later).

Diplomatic dependence upon the U.S. (or any other industrialized Western nation) left Japan vulnerable since these states also were vulnerable in the same way (although not to the same extent) as was Japan. The lack of foresight in developing alternative options via diplomacy was plain. In part, this problem was caused by inadequate information.⁴⁴⁰ Japan discovered it needed to expand and integrate its political intelligence paralleling those in economic intelligence.

Japan vigorously addressed all these particulars making liberal use of government provided "administrative guidance." Tokyo successfully sought alternative, non-OPEC sources of oil in Mexico, the North Sea, and China. Simultaneously, the government addressed the petroleum storage problem by increasing its (announced) national stockpile level to 120 days of national supply while influencing key industries to maintain a similarly enlarged level of reserves. Other sources of energy and critical materials also were stockpiled. Nor were government diplomatic efforts stunted. Besides the atmospherics of direct deals between firms, Tokyo also seized every opportunity to conduct government-to-government arrangements for oil. Domestically, the Japanese government initiated several programs and arranged for incentives for developing and using conservation measures and alternative forms of energy. Japan's general, if uneven, success in these measures, when joined with Japan's significant commercial relations in the international economic system, resulted in a viable solution to a national vulnerability.

⁴⁴⁰ Although the omnipresent Japanese media contains a large amount of political commentary, the subject matter overwhelmingly concerns domestic political affairs. Foreign political developments that habitually get some coverage include the U.S. and China; the rest get irregular mention.

In all, after the initial shock, the Japanese reaction to the Oil Crisis was responsive, pervasive, cohesive, focused, and integrated. It suggests Japan could respond to this form of threat without moving into the military arena or adopting some form of economic warfare.

Additionally, since the U.S. and other Western countries also were affected, Japan may have realized a greater sense of common identification with the West. While the sense of insecurity in the economic arena did incline Japan toward a stance less aligned with Washington's Middle East policies,⁴⁴¹ it did not heighten Japanese desires to loosen its security bonds with the United States.

In sum, no adjustments were made in Japan's security relationship with the U.S. during this period and the fundamental premises of the alliance were unaltered. In effect, the Oil Crisis of 1973-74 (and the following one in 1978), were tests of that relationship that served to confirm rather than dissolve it.

.. *The JDA Studies Defense Issues* - The years from 1961 to 1975 were busy ones for Japan. International relations, domestic political affairs and sundry economic crises vied for primacy among both governmental officials and the Japanese public. Significant changes in Japan's general security milieu plainly had occurred. The Sino-Soviet conflict, the Berlin and Cuban Crises, the U.S. experience in Vietnam, the Shanghai Communique signaling China's altered regional and international status, the

⁴⁴¹Then Minister of International Trade and Industry Nakasone explicitly stated that Japan, "no longer agreed with the principles of the United States' Middle East Policy." as found in Hanns Maull, "The Strategy of Avoidance: Europe's Middle East Policies after the October War," *Oil, the Arab-Israeli Dispute and the Industrial World: Horizons of Crisis*, ed. J. C. Hurewitz, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976), p. 270.

extensive buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East, and the Oil Crisis all had the dual effects of confirming the U.S.-Japan relationship⁴⁴² while simultaneously raising Japanese concerns to a level where Japanese officials believed a holistic reappraisal was warranted.

In 1975, Michita Sakata, Minister of State for Defense,⁴⁴³ Japan Defense Agency (JDA) directed an overall reappraisal of Japan's defense issues. This reappraisal, done as a study of defense issues, was an unusual creation. Prepared in both English and Japanese, circulated to both Japanese and U.S. officials, paralleling conversation conducted between U.S. and Japanese negotiators, and reflecting a peculiar construction, the document is a summation of much strategic consideration and a call for assistance in the strategic process. Its unilateral generation, but bilateral circulation to U.S. officials (military and civilian), suggest its tentative nature as, perhaps, a preparatory step prior to hazarding a more public exposure of policy adjustments.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴²This is apparent from both President Ford's visit to Japan (and Korea) in November, 1974, Prime Minister Miki's visit to Washington in August, 1975, but most symbolically, in the visit of Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako to the U.S. during September and October of 1975. The words of Hirohito seem particularly appropriate:

Never before in history have two such distant and different peoples forged such close bonds of friendship. I am confident that friendship, so well tested through a number of trials in the past, is an enduring one which will withstand whatever vicissitude there may be in future history. "Toast by Emperor Hirohito, October 3, 1975," in *Presidential Documents*, Vol. XI, (1975), p. 1114.

⁴⁴³Curiously, Sakata and the JDA began using this title despite its unofficial status. The other ministries e.g., MOFA and MOF, continued to refer to Sakata as Director. From conversation with Colonel Wayne T. Fujito, U.S. Army Attache, at the U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, November 21, 1987.

⁴⁴⁴The timing of the study is instructive. The study follows a sequence of events all impinging on Japan's security. These events occurred with increasing frequency and affected multiple areas of concern to Japan. The study was prepared under the direction of Director General Sakata, a director of the JDA (notably less "hawkish" than his predecessor Yasuhiro Nakasone), in step with Prime Minister Miki (noted for his

In September, 1975, the committee delivered its report titled "A Study of Japan's Defense Issues." A pamphlet forty pages in length, the document is unique for the period, unusual in its authorship, and suggestive in its target readers. The study has as its stated purpose ". . . to reassess the nation's defense requirements in order to develop long-range programs for Japan's future."⁴⁴⁵ and to ". . . marshal nationalism developing a personal sense of commitment to national defense in each Japanese citizen."⁴⁴⁶ Curiously, within the conclusion it contains the statement: "Policy makers must understand that Japan's defense needs have reached a new starting point, and that they must henceforth chart a systematic, realistic and pragmatic series of programs for the nation's defense policy."⁴⁴⁷ In this respect the document has an elliptical sense.

Because of its irregular conception, construction, subject matter,⁴⁴⁸ timing, high

"dovish" stance). The study, in part, answers (by softening and deferring difficult points) the issues raised by Nakasone during his tenure in the office. Further, it was closely followed by the publication of the first defense "white paper" (i.e., *The Defense of Japan*) in six years, and the significant alteration of the manner in which the Japanese defense budget was handled. This change was made public with the publication of the 1976 "National Defense Program Outline." Significant assertions found in the "white paper" also are found in the 1975 study. Likewise, the Nomura Research Institute published a report in 1978, that endorsed the concept of comprehensive national security, key elements of which are found in the 1975 study. This is unsurprising since the director of the Nomura Institute in 1975 was a member of the committee which did the study. J. W. M. Chapman, R. Drifte and I. T. M. Gow, *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence-Diplomacy-Dependence* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. xv.

⁴⁴⁵ Michita Sakata, "A Study of Japan's Defense Issues," unpublished manuscript (in Japanese and English language versions) provided by the Japan Defense Agency to Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan, September, 1975, p. 6; hereafter Sakata, "A Study of Japan's Defense Issues."

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁴⁴⁸ Perhaps the greatest shortfall of the document and the most curious strategic omission is the absence of discussion of any economic feature. For a nation that has been steadfast in its pursuit of economic objectives, the lack of discussion is more than odd; it is startling. Further, considering the regional balance of power is, in part, due to the difference in economic-based ideologies, the omission suggests a deliberate avoidance of the topic. The conclusion of the document contains a section that maintains Japan will rely upon political and

level support and target readers, it is a significant milestone in Japan's internal and external strategic dialogues. The committee (eleven members) which prepared the report was formed entirely of civilians, selected with "great care,"⁴⁴⁹ and were required to have a keen interest in defense issues and an ear attuned to public opinion. The report provided short biographical sketches of each member stipulating each member's focus and expertise. The report noted several members as having expertise in more than one area.⁴⁵⁰ In other cases significant omissions are apparent.⁴⁵¹ Not surprisingly, the crucial power triangle of bureaucracy-big business-politicians was represented, albeit as bureaucracy-big business-media. However, the public, the very entity specified as the object of this study, was not directly represented.⁴⁵²

The conception of the report was unusual in that it was required neither by legislation nor custom. Beyond the absence of a requirement for such a report, it is the Cabinet Research Office (an organ of the Prime Minister's office) that has the responsibility of investigating and reporting on security matters. The report's

diplomatic means. Yet, neither of these are Japan's strongest feature and both are and probably will remain the result of Japan's economic stature.

⁴⁴⁹Sakata, "A Study of Japan's Defense Issues," p. 9.

⁴⁵⁰Of greater curiosity is that some individuals were described as one thing, yet clearly were greater experts in another. For example, the report describes Kiichi Saeki as an expert in national security, but at the time he was president of Nomura Research Institute. The institute is an organ of Nomura Securities, a major stock brokerage and investment firm with significant links to the Ministry of Finance.

⁴⁵¹For example, despite its subject matter, no member was identified as having personal military experience. Yet many were of an age that military service during the period 1936-1945 was highly probable.

⁴⁵²This omission of elected public representatives suggests that this study was to be an "in house" affair, i.e., one where the participants and the recipients were directly connected to policy making. The risk of the study becoming politicized, as had happened with the renegotiation of the Mutual Security Treaty, was precluded. Additionally, such a tactic aligns with the cultural penchant for pre-rigged deals.

conception, structure and membership suggest that the JDA (and by that the Japanese government) wanted a way to distance itself from the report should it prove contentious.⁴⁵³ Yet, those points listed in the section titled Resume of Discussion (the collective report) probably are those about which the JDA felt confident and represent continuity links to extant policies or programs.

Paralleling the irregularities of conception, committee formation and membership, and presentation, the document organizes its discussion inductively, but, in an odd elliptical construction, concludes by recommending precisely what it initially set out to study. Yet, close reading of the five general sections of the discussion give this document a special significance. Each portion communicates the mainstream of Japanese concern on a specific set of points and simultaneously implies objectives for Japan's strategic process.

The first section, "Japan and the International Diplomatic Situation," begins by covering superpower machinations and moves to regional affairs. The tone of this section is marked uncertainty and an ominous lack of confidence. For example, the discussion implies doubt about the U.S. pursuit of detente and, since it was not

⁴⁵³It is unlikely that the JDA would have produced a document in both Japanese and English and distributed it to U.S. and Japanese officials which would posit unproductive or questionable policies. It is more probable that a group of options, all of which generally were acceptable, would be presented with the one most favored tendered in the best terms. Notions unacceptable to the Japanese government would not appear. But there is always the chance that some specific item might generate unforeseen resistance. In such case, that this committee was non-legislated and its report unstructured, allowed the JDA to distance itself. Alternatively, should a part meet with enthusiasm, the connection to the JDA is close enough for it to claim credit. The construction of the document supports this since it begins with the collective report, a general summation titled (Part I: Resume of Discussion). The second section (Part II: Personal Views on National Defense), is a summary of the personal views on defense by the committee members. Those notions about which the JDA felt "safe" are in Part I. Those of a more speculative nature, particularly those depending upon public support, are found in Part II.

consulted, infers that Japan's role is to endure the results.

The tone of uncertainty also pervades the discussion of regional matters concerning Asia in the post-Vietnam War period. For example, the study notes that although the U.S. made a sixteen-year effort in Vietnam and failed, Washington made firm commitments to Japan regarding its security. Taken in this context, the report infers doubt that all the U.S. assurances would or could be kept. Similarly, the portions that discuss the American and Soviet policies in Asia seem loaded with factors of uncertainty, with Soviet motives being dismissed as untrustworthy. Ergo, any consideration of them as valid (as in detente) must be suspect.⁴⁵⁴

In terms of China and the Koreas (both historical enemies), there is the notion that balances premised upon atmospherics could be altered in fundamental ways, with or without Japan (an oblique allusion to the U.S. opening to the PRC). There is the tacit implication that the U.S. is on the "inside track" with all, and Japan and its concerns have been left behind. This echoes the inference found in the discussion of superpower affairs; Japan is left out, yet is bound to endure developments.⁴⁵⁵

This section also contains a discussion identifying those causes of international disputes around Japan. However, the discussion's definition limits threats to peace

⁴⁵⁴This is but one example of the document's reflexive, elliptical logic which infers responsibility and systemic errors and seeks to transfer them elsewhere.

⁴⁵⁵There is a cast to this section that suggests the evolution will be unfavorable to Japan in any event, and that this is inappropriate. There seems to be a fear that the U.S. might bollix things for Japan (also possibly for itself) and then depart the region, leaving Japan, which cannot leave, to face the (unspecified, but certainly negative and undeserved) consequences. The vagueness of language and the inductive logic used, makes it difficult to precisely delineate this point, since it is unclear whether this is an implied expression of frustration over the way things are, or an implied call for adjustment by the United States.

"through outbreaks of shooting" as a function of geography. This parameter severely limits the discussion in terms of the nature of threats, particularly for a nation that primarily focuses on other-than-military aspects. Moreover, all mention of historical antecedents, ideological factors, and the growth of Japanese economic power (and inferentially military potential) which might lead to frictions and conflicts are excluded. Even the growth of regional military power gets short shrift. For example, the growth of the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet is noted, but the considerable expansions of land, air and rocket forces are ignored.

The geographic focus is especially pronounced with respect to the Korean peninsula. Describing the peninsula as currently the most dangerous point, and noting that Japan inevitably has been affected by flare-ups in that area, the study notes:

. . . should the major powers intervene in such a conflict, the resultant expansion of fighting would no doubt engulf Japan also. These possibilities will not allow Japan to stand aloof from the Korean situation. A lack of proper planning and preparation in this area could lead Japan into major difficulties which, with care, are possible to avoid.

and

Of primary importance is the need for Japan to make strenuous effort to forestall an outbreak in Korea . . . the government . . . must follow policies leading to a stabilized situation on the Korean peninsula.⁴⁵⁶

There is the clear statement that Korean peninsular affairs directly impinge on Japan's security, but the implication of "not being allowed to stand aloof" stops short of delineating Japan's involvement or responsibilities. The general tone of wishing to

⁴⁵⁶Sakata, "A Study of Japan's Defense Issues," p. 17.

be left out of any such adversarial development,⁴⁵⁷ is counterpoised by the paradoxical observation that to avoid entanglement Japan must be more involved (not further defined) in stabilization efforts and processes.⁴⁵⁸

For so important a section, the contents are too vague. Important and necessary discussion needed for a proper analyses seems to have been left out and the focus narrowed excessively. Subject matter has been pursued to an extent that other affiliated matters must have been considered; yet, these are absent. This raises questions about what the committee discussed, but left out of the study report, and why that might have been done. The section implies a great deal, but specifies little; it notes motivations and rationale for actions, but suggests neither policies nor objectives.

The second section "Domestic Prerequisites for Improving National Defense," is a discussion of Japan's difficulties in developing national consensus with respect to defense issues. It surveys a broad spectrum of factors that condition public opinions pertaining to defense as a concept, a governmental responsibility, and a social program.

⁴⁵⁷There is little doubt that the Japanese government was aware of the provisions of the U.S.-ROK Security Treaty and those between the DPRK and USSR which both call for the automatic involvement of military forces. With the U.S. deployed along the DMZ and centrally in the main invasion route into South Korea, U.S. forces hardly could avoid being involved from the outset. The Soviet regional build-up (which added another fifteen divisions to the thirty already in place in 1970 -- in addition to the considerable air and naval increases) inferred that Moscow would honor its agreements with Pyongyang, although it was unclear to what extent it would be willing to directly confront U.S. forces. Certainly there was the chance that the situation could rapidly escalate and expand to unforeseen and uncontrollable dimensions. For data concerning force strengths see International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1975-1976* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 13; hereafter IISS, *Military Balance*.

⁴⁵⁸Such involvement implicitly increases the chance of involvement in whatever might transpire, increasing the threat to Japan from minor events from which Tokyo might otherwise be able to distance itself. In addition, there is the tacit recognition that Japan had not been included by the regional powers because they did not wish Tokyo to be involved.

It identifies difficulties, requirements, and suggests that the tools of the past may not be sufficient for the future. Yet, it does not posit solutions, instead carrying more the tone of apologia. Like the preceding one, this section is an expression of general uncertainty and little positive guidance.

The third section deals with the fundamentals of national defense. The most pragmatic and straightforward portion of the document, its initial focus illustrates the difference between the ideal of general security and the reality of Japan's defense requirements.⁴⁵⁹ As opposed to the previous sections, the language is precise (if inclusive), but the logic is inductive.

This third section begins with the assertion that the only way to realize effective and permanent peace on "spaceship earth" is for all nations to adopt a global view. The ultimate goal of this global view is eradicating national barriers and accomplishing worldwide disarmament. Labeling such a notion as an illusion, the study posits that intermediate steps serving to sustain peace are possible through the aegis of the UN or regional collective security systems.⁴⁶⁰ However, the document asserts that peace is preserved through diplomatic relationships that achieve a balance of military power between the industrialized democracies on one side and the communist nations on the

⁴⁵⁹This section probably was created and presented in its particular fashion to debunk idealistic notions and disarm opponents championing an unarmed neutrality posture for Japan.

⁴⁶⁰This is an interesting step for the document to take since Japan had declined to provide troops for the UN in any capacity, and carefully avoided entertaining any expectation that it would enter into a security relationship with any other nation. However, the gesture towards the UN is a necessary one, since through its assertion that all nations have the right of self-defense, Japan's military structure is justified in the face of Art. IX of its Constitution. Similarly, in a bipolar world (with the next-door example of Korea) it would be difficult for Japan not to acknowledge the extant balance of power system that provided Japan the security envelope it enjoyed.

other.⁴⁶¹ The report asserts that Japan's military component plays a contributing role to the stability of the Far East, that an excess of defense power could upset regional stability by posing a threat to other nations, and closes with a justification for establishing the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, ". . . to deter foreign aggression and preserve the peace and security of the nation."⁴⁶²

These assertions and their buttressing rationale are significant. First, they show the Japanese hold the conviction that military power is a reality in a less-than-ideal world. Second, there is acceptance of the notion that weakness invites intrusion in turn begetting disaster. These first two virtually eliminate any national course for security affairs except those premised on or guaranteed by strength. Third, Tokyo evidently has accepted the credibility of the concept and practice of deterrence. In so doing, Tokyo virtually mandates the security bond with the U.S. since Japan alone (armed or not) is highly vulnerable to the military power of both the USSR and China. Fourth, Japan's contribution to defense must be potent enough to be taken seriously in combination with its defense partner. While the emphasis of the language is on actual military power, Japan's potential, a large variable that might heavily weigh in the balance, is implied. Fifth, Japan's defense capabilities are not to be so strong as to be considered a

⁴⁶¹There is a sense of "chicken-or-egg" to this argument, but it does raise the question as to whether Stalin, Mao or their heirs would agree.

⁴⁶²The plaintive, rationalizing tone of this section is confusing. Sakata, "A Study of Japan's Defense Issues," p. 29.

threat to regional states when considered in isolation of its defense partner.⁴⁶³ Sixth, because of Japan's recent, aggressive, military history, Tokyo has only one realistic option for a defense partner, a situation that forecloses Japanese participation in any collective regional security system.⁴⁶⁴ Last, sovereignty demands that Japan be responsible for its own defense.⁴⁶⁵

The study presents a picture of complex texture and delicate balance, but not an original one. The inferential conclusions are that Japan must opt for deterrence with a strong defense partner while simultaneously convincing regional states that Japan alone is not a threat (essentially the arrangement worked out for the 1951 MST). To do this, Japan built the minimum credible defense capability that preserved independence of action and accomplished the essence of security. Further, to enhance its flexibility, it

⁴⁶³This particular has proven a paradox for U.S. military planners who consistently sought to gain and maintain significant advantages over communist capabilities—particularly in the air and naval components. By doing more, the result is to permit (even encourage) the Japanese to do less. However, to expect the Japanese to do more than the minimum is to cause a shift in regional balance which the Japanese (and others) oppose. Thus, a unilateral U.S. reduction (short of a total withdrawal) is unlikely to be met by a commensurate Japanese increase. Since the U.S. had no intention of withdrawing from Asia (to do so would have been tantamount to abandoning its global strategy) the asymmetrical arrangement and frictions over appropriate shares of the defense burden persisted.

⁴⁶⁴The Study's argument at this point is overdrawn. It had been thirty years since the end of the war, new alignments had taken place and reformed yet again. Beijing sought increased security discussions with Japan, the USSR wanted at least a non-aligned Japan, and the U.S. had on more than one occasion suggested an arrangement between itself, Tokyo, and Seoul. In all of these (save Korea where it was mutual), it was Japan which abjured. The point is that no other partner or combination of partners could provide what the U.S. could, none would be as likely to do so on such favorable terms, and all were less palatable alternatives than America. The Japanese argument here is self-serving, perhaps intended for U.S. consumption.

⁴⁶⁵It was more than the demands of sovereignty; the Nixon Doctrine made it plain that the U.S. expected Japan (as well as others) to do so. Further, the justification for the existence of the Self-Defense Forces demanded that role else there be calls for their disbanding—an option already rejected by the realization of the reality of military power and the belief that weakness invites aggression. It is curious that the argument takes the rationalizing tack of sovereignty when the case for indigenous military forces was already substantiated.

was important that Japan neither be nor be perceived as a compliant U.S. clone. Accomplishing this level of engagement required Japan's policy makers to steer a narrow course. They kept Japan close enough to the U.S. to insure bonding, yet not so close as to entangle it in affairs detrimental to Tokyo's objectives. The balance was that of being *with*, the U.S., but not *of* it.

While the picture presented in this section of the report was clear, the tone was not optimistic. The reader was left with the impression that the committee had only marginal confidence in the ability of Japan to sustain this balance.⁴⁶⁶ Significantly, no recommendations were made for enhancing efforts at improving balancing techniques or altering those circumstances that might dispel the need for maintaining the balance.⁴⁶⁷ Essentially, it endorses maintaining the status quo.

The next section, titled "The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty," focused on the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (1960 TMCS). Clear and brief, this section has all the characteristics of that portion least debated by the committee. Three discussions important to Japan's strategic objectives are found in this section. The first of these is the delineation between Article V and Article VI of the 1960 TMCS.⁴⁶⁸ Article VI has been the focus of Japanese objections because they see it as the

⁴⁶⁶This tone is curious since the Japanese had been doing quite well in this process for thirty years.

⁴⁶⁷There is the tacit conclusion that no suggestions were made because none were needed.

⁴⁶⁸Article V obliges the U.S. to aid Japan if Japan is attacked. Article VI allows the U.S. the use of bases and facilities in Japan to maintain peace and security in the Far East.

mechanism that might entangle them in a war not directly threatening Japan.⁴⁶⁹

Second, the discussion presents four credible functions of the treaty. Notably, all four functions benefit Japan. Through the treaty America's defense power: a. deters attacks on Japan; b. maintains the balance of power in East Asia; c. forces any aggressor to use a minimum of force to avoid a showdown with the U.S.; and d. if Japan is attacked, provides assistance in opposing the invading forces.

Third, the discussion posits objections to the 1960 TMCS; these generally express some uncertainty and the desire to increase trust and understanding of the relative positions of both the U.S. and Japan. Palliative, their implications are broader, deeper, and self-serving for Japan.⁴⁷⁰

The study's final discussion section, "Defense Requirements," is quite unlike the remainder of the document. Beginning with fundamental questions, it provides no specific answers. Instead, the study asserts,

. . . a decision on the upper limit of defense power required in peacetime must be made on the basis of potential conditions under which such forces may need to be mobilized. Political and diplomatic initiatives must forestall any condition requiring

⁴⁶⁹Sakata, "A Study of Japan's Defense Issues," p. 33.

⁴⁷⁰There are both internal and external components applicable at this point. If Japan has greater certainty about the U.S. and its policies, particularly how far it will go in providing for the defense of Japan, then adjusting the amount of the defense budget, altering the way that the defense budget is expended, and changing the roles and missions of the Self-Defense Forces becomes less risk-laden. In addition, it provides a means to take a stance, which if it proves unpopular to either domestic or foreign entities, permits shunting the onus to U.S. authorities. Further, it provides the greatest amount of assurance with the greatest degree of flexibility—both at U.S. expense. For example, the study alludes to U.S. post-Vietnam Nixon Doctrine, emphasizing the American stress on providing assistance only to those who show an willingness and capacity for self-defense. The tone is suggestive in that it seems to cast the onus on the U.S. for "requiring" Japan to do more in its own defense. Sakata, "A Study of Japan's Defense Issues," p. 34.

defense capability beyond this upper limit.⁴⁷¹

Although the statement seems to link Japan's response to the nature of the threat, precisely what this "upper limit" is and how it might be determined is not described. The assertion of an upper limit and what must be done to address threatening conditions beyond it infers a shift of strategic technique, yet how another nation's military capabilities are to be "forestalled by political and diplomatic initiatives" is unclear.⁴⁷²

What is clear is that the tone is positive, demonstrating confidence that such political and diplomatic activities will be successful. Thus, making a decision that establishes a modest upper limit for military preparations is within the zone of acceptable risk. In fact, the study asserts, ". . . the primary focus of defense policy is aimed at eliminating [sic] circumstances which could lead to their [the Self-Defense Forces] use in a conflict."⁴⁷³ This is remarkable since the previous sections are all marked by a pervasive tone of uncertainty, lack of positive recommendations and measures, and an ominous depiction of Japan's relationship to evolving security affairs. It is even more remarkable given the unsubstantial nature and unpredictable results of "political and diplomatic activities."

The study discusses the need for forces in terms of necessary responses to a

⁴⁷¹Ibid., p. 35.

⁴⁷²This assertion is all the more startling considering the earlier section which focused on the fundamentals of national defense. Moreover, there seems to be a willful ignoring of the fact that war can be a unilateral action. Were suasion exercised through political and diplomatic initiatives so effective, one suspects that Japan would have been dissuaded from its imperialist adventure.

⁴⁷³Sakata, "A Study of Japan's Defense Issues," p. 38.

particular type of threat. The only caveat stated, (indeed crucial) is: "For so long as the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is in force, Japan is safe from nuclear or large-scale conventional attack because of the deterrent power of America's military might."⁴⁷⁴

What follows are assumptions about the various operations envelopes (i.e., air, seas, and ground combat environments) that would characterize conflict in or about Japan. These are far too brief,⁴⁷⁵ raising the question why they have been treated in such a cursory manner.

Yet, if Japan accepts the initial premise of U.S. power as effective deterrence, and in the event of deterrence failing, then that power being effective in war fighting, Japan needs only to address a spectrum of very limited conventional capabilities, unconventional warfare, or subversion. All these were easily within the capabilities of the Japanese military structure and the National Police. Clearly, an emergency beyond that scope requires Japan to generate a strong national will, mobilize its industry, and gear up high technology forces. The study does not address if such efforts could be mounted given the limited time of a developing crisis.

Since the Japanese Government evidently considered the likelihood of a large-scale emergency to be quite low, there seems to have been no great sense of urgency for conducting the massive, detailed analyses of threat capabilities. The focus of Japan's intelligence efforts remained on general capabilities, specific intentions, and the

⁴⁷⁴Sakata, "A Study of Japan's Defense Issues," p. 35.

⁴⁷⁵For example, the naval and air envelopes are "covered" in three sentences apiece; the ground /amphibious envelope is dismissed in a single sentence.

changes in key relationships that might affect Japan's relations with other nations and organizations. Indeed, by comparison to similar documents, even those produced by the JDA, the shallow treatment of threat particulars is remarkable.

The document's conclusion indicates that the overall conditions that affect Japan were apparent by 1975, and led to this reappraisal of Japan's defense issues. The steps outlined for consideration by "policy makers"⁴⁷⁶ are a holistic reappraisal of Japan's defense structure, organization, and equipment in terms of Japan's current and future requirements. However, most notable is the admonition to policy makers,

. . . not to be overly concerned with comparisons to other nations or to the traditional beliefs regarding defense power. Instead they should concentrate on a creative study of the peculiar circumstances underlying Japan's defense situation.⁴⁷⁷

This statement implies there was concern among Japanese defense officials about changes in the circumstances framing Japan's security. Further, it suggests creating alternatives to military capabilities by understanding the basic nature of Japan's situation. In effect, these inferences are calls for a revisiting of the strategic hypotheses and techniques of strategic process by officials involved in Japan's strategy. Underlying the whole document is a current of urgency that requires Japan to address a changed strategic milieu. "Policy makers must understand that Japan's defense needs *have*

⁴⁷⁶ Although the document's conclusion is addressed to "policy makers," inferentially Japanese policy makers, the fact is that the document was produced in both Japanese and English, it received circulation in U.S. defense circles, and parallels discussions with U.S. officials at several levels. All of this suggests that the target readership deliberately included U.S. policy makers and those others involved with U.S.-Japan affairs. If this is the case (and little argues against it) then this document serves as notice of Japanese considerations of adjustments in its foreign policy, and that those adjustments require U.S. support, or, at the least, "understanding."

⁴⁷⁷ Sakata, "A Study of Japan's Defense Issues," p. 40.

reached a new starting point, and that they must henceforth chart a systematic, realistic and pragmatic series of programs for the nation's defense policy."⁴⁷⁸ (Emphasis added.)

Although the study couches this concluding section in more positive and confident tones, it retains a tone of plaintive hopefulness.

The whole character of the document suggests that Japan, facing potentially difficult circumstances, is seeking greater flexibility, assistance, and understanding from Japanese and Americans alike. The study's preparation and presentation reflects Tokyo's concern that any significant departure of Japan's policy that does not enjoy the approval and/or assistance of the U.S. is chancy, as a negative U.S. response could detrimentally affect Japan's strategy. This makes policy difficult to achieve, painful to unilaterally execute, and risk-laden. Because risk is precisely what Japan's defense policy is supposed to preclude, the study is a significant segment of Japan's strategic dialogue and process.

. *The 1976 National Defense Program Outline* - The 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) is a benchmark defining a greater awareness of Japan's concept of itself and its situation. Following the 1975 study, it is a public statement showing strategic consideration of the developments in and about Japan, the U.S.-Japan relationship, and those factors that heightened feelings of insecurity. However, it stops short of making any adjustments in the U.S.-Japan relationship. Simultaneously, it shows marked restraint in its proposals, reflecting concerns of their possible effects on

⁴⁷⁸Ibid.

regional powers. These two features align with the 1975 study and Japan's strategic concerns and processes since 1945. Significantly, the NDPO does not appear in isolation, but teams with the second Defense White Paper (re-initiated after a hiatus of six years). Further, the larger context includes ongoing treaty negotiations between Tokyo and Beijing, the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister A. Gromyko to Tokyo, Japan's ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a sudden cooling in the Sino-Japanese relationship, and President Carter's announcement of the U.S. intention to withdraw troops from Korea.⁴⁷⁹

One important function of the 1976 NDPO is that it provided flexibility to the Japanese government. It did so by cloaking how and when things were done, while inferring the rationale for present and projected adjustments. From a political perspective, if not all things to all factions, it became a useful tool to many. The 1976 NDPO made significant procedural changes. The most obvious shift was that instead of having specific target dates for totals of on-hand equipment, the NDPO set forth guidelines that suggested what the configuration of the force should be in the near future. It specified neither the totals of equipment by type nor the accomplishment dates. This caused several adjustments in how Japan sought to address the threat, in turn implying modalities that matched assumptions of the strategic environment.

⁴⁷⁹ Although there was a change in Japan's administration, it is not probable that this shift resulted in the appearance of the NDPO. The 1975 study (to which it is linked) clearly had a genesis before Sakata selected the committee. By the end of 1976, Takeo Fukuda, who had assumed the office of Prime Minister, made no move to adjust or repudiate it. For a concise discussion of the Fourth Build-up Plan (part of the ongoing series) championed by then JDA Director Nakasone (which the onset of the Oil Crisis helped undercut) see Chapman, Drifte, and Gow: *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security*, pp. 61-67.

In this, the NDPO set out to shift the emphasis on the Self-Defense Forces from quantity to quality; the goal was a force that would provide the "minimum necessary amount of power."⁴⁸⁰ Notably, a high quality force answers other considerations.⁴⁸¹ By not fixing equipment density acquisition deadlines, Japan was more able to shift procurement and other defense budget sectors to meet its security requirements thereby enhancing flexibility and quality.

In all, the 1976 NDPO is an adjustment in the strategic process and part of the strategic dialogue. However, it does not mean that Japan perceived its strategic hypothesis, the strategic milieu, or the factors that maintained them as having so changed that more fundamental alterations were required.

In this regard, the steps the 1976 NDPO took did not reflect major departures in

⁴⁸⁰ *Defense of Japan, 1981*, pp. 167-173. This is an important statement. By staying with its 1 per cent of GNP defense budget ceiling and stipulating its aim as a well-rounded force (necessarily a force balanced in its ground, sea and air arms), Japan not only limits itself to a structure that could not prosecute a land war in Asia (thereby precluding notions of a recreation of the wartime IJA), it limits itself to a force that could not project power. The former is a statement of capability, the later a statement of intent. At the same time, Japan passes the initiative for any offensive action to the U.S. (which simultaneously conveys the reaction and focus of possible threats by Asian states to the United States.) By concentrating upon a high quality force, Japan enhances its advantages, and simultaneously communicates an inferential warning that it could harness its high quality development to its major industrial production capabilities and create a potent force. Last, insular Japan can only be threatened through the air and sea envelopes, both requiring highly technical forces. Thus, by concentrating on a high quality force, Japan forces any potential aggressor to develop and deploy a similar force. Notably, the main military strengths of the USSR and PRC are large ground forces.

⁴⁸¹ First, a high quality force costs less. Personnel costs are the main driver of a defense budget. Because both better personnel and improved levels of technology require fewer personnel to be effective, the long-term costs of such a force will be lower. In turn, this releases a greater portion of the defense budget to other uses. Further, the greater efficiency of a high quality force provides a more responsive and longer lasting force from the outset. In addition, the higher professionalism necessary at all levels of such a force, suggests a smoother and more effective effort, should there be an emergency requiring rapid force expansion. The limitation on force size reduces the leverage of Japan's military establishment while the greater reliance on higher technology increases its dependency on the civilian sector. All of these were attractive to Japan's government.

strategic perceptions. Crucial assumptions undergirding Japan's strategy premised the overall assessment and course of action of the 1976 NDPO. Five of these assumptions⁴⁸² were:

1. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would be maintained.
2. A large-scale war between the US and USSR would be avoided.
3. The Sino-Soviet confrontation would continue.
4. Improved Sino-American relations would continue.
5. The present situation on the Korean peninsula would remain unchanged.

None of these were startling; the historical antecedents to all suggested their continuance. To some extent, all had been challenged by external events and proven resistant to change. Yet, Japan's assessment process underwent an important alternation. In a departure from what is considered general practice, Tokyo chose to define and scale the threats to Japan in terms of two factors, capability and intent. It is the nature of military organizations to err on the side of safety, thus assessing capability is the norm; assessments of intent are considered suspect. Japan's choice in assessment modality is significant in the sense that not only are the analyses cumbered by fundamentally indeterminable factors, but because Japan defined both its threats and its security in other than military terms, assessments incorporating intent were inescapable. Therefore, in its negotiations and consultations with U.S. military representatives, Japanese officials found themselves arguing a factor of analysis unacceptable to their U.S. counterparts,⁴⁸³ yet very pertinent to Japan's strategic concerns.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸²Chapman, Drifte, and Gow, *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security*, p. 66.

⁴⁸³There are two other aspects to this stance. If Japan should be wrong in its assessment, then the U.S. would stand as its guarantor. On the other hand, should the U.S. be wrong in its assessments, then the whole coalition of the West collapses. The U.S. could not afford to be wrong; it could not and would not take such

At the time of its presentation, the NDPO was criticized for being optimistic. Its critics pointed out it took a generally favorable view of the international situation, yet totally ignored the persistent problems directly affecting Japan's welfare (e.g., the Middle East). Pointing to the regional Soviet military buildup in the latter 1970s, critics cited the lack of a commensurate Japanese response as the product of flaws in the NDPO. Yet the Defense Agency and the Government of Japan⁴⁸⁵ stood firm.⁴⁸⁶ Indeed, they had to since the strategic milieu at the global and regional levels retained their essential character.⁴⁸⁷ Other writers have noticed the reluctance of the Japanese

a chance when the remedy was simple (albeit expensive) and within reach. In contrast, although Japan could not afford the final failure, for it not to take the risk of such assessments may place it in the position of increasing its military role. But to assume increased military roles places it at cross purposes with fundamental aspects of its strategy which have a higher immediate probability of negative effect on Japan. The second aspect results in a similar conclusion. By incorporating assessments of the intent of the threat, the NDPO functions as a brake on defense acquisitions, serving to damp external perceptions of Japan continuing its drive to rearm. By retaining the element of intent in analyses, Japan avoids being tied to the military expansions of others. Although there is risk involved, (largely to the U.S.) this effectively keeps Japan out of the escalation cycle. This may explain why Japan was in no hurry to complete the equipment listing attached to the NDPO, or in specifying finite densities. Should Japan do so, or revert to the process of gauging its equipment on those of others, (i.e., planning in terms of capabilities alone) an upwards spiraling of militarization could occur that might once again lead Japan on the militarist road. Thus, in a finely tuned sense of balance, the use of intentions as part of the Japanese assessments of threats is not just less expensive, it is strategically advisable.

⁴⁸⁴This dichotomy seems the result of both different levels of strategic dialogue and the scope of those dialogues. Moreover, the difference in focus, demonstrated by the lack of coincidence in threat identification, and the character of the parties in this dialogue added to communication difficulties.

⁴⁸⁵The critical portion of the Japanese Government in such matters is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular the North America Bureau. Chapman, Drifte, and Gow, *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security*, p. 91. For an expanded discussion of the structure and role of the Japanese bureaucracy in security affairs see *Ibid.*, pp. 56-97.

⁴⁸⁶Indeed, they have continued to do so despite a number of changes of administration, the alteration of regional and international events, and frictions with the U.S. This consistency suggests that more pragmatism and less idealism pertains to the NDPO than the early critics were wont to credit it.

⁴⁸⁷In terms of military forces, the overall size of Soviet deployments is less important than the portion of them that might be brought to bear on Japan. And of those assets, only a certain amount would be addressed by Japan unless Japan were to assure roles and build capabilities which necessarily would alter Japan's strategic relations at all levels. Since Soviet capabilities, despite their build-up, did not exceed the combined

government to alter its position on the NDPO. I. T. M. Gow, citing the *Nikkei Shimbun* (November 2, 1980), asserts that the Japanese Government would not consider reviewing the NDPO until convinced of certain preconditions,⁴⁸⁸ namely: a. when a major change affecting Japan occurred in the international environment; b. when the acquisition of the suggested SDF equipment (attached to the NDPO) is complete; and c. when changes in the domestic environment, particularly those of public opinion and finance, warrant or permit it.⁴⁸⁹ Evidently, the Japanese Government was not convinced that such a review was necessary.

In all, the NDPO was a public statement showing strategic consideration of the developments in and about Japan, the U.S.-Japan relationship, and both internal and external factors heightening feelings of insecurity. Plainly the government wanted strategic flexibility; the NDPO was a suitable vehicle in achieving it. The persistence of the Japanese Government in maintaining the NDPO suggests permanence beyond lower-level political tactics. Further, the shift of the NDPO away from a fixed program suggests pragmatism by the Japanese Government to meet threats as it perceived them.

U.S.-Japanese capabilities needed for the defense of Japan, there was little incentive for Japan to react. This was particularly true since if Tokyo were to embark on such a militant course, a regional arms race might be initiated, a development not in Japan's best interests. Hence, Tokyo, as before, exercised restraint and in so doing, made a "contribution" to the collective good of regional stability. With good reason, Tokyo might refer to the process as comprehensive rather than collective security.

⁴⁸⁸ I. T. M. Gow, "Defence Planning in Post-War Japan," *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security*, ed. Chapman, Drifte, and Gow. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 70.

⁴⁸⁹ All three of these are at the core of Japan's strategic process. It is instructive that with the general exception of the equipment list, changes in either of the other two cause a shift in the other (and connote an adjustment in the equipment list). Further, it is unclear whether the Japanese Government meant that a shift had to occur in all three, or merely one of the factors; it does seem sure that the decision as to whether there had been significant change (and thereby a need for review) would be internally determined.

Yet, the NDPO shows concern for how its proposals might affect other regional powers and stops short of making any adjustments in the U.S.-Japan relationship. Since it does not appear in isolation, the NDPO is not a separate entity. Its appearance in relation to other elements (e.g., strategic regional developments) forces other nations to weigh Japan's reactions and options in terms of their own activities. In this regard, the NDPO functions as part of the strategic dialogue. Last, the NDPO was a management tool for Japan's officials. It provided the rationale and means for greater flexibility, yet, did not alter the basic structure of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

. 1976-1983 The Test of Maturation

.. *Background* - The period of 1976 to 1983 was one in which Japan's security strategy was challenged by emerging threats. It was a period when shifting trends connoted similar shifts in the priorities of regional powers and, perhaps, in U.S. resolve to meet obligations. It was to these shifts and implications that Japan found its strategy a valid response. It is worth noting that Japan's strategy, the well-established essentials and fundamentals of which were described in the White Paper and the NDPO, rested on premises undergirding the international environment. Had any of these significantly worsened, they would have degraded Japan's security situation.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁹⁰For example, had the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty not been maintained, or a large-scale war broken out between the U.S. and the USSR, the core of Japan's security strategy (deterrence) would have collapsed. A cessation of the Sino-Soviet conflict or a sharp worsening in Sino-American relations would have lesser, but still degrading impact on Japan's strategy as both would tend to place Japanese considerations at relatively lower immediate priorities to the major parties. Of even lesser, but still important, concern is the situation on the Korean peninsula. Having Korea divided, both portions inward looking, consumed with the other, and locking the peninsula in such a way as to prevent dominance by any single great power served Japan. For

Characterizing the period as one of flux in which the U.S. was declining, the USSR expansionist, and China isolated but emerging is simplistic, but incomplete. All three of these nations were forced to calculate their relative position compared with each other and as to the probable and possible role(s) of Japan.⁴⁹¹

Moreover, despite shifts and adjustments, the region was singularly unchanged at the conclusion of the period. Both Soviet and Chinese efforts to gain marked advantage over the other had come to something less than desired and the situation on the Korean peninsula remained as firmly fixed as ever. The U.S. had recovered some stature (arresting its decline), while Japan's alignment was, if slightly more independent, still firmly joined to the U.S. Even Taiwan, allegedly abandoned earlier, was more secure after Ronald Reagan became President. Yet, the lack of change does not mean a lack of activity or effort any more than does the lack of movement of the rope in a tug-of-war.

The period from 1976 through 1983 is studded with developments that Tokyo hardly could ignore and invited response from a wide range of options. Tempering its reactions, restraint characterized Tokyo's activities. The first of these developments

Tokyo, it was, perhaps, the best of all possible strategic solutions. But Japan's worry over these particulars was evident in the joint statements issued to the press subsequent to high-level visits to either Tokyo or Washington. Tokyo sought reassurances from Washington that matters central to Japan's security be well-coordinated prior to any public shift by Washington. For examples see "Joint Statement by President Ford and Prime Minister Miki at the Conclusion of Their Meetings, August 6, 1975," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. XI, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 835-6; hereafter *Presidential Documents*. "Joint Communique Issued in Washington on Conclusion of the Visit of Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, March 21-22, 1977," *Presidential Documents*, Vol. XIII, (1977), pp. 424-7.

⁴⁹¹ Thus, discussions of Washington "playing the China card" or of Beijing "playing the U.S. card" that do not include the possible positioning of Japan must be overly narrow.

was the U.S. initiative of reducing regional armed forces, particularly ground forces.

.. *Carter and Korea* - Since the pronouncement of the so-called Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the U.S. had sought reductions of its armed forces deployed overseas.⁴⁹² Publicly, these reductions focused on U.S. forces in Vietnam; however, a popular ground swell of opinion expanded that notion to U.S. troops deployed elsewhere (e.g., Europe, Korea, or at sea). Nevertheless, gratifying this isolationist tendency was not easy; the security of the U.S. was predicated upon alliances the efficacy of which (especially deterrence) rested squarely upon confidence in the U.S. resolve to meet its obligations. Simply, the U.S. could not withdraw troops everywhere or even in great amounts anywhere and simultaneously avoid damaging its strategy of deterrence.

Yet, the pressure of a deeply disenchanted public weighed heavily upon a president who had campaigned on themes which included distancing the U.S. from such adventures as Vietnam.⁴⁹³ President Carter wanted to mollify the public, provide the means to hold the U.S. apart from Asian military involvement, and shift some of the burdens for the defense of the West to other shoulders. Thus, (following the lead of Ford) Carter announced that the U.S. would be withdrawing forces from Korea.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹²Indeed, the U.S. had done so. In 1970-1971, the U.S. withdrew a division (about 15,000 men) from Korea. See *Presidential Documents*, Vol. XIII, (1977), p. 817.

⁴⁹³Elaine P. Adam, (ed.), *American Foreign Relations, 1977: A Documentary Record* (New York: New York University Press, 1979), p. 99.

⁴⁹⁴Although this was the general tone of the campaign remarks, the reality was that the U.S. had no intention of withdrawing totally from Korea. In complying with the President's directive, the Department of Defense envisioned a reduction of ground forces, particularly those committed well forward. What was to be retained was the logistic facilities (sea, air, and ground), the support structure, and suitable in-country stocks of

The notion did not meet with unanimous approval in the U.S., South Korea or Japan.⁴⁹⁵ With the U.S. a central feature in the security strategies of all regional nations, any shift by Washington virtually guaranteed adaptation by all the others. A reduction in U.S. commitments connoted an increase in burdens for U.S. allies, or acceptance of increased risks.⁴⁹⁶ Nor was there a unified consensus on the U.S. side that reductions were the appropriate course of action.⁴⁹⁷

Those who wanted no withdrawal saw the pattern in which troop presence established linkage, linkage showed resolve, resolve ensured deterrence, and deterrence meant peace. In all, it was a paradigm of obtaining peace through obvious strength. Further, there were fears that if forces were withdrawn from Korea, an unfortunate precedent would be set that might be applied elsewhere, possibly damaging the global

material that could make possible a rapid deployment and reinforcement of South Korean forces. See *Presidential Documents*, Vol. XIII, (1977), p. 330. Further, there were statements (soon silenced due to indefensibility) concerning the savings to the U.S. taxpayer about having the troops home.

⁴⁹⁵The U.S. shift led to consultations, but not a great amount of agreement with both Tokyo and Seoul. Official statements of the time paper over the differences in diplomatic language, but the tone of unilateral decision and the smoothing of relations to be conducted during and after the fact suggests a lack of agreeable consensus. For example, "President Park has been informed, and we will work very closely with the South Koreans for an orderly transition, leaving the ground troops of the Republic of Korea strong enough to defend themselves and leaving our own commitment to them sure." See "Withdrawal of United States Ground Forces from South Korea: News Conference Statement by President Carter, May 28, 1977," in *Presidential Documents*, Vol. XIII, (1977), pp. 817-19.

⁴⁹⁶Unless the threat declined at the same time. In this case, quite the opposite was occurring.

⁴⁹⁷This was particularly true of U.S. military authorities in Korea. The statements made by General John K. Singlaub, Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces, Korea, scored the proposed withdrawal schedule as one that could lead to war via emboldening the North Koreans to attack. Such emboldening would occur with a perception that South Korea would be greatly weakened by the withdrawal of its security guarantor. Although Carter quickly relieved General Singlaub of his position, the General's actions heightened awareness of clear differences in approach.

fabric of deterrence.⁴⁹⁸

Alternatively, there were those who participated in the painful U.S. extraction from Vietnam,⁴⁹⁹ wanted the U.S. to have greater flexibility in distancing itself from draining Asian affairs, and saw it imperative to forestall any entangling recurrence. In this vein, withdrawal of U.S. ground forces would sever the automatic linkage between the U.S. and the South Koreans, and might allow the U.S. to avoid immediate involvement should an emergency develop. Further, the withdrawal of ground forces could be a precursor to additional reductions that might continue until a minimal presence (perhaps just easily withdrawn aircraft and ships) remained.

A minimal U.S. presence cast the U.S. in a supporting role, in turn, permitting the U.S. to do two things: a. retain the supporting role (in keeping with the Nixon Doctrine) should an emergency, but not a collapse, occur; and b. allow the U.S. to more easily extricate itself should the situation prove disastrous. Further, the absence of

⁴⁹⁸In addition, there were fears that once U.S. forces were withdrawn, their maintenance in an active status might be questioned on grounds of need and expense. Yet, if for budgetary reasons active units were shifted to reserve and National Guard organizations, the decisions pertaining to the use of those forces would become more sensitive to domestic political agendas and their combat readiness would suffer. In this way, not only damage to Korea's security could occur, but also to other alliances. Nor was this all. The pattern of unilateral U.S. withdrawals set a perception which echoed in other fora (e.g., SALT negotiations). Many who opposed SALT as giving away too much to the Soviets, saw the reduction of conventional forces, particularly outside the framework of Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), as convincing proof of naivete, political cupidity, or incompetence on the part of U.S. political appointees in dealing with the communists. For a sense of reactions to the reductions see Vernon A. Guldry, Jr., "Rumsfeld's Hard-Line Valedictory," *Washington Star*, January 19, 1977, p. A6, and "Carter and Brezhnev: The Game Begins," *Time*, February 7, 1977, pp. 40-2. For opposition from within the U.S. Government see "SALT TWO: Verification," *Selected Documents No. 7*, Department of State, February, 1978, p. 12, and Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, ". . . No Rubber Stamping," *Washington Post*, March 16, 1978, p. A23.

⁴⁹⁹See "United States Policy Toward Indochina: Letter from Secretary of State Kissinger to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, March 25, 1974," in Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam (ed.), *American Foreign Relations, 1974: A Documentary Record* (New York: New York University Press, 1977), pp. 76-90.

forces in the active force structure might damp presidential tendencies toward military adventure.⁵⁰⁰

None of these machinations were comforting to Japan. The clear lack of agreement among American officials regarding overseas troop reductions bespoke a nation divided in its course. Additionally, there seemed two viable, but very different and mutually exclusive approaches to a problem many had thought indefinitely stabilized. Shifts in the methodology that had stabilized the peninsula for decades bespoke shifts in strategy. To Tokyo, even the appearance of ambivalence was unsettling.

Worse, the proposal to withdraw troops from Korea seemed to raise considerably the risk of conflict on a peninsula recently grown more restive.⁵⁰¹ To Japan, a move that might increase Korea's risks was a move that also increased Japan's risks.⁵⁰² Some statements made by U.S. officials could be interpreted as alarming or

⁵⁰⁰To get armed forces from the reserve components, the U.S. President must call them up by directive, a public affirmation which would draw Congressional and public scrutiny. It should be recalled that the U.S. domestic political agenda had included a considerable struggle over the Congressional War Powers Resolution which had been passed over the President's veto in 1973. This law requires the President to inform Congress of actions taken even with active components. The political volatility of such actions was demonstrated in the so-called Mayaguez Affair (May 12-15, 1975).

⁵⁰¹The recent assassination attempt on President Park Chung Hee by a Korean resident of Japan allegedly affiliated with the Chosen soren (an organization affiliated with North Korea) (which missed Park but killed his wife) was paralleled by student demonstrations against Park's authoritarian tactics. But considerably more inflammatory to the U.S. was the so-called 1976 Tree Cutting Incident in which two American officers were attacked and killed by axe wielding North Koreans in the Joint Security Area of the Demilitarized Zone at Panmunjom. This incident drew a major (but measured) U.S. response. See "Statement by Assistant Secretary Hummel before the Subcommittees on International Political and Military Affairs and on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, September 1, 1976," DOS Bulletin, Vol. LXXV. (1976), pp. 386-92.

⁵⁰²The seemingly abrupt change in the U.S. with respect to Korea may have been both puzzling and irritating since the Korean peninsula had posed awkward problems for the U.S.-Japan security relationship. For example, the U.S. was exceedingly firm about maintaining bases in Japan to underwrite the American

confusing. For example, speaking before the Subcommittees on International Political and Military Affairs and on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, on September 1, 1976, Assistant Secretary Hummel said: "We do not view the August 18 incident as having a major effect on decisions regarding U.S. force levels in Korea." Quoting Mr. Habib when he was Assistant Secretary, Hummel continued:

. . .the specific level of our forces in Korea is not immutable. It is a function of the North Korean threat, the ability of the Republic of Korea forces to meet that threat, and the prevailing international situation. . . . we intend to honor commitments and maintain our presence in the area and in this context we had [sic] no present plans for significant force reduction in Korea.⁵⁰³

It may be that the restrained approach of the U.S. to such provocations as the murder of the U.S. officers in the Joint Security Area reassured Japan that the U.S. was unlikely to suddenly lash out. However, it begs the question of what level of provocation would cause the U.S. to take action.⁵⁰⁴

pledge to South Korea. Article VI of the 1960 TMCS, a direct product of the Korean War, seems to highlight the differences in the security requirements for Korea and Japan. The presence of U.S. forces well-forward in Korea increased Tokyo's anxiety that it might be drawn into some sort of peninsular conflict, a concern apparent at the time of Okinawa's reversion to Japanese control. The U.S. insisted on base rights which directly supported Korean contingencies, yet were allegedly difficult for Japan to accept. Although the U.S. peninsular presence anchored Japan's security as well as Korea's, the Japanese thought this could be done from sites *in Korea*. This impasse generally was resolved by Prime Minister Sato pledging himself to deal with the matter in a co-operative spirit if hostilities recurred on the peninsula. See Kunio Muraoka, "Japanese Security and the United States," *Adelphi Paper* No. 95, (London: IISS, 1973), pp. 7-8.

⁵⁰³ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁴ The military shifts that the U.S. made to the attacks in the Joint Security Area (JSA) were prophylactic: no strikes, raids or attacks against the North were conducted. The only action taken was to reenter the JSA and cut down the tree in question, an action with which the North did not interfere. None of those forces alerted for this situation were relocated to the Far East. The result to an admittedly explosive situation was pragmatically effective; however, it was not satisfying to many as it was seen both as reactive and tepid. Coming at a time when the memory of the Mayaguez Incident lingered, the U.S. response in the Tree Cutting Incident, despite statements asserting the U.S. response proved U.S. resolve, left uncertain perceptions of U.S. intentions.

Alternatively, other officials may have been more reassuring. In a luncheon address, "America and Asia," made at the Downtown Rotary Club and the Seattle Chamber of Commerce on July 22, 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger said:

No relationship is more important to the United States than our alliance with Japan. Mutual security remains fundamental to our collaboration; but in a new era we have extended our partnership to a broad range of common interests: easing tensions in Asia, solving regional and global problems, and combining our vast economic strength to spur stable and non-inflationary world economic growth.

In the early 1970's, Japan and the United States passed through an inevitable period of adjustment from dependence and American predominance to equality and mutual responsibility. There were frictions over textiles and monetary policies and over the timing of our essentially parallel China policies. But these difficulties have been overcome; they proved to be the growing pains of a more mature and equal relationship.

Today our relations with Japan are better than they have ever been. There are no significant bilateral disputes. We have developed a clearer common perception of our security requirements which will be further enhanced by the recently formed Joint Committee on Defense Cooperation. . . . Our relationship with Japan plays a central role in furthering stability and progress in Asia and the world. Our security relationship is crucial for the global balance of power. . . . close consultation on key regional and global issues is at the heart of our respective policies. The United States will make every effort to strengthen these bonds. . . . Our experience and our sacrifice define our stake in the preservation of this hard-won stability; *treaty obligations of mutual defense define our legal obligations*. Our support and assistance will be available where it has been promised.⁵⁰⁵ (Emphasis added.)

Yet, despite what Dr. Kissinger may have said, there were facts distressing to Tokyo. The U.S. was withdrawing forces from the Far East while the Soviets were sharply increasing theirs. Detente was unproven and the Korean peninsula was restive. Southeast Asia increasingly was falling under communist or other authoritarian control, and other issues and regions of the world, all once remote to Japanese concerns,

⁵⁰⁵DOS Bulletin, Vol. LXXV. (1976), pp. 217-26.

increasingly were in ferment.⁵⁰⁶ Last, the content of Kissinger's speech suggests a significant gap in perception; there was no obligation for Japan to come to the aid of the U.S. in a conflict.

However, the continual shifting of factors within Japan's security milieu seems to have confirmed its historical alignment with the U.S. rather than stimulate Tokyo to consider significant departures or adjustments. If the shifts in the security milieu seemed to reduce stability, they did not indicate any course more promising than maintaining the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Indeed, the fundamentally unchanged security milieu seemed to underscore Japan's current course and the lack of other suitable options. Dr. Kissinger's remarks suggest that the shifts may have had the effect of heightening the value of the relationship to both Tokyo and Washington.⁵⁰⁷

Other significant developments occurred in the regional strategic dialogue; one of which produced a de facto agreement of major significance. The evolution of the Sino-Soviet conflict produced a tacit acceptance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty by both Moscow and Beijing.⁵⁰⁸ In so doing, both communist powers increased Tokyo's

⁵⁰⁶For example, the Middle East with its oil had already demonstrated its ability to pressure Japan, and Africa, a region whose resources were occupying an increasing share of Japan's requirements, was in the midst of convulsions of several different orders all beyond Japan's ability to mollify, set aside control. Additionally, transnational entities, such as terrorist groups, demonstrated Japan's international vulnerability.

⁵⁰⁷DOS Bulletin, Vol. LXXV. (1976), pp. 217-26.

⁵⁰⁸Indeed, both had adequate reasons to do so. As long as Japan is paired to the U.S., Tokyo is forestalled from taking an independent approach which might include rearmament. Certainly a rearmed Japan (which could readily acquire nuclear weapons), whether independent or aligned with an opposing power, could present either Beijing or Moscow with the equivalent of another superpower with which to deal. Such a development could allow Washington to play a balancing role to its own advantage. However, a Japan aligned with and secured by the U.S. would not realize such a potential and its linkage to the U.S. connoted that the U.S. might be swayed to consider aspects important to its defense partner allowing the use of

leverage potential. Tokyo, in a position in which it neither needed an alliance with nor could be successfully coerced by either Moscow or Beijing, found its situation more flexible (and, perhaps, uncertain). However, were it not for Japan's security relationship with the U.S., Tokyo would have found fewer attractive options available.

Nor was the significance of this tacit acceptance solely confined to the machinations of the communists. With the acceptance of the treaty, a chief reason (entanglement in an East-West war) used by Japan's domestic opposition parties in criticizing the U.S.-Japan arrangement was undermined. Rather, should Japan abandon its treaty the U.S., an increase in instability and tensions seemed likely.

Thus, Japan found that its strategy of alignment to the U.S. and maintenance of its particular posture gained in effectiveness (and value) as the conditions of Japan's security milieu seemed to worsen.⁵⁰⁹ However, it hardly was a time for speculative relationships; no course of action seemed to offer more flexibility and less risk than maintaining the status quo. It seemed that the chief task of Japan's officials was to influence Washington so that its regional shifts did not lead to an uncoupling and possible misadventure by another.

.. *Guidelines for Defense Cooperation* - As with other aspects of Japan's security, the public appearance of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense

pressure on Tokyo to influence Washington. Thus, to preserve the security linkage between the U.S. and Japan became an important, if unspoken, position of both Beijing and Moscow. Tokyo, evidently not unmindful of this circumstance, exerted leverage on both communist powers with some success.

⁵⁰⁹There was another important aspect which bore on this result. The alternatives to the smaller regional states, should the U.S. withdrawal become more extensive, clearly needed to include Japan. Yet, the notion of Japan exercising a military policy independent of the U.S. was unsettling.

Cooperation must be seen in the context of other developments, specifically, a lengthy bilateral coordination process. In this regard, the Guidelines serve as evidence of the ongoing U.S.-Japan strategic dialogue that managed the relationship. Further, the appearance of the Guidelines has symbolic significance. However marginal were the actual results of the military-to-military planning they legitimized, the Guidelines inferred a broader application. As portrayed, the Guidelines illustrate Japan's awareness of and preparations for reacting to emerging regional threats, but stop short of an independent Japanese role or suggesting a change in security strategy.

The development of the Guidelines had its origins in Japan's long-standing desire to exercise increasing control of events concerning its security, and in the U.S. desire for Japan to bear a larger portion of the defense burden. In relation to military security affairs, Japan seemed to pursue a paradoxical course of both greater separation and integration with Washington.

Japan's objective of greater independence was a product of a perception that U.S. actions primarily supported U.S. interests, and the U.S. defense of Japan was a part of those (primarily self-serving) interests. This version of ascribed motivation indicated that Japan needed to look out for its own concerns. Moreover, to preclude entanglement and avoid the image of Japan as a U.S. clone, Japan resisted becoming too closely involved with the United States. These characteristics had been a consistent feature of Japan's security relationship with the U.S. since 1945.

Thus, the avoidance and deflection techniques used by Japan's strategic planners at this stage were not new: such tactics had been in use continuously since the end of

the war. Therefore, particularly in situations where Japan's contribution would be minimal (e.g., superpower military affairs), eschewing involvement was best.

However, avoiding active involvement was not the same thing as being uninformed, negligent in exercising influence to Japan's advantage, or supinely accepting results. Tokyo used greater contact with U.S. military officials in exercises, involvement in civil-military matters, and greater voice in international fora in seeking greater integration.⁵¹⁰

Yet, Japan faced a strategic paradox. Since the war, it had been Japan's consistent international posture to attempt friendly relations with all, particularly by avoiding issues that might make it the enemy of any. Reconciling planning that clearly delineated a particular state as a potential opponent without damaging Japan's consistent omnidirectional policy of friendship would be difficult. Yet, Japan's security environment showed a clear need to prepare for emergencies ahead of their occurrence. To make preparations, such as military contingency plans, required Japanese officials to ascribe specific enemy characteristics so that planning had relevance. Yet, by assigning characteristics, the identity of the notional enemy becomes evident. Japan had

⁵¹⁰For example, the joint statement released after a visit of a Japanese prime minister to the U.S. habitually contains a passage alluding to agreement on the need for better bilateral coordination and communication. What is unclear is whether this consistent feature speaks to a recognition of cultural difference affecting strategic dialogue, process or hypothesis, or connotes a key (and perhaps yet to be attained) objective of Japan's security strategy (e.g., maintaining strategic flexibility through always being consulted prior to significant U.S. policy shifts). Further, it is unclear precisely what role the Japanese see for this coordination. Despite their extensive breadth (see JDA, *Defense of Japan*, 1983, pp. 203-12), in the author's experience, the consultations on the military level were fragmentary, overly focused on minutiae and vague on key issues. This tended to generate impressions that the Japanese were "not serious" about meaningful military coordination. In turn, this conclusion raised suspicions that the Japanese were only concerned in finding out what the U.S. had in mind, and in keeping enough distance to "jump in or out" if forced to a decision.

only two plausible choices, the USSR or the PRC, and no wish to aggravate its strategic dialogue with either. Too, Tokyo wished to avoid the domestic objections likely to be alleged about Japan's taking the road to remilitarization or entanglement.

Alternatively, not to do "real" planning and coordination with the U.S. was to express doubtful motives, an aspect that could damage the alliance and by that Japan's security.⁵¹¹ The obvious choice was to seek some sufficiently vague and reassuring middle course that provoked neither the U.S. nor other regional powers. Yet, Tokyo had to make plain its strategic awareness and willingness to take unilateral coordinated action, and not stir up domestic agitation. Forming an administrative body that, in turn, would create a legitimizing mechanism seemed a course satisfying these requirements.

On July 8, 1976, a directive from the Security Consultative Committee, Meeting XVI, established the Subcommittee on Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (SDC). The Subcommittee was created to develop the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, which it did during eight meetings held between August 30, 1976 and October 31, 1978.⁵¹²

Other features also hampered Japan's security planning. The anti-military aspect of the domestic situation meant that civilian control of the military would include

⁵¹¹See *infra*, footnote 561, p. 305.

⁵¹²JDA, *Defense of Japan*, 1983, p. 206. This series took a longer period than that of the negotiations for the contentious Administrative Agreement that accompanied the 1951 Mutual Security Treaty. While the sense of urgency was less, the deliberate pace may indicate that any suggestion of a hasty effort was to be avoided.

restrictions thought to preclude the military from regaining dominance.⁵¹³ Among these were provisions preventing emergency enabling legislation, limitations on possibly offensive equipment capabilities,⁵¹⁴ and those that forbade the deployment outside Japan of JSDF personnel. Japanese officials sought to adjust these obstacles, but to do so in a way that kept them from sparking prohibitive objections.⁵¹⁵ It is notable that while they were developing the Guidelines, they also undertook a study on the legal problems associated with emergencies (emergency legislation).⁵¹⁶

Nor was this all. The 1976 NDPO, establishing quality rather than quantity as the central theme in the future development of the SDF, clearly catered to Japan's national strengths (high technological development and mass manufacturing application). In December 1977, the National Defense Council decided to introduce F-

⁵¹³Some were bureaucratic, yet effective. For example, military-to-military contacts are kept at a low level by maintaining coordination in Japan and between the JDA and Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan, well below the U.S. JCS and DOD levels.

⁵¹⁴In keeping with the "self-defense only" aspect of its armed forces, this general policy is understandable. However, on occasion the application was strained. For example, when Japan acquired F-4 fighters, the air-to-air refueling equipment (and thereby the capability) was removed. Yet, Japan possessed no aerial refueling tankers; the capability could not have been realized in any event. Even had aerial tankers been later acquired, simple controls over these assets could have limited the range of the F-4s making impossible deeper strikes into the USSR or China, yet permitting longer on-station times which are critical in maintaining an aerial defense. At the time, Japan's air forces were heavily outnumbered by regional potential enemies and simultaneously burdened by competing operational demands (e.g., surface attack).

⁵¹⁵For example, the prohibition of overseas deployment of SDF personnel was challenged indirectly through the attempt to use such personnel as part of UN efforts, notably not in a military (peacekeeping) role, but as part of humanitarian efforts in emergency relief. All attempts failed until the early 1990s.

⁵¹⁶This study (officially) was begun in August, 1977 on the directions of JDA Director General Mihara. Progress reports subsequently were made on April 22, 1981, October 16, 1984, and March 4, 1985. The first progress report divided the study into three classifications of legislation: #1) laws under the jurisdiction of the Defense Agency; #2) laws under the jurisdiction of other ministries and agencies; and #3) laws pertaining to matters not clearly falling under jurisdiction of any ministry or agency. The report then addressed only those matters in classification #1. The overall process suggests avoiding friction through careful selection of subject area and slow development. No changes in emergency legislation resulted.

15 fighters and P3C surveillance aircraft, a clear step toward upgrading Japan's military capabilities.⁵¹⁷ Improvements in ground and naval force capabilities paralleled those in air forces. Further, the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system and general surveillance capabilities were upgraded. As if to stress the point, Japan expanded its participation in various joint military training exercises held with the U.S.⁵¹⁸

Yet, these improvements in Japan's military capabilities remained limited in scope. Compared to other regional powers, equipment densities were modest and the capabilities of the equipment acquired, while on par with then fielded systems in East Asia, were generally behind those of the more militarily advanced nations.⁵¹⁹ By

⁵¹⁷ It should be noted that in acquiring the F-15, Japan also purchased the rights to produce it in Japan (where it is designated the F-15J). Although the engines and airframe are the same as the U.S. model, the Japanese version has significantly altered electronics making its actual capabilities, particularly in a high technology operational envelope, essentially unknown. This production right and indigenous manufacturing capability followed the earlier similar acquisition of production rights for air-to-air munitions. In all, the F-15, then state-of-the-art, was a significant step in capability that did not go unnoticed by Japan's neighbors.

⁵¹⁸ These joint and combined exercises, long urged by the U.S., were met by modest (even minimal) JSDF participation. Nor were they greatly expanded in scope or participation over the period; the increases were deliberate in pace and marked by restraint. Better progress was made in naval exercises (the MSDF had exercised with the U.S. Navy since 1955). U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises (e.g., "Keen Edge" or "Yama Sakura") habitually focused on map and staff exercise with the use of actual troop units very limited in scope and scale. Even the considerably enlarged exercise schedule of the late 1980s showed considerable restraint.

⁵¹⁹ The fielding of a limited number of relatively sophisticated systems did demonstrate several important points. First, it suggested that Japan could field a great number of these systems should it decide to do so. Second, the presence of a number of these systems meant that any possible aggressor would be forced to increase his combat densities or upgrade his systems to expediently overwhelm the Japanese forces. Both of these would be difficult and expensive. Third, since Japan's systems could not be taken in isolation of U.S. capabilities, Japan's effectiveness would be increased by more than mere number equivalencies; the ancillary systems and support provided from U.S. sources to Japan (and vice versa) significantly improved combat effectiveness. Last, the systems fielded by Japan had a certain degree of interoperability with those of the U.S. (e.g., tank, aircraft, and naval fuels and ordinance were interchangeable). In all, for a modest expenditure and a relatively low profile, Japan had been able to acquire more deterrence than war fighting capability, thereby contributing to its security and not provoking a charge of remilitarization.

exercising restraint in its upgrade of equipment, Japan had implied much, made preparations for much, but had done relatively little.

Japan's promulgation of the Guidelines is linked to Tokyo's strategic dialogue with China. In this dialogue Beijing sought to use Japanese capital, technology and leverage to improve its general economic condition and to break out of the isolation largely imposed by the USSR. Further, Beijing sought to involve Japan in an anti-Soviet alignment through the wording of the Treaty of Friendship and Amity signed between Japan and the PRC in August of 1978.⁵²⁰ In developing its relationship with the U.S., Beijing also seemed aware that good relations with Tokyo could enhance its relations with Washington.

Japan's contacts with Beijing suggest several objectives. The first of these was flexibility in the international arena. After the jolts of the Oil Crisis and so-called Nixon Shocks, Japan's need to expand its base of international relations was evident.⁵²¹ Beginning in 1975, Tokyo and Beijing earnestly negotiated for three years in concluding a treaty of peace and friendship. Nevertheless, the attempts to normalize

⁵²⁰The principal cause for concern was the insistence by Beijing that the proposed treaty include a clause (Art. 2) which would bind both China and Japan to oppose the efforts by any other nation (read the USSR) to establish regional "hegemony." Japan eschewed such obligation (Art. 4) for the obvious reasons that it was dangerous to its security and damaging to its leverage with both Moscow and Beijing.

⁵²¹Such expansion would enhance Japan's ability to access resources (such as oil) from other sources (like China) and simultaneously permit Japan to avoid dislocations that might be the product of political motivation focused on another. Additionally, the distancing of Tokyo from Washington serves to prevent Japan from being treated as an extension of the U.S. thereby tacitly permitting Japan to act as a conduit (perhaps ombudsman) between the U.S. and other parties.

relations with Beijing had its costs, particularly as to the relationship with the USSR.⁵²²

A second probable objective for Japan was the broadening of strategic options should its relationship with the U.S. decline. Regional relationships received increased emphasis. In this, only the option of improved relations with the PRC (itself anxious to conclude a closer arrangement) provided a possible regional means for Japan to balance out the Soviet Union. Far from a satisfactory replacement to the U.S. as an alliance partner, the choice of the PRC would reflect as much the characteristic of anti-Soviet sentiment as pro-Chinese feelings.⁵²³ Soviet activities seemed to confirm its threatening nature, thereby facilitating a pro-Beijing "tilt" to Tokyo's diplomacy. Additionally, if it took a stance favorable to Moscow, Tokyo necessarily would be in opposition to Washington, perhaps the worst of all possible alignments for Japan.⁵²⁴

⁵²²The USSR opposed the growing Sino-Japanese relationship from the outset, and made extensive efforts to derail the negotiations. The spectrum of their efforts ranged from implied inducements by raising the matter in other contexts (e.g., negotiations on fishing rights in Soviet waters) to threats (demonstrated by the large augmentation of armed forces throughout the region). These efforts backfired, deepening Japanese perceptions of the Soviets as a threatening adversary. For a summary of these events from a Japanese perspective (but in English) see Shinkichi Eto, "Recent Developments in Sino-Soviet Relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XX, No. 7, (July, 1980), pp. 726-43. From the Soviet point of view, a Sino-Japanese entente presented Beijing with two options for a strategic partner with which to oppose Moscow. Not surprisingly, Moscow concluded a quasi-military alliance with Vietnam shortly thereafter. When in succession Vietnam invaded and quickly overran much of Cambodia and China launched a punitive foray into Vietnam, Tokyo's prudence in distancing itself from vague obligations contrary to its strategic premises was apparent.

⁵²³ Admittedly, during the early 1970s, Sino-Japanese relations improved on a broad spectrum, with China briefly displacing the U.S. as the "most admired" or "most liked" country in Japanese public opinion polls. (In contrast, the USSR has consistently ranked as "most disliked" or "least respected," a dismal position challenged only by the Koreans.) However, this warm blush of Japanese atmospherics for China rapidly chilled with the 1979 invasion of Vietnam. With the subsequent scaling back of economic development plans, partially caused by Chinese default on Japanese loans, a more realistic tone characterized the relationship.

⁵²⁴ Another strategic aspect may have been a factor. The U.S. strategy of containment explicitly called for the formation of separate power centers. With Washington's approach to China based, in part, on a perception of China behaving in a way that aided that strategy, Washington may have had mixed feelings regarding the Sino-Japanese dialogue. Thus, Washington may have felt that as long as Tokyo's approach did not damage the U.S. military presence, the lure of what Japan could provide China might be strong enough

A third objective that Tokyo may have sought was enhancing the value of Japan in either peace or war to both communist powers and to the United States. By possessing sufficient potential to alter the outcome of the Sino-Soviet conflict during peace, war, or the post-conflict recovery phase, Japan could be in the happy position of being left out of the conflict should it occur.⁵²⁵ Moreover, because of its considerable potential, if not involved in the conflict, Tokyo would be in a position to significantly influence the shape of post-conflict regional affairs. As to its relations with the U.S., should Washington recognize that Tokyo had other options, Tokyo might gain a bit more leverage in negotiations with Washington. Although no alternative might be as suitable as continued alignment with the U.S., still an arrangement sufficient to answer Japan's fundamental requirements might give Japan alternatives. In all, the potential for increased flexibility made this option attractive to Tokyo; yet, it was risk laden.⁵²⁶

to cause a softening of that regime. Since the likelihood of Japan separating itself from the U.S. or the general global mercantile economic system was slight, Japanese and Chinese needs and capabilities were complementary, and both regimes could ease potential security problems through increased dialogue, Japan could act in the role of quasi-ombudsman. Japan's peculiar status of being in, but not of, the West facilitated this role. Beijing, evidently sensitive to Washington's global and regional roles, softened its rhetoric considerably and reduced its support to insurgent movements. Moreover, Beijing ceased objecting to the presence of U.S. naval assets based in Japan (perhaps because of concern about Soviet regional military--particularly naval--increases), but, in so doing, tacitly endorsed the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Thus, a strategic dialogue evolved that confirmed the U.S.-Japan relationship, enhanced U.S. global and regional strategies, and increased Tokyo's international involvement and, perhaps, leverage.

⁵²⁵This is a tenuous construction since it is hard to see how Japan would be interested in supporting either Beijing or Moscow in a conflict. A military alignment with either only increases Japan's risks. However, since any conflict between Moscow and Beijing also raised the risks to Japan, Tokyo may have seen the utility in aiding deterrence through adjusting the thrust of its policies to damp unsettling trends.

⁵²⁶A false step by Tokyo could result in the alienation of one or more of the major powers, and an unbalanced, even isolated, position for Japan. Further, the conditions under which Japan could exercise such potential power were wholly unpredictable, but, particularly in the case of conflict between China and the USSR, dire. Such conditions almost certainly were dangerous to Japan and could dwarf any advantage that might come Japan's way. In all, Japan's pursuit of this objective would have to be marked by restraint and balance with the process characterized by the using the pressures of the major powers in such a way as to

Perhaps the most important value of the Guidelines is that they publicly affirm the solidity of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. With that relationship secure, Japan was in the position of being able to negotiate in all strategic arenas from a position of strength.⁵²⁷

Additionally, since the U.S. and Japan each acted as a brake on the other, the announcement of the Guidelines facilitated the tacit acceptance of the U.S.-Japan TMCS by both the Chinese and the Soviets.⁵²⁸ Yet, since the Guidelines publicly legitimized combined military planning, they served notice that the restraint that the lack of such planning exercised no longer existed, inferring other restraints also could be removed. The Guidelines seemed to more firmly join the U.S. and Japan, thus making more remote the specter of an independent, resurgent militaristic Japan. However, acknowledging the combination of the U.S. and Japan in military planning seemed to raise a nightmare vision of what a holistic U.S.-Japanese military-industrial combination might portend.⁵²⁹ In this way, the Guidelines seemed to accomplish little, but suggest that much could be done.

jockey Japan into position.

⁵²⁷ Beijing retained some ability to influence the basic conditions of Sino-Japanese ties, since if Tokyo proved reluctant, Beijing had other options. The sources of this influence included international recognition, leverage with the Washington, and considerable Japanese domestic pressure.

⁵²⁸ With the U.S. and Japanese jointly involved in planning, the Japanese (for their own reasons) will damp American proclivities toward the extremes of overreaction or isolationism. In a mirroring effect, the U.S. linkage to the Japanese damps the alleged tendency of Japan to change direction abruptly, remilitarize, or align with another.

⁵²⁹ With the U.S. as the only true superpower and Japan then ranked as number three in economic strength and technology, an assertive combination of the two could outdistance not only *any* single opponent, but probably any possible combination of communist opponents. In all, it was the sort of spectral development both Beijing and Moscow feared.

Yet, the Guidelines were published in the aftermath of Vietnam. Support within the U.S. for military involvement in foreign, especially Asian, arenas was sparse. Neither was there a broad belief in the international community that the U.S. sought involvement; instead, many were concerned that the U.S. might retreat too far into its historical isolationism. In this way, the Guidelines functioned as a brake on both Japanese and U.S. shifts.

Thus, instead of accentuating concerns that a powerful and perhaps expansionist U.S.-Japan military-industrial union was forming, the image was one of two powers shoring up their alliance in the face of changed circumstances. In effect, the Guidelines became an anchor point for their respective strategies and by that, regional stability. During the following year, circumstances tested and confirmed this anchoring effect.

.. 1979 - *Afghanistan, Vietnam, Korea redux* - Nineteen seventy-nine was a year that convinced Japanese officials (and many in other countries as well) that their dark suspicions of Soviet intent were well founded. In invading Afghanistan, Moscow sealed negative opinion of the USSR among both non-communists and non-Soviet communists, resulting in a broad spectrum of resistance to Soviet machinations. If the U.S. experience in Vietnam had disappointed American supporters, a bright lining to that dark cloud was the near-universal recognition that the U.S. was not an expansionist power. In contrast, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan seems to have alarmed many, invoking just the opposite image of the USSR.

Plainly, Washington would not directly engage its military forces in Afghanistan; in some respect a worrisome situation, since there seemed a pattern in

which Soviet expansionist activity was directly proportional to U.S. acceptance of a declining posture.⁵³⁰ Prognosticators of America's decline and coming collapse pointed to numerous events summing to a worrisome image of a tired champion beset by a host of vexing, perplexing problems, burdened by self-doubt and giving ground before the main challenge. Not accepting that image was hard. Since the withdrawal from Vietnam and its collapse, the Southeast Treaty Organization (SEATO) was abandoned, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was dissolved, Afghanistan was invaded, and Washington entered Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the USSR. Significantly, Washington softened its position in these talks, ceding notable advantages to Moscow.

Nor was Washington spared in other areas. In the Middle East, Washington's support of Israel reaped a harvest of animosities from the largely Islamic Arab nations. In the Far East, Korean affairs, still tense after the so-called August 18 Tree Cutting Incident, included an assassination plot against President Park, internal and external protests to Park's authoritarian measures under the 1972 constitution, and "Koreagate" in 1977. President Park's assassination by the head of his own intelligence apparatus on October 26, 1979, generated political flux from which a military officer, General Chun Doo Hwan, seized power and reestablished authoritarian government. Popular reaction to authoritarian rule crystallized with the bloody Kwangju incident in May 1980, presenting the U.S. with the uncomfortable prospect of supporting authoritarian rule in

⁵³⁰ Perhaps it was the absence of the U.S. confronting the USSR that so alarmed others. For thirty-five years the U.S. was generally consistent in opposing communist expansion; other nations had come to expect that Washington would carry the burden.

spite of its own democratic ideals.⁵³¹

Even in Southeast Asia the situation seemed to have worsened. Far from withdrawing to leave the region at a lower level of conflict, hopefully to find its peace, the region's conflicts expanded, escalated and worsened. It was a disordered, unpalatable and dangerous environment. Even maintaining stability through opposing Moscow by strategic adjustments between dissimilar regimes (like the U.S. and PRC) seemed problematic.

If Washington's burdens were not eased by the generally less stable environment, neither were Tokyo's anxieties assuaged or its strategic considerations simplified. Strategic linkage connoted negatives and positives, and the strategic dialogue reflected this situation. It was unsurprising that American allies might feel unsettled with Washington evidently on the defensive. It was alarming that while Washington seemed beleaguered, the USSR seemed ascendent and expansionist.

Of the general evolution of events Japan was aware, but largely unengaged. Not only were these events generally distant, but Japanese policies that were key portions of Tokyo's security strategy precluded Japan's involvement. Yet, Tokyo's normalization and improved relations with the PRC were not mirrored with the USSR, thereby following the U.S. example rather than Japan's omnidirectional foreign policy.

Nevertheless, it was not apparent that Tokyo's attempts for greater security

⁵³¹The Korean developments were even more unsettling than they might seem at first glance, for in 1979, President Carter halted the withdrawal of U.S. forces, suggesting that for the protection of Korea, a modernizing, democratizing, and loyal member of the West, U.S. presence was necessary. The eruption at Kwangju, a domestic event in which the Korean military over-reacted, seemed to indicate that the regime was of the sort which the U.S. ideals opposed.

through the provisions of the 1976 NDPO and its general policies had succeeded. Indeed, with the invasion of Afghanistan and the beleaguering of the U.S., a reassessment was in order, the first order of business being a reassessment of the USSR.

To do so, the Japanese seem to have gone back to the presumptions undergirding the 1976 NDPO; specifically, the assessment of Soviet intent. With the invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow seemed more ready to undertake military adventure in pursuit of political objectives than at anytime since World War II. Soviet military capabilities had never been in question, yet, Tokyo seems to have considered the likelihood of Soviet aggression toward Japan remote. Viewing Afghanistan, the probabilities seemed far less remote. The assessment of "could they" remained; the assessment of "would they" changed from "no" to "probably, yes -- if given opportunity."⁵³²

.. *1980 Report on Comprehensive Security* - Established on April 2, 1979, at the behest of Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, the Comprehensive National Security Study Group, brought out on July 2, 1980, a 72-page report titled "Report on

⁵³²In the author's conversations with Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) officials in 1983, with GSDF officers in 1984, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials in 1987 there was consistent expressions of surprise over the Soviet action. but acknowledgment that Moscow's actions confirmed long-held suspicions of the USSR. Further, all confirmed that from their vantage points a reassessment of the Soviets took place causing a sea change in threat awareness. Seiichi Igarashi, a JDA official, supplied the "could and would" delineation (November, 1983). Notably, there was no suggestion from any of these officials that Tokyo contemplated a sudden change of course, rather that the revelation of the true nature of the USSR confirmed the need for Japan to maintain its pre-determined policies and course of action.

Comprehensive National Security."⁵³³ This report was generated by twenty-five persons representing a broad spectrum of fields: government ministries and academia were heavily represented. Only two persons were associated with the military, (and then only through education); neither were uniformed service members.⁵³⁴

Like a predecessor, the 1975 "A Study of Japan's Defense Issues," the 1980 report was produced in both Japanese and English translation, and provided it to U.S. officials both in Japan and the United States. Paralleling ongoing discussions with U.S. officials, the report served multiple objectives in being a part of the strategic dialogue. However, unlike the 1975 study, the 1980 report is forthright in its approach, direct in language, broader in scope and contains conclusions throughout. Some of these are brutally frank. Further, the 1980 report includes economic aspects and domestic considerations (that the 1975 study omitted), infers a hierarchy of efforts, is notably free of the idealistic tone permeating the 1975 report, and plainly notes Japan's security and means to achieve it are broader than just military. For example, in the first paragraph, the report states:

⁵³³The Comprehensive National Security Study Group, *Report on Comprehensive National Security*, trans. M. Nakajima, (Tokyo: The Comprehensive National Security Study Group, 1980), sometimes called the Inoki Report after its editor Masamichi Inoki; hereafter *Report on Comprehensive National Security*.

⁵³⁴The structure and composition of the Comprehensive National Security Study Group and that which produced the September, 1975 "Study of Japan's Defense Issues" are remarkably similar. Although most of the names are different, conspicuously present is representation from the Research Institute for Peace and Security, the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs, key industries, and academia. The 1980 study has no specific representation of the media and, in being twice the size, represents a broader group of fields (e.g., group membership included an architect and a novelist). However, even a brief review of their positions and organizations suggests care in their selection and a deliberate intent to assay a broad societal base.

Efforts required for security consist of three levels of efforts: efforts to turn the overall international environment into a favorable one; self-reliant efforts to cope with threats; and as intermediary efforts, efforts to create a favorable international environment within a limited scope while protecting security in solidarity with countries sharing the same ideals and interests.

This is true for both security in the narrow sense and economic security. Since these three levels of efforts are mutually complementary and at the same time contradictory, it is important that balance be maintained among them.

The security question is of a comprehensive nature not only in the sense explained above but also in the sense that the fields of security interest and the means at our disposal are diverse.⁵³⁵

The most striking aspect of this report is the uncompromising tone of its observations, findings, and (especially) recommendations for the Japanese Government.

For example:

In considering the questions of Japan's security, the most fundamental change in the international situation that took place in the 1970s is the termination of clear American supremacy in both military and economic spheres.

and

Economically, U.S. economic strength has declined both in absolute terms and in relative terms against the economic development achieved by Europe and Japan. As a result, it has become impossible to primarily rely upon the United States as in the past for the maintenance of the international currency system and free-trade system.⁵³⁶

The era of the "Pax Americana" upheld almost single-handedly by the United States is over, and it has given way to a new era of "peace maintained by shared responsibilities," in which all countries cooperate in the maintenance and management of the international system. It has become impossible for Japan to pursue solely its own economic interests within this system. . . . In order to protect the political and economic systems from threat of external aggression, it is necessary for Japan to strengthen its self-reliant efforts as well as to contribute to the

⁵³⁵ Report on Comprehensive National Security, p. 7.

⁵³⁶ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

maintenance and strengthening of the international system.⁵³⁷

Having, delineated the reasons why it undertook the study and that Japan must see its responsibilities (tacitly acknowledging that Tokyo has not done so in the past) the report is particularly plain spoken in assessing what will no longer work and in recommending adjustments.

Japan may place stress on its efforts in the economic field to build a better international order, but this should never be used as an excuse for Japan to neglect its efforts in other areas. It is undesirable for international stability that Japan continue to remain a limping "economic giant = political dwarf." Based on its economic power, Japan can contribute politically to the stability of the Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia, and even the Middle East. The question here is one of political will and political stance, When Japan has the political will, it will be able, for example, to take the initiative in arms control in the Asia-Pacific region or participate in the United Nations Peace Keeping Forces in the Middle East.

Japan has till now almost always supported U.S. actions, albeit in a lukewarm fashion. This has invited the criticism that Japan is a U.S. lackey on the one hand, and on the other, it has given the United States the impression that Japan is an unreliable ally. Japan must change this posture and assert the interests that deserve to be asserted, criticize what ought to be criticized, and support the United States strongly and forthrightly when it deserves Japan's support.

Finally, Japan also has to strengthen its defense efforts. If Japan continues to rely on the United States for its security in almost all respects, it will foster a negative image of itself as an irresponsible dependent. Furthermore, since the United States is trying to cope with the Soviet arms buildup in joint efforts with its allies as stated before, neglect on the part of Japan to join in such efforts will evoke even stronger criticisms against it.⁵³⁸

Nor does the assessment of the regional circumstances, the Japanese appraisal of them or expectations of evolution escape frank, unsparing coverage. The writing style of the section titled "Relations with China and the Soviet Union," is so direct that one suspects its purpose is not merely to be understood, but to be so plain that it could not

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

be misunderstood.⁵³⁹ One crucial feature of this section is its absence of ideological polemics; the authors premised the entire section on balance of power notions. Whether this is symptomatic of Japanese perceptions, or of a desire by Japanese officials to cast the material in a paradigm whose terms all would understand, is unclear. What is clear is the transmission.

The primary reason for the Soviet Union's apprehension over the progress in Japan-China relations is that the two-way economic exchange will contribute to China's modernization and thereby make China stronger. The Soviet Union is particularly sensitive to economic exchange that may lead to the strengthening of China's military power. Beyond that, the Soviet Union seems to regard the development of Japan-China relations as having a power-politics implication as well within the context of international politics. In other words, the Soviet Union seems to hold the view that the existence of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the conclusion of the Japan-China treaty, and the normalization of Sino-American relations might lead these countries - the United States, China, and Japan - toward a tripartite alliance, and further that, taking into consideration NATO as another element, a new way to encircle the Soviet Union is taking shape.

This Soviet reaction is excessive but not entirely groundless. . . . The fear over the formation of a U.S.-Chinese-Japanese alliance is not a rational one, since Japan has no intention of forming such an alliance and neither the United States nor China seems to be contemplating to go that far. Nevertheless, regardless of Japan's own intentions, the development of the friendly relationship between Japan and China does carry implications of power politics. For one thing, fierce rivalry between China and the Soviet Union continues. For another, despite American and Soviet attempts at *detente*, a fundamental confrontation exists between the two nations, which gradually became critical in the latter half of the 1970s and was further intensified by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In this situation, as is indicated in statements made by both American and Chinese leaders, the United States and China consider Sino-American relations as a part of their policy to control the Soviets.⁵⁴⁰

Yet perhaps more important, the report contains continued references to the

⁵³⁹Since this unrestricted report was produced in an English language translation and deliberately circulated among U.S. officials (and thereby could be expected to "leak" to other foreign entities) the envisioned readership was most probably broader than Japanese and U.S. officials.

⁵⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 50-1.

possible threat posed by the USSR.

. . . it is an undeniable fact that the military nature of the Soviet Union's foreign relations is becoming increasingly obvious. This was confirmed decisively by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Soviet diplomacy strongly reflects the philosophy of power.⁵⁴¹

The report does not stop there. Beyond the already noted references for Japan to provide more assistance, the report suggests that "the West" (with which Japan obviously identifies itself) must meet military requirements. In the section titled "Strengthening Defense Capability," the report notes:

History has shown that it is necessary for the West to avoid deterioration in its position in the military balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has respected the autonomy of nations, such as Finland and Yugoslavia, that are determined to defend themselves and possess some degree of ability to do so. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has not hesitated to use its military power in places where the Soviet Union has considered it possible to obtain satisfactory results by military operations in a short period of time, as in the case of Czechoslovakia.⁵⁴²

and in a section dealing with energy security,

. . . a war in the Middle East is also a possibility, for the Arab-Israeli dispute is still unresolved and the Soviet Union is showing a stance aimed at a southward push. A probable outcome in such a situation would be a complete stoppage or cutback of oil supplies, or an embargo, each lasting for some time.⁵⁴³

Nevertheless, the report is careful not to overreach in its recommendations. In the section dealing with relations with the USSR and China, the report explains how Japan must chart its course with respect to the Soviets.

. . . establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union will be no easy

⁵⁴¹Ibid., p. 52.

⁵⁴²Ibid., p. 41.

⁵⁴³Ibid., p. 57.

task. . . . The reason for this probably lies in the way the Soviet Union looks at international politics, particularly its unique philosophy of power. The Soviet Union's stance is twofold: On the one hand it tends to feel threatened by the rest of the world and hence to believe it necessary to ensure its security by equipping itself with a strong military force; on the other it tends to wield its authority quite overtly in situations where it enjoys supremacy. This being the case, a country must maintain a profile so that it neither appears weak to Moscow nor appears threatening or likely to give a sense of isolation to Moscow. In other words, what is required are skills to deal with the Soviet Union in a self-confident and at the same time unhostile [sic] manner. The difficulty lies in how to harmonize these two needs.⁵⁴⁴

In recommending improvements, the report asserts the following rationale and caveats:

This, however, does not mean that Japan should strive to build up its military power to the extent that the character of its military power is changed. . . . Japan's policy to possess self-defense capability as a denial force is in principle correct. There is a limit to the use of military power in the nuclear age, and that limit is quite low. . . . In the case of Japan, a large-scale military conflict is effectively avoided under the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. It is sufficient for Japan to possess this denial force in its defense capability with the premise of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.

A policy of so-called autonomous defense would necessitate fairly enormous outlays. It would also lower the level of Japan's security by provoking aversion in other countries and thereby increasing the possibility of inducing threats which exceed Japan's ability to defend itself. Such a policy, therefore, should not be adopted.⁵⁴⁵

In all, the 1980 Report on Comprehensive National Security is precisely that. In the conclusion the committee makes the following statement:

It is our hope that the issues raised in this report will serve as a catalyst for wide-spread national debate and that this will lead to productive results. It is the formation of national consensus through wide-ranging discussion that will lead to united national efforts for Japan's security.⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 52-3.

⁵⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁵⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 71. This is, in its own fashion, a statement of maturity. It is hard to imagine that anyone close to the events of 1960 would make such a recommendation a decade earlier.

Beyond being a report on national security, the report is a public statement affirming Japan's alignment with the West, the U.S., and, significantly, its own national strategic course. It became a holistic working agenda for security considered from a comprehensive perspective and within broad, already emplaced and tested policy guidelines. In substance, the report did little more than suggest marginal changes to national priorities for resources in meeting medium and long-term requirements. However, the very analyses that concluded those marginal changes were all that the situation required, and by that, confirmed Japan's strategy. In this way, the report was part of the several strategic dialogues, and enhanced Japan's stature through the report's scope, construction and confident tone.⁵⁴⁷

.. *Regional Trust* - A primary facet of Japan's national security is the extent of regional trust accorded Japan by its neighbors. Japan has maintained a consistent postwar policy of presenting a military posture sufficient for "denial," yet also so limited as to forestall militant responses and aid in the dissolution of historical animosities. This policy remains an essential pillar of Japan's security strategy. However, because of its security relationship with the U.S., Japan must carefully craft its strategic dialogues since regional trust in the U.S. approach to regional security

⁵⁴⁷ For example, in its conclusion the report makes the following statement:

Inasmuch as Japan's security depends on comprehensive efforts in many fields and at different levels, it is not a task that can be left solely in the hands of the Defense Agency It is necessary for all the ministries and agencies of the Government to bear comprehensive national security considerations in mind in implementing various policy measures. *Ibid.*, p. 72. Further confirmation is to be found in the interview of Mizuo Kuroda, Japan's Ambassador to the United Nations on January 31, 1983, as found in Robert W. Barnett, *Beyond War: Japan's Concept of Comprehensive National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1986), pp. 81-2.

issues and processes and those of Japan differ. One way of putting this is to note that Japan is *in and of* the region; the U.S. is *only in* it. Such differences in involvement clearly affect national sensitivities and feelings of urgency about regional affairs.

Obviously, should regional atmospherics become hostile, the U.S. has a water barrier some 8,300 kilometers in width (and a nuclear shield) behind which to retire; independently, Japan has neither option. Thus, Japan's concern for regional sensibilities must be higher.⁵⁴⁸

Additionally, at least until historical memory fades, Japan will bear a burden of mistrust due to its imperial activities. Tokyo's concern for Soviet sensibilities during treaty negotiations with China parallels Tokyo's concerns for Chinese sensibilities during the several crises about the Taiwan Straits. Likewise, Japanese requests for U.S. intercession in smoothing relations between Japan and Korea, or other states at earlier times, suggest Tokyo wanted to exercise all options and leverage in promoting its national image a peaceful and trustworthy.⁵⁴⁹

By the late 1970s, Japan's policy of "openness to all, an enemy to none"⁵⁵⁰ had been in place for nearly three decades. More effective in those areas where Japanese imperial intrusion had been the least, Tokyo regained some respect and acceptance in

⁵⁴⁸Continual references to this concern mark the Report on Comprehensive National Security.

⁵⁴⁹This is part of a well-established pattern. From the Meiji period onward, Japan recognized its security in terms of its neighbors. Not surprisingly, from 1945 onward, it sought ways to enhance those relations conducive to its security, since, with or without the U.S., Japan still would have to cast its efforts in consideration of regional interactions.

⁵⁵⁰See interview of Takeo Miki, former prime minister of Japan, January 30, 1983, in Barnett, Beyond War, p. 108.

Asian fora.⁵⁵¹ However, Japan's national strength had grown simultaneously, far exceeding its prewar stature. Besides probable envy over Japan's recovery and continued success, what Japan might become or the course it might pursue caused apprehension, reducing thereby the regional trust extended Japan. Although Japan made three major "concessions" to achieve and maintain trust in the region,⁵⁵² as Tokyo increasingly emerged from the U.S. shadow, regional trust loomed as a larger consideration than before.⁵⁵³

It is in consideration of Japan's need for and efforts to create and maintain perceptions of Japan as a peaceful nation that three particulars bearing on regional trust will be examined. Individually and collectively they are instructive of Japan's security position and regional roles, illustrating that regional strategic dialogues are as much premised on perceptions as upon calculations of force figures.

- *Suzuki and Sea Lanes* - Befitting an insular nation, particularly one poor in natural resources and dependent upon foreign sources for a sufficient food supply, maritime affairs hold a high level of priority in Japan's affairs. To Japan,

⁵⁵¹ Tokyo's generally liberal use of foreign aid and Japanese money capitalizing economic efforts and underwriting ventures assisted in creating this improved condition.

⁵⁵² These three major "concessions" were to forego major rearmament (particularly of an offensive nature), forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and forego a stance, either independent or as a clone, of the U.S. As maintained earlier in this investigation, these are hardly concessions given Japan's conditions and options, but it remains that after 1960, any of these were within Japan's reach. However, it is plain that should any of them have been realized, the reactions of Japan's neighbors would have reflected markedly less trust and, as pointed out in the Report on Comprehensive National Security, reduced thereby Japan's security.

⁵⁵³ Indeed, Tokyo's behavior is not remarkable in this respect. As Tokyo established a more self-determined course the effects on regional states became critical, for if the U.S.-Japan relationship were to eventually collapse, Japan would have to seek some sort of accommodation with its neighbors. For a general discussion see Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, pp. 26-8, 33, 42-51.

overseas commerce is more than a means to prosperity; it is Japan's lifeline.⁵⁵⁴ Indeed, Japan's modern history is hardly comprehensible apart from maritime affairs.⁵⁵⁵

Significantly, fears of Japan, particularly fears associated with Japan's imperial period, also relate directly to Japan's naval posture.⁵⁵⁶ These apprehensions are not confined to Japan's neighbors, but also are present in the Japanese polity.⁵⁵⁷ Thus, any reference to the expansion of Japanese naval capacity draws attention; the expansion of roles draws protest. Yet, Japan's maritime concerns are real. Crucial to its security, Japan must coordinate its maritime affairs with its defense partner.⁵⁵⁸

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, this was more important than it had ever

⁵⁵⁴For example, the sense of urgency with respect to maritime affairs is suggested in the Report on Comprehensive National Security where the chapter on relations with the USSR and China total three and one-half pages, while energy security and food security are individual chapters each almost twice that length.

⁵⁵⁵It is not surprising that postwar Japan has been an active participant in all manner of maritime discussions whether they relate to Law of the Sea conferences, sea bed mining, fishing, nuclear tests at sea, the neutrality of international straits, or the delineation of territorial waters or exclusive economic zones. On the military side, Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force has exercised with the U.S. Navy since 1955, and has grown into the largest non-communist naval force in the Far East. Although absent the force projection capability (e.g., aircraft carriers) of a balanced naval force, its concentration on mine sweeping and anti-submarine operations suggests a determination to preserve its sea borne commerce.

⁵⁵⁶Without a credible naval force, Japan cannot project a significant military force against (set aside invade) any nation.

⁵⁵⁷The chief concern being entanglement in foreign military affairs (long a central theme of the government opposition) the government policy of "no overseas dispatch of Self-Defense Forces" is paralleled by its extreme reluctance to dispatch naval assets in any role which could be seen to similarly entangle Japan. On the several occasions when an out-of-Japanese-waters deployment was suggested (e.g., when Yasuhiro Nakasone was both Director of the JDA and later when he was prime Minister) the political squalls that blew up in the Diet were quite sufficient to squelch the notion.

⁵⁵⁸There is reason to believe that the SLOC issue had always been of high importance to the Japanese. See James Auer, *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-1971* (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 132-45, where he suggests that the 1,000 mile SLOC responsibility was planned from the early days of the development of the MSDF.

been.⁵⁵⁹ The expansion of the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet (POF) outstripped U.S. Naval regional expansion efforts. Although the Soviet naval expansion was not seen as having usurped U.S. naval predominance, it was seen as having spread U.S. naval functions to the extent that sea lane protection might be insufficiently addressed.⁵⁶⁰ It was in cognizance of those trends that the USN and JMSDF had entered studies, ostensibly to address protection of sea lanes.⁵⁶¹

An unsurprising conclusion of the studies was that greater reliance would have to be placed on Japanese assets. The most visible and apparent form of coordination

⁵⁵⁹There had been a significant change in Northeast Asian naval alignments. The Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet had grown to be the largest of the USSR and the largest fleet in the Pacific. Second, with the decline of its shipbuilding industry, the U.S. Merchant Marine, the backbone of the U.S. ability to provide overseas support for itself and its allies, was in steep decline. Nor was the "mothball fleet" a sufficient answer. Its composition and condition indicated marginal utility for those missions associated with Japan. Third, the growth in efficiency of the Soviet Pacific submarine force, suggested that the USCINCPAC mission of first priority would be the destruction of Soviet SSBNs followed by the protection of carrier battle groups (strategic force projection capability). Convoy protection, a lower priority, would wait for assets while it waited. Fourth, the U.S. had global commitments, and in the event of the sort of war which would involve Japan, it was likely that support to Europe also would be required. The priority enjoyed by Europe in the U.S. strategic calculus suggests that at least some of a rather smaller number of available assets would be dedicated to that theater. In sum, to answer the shifts in naval trends, the logical answer was the increased use of Japanese assets for the defense of Japan.

⁵⁶⁰This was particularly the case with respect to the shipment of oil from the Persian Gulf to Japan. If U.S. craft were to "swing" into the Indian Ocean while simultaneously trying to cover the Pacific region, significant difficulties could result from the lack of density in anti-submarine assets.

⁵⁶¹These "studies" fulfilled a number of functions, not the least of which was to give U.S. officials the sense that greater coordination and military development was ongoing in Japanese defense. This proved frustrating to U.S. military planners since the studies were laden with unrealistic limitations (that damaged their military utility) and continued interminably. Similarly, the studies fulfilled the function of providing leverage to Japan's military officials for acquisition of equipment which they wanted, but for which the JMSDF was reluctant to take responsibility by requesting. By using the "study" it was easy to cast the onus onto external actors (i.e., the U.S.) as demanding such equipment acquisitions. Further, the lack of action on study recommendations (which usually had been diluted to the point of being non-objectionable) indicated a reluctance to accept even their own conclusions. In turn begging the question of why the "study" was initiated at all. To U.S. military officials, the unreality attached to the studies suggested these studies were a vehicle for other agendas. Personal interviews of the author with then-Commander Daniel Muccia, USN, a participant in the bilateral "Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Studies," in Hawaii, April, 1983.

was the expansion of Japanese participation in at-sea exercises.⁵⁶² In this fashion both the studies and the exercises functioned as portions of the strategic dialogue.

By 1981, Japan's awareness of and concern for the external environment had sharpened significantly; simultaneously, governmental concerns about internal turbulence (such as that which attended the 1960 TMCS) paled.⁵⁶³ In part, economic aspects drove this condition. Japan's economic growth, while slackening from earlier double digit rates, remained robust. This increased Japan's concerns that resource access (almost entirely external) remain unhindered, while, simultaneously, the protracted period of economic strength permitted the satisfaction of all sectors of the economy.

This favorable situation had its effect on military security issues including increasing the absolute amount of defense spending. Further, the significant rise in applied military technology allowed Japan to use the 1976 NDPO focus on quality to enhance both its military capabilities and (because it was buying the equipment from the U.S. and augmenting U.S. forces) ease relations with Washington.⁵⁶⁴ Yet, because of the rise in applied technology, it meant that Japan need not purchase as many

⁵⁶²Japan was to openly acknowledge the emphasis placed on Japanese assets and their integration into roles pertaining to the security of sea lanes of communication. See *Defense of Japan, 1986*, pp. 271, 284-5, 306-7.

⁵⁶³Challenges to LDP rule were insignificant, nascent neutralism seemed quiescent, the long period of Japanese economic growth reduced the potential of internal instability while simultaneously permitting funding of military improvements and social programs.

⁵⁶⁴These were important. Japan's capabilities were quite insufficient to meet the demands of increased roles in SLOC protection. A study by Senator Carl Levin of Michigan premised on the criterion of SLOC protection for 1,000 miles concluded there was a large gap between the mission and the available forces. See US Senator Carl Levin, "U.S. Relationships with NATO and Japan - Sharing the Burdens of Common Defense," *The Congressional Record*, June 27, 1983, p. S9217.

systems to attain sufficient offsetting or deterring capability. In turn, this gave the impression of slow growth and restraint, both important to domestic constituencies and regional neighbors.

The stage had been set for the public avowal of an extant tacit arrangement through which Japanese participation could be expanded. This participatory expansion answered two Japanese strategic objectives, the acquisition of greater flexibility (through having more unilateral capability) and strengthened bonding to its security guarantor (through ameliorating some fictions inherent in the relationship).⁵⁶⁵ Such was the background to Prime Minister Suzuki's remarks about sea lane defense.

In his speech to the National Press Club in Washington on May 9, 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki said that it was only natural that Japan should consider stepping up efforts to secure its sea lanes to a distance of 1,000 miles as defensive actions under its constitution.⁵⁶⁶ Considering the attention such a statement would bring, Japanese

⁵⁶⁵ Answering these two objectives resulted in an agreement between the U.S. and Japan framed along three particulars; an increased military relationship, a more reciprocal quid pro quo, and a formal separation of military and economic affairs (so-called *Sei Iki*). All three were highly beneficial to Japan's strategy. The U.S. agreement was, in part, obtained out of frustration since Secretary of Defense Weinberger, learning from his predecessor, shifted tack (from calling for a specific percentage of GNP for defense) and called for a division of roles and missions as a means of getting Japan to do more in terms of sharing the defense burden. GOJ perceptions evidently were that an increased military relationship aided Japanese security by enhancing bonding and (through equipment acquisition) flexibility. A more reciprocal quid pro quo allowed the mollification of an ally (assisting in insuring retention of U.S. forces in the region), and the separation of military affairs served to defuse or deflect hostile U.S. Congressional actions about the trade deficit.

⁵⁶⁶ The announcement is a rather minor aspect of the Suzuki-Reagan agreement found in the Joint Communiqué. The significance of this document is that it is the only formal military adjustment since the 1960 TMCS; it announces the relationship as an "alliance" based upon a division of roles. Although a furor arose in Japan, resulting in the resignation of Foreign Minister Ito and there was some curious shuffling of verbiage, the agreement remains in effect (a parallel to the GOJ reactions to the 1960 TMCS protests). Significantly, the scale, sense of urgency and comprehensiveness of joint military affairs with the U.S. were to quickly increase, a marked turn-around.

consideration of this contingency apparently had been ongoing for some time.⁵⁶⁷

It is not apparent whether Suzuki expected his remarks to generate the resulting large amount of negative public reaction in both the press and Diet. Negative reactions also came from abroad. Both President Suharto of Indonesia and President Marcos of the Philippines registered alarm.⁵⁶⁸ Marcos, noting that 1,000 nautical miles from Japanese territory placed a portion of the Philippines and its territorial waters within the defined zone, strenuously objected. His objections, and Tokyo's desire to avoid negative implications, prompted an immediate redefinition of the origin point for measuring the 1,000 miles.⁵⁶⁹

Suzuki's lame attempt at a denial of his statement (variously attributed to misquotation, or not what he meant to say) satisfied no one. In particular, the U.S.,

⁵⁶⁷In fact, the expansion of Japanese participation in at-sea exercise had been ongoing for almost three years. More important, the publication and circulation of the 1980 Report on Comprehensive National Security (which drew little comment) may have given Suzuki some confidence that scant difficulties would attend his announcement.

⁵⁶⁸Over a year after Suzuki's public announcement, and the quick adjustment of measurements, this apprehension remained. See interview of Ali Alatas, Indonesian Ambassador to the UN, December 2, 1982, in Robert W. Barnett, *Beyond War: Japan's Concept of Comprehensive National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1984), pp. 59-61.

⁵⁶⁹In an obvious effort to deflect the apprehensions of Southeast Asian nations, the subsequent measurements were taken along two different sea lanes. The first was from Osaka to north of the Philippines and the second from Tokyo to Guam.

which had been delighted at the statement,⁵⁷⁰ felt betrayed.⁵⁷¹ Eventually this ostensibly minor event was ironed out through joint diplomatic efforts, and personified in the December meeting between Suzuki and Reagan.

This event demonstrated to Tokyo and Washington that regional tolerance for expanding Japan's military roles or geographical scope of military efforts remained low. The implications were quite plain; regional powers were not yet ready for a major Japanese military role. The event was an exercise of strategic dialogue reinforcing Japanese proclivities not to assume the expanded role in protecting sea lanes. Washington could not look forward to schemes that replaced, or even heavily augmented, the U.S. military regional presence with Japanese forces. In effect, this undercut some conclusions that might be drawn from the Report on Comprehensive National Security, and it strengthened the Japanese position with respect to resisting U.S. pressure for increased defense spending. However, it also hampered Japan's acquisition of greater military flexibility and did little to facilitate ways that might

⁵⁷⁰The U.S. Navy had been trying for years to get the Japanese to shoulder more of the Pacific maritime defense burden. The protection of SLOCs, the lifelines to Japan, seemed only too clearly within Japan's interests and legislation, in other words, Japan's responsibility. In addition, any efforts that Japan might make served to increase the availability of U.S. assets for other tasks in a vast maritime theater, an important consideration given the growth of the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet, and U.S. notions of a "swing strategy" that could shift U.S. assets away from the Pacific.

⁵⁷¹On May 13, 1981 Prime Minister Suzuki assured the Diet that the term "alliance" had no military meaning, rather that it referred to friendly relations between two democratic nations with Japan's security role being confined to political and economic activities. *New York Times*, May 17, 1981, p. 1. Not only was the reaction of U.S. officials negative, but Suzuki came under fire from his own administration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized the notion that the alliance had no military meaning, while senior LDP members pointed out that the basis of U.S.-Japan relations was the 1960 TMCS. *Japan Times*, May 14, 1981, p. 1.

mollify America.⁵⁷²

Suzuki tested the waters of regional strategic dialogue with expectations of one of two probable results; there either would or would not be major opposition to the expansion of Japan's roles. If no major objections resulted, Japan could strengthen (at its own pace) its security through improving the protection capabilities of its SLOCs (and simultaneously enhance its relations with the U.S.). Alternatively, in the face of major opposition, Tokyo could turn to Washington, decline increased responsibility for roles (and expenses), citing that to do so would injure its general security.⁵⁷³ In all, it was an inexpensive, successful effort at gauging the strategic dimension of regional trust.

- *Textbooks* - The so-called Textbook Controversy is a companion development to the Suzuki statement regarding Japan's defense of SLOCs. Even more so than statements regarding appropriate roles for its own defense, the decision to write textbooks in whatever manner it wants, seems both an internal and sovereign matter.

However, since regional states directly link the historical treatment of Japan's imperial period to Japan's current intentions, the historical presentations in school texts

⁵⁷²The mood of Congress hardly was improved by plaintive assertions of effort in the face of mounting trade deficits and disproportionate trade barriers.

⁵⁷³Publicly, Tokyo took the latter course, but actually pursued the former in a low-profile manner. Notably, the course of Japan's equipment acquisition program included increased acquisition of assets highly useful for SLOC protection activities, paralleling the studies and exercises conducted with the USN, connoting that a tacit agreement was in place which, to avoid adverse publicity, it was advisable to keep in low profile. See *Defense of Japan, 1986*, pp. 271, 284-5, 306-7. For example, on May 31, 1981, the Japan-U.S. Working Level Meeting met as scheduled in Honolulu, HI where improvements in joint planning and operations and equipment procurement for SLOC defense were discussed. In the Fall of 1981, the first combined communications training was conducted, followed by the first combined command post exercise in 1982.

serve as rough barometers. Thus, when Japan altered its textbooks to reflect a sympathetic treatment of Japanese military activities in China, the Chinese were indignant. In particular, the Chinese objected to Japanese aggression being termed as "an advance" and the whitewashing of wholesale brutalities such as the rape of Nanking.

Nor was the issue confined to China. Japanese texts gave such a benevolent cast to Japan's treatment of Korea from 1905 to 1945, that it might be inferred the Koreans welcomed Japanese annexation and occupation. Predictably, this proved an incandescent issue to Koreans, particularly since it occurred at a time when Korean nationalism (along with economic progress) was on the rise.⁵⁷⁴ To these voices were added those of the Philippines and others who had suffered from Japanese aggression.

Perhaps the issue would have been less dramatic had not two other features applied. The first was that Japan's Ministry of Education decides what goes into the Japanese school text books used throughout Japan's schools.⁵⁷⁵ Therefore, external observers interpreted (not unreasonably) that whatever Japan's school texts contained were the official views of the Japanese Government. Thus, portrayals of Imperial Japan as benevolent or misunderstood were seen as more sinister than apologist. Second,

⁵⁷⁴It did not help matters that an assassination attempt on then-President Park was conducted by a Korean resident in Japan. The author was privy to discussions by Koreans who suggested that the assassin might well have been an agent provocateur inspired by Japanese sources and sent to keep Koreans fighting among themselves so Japan would not have to face a united Korea. For their part, Japanese, to whom the author has spoken, considered it "Just another intra-family affair," citing the kidnaping of Kim Dae Jung and the North Korean raid on South Korea's "Blue House" as other examples. There was no sense on the part of the Japanese of any connection between the assassination attempt and anything to do with Japan. Personal experiences of the author in Korea May, 1986, and in Japan, August, 1987.

⁵⁷⁵The regimentation of the Japanese school system goes far beyond the use of the same text.

when challenged, the remarks of the Minister of Education heightened frictions, seeming to confirm both the historical portrayal in school texts as the official interpretation and that an arrogance of which many Asians accuse Japan had been resurrected in official matters.⁵⁷⁶ The connotations of this affair were unfortunate.

In the end, the Japanese Prime Minister was forced to step in, discipline his minister, make appropriate apologies, and generally move to smooth relations. But the ill will faded slowly. For their part, many Japanese felt the minister justified and were themselves irritated at what they saw as unnecessary servility by Japan.⁵⁷⁷

Most accounts of the public and governmental reactions to this volatile issue are charged with emotion, recrimination, and racism. Yet, there are strategic considerations. Like the Suzuki statement, the issue serves to illustrate that regional trust of Japanese motives is shallow.⁵⁷⁸ Further, if foreign relations ultimately must be grounded on perceptions, then the indications for Japan at the time of this controversy were not favorable. For the U.S., which distanced itself from the issue, the affair stunted progress aimed at bilateral objectives, specifically an expansion of Japan's roles

⁵⁷⁶It was at about this time that ASEAN members (and others) were objecting to "tied" Japanese aid and images of "the ugly Japanese" were replacing those of "the ugly American."

⁵⁷⁷There was a rise in Japanese nationalism at this time that, combined with the historical antipathy of Japanese for Koreans, could have made this whole issue much more difficult. But aside from this factor, there has been a continual, if uneven, series of books and articles that either absolve Japan of primary responsibility for its aggressive behavior (usually casting it upon the U.S. as the party that "forced" Japan to act), or ignore unfortunate instances.

⁵⁷⁸Much has been made in print of Asian antipathy for Westerners; indeed, the terms used for foreigners in China and Japan often reflect a racist bias. To this aversion (usually cast as evident on both sides) all manner of circumstances are alleged to owe their genesis. However, less often found are accounts of Asian antipathy (racist and otherwise) towards Japanese, itself a deep and abiding feature of the Far East.

or capabilities. Since the strongest reactions were from China and Korea, the two most critical states after Japan to Washington's Far East policies, the U.S. shelved initiatives aimed at aligning Japan with either Korea or China in security matters.⁵⁷⁹

The strategic implications follow those associated with the Suzuki statement regarding Japan's defense of 1,000 miles of sea lanes. Regional mistrust of Japanese motives inferred a low tolerance for any expansion of Japanese military roles. Plainly, no Japanese military component beyond strict self-defense was yet welcome, precluding notions of the replacement or augmentation of the regional U.S. military presence with Japanese forces.⁵⁸⁰ In a sense, this issue damaged Japanese security by undercutting much prior effort at improving Japan's image. Yet, it strengthened Tokyo's position for resisting Washington's pressures for increased Japanese military participation or contributions. With the shelving of Washington's notions for a regional security

⁵⁷⁹As with the sea lanes controversy, this incident also could have been artfully pre-rigged with the same general objectives in mind. Additionally, since the source of the negative reactions were precisely those parties to which the U.S. had referred on several occasions as suitable alliance partners – despite Japan's frank (private and public) dismissal of such a notions (see *supra*, p. 298) – the arrangement of a domestically supportable but convenient intransigence by the other possible alliance members served to squelch Washington's notions. Moreover, since both South Korea and China were experiencing increased nationalist feelings, the deliberate surfacing of these feelings may have been strategically very timely. In the end, the results kept Japan from being tied to continental military affairs and were arrived at without forcing Tokyo to confront Washington.

⁵⁸⁰To what extent this awareness influenced U.S. officials is unclear. However, with the change in U.S. administrations from Carter to Reagan there was an immediate public shift with respect to the U.S. position on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. Undersecretary of State Stoessel was to affirm:

We have moved quickly to affirm our security commitment to the Republic of Korea and lay to rest any notion that this Administration will contemplate withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea in the foreseeable future.

Walter Stoessel, Jr., "Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia," *DOS, Current Policy*, No. 274, April 24, 1981. In effect, this U.S. decision supports the 1969 Nixon-Sato Joint Communique that recognized the security of the Republic of Korea as essential to Japanese security. It implies that Tokyo was either unwilling or unable (perhaps elements of both) to take a more prominent role in regional defense; even with respect to its only continental buffer. Thus, not only was the Carter notion bankrupted with respect to Korean security, but the Reagan Administration was forced to retrench for Japan's security.

alliance, the danger to Japan of entanglement in Chinese or Korean military affairs also was made more remote. Again, the waters of regional strategic dialogue had been tested (although at more cost and, perhaps, inadvertently), and seemed to confirm Japan's need to remain aligned with the United States.

- *Defense Spending* - For nearly four decades, Japan's defense spending has been the subject of much investigation, exposition, explanation, speculation and acrimony. This controversial subject is not confined to U.S. allegations of Japan's "free ride;" it also generates a considerable debate in Japan, the region and has occasionally drawn commentary from NATO members.⁵⁸¹ Although it has, on occasion, seemed to be the tool of all use to all parties,⁵⁸² it has consistently functioned as a part of the Japanese strategic dialogue. Plainly, it also has been a portion of the strategic process. And last, from whatever might be imputed from its genesis, use and composition, it has contributed to forming sundry strategic hypotheses.

⁵⁸¹It is neither within the scope nor the purpose of this investigation to delve into the quite considerable topic of Japan's defense spending, worthy though that subject may be. However, some referential points are in order. Japan's defense budget is not calculated by Tokyo with the same formula as that used by NATO. Were the NATO formulation used, Japan's defense budget would approach 1.6% of GNP. Second, it is not how much is spent in defense, but what that spending purchases relative to defense needs that is important. Third, the 1976 NDPO placed emphasis on quality rather than quantity, while at the same time Japan developed much of its own defense production capability. These policies have the tendency to increase the cost for each end-item. In addition, the government's policy banning the export of weapons prevents Japan from passing on research and development costs to other-than-Japanese consumers. Fourth, Japanese domestic political considerations, as with other countries, are key (albeit often distorting) determinants in the budget process. Delineating and discriminating the influence of those factors is an uncertain process. Fifth, the structure and composition of the Japanese forces is unlike that of most other countries, a product not only of geodemographic aspects, but also of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Thus, analogous comparisons, particularly with nations having a robust economic stature, may be inappropriate.

⁵⁸²This includes political parties in Japan and the U.S., regional states, even business executives, all of which have used some aspect of Japan's defense budget to buttress their separate agenda (castigating or commending as it served their purpose).

From 1976 to 1983, Japan's defense budget was the subject of intense scrutiny, serving as an indicator of Japan's motives, policies, and, ultimately, security strategy. On November 5, 1976, seven days after the publication of the 1976 NDPO (as if to underscore the relationship between defense spending and policy), the Miki cabinet decided to adopt a ceiling of 1 per cent of gross national product (GNP) for Japan's defense spending.⁵⁸³ Despite pressures internal⁵⁸⁴ and external, Japan has continuously observed that self-imposed limitation.⁵⁸⁵ As an additional indicator of consistency, from 1976 to 1983, the ratio of defense spending to the general budget account varied from a high of 6.2% (1976) to a low of 5.1% (1981).⁵⁸⁶

⁵⁸³ There were a number of cogent reasons for doing this. First, should the percentage of budget devoted to defense remain the same, the absolute amount would be enormous in a very short period of time; Japan's growth in GNP was among the highest in the world for nearly a decade. Second, the costs of defense were growing, but the actual percentage of GNP devoted to defense had been dropping. To prevent the total amount of budget requested through the Diet from seeming too large and inviting rejection (particularly in five year increments), portraying the budget in yearly segments (a provision of the 1976 NDPO that called for an annual internal review of the defense budget projected for a three year interval) would make the total amount a more palatable figure. In fact, after it was adopted, the 1 per cent level actually slightly increased both the percentage of the general account devoted to defense and the absolute amount. Third, by using a shorter time increment, flexibility was enhanced, an important criteria in an arena then undergoing changes. Fourth, by portraying the budget as a comparatively small percentage of GNP, it set the image of the government as mindful of keeping the defense portion as subordinate to and in-step with Japan's overall condition. Fifth, by keeping Japan's portion advertised as small (in percentage terms) focus on the absolute amount tends to be deflected, thereby aiding a regional perception of Japan as pacific. In sum, these particulars are evidence of Tokyo's appreciation for Japan's multiple strategic dialogues.

⁵⁸⁴ As an example of the sorts of internal pressures that could occur, the resistance by the opposition, using the tactics of parliamentary disruption, to the Fourth Defense Program (proposed under the aegis of then JDA director Nakasone) virtually paralyzed the Diet for twenty days in 1972. In response, the LDP abstained from performing legislative business, but eventually was forced by opposition tactics to revise its budget. It was this sort of ever-present obstructionist tactics that constantly hampered the Japanese government and may have served as a major stimulus for altering the process through the 1976 NDPO and adopting the 1 per cent of GNP policy.

⁵⁸⁵ In fact, it slightly exceeded the 1% mark in 1987, rising to 1.004%. *Defense of Japan, 1987*, Diagram 3-15, p. 154.

⁵⁸⁶ *Defense of Japan, 1987*, Reference 37, p. 306.

Yet, this limit on defense spending does not illustrate the whole story; during the same period the Japanese GNP was growing. Significantly, because of the large size of its GNP, Japan's total amount of defense expenditure (in absolute terms, 1955-1985) was never lower than eighth in the world.⁵⁸⁷ These facts coupled to the awareness of Japan's demonstrated capabilities generated considerable anxiety among regional states. Japan's potential was such that even minor alterations of defense policy, the sort that would be unremarkable in other nations, drew intense scrutiny.⁵⁸⁸

⁵⁸⁷ Indeed so. The absolute growth in Japan's defense expenditures is impressive, averaging 15.66% per year for the period 1970 through 1983. Between 1970 and 1983, defense expenditures quadrupled, rising to Yen 2.75 billion. It is this absolute amount that gains attention, especially when compared to Japan's neighbors. See J. T. Bergner, *The New Superpowers - Germany, Japan and the US and the New World Order*, (New York: St. Martins, Press, 1991), p. 174. Unfortunately, discussions that purport to compare nations only (or primarily) through the device of respective defense expenditures can miss several crucial points. First, defense costs are not consistent from nation to nation. Second, the particular demographics of a nation predispose force structure which tend to drive costs. Third, fluctuations in currency values tend to skew figures. Fourth, the relative importance accorded to defense expenditures often is prisoner to the viewpoint of the appraiser. Thus, in the view of smaller regional powers, Japan's spending is far too much, while from Washington's perspective, for decades it has been far too small.

⁵⁸⁸ Intelligence communities worldwide devote much effort to calculating budget allocations with the view of framing the extent of effort, capabilities and priorities both general and specific. However, large sums of money connote a considerable degree of flexibility making the calculations of sundry variables difficult. This lack of percision, coupled to mistrust, easily leads to ominous speculations. Moreover, in cases like Japan where the current percentage amounts devoted to defense are low but the actual amount is high, the GNP is high and growing, and the potential is apparent that significantly more could be devoted to defense without occasioning public hardship, strategic shifts could occur with alarming speed.

For example, it has been calculated that the cost of a nuclear force consisting of the warheads, approximately 20 SSBNs, and 100 strike aircraft would be about \$20 billion for ten years, or \$2 billion annually. This would have been about 0.7 percent of Japan's GNP for 1972. See Kunio Muraoka, "Japanese Security and the United States," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 95, (February, 1973), p. 26. Although inflation would have moved this figure up somewhat by the early 1980s, the rise in Japan's GNP would have absorbed the difference. Were Japan to add the 0.7 per cent to its 1 per cent level, the total on a percentage basis would still be half that of Britain, less than half of that of France, and about a quarter of that of the U.S. In short, in something under a decade and with relatively little adjustment, Japan could develop a potent nuclear capability. Other authors suggest that to attain credible deterrence at the superpower level would require percentage expenditures on par with those of the superpowers (equaling a commitment of about 10-15 per cent of GNP annually), a proposition that could be disruptive to Japan's political and social life. Jay B. Sorenson, *Japanese Policy and Nuclear Arms* (South Orange, NJ: American-Asian Educational Exchange, Inc., 1975), pp. 46-7. Be that as it may, the difference to regional states may be moot and the effect on the regional balance profound.

For this reason the relationship between Tokyo's defense spending policies and the other factors of regional trust applicable to Japan are important. The Japanese defense paradox was by spending more on defense and by that increasing its military capabilities, Japan's neighbors grew more apprehensive and Japan's security declined. Alternatively, Japan's conundrum was that its military security depended almost exclusively upon maintaining its security relationship with the U.S., which looked to Japan to carry more of the defense burdens. In both cases, the yardstick used was the Japanese defense budget. Increases in Japanese defense spending would depend greatly on the trust and toleration levels of Japan's neighbors and its own polity, improbable prospects on all accounts. Not to increase its defense spending would depend greatly upon the understanding and toleration level of the U.S. Government, both notably diminishing because of trade deficit frictions and the growing Soviet threat.⁵⁸⁹

Having little freedom of movement within its strategic construct, Japan made marginal adjustments, exercised as much suasion in the diplomatic field as possible, and sought to replace performance with posture. The specific measures Japan carried

⁵⁸⁹This may have been one of the concerns behind the GOJ decisions (1967 and 1976), to ban weapons exports. Certainly Japan has both the capability to produce sophisticated weapons and the economic proclivity to sell them. Obviously, there is a great deal of profit to be made. Yet, Japan's policy runs against these factors, suggesting matters more important than profits are the issue. It seems clear that if Japan goes into the business of manufacturing arms for export, it presents an image of Japan as militarily capable and less than pacific in philosophy. This damages both Japan's standing with regional powers and begs the question with the U.S. as to why Japan is not doing more. At the same time, Japan becomes a competitor in the international arms market, the largest portion of which is served by the United States. Therefore, for Japan to operate successfully in this market, the likely losers would be U.S. companies which, paralleling the objections already forthcoming from other sectors of the U.S. economy, would seek Congressional action. It would be hard for any administration to act as an apologist for Japan under those circumstances. In any event, Japan compromised with its own manufacturers taking up production of its own equipment (either indigenous designs or U.S. designs produced under license) thereby incurring an extremely high per item cost, yet retaining a "warm" production capability should rapid expansion be required in an emergency.

out included increasing its portion of in-country expense sustaining U.S. forces in Japan, a round of foreign visits and attendances at high level conferences (e.g., economic summits), and the more visible actions and words of the new Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.

To augment perceptions of Japan's trustworthiness and enhance its diplomatic initiatives, Tokyo significantly increased its contributions in foreign aid.⁵⁹⁰

Significantly, some aid targets were Western-oriented but debt-ridden countries buffering Soviet influence (e.g., Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and the Philippines). Yet, posture had its limits. Despite the machinations of Nakasone, during the period, no Japanese personnel contribution was forthcoming for UN peace keeping activities, Japan adopted no expanded SDF roles or missions, and despite considerable internal maneuvering, the portion of the general account devoted to defense decreased.

In all, the patterns long-established for defense spending, and the relationship of those patterns to Japan's regional situation did not change. Linked to regional (mis)trust on one side, and to its relationship with the U.S. on the other, there was no strategic variation. The strategic pacing factor was the momentum of strategic themes long in place. In short, like the basic parameters of its strategic milieu, Japan's national

⁵⁹⁰Japanese foreign aid (termed Overseas Development Assistance, or ODA) was particularly attractive to Japan as it was a politically benign way to add to regional and global stability in a non-military fashion. Further, ODA had been criticized for being "tied" or "limited tied" in form. ("Tied" aid being provided with the stipulation that it be used to buy Japanese goods or services, and "limited tied" aid being that money provided under the proviso that a Japanese firm perform the feasibility study for the economic project to which the money will be applied.) The Japanese provision of untied aid was attractive to the U.S. since that money served to enhance regional and global stability (a benefit to its own strategy), but not at its direct expense. For an expanded discussion and analysis of Japan's foreign aid processes see Alan Rix, *Japan's Economic Aid: Policy-making and Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), and Robert M. Orr, "The Aid Factor in U.S.-Japan Relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 7, (July, 1988), pp. 740-56.

security strategy was unchanged.

.. *Summation* - The period from 1976 to 1983 was a challenging one for Japan, perhaps more so because of two important differences. First, Japan was considered a major international participant by both itself and other nations. Yet, although no longer in the U.S. economic shadow, nor, generally, the diplomatic one, Tokyo's negotiations with Beijing, Moscow and ASEAN suggest Tokyo wanted and needed to retain its alignment with America. But, alignment and coincidence were different; there was little indication of a sense of being bound to decisions made in Washington.

The second major difference was Tokyo's realization that the relative U.S. and Soviet trends meant that more of the burden for Japan's general security would fall on Japan. The U.S. guarantee was still in place and apparently working. Yet, it also was apparent that Japan (and other countries) probably would have to contribute more to stabilize a global milieu affecting them all. The difference between the 1975 Study of Defense Issues and the 1980 Report on Comprehensive National Security in tone, construction, and rationale suggest Tokyo's level of publicly expressed awareness also changed during that period.

Yet, if Japan's perceptions changed, the effects were marginal. The region at the conclusion of the period was singularly unchanged. The Sino-Soviet conflict, despite considerable maneuvering, left both with little marked advantage over the other. The situation on the Korean peninsula remained as firmly fixed as ever, particularly with the U.S. reversal of its policy of troop withdrawals. The U.S. recovered some

stature, lost some naivete, and saw itself go from a creditor to a debtor nation, (thereby increasing its dependence both on the region and Japan). The alignment of Japan was, if more independent, still firmly joined to the U.S. in military and political arenas, and committed to the West's economic system.

It is, perhaps, this lack of change that perhaps is most telling; even with the general degradation of the security milieu about Japan, Tokyo did not change its policies. Instead, Japan made adjustments suggesting there was no change in its priorities or the key strategic factors affecting its strategy, and thus, none in its sense of restraint.⁵⁹¹ Far from suddenly changing direction, Japan's activities seem careful in maintaining a shrewd balance of perceptions.⁵⁹² It is a mark of strategic maturity that Japan did not overly react, instead choosing restraint as its chief lever.

. Williamsburg and Confirmation

In 1983, the Prime Minister of Japan, Yasuhiro Nakasone, was photographed at Williamsburg, Virginia standing with the other leaders of the West. It is a significant photograph, for it shows a very Asian gentleman, a former member of the Imperial Japanese Navy, in western style clothing, clearly included in an exclusive club. More broadly, the picture is a representation of Japan as a member of the "Coalition of the

⁵⁹¹For example, the pattern of the U.S. applying persistent pressure for further burden sharing and military improvements by Japan was answered by a incrementally positive, but nevertheless reluctant, response. Similarly, Japanese offers to increase Japan's share in non-military fora are considered and accepted by the U.S., albeit in exchange for lessened pressure in the military arena.

⁵⁹²Seen in this light, it may be that Suzuki's statement of Japan's intent to secure 1,000 miles of sea lanes may not have been a misstatement.

West," that group of modernized, industrialized democracies symbolizing the leadership of the world in economic, political and military fora. Significantly, Prime Minister Nakasone's stance at that meeting, emphasizing economic and security aspects, seemed an affirmation of faith to a group of peers.

It was the end of an era, begun in 1945 on the deck of the USS Missouri, with General Douglas MacArthur remarking, "A new era is upon us." Now, at Williamsburg in a setting less dramatic and far more socially amenable, the leaders of many of the same powers represented that day on the battleship's deck posed with a sense of harmony and purpose.⁵⁹³ If it was the end of another era, there also seemed the promise of a new one beginning.

The 1983 Williamsburg Summit Meeting is a significant milestone in Japan's strategic evolution, because it marks the recognition by the leadership of the West that many strategic trends had stabilized in their course or reached fruition. The public statements and postures evident at Williamsburg are de facto seals of public recognition and acceptance.⁵⁹⁴ Of all those, it is the acceptance of Japan in this elite group that is the most significant; it was an acceptance Prime Minister Nakasone dramatized.

⁵⁹³Three years later in 1986, a summit meeting was held at Tokyo, and the picture, complete with a well-tended Japanese garden in the background, seemed to echo the composition and progress of the meeting itself. In the 1986 picture, Nakasone has moved toward the center of the group and stands next to the center figure, President Reagan, who is flanked on the other side by Helmut Kohl, West German Chancellor.

⁵⁹⁴Notably, the 1983 Williamsburg Summit was not the first Williamsburg meeting for security officials. Over ten years earlier, Nelson Rockefeller, acting with a sense of strategic awareness in the wake of the U.S. opening to China, determined upon an initiative for an open forum discussion and exchange of security concerns. Attended by security officials, academicians, and policy makers from several countries, and successful from the outset, these meetings on Asian security became an annual Williamsburg event. In itself, the 1983 Summit is a culmination of meetings apart from those more visible ones conducted by heads of government.

The popular image of Prime Minister Nakasone at the 1983 Williamsburg Summit usually surrounds his departure in style from earlier Japanese officials in such gatherings. Forthright in expression, his style was more characteristic of a European statesman. Yet there is a certain irony to the picture, the statements and the tone of Japan's Prime Minister.

The inclusion of Japan, personified by Nakasone, among the leaders of the West seemed the conclusion of a process⁵⁹⁵ by which Japan applies for, is considered, tendered and accepts membership. Yet, among this group, Japan had always been represented,⁵⁹⁶ only its prominence (and the roles applicable thereto) had been at issue.⁵⁹⁷ Far from being excluded during the postwar period, Japan and its roles have been at the center of Far Eastern considerations, first through the medium of U.S.

⁵⁹⁵This process had been ongoing for some time. Prime Minister Yoshida made an extensive trip to Western (European) countries in 1954. The first of its kind for Japan after the war, Yoshida evidently saw his journey as an affirmation that in global affairs Japan fundamentally was a "Western" nation. While his trip generated little domestic support, and was, in part, designed to soften the U.S. approach to Asian affairs (particularly with respect to U.S. China policy), it was apparent that a stronger Japan would result with Japan's reintegration into the mainstream of international relations rather than relying upon a single power.

⁵⁹⁶Robert Scalapino, from a somewhat different perspective, observed the same thing. He notes: The very facts of Japanese development have set this nation apart, with the result that it is, but not fully, in Asia. Its problems, as well as its progress, align it naturally with the advanced West, and particularly with the United States, yet the sense of mutual identification on both sides is significantly weaker than one might presume.

Robert Scalapino, *Asia and the Road Ahead: Issues for the Major Powers* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), p. 50.

⁵⁹⁷From the time Japan had set out to modernize itself and catch up with the West under the Emperor Meiji, Japan's course had been set. Even during its conflicts with Western powers and despite its occupation in the aftermath of defeat, the relationship between Japan and other states more resembled that of similar vice dissimilar entities; it was the difference between being a member or a member in good standing. During the Occupation period, Japan's role in the U.S. global strategy guaranteed that Far Eastern concerns, particularly those surrounding Japan, would receive attention with the U.S. serving as Japan's spokesman. In the wake of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan found the U.S. willingness to serve as Japan's mentor and ombudsman attractive for it allowed Japan the privileges of membership, but absolved it from the need to discharge responsibilities except as it felt inclined.

representatives, and later directly.

It was a combination of factors that prevented Japan from being more forthrightly and independently prominent at earlier times, factors that were present both within and outside Japan. However, if these factors affected Japan's posture, the primary determinant was the willingness of Japan itself to take a stance. The strategic pattern, established first by Washington and then by Japan, had been so successful that no shift in Japan's basic posture probably would be forthcoming unless significant changes occurred in the strategic environment, changes that unambiguously showed the advisability of changing Japan's strategy.

Thus, when Nakasone spoke at Williamsburg, frankly acknowledging Japan's intent to be more than "just an economic animal," its security alignment with the West⁵⁹⁸ and its military relationship with the U.S., it was not because anything had dramatically changed between the U.S. and Japan. Rather, it was because of changes in circumstances, particularly in the strategic milieu, suggested the need for a public affirmation of altered stature and prominence, but not of an abrupt departure by Japan

⁵⁹⁸Perhaps some measure of Japan's resolve is revealed by noting three particulars. First, Williamsburg was the first economic summit in which there was no predetermined agenda. Second, this aspect meant that security issues could be taken up on an *ad hoc* basis (which President Reagan exploited for a joint statement). However, France opposed this technique since they thought the U.S. was attempting to turn the economic summit into a "super NATO" for the purposes of issuing security policy. Third, the key element in the joint statement of Western security solidarity (in answer to Moscow's threatening pre-summit statement) was one which said, "The security of our countries is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis." This statement was inserted at Japan's express request. Shiro Saito, *Japan at the Summit: Japan's Role in the Western Alliance and Asian Pacific Co-operation* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990), p. 79. The general conclusion is that Japan had the opportunity to evade such a forthright stance on security, but not only did not do so, it insisted upon and facilitated passage of the key phrase. Notably, the word choice was "security," a broader, more vague term that Tokyo has habitually used, rather than the more finite description "military security," that most in the West assumed it meant.

from its established strategic course.⁵⁹⁹ Indeed, Nakasone was to reemphasize his support of the Reagan Administration's policies (by implication Reagan's arms and strong anti-communist foreign policies) after the Williamsburg Summit stating, "President Reagan's unflagging quest for peace and the wise decisions he has made in the pursuit of peace have my full understanding and support."⁶⁰⁰

What were these shifts in the milieu that required an open acknowledgment of Japan's stature? Clearly the world of 1983 was not the world of 1951, 1960, 1976, or even 1980. Major (if ill-delineated) shifts in the relative stature of states, the rise of new forces previously of low consideration, and the balancing of intrastate asymmetries in economics, technology and social stability suggested that different levers of power had acquired potency. In contrast, others (e.g., the military instrument), had lost application value (if not their lethality) precisely because of their potency.⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁹Indeed, the so-called "Yoshida Plan" had stressed the economic dimension from the outset in terms of confronting communism asserting that political and economic strength was as important as military might, if not more so. See John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 473, 477. In keeping with its economic orientation (as well as its economic stature), from the mid-1970s Japan has been included in specifically economic summits. Saito, *Japan at the Summit*, p. 59.

⁶⁰⁰"Nakasone Sees Shift In Industry," *New York Times*, June 1, 1983, p. D18.

⁶⁰¹This was an important, if understated, development. If the utility of military power has declined while superior alternatives available for assuring national economic welfare and growth have grown, then the tack taken by Japan has multiple advantages. First, the time and resources devoted to a major military effort have not been wasted. Second, the difficulties inherent in rectifying a misadventure are avoided. Third, the time, capital and human resources can be devoted to activity along the most productive lines. Fourth, relative to other states who are not vigorously pursuing the most productive avenues, avoidance of the military instrument confers advantages. There are several important caveats, however. The most important of these is that military power can negate any other form, even as it cannot itself create power, but only alter the relative levels. This is very unlike the power of education, technology or economics which in their being steadily create power in many forms. Moreover, the increases in non-military forms of power do not by becoming larger increase the degree of coercion leverage for military power, rather the reverse. This suggests that while some military power is a necessity (chiefly as a means to prevent the use of military power by an opponent), the main arena of national strength, and by that, security, is in the interrelated fields

Additionally, the U.S. strategic goals and objectives of containment were coming of age;⁶⁰² simultaneously the reverses and frustrations Washington experienced exposed unexpected vulnerabilities.⁶⁰³ All these affected Japan and the other powers.

The overarching feature of the strategic milieu was that the Cold War persisted, its military components both real and dangerous, and its balance evidently in flux. Despite the emergence of other powerful forces (e.g., Japanese economic strength or China as a nationalist, continental counterweight to the USSR), and hopeful initiatives to moderate or disarm it, the essentially military and polarized aspects of the Cold War remained.

The second feature of the strategic milieu was that no single nation, not even the U.S., could carry the burden of the defense of the West by itself.⁶⁰⁴ Nor, for that

of economics, education, and technology. For further discussion along these lines see Klaus Knorr, "International Economic Leverage and its Uses," *Economic Issues and National Security*, ed. Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, (Lawrence, KS: Allen Press, 1977), chapter 4, particularly pp. 114-18, 121.

⁶⁰²Both Japan and Germany had developed into robust anti-communist centers of power, the PRC had moved to a position of opposing Soviet hegemony, and a host of newly industrializing economies (NIEs) were beginning to emerge. Few, if any, of these had any willingness to see the advancement of the USSR, most, perhaps all, were apprehensive of Soviet activity and intentions, and, for their own reasons, were willing to resist Moscow. That most, to a greater or lesser extent, were willing to enter into some sort of security alignment with Washington wherein the U.S. served as general guarantor, merely confirmed the success of Containment.

⁶⁰³Indeed, the Vietnam experience had demonstrated that the U.S. resources of applicable military power, economic largess and public stability and unity had limits. Nor were the realizations of limitation or the application confined to the United States. The Nixon Doctrine resulted in sobering reappraisals, while the Oil Crisis, deeply affecting many regimes, had clearly married politics and economics in the minds of many leaderships by demonstrating that vulnerability in one area could readily result in vulnerability in another.

⁶⁰⁴The "defense of the West" was not merely the confrontation and neutralization of the USSR, the ideological notion of communism, or authoritarian/totalitarian government, although all of these are subsumed. The notion of "the West" carries aspects of regional stability, freedom of overseas commerce, a global mercantile system based upon international law, and the prevention of either exclusive trade areas (e.g., like colonies) or power blocs (military, economic or political) which might threaten any of the foregoing. Thus, confronting the USSR was a defense of the West, but so also were the efforts to secure a lasting peace in the Middle East, suppress international terrorism, or prevent political collapse due to

matter, could any single state carry the whole burden of the communist coalition. This meant that the respective polar dominance both of the U.S. and the USSR had weakened, while the strategic dialogues of the other states were becoming more important.⁶⁰⁵ Yet, Washington retained the primary role of leadership in the Pacific.

The third feature was the increase in costs associated with all state activities. Where before millions had been easily adequate, now they required billions. Nor were such increases associated with just the military arena;⁶⁰⁶ foreign aid expenses affected donars, and all states faced the conundrum of increased requirements for social spending⁶⁰⁷ while defense costs were rising. Further, it was increasingly difficult to separate funds for civil purposes from those designated for security purposes.⁶⁰⁸

economic distress.

⁶⁰⁵ Although this development begets problems for both superpowers, the difference in the strategic approach of the two suggests that, given its strategy of containment, this would be less a problem for Washington than for centrist-prone Moscow.

⁶⁰⁶ Defense costs soared, a product of the application of high technology to military purposes. At the upper end of the military technology envelope, only a very few countries could afford to fully participate. However, defense requirements also had expanded, an indirect result of high technology. Since most states could not afford the costs of fielding and supporting a high-technology armed force, those who were unable to achieve a satisfactory security situation through alliances or limited technological applications reverted to more basic forms of military security (e.g., the so-called "peoples war" doctrine of the PRC). Yet, this too took considerable expenditure (as well as risk), while providing little in the way of ability to exercise coercion or suasion at the intra-state level.

⁶⁰⁷ This may have been a significant byproduct of the development of rapid global communications raising public expectations. The destabilizing aspects of a public's unanswered expectations (whether esoteric or exoteric) have long been understood (and feared). Repressive regimes could not have been pleased with heightening of expectations, particularly as the difference between reality and the regime's propaganda became apparent. But democratic regimes were not spared this development. In either case, the characteristics of the strategic milieu required a shift in policy emphasis toward economics.

⁶⁰⁸ If foreign aid served to enhance the economic conditions in a particular country and thereby prevented or attenuated a communist insurgency, it might be plain that such funds were serving a security function. However, it also would be difficult to measure how effective they might have been. Notably, such difficulties in linking cause and effect did not prevent vast sums from being provided to states in the hope and expectation that sundry objectives under the rubric of the "defense of the West" would be realized.

The fourth feature was the interdependence of nations. Few, if any, states could claim to be totally self-sufficient. Thus, the affairs of those distant often had a direct correlation with local events or conditions, a lesson Japan learned with the Oil Crisis.⁶⁰⁹ In the Far East, countries once apprehensive about Japan⁶¹⁰ found themselves so deeply entwined with Japan in economic affairs that the positive aspects of their relationships (and the negative results should they collapse) served to discount historical apprehensions. In effect, security concerns premised on economics began to override security concerns premised on memory.

The fifth feature, the emergence of nations, was closely related to the fourth. With the global proliferation of states, many emerging from colonial status,⁶¹¹ the struggle for the "hearts and minds" in the Third World depended as much on local economic affairs as on weapon inventories. This increased the importance of aid programs simultaneously enhancing the efficacy of the economic instrument. This change in circumstance favored Japan since it had the available capital, was usually non-aligned on local issues, and while with the West, was not often seen as

⁶⁰⁹ Indeed, (and most appropriately for Tokyo), the first economic summit that Japan hosted (1979), was wholly focused on the energy problem, key to Japan's national security strategy from several aspects.

⁶¹⁰ Australia and Indonesia being two examples.

⁶¹¹ Many new states were in possession of crucial natural resources, but lacked many (usually most) of those aspects of governance and infrastructure permitting or facilitating the management of that resource. The combination of resource availability, governmental and professional weakness, and greed (both external and internal) made these states targets. Aside from this economic vulnerability, these states often were the targets of the ideological struggle of the Cold War. In part this was because of their ideological plasticity, in part because of the resource(s) they controlled, and in part because of their geographical and societal location. In short, they became economic, ideological, political, and (all too often) military battlegrounds.

ideologically of the West.⁶¹² This strategic tableau, with its emphasis on economic aspects, was particularly favorable to Japan. Its growth in economic fora having risen to the world's third largest, it is unsurprising that recognition soon would follow.⁶¹³

Some irony of Japan's acceptance is due to its long-term actual presence. Yet, it is Japan's acceptance among the major Western powers, while acknowledging it as an overt military power of low order, that seems more obvious. It is true that all the members at the Williamsburg summit were leading economic powers; equally pertinent is that they also were military powers united in the purpose of joint defense against a common enemy. Although all had differing levels of military commitment, in reality all were reciprocal allies.⁶¹⁴ Japan clearly fit the economic parameter, but hardly the overt military one.⁶¹⁵ Japan's acceptance seems premised on a perception combining two

⁶¹²Even Japanese officials had some difficulty coming to closure with Japan's appropriate status in the international environment. Prime Minister Fukuda admitted that attending the Bonn summit in 1975 was a "trying experience" because he felt an underlying psychological ambivalence, a feeling of "belonging" to the Western world, mingled with a sense of alienation. *Japan Times*, January 16, 1979, p. 1.

⁶¹³Yet, this was not automatic. In January of 1979, (the same year Japan was to host its - and Asia's - first economic summit) the so-called "big four" (U.S., Britain, France, and West Germany) met at Guadeloupe in the Caribbean (the so-called "Sunshine Summit"), where they discussed world political agendas, monetary issues, and, most importantly, political-security affairs. It was the first such meeting on the latter since the end of the Second World War. Japan, along with middle-ranked powers such as Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands, was excluded.

⁶¹⁴This was true even of France, who, although no longer part of NATO, clearly was identified as part of the West and with its *force de frappe* a significant military contributor.

⁶¹⁵In 1980, at Venice, the summit meeting agenda had not called for discussion of security topics, yet Afghanistan and the Iranian Hostage Crisis intruded. Japan's approach was reluctant, (in part due to Ohira's death), yet found itself generally aligning with the U.S. on Afghanistan and with the European powers on Iran. In 1981, at Ottawa, Japan took a more active role. In the compromise that characterized the "Trudeau Report" issued at the end of the meeting, a two-prong approach to the USSR had been recommended: a military build-up, and the opening of increased dialogue. Japan, differing from the U.S., stressed greater dialogue. Further, as the only Asian state represented, Japan (particularly Suzuki who had just finished a visit to ASEAN that January) may have felt that it was the sole representative of the Asian states. However, Suzuki stopped well short of committing Japan to increased military role or build-up. This puzzled the Americans since Suzuki's position had been that the West must restore the military balance with the East to

particulars, Japan's military potential, and that Japan, in any event, must align with the other Western powers.⁶¹⁶ In effect, it was the acceptance of *awase* in lieu of *erabi* reasoning. It also was the formula for agreement between Suzuki and Reagan on the Joint Communique. But, most importantly, the acceptance of Japan on those terms was a confirmation of Japan's strategy and an acceptance of an alternative method in strategic dialogue.

Yet, the willingness of Western European powers to accept Japan did not mean that Japan would publicly accept inclusion, or that any significant alteration in military capabilities or roles would be forthcoming. Indeed, the actions of Suzuki at both Ottawa (1981) and Versailles (1982), suggested an aversion to Japan stepping up to increased commitments.

At Ottawa, Suzuki explained that the West must restore the military balance between East and West so that a productive exchange could result from future disarmament talks. Yet, Suzuki declined any increase in Japan's contribution citing its own defense policy and constitutional renunciation of war. At Versailles, Japan's

ensure a fruitful dialogue between the two sides for disarmament in the future. Clearly, if Japan so believed and was enjoying such a spectacular economic growth, then it should bear some of the costs associated with restoring that East-West balance. If Japan's rationale-action mismatch was not enough, on the economic question that generally occupied center stage for every summit, Japan's response to soaring trade deficits was the suggestion to the Western countries that the answer lay in their making "structural adjustments" (i.e., in Japan's competitors improving their own means of production). Meantime, outside the formal seven-nation summit meeting, Suzuki met Reagan to patch up the clash resulting from the differences in interpretation of the Joint Communique that followed their May meeting in Washington. Amazingly, Suzuki succeeded, albeit by affirming Japan's commitment to the communique. Although this diplomatically papered over the differences, it remained that the strategic thrusts of the U.S. and Japan were significantly different.

⁶¹⁶It was precisely this fear of a military alignment (with Japan taking a significantly more prominent role) that concerned the Soviets and thereby Japan's leadership. Japanese officials were concerned lest Japan be incorrectly identified as "a sixteenth member of NATO," a perception which Tokyo's extension of yen credits to Turkey seemed to support.

position was even less compatible to the other members who increasingly worried about the disproportionately large trade surplus generated by Japan. Hoping to deflect a slide into protectionism, the others prevailed on Japan to reduce its asymmetrical trade barriers. Tokyo demurred, instead announcing a tariff reduction package on some 200 items to deflect being singled out. On the issue of the Falklands War, (discussed outside the framework of the summit) Japan voted for the UN resolution calling for the immediate cease fire, removal of troops and settlement through the UN.⁶¹⁷ Yet, Japan had long-established its unwillingness to provide the sorts of forces to the UN that the Falklands' circumstance would require. In short, whether in economic or security fora (even the UN), Japan insisted that reciprocity did not apply to itself.

Japan's posture was a frustrating one, and, indirectly, dangerous to Japan. The trade deficits existed not only with the U.S., but also with Europe, while the general world economic picture looked grim.⁶¹⁸ The larger security environment upon which Japan depended included the nations represented at the summits. The whole global economic structure depended upon the collaboration of efforts between these states. Should Japan find itself singled out as having a "free ride" in security at the expense of the others, and simultaneously damagingly inequitable on trade, (another "free ride"),

⁶¹⁷ At Versailles, British Prime Minister Thatcher complained to Suzuki that Japan could have abstained on its vote; however, Britain got the endorsement of all seven summit members for the British position.

⁶¹⁸ During the period 1981-1982, the level of industrial production in the seven summit countries had decreased by an average of 2.8 percent, the level of unemployment continued to spiral higher, and interest rates were higher in many countries than they had been since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Added to this was the alarming burden of debt. In all, the situation was somber and it was unsurprising that there were disagreements between the summit countries over the appropriate courses to follow.

isolation could result. Such mandated isolation might even lead to the formation of a protective economic entente targeted on Japan. In short, persistence by Tokyo in its long-established policies could rebound in pervasive damage to Japan's whole security envelope.⁶¹⁹

Yet, the situation was not wholly one-sided. Japan was too important to ignore or exclude. It was the only Asian nation represented in the gathering, a representation of enormous significance. Economically it had to be considered. The ties of trade and commerce (both to the summit members and others) were so extensive and its industry so robust, that shutting Japan out could not but damage those economically aligned against Tokyo.⁶²⁰ Moreover, Japan had alternatives which, if pushed to extremes, were unattractive to the other major Western powers.⁶²¹ What would Japan do, what could

⁶¹⁹In effect; the collective good in the form of the global economic system could be denied Japan, at least in part. Moreover, should the U.S. (and others) not be willing or able to bear the cost of the collective good of security with Japan as a member, they might be able through de facto collusion, deny a portion of that good to Japan. Although through a concurrent contraction of responsibilities this might ease some of the burden of providing the collective good, it is doubtful Japan would be singled out for such treatment. Not only was the threat posed by Moscow large and broad, Japan's contributions in other than military security (e.g., foreign aid) were substantial. Too severe a reaction could invite an unfortunate response (instead of compliance) and the general loss to the collective welfare could be substantial. In short, retaining Japan provided some benefits and the opportunity to access more. While this ability to deny a collective good is a contradiction of Olson's definition, it should be noted that the notion of contracting a collective good (except where such goods become private goods) does not receive extensive discussion, not does the proscription of participants/partakers of the good received detailed theoretical treatment. Some discussion is given of techniques used to coerce contributions, but these are cast in terms of an established framework of order rather than the anarchical environment of international politics. See Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, pp. 30-44.

⁶²⁰Cf., Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," RAND memorandum 4297-ISA, pp. 19-23.

⁶²¹Theoretically, there are (at least) two points illustrated here. First is the situation's complexity since more than one collective good is present and the possibility of manipulable exclusions is allowed; especially in this case where the membership of those contributing and partaking of the good is neither entirely overlapping or coextensive. Second, it is impossible to measure how much each of the several members value an alliance, but generally an alliance loses by excluding a member. The problem here is that there is security dialogue being conducted in two modes (military and economic) and on two levels (national and

Japan do, if other nations imposed such isolation?⁶²²

In fact, Japan needed the West and the West needed all its significant members, of which Japan was one. A general breakdown would help none of the members (or for that matter, many of those not present). Additionally, there remained the ominous shadow of the USSR (whose threatening posture acted as a unifying force). The stage was set for some form of accommodation in the strategic dialogue, accommodation that overtly must be seen as coming from Japan.⁶²³

Curiously, the shift in strategic dialogue was initiated by reinforcing a theme

international). Japan's economic role is active, but its security role is passive. The dichotomy is made stark by Japan's great economic growth, both absolutely and relatively. Yet, the ability of the others to coerce Japan into greater contributions fails because; a. Having its relationship with the U.S. secure, the West has lost its greatest bargaining lever (the threat that Japan will not be assisted), b. The *alliance* stands to lose more *collectively* by having Japan out rather than in; c. The private goods that each state derived from its relationship with Japan served as a brake to both individual and collective action.

⁶²²These were hard questions with uncertain, perhaps ominous, import. For example, would isolation propel Japan into a role out of step with the West, possibly generating another global pole, East Asian in orientation and built around a Sino-Japanese merger? What were the bilateral and global roles for the U.S. in such a circumstance? Could not the isolation of Japan undo much of the strategy of containment, and by that, perhaps spawn a myriad of security problems for all? In balance, was it more prudent to retain Japan, essentially preserving the status quo, or seek to alter the strategic hypothesis, process and dialogues? For Tokyo, this relational development and Japan's exploitation of it as a technique were not new. This situation echoes the notion of implied power in both passive and negative senses which Japan had so successfully used in its strategic dialogues with Washington and the communists. In its successful implementation, the technique had become an established process, and gave an unusual twist to theoretical expectations associated with collective goods, balance of power and small power alliance behavior theories. Indeed, Japan's exercise of its influence is a match for Richard Synder's discussion of the concept of strategy in game theory, ". . . strategy means a skillful or an adroit plan . . . so complete it cannot be upser by an opponent or by nature. . . . Strategy takes into account the potential behavior of opponents and renders irrelevant the expectations of the latter concerning one's own behavior." Richard C. Snyder, "Game Theory and the Analysis of Political Behavior," *Introductory Readings in Political Behavior*, ed. S. Sidney Ulmer, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1961), pp. 271-72.

⁶²³This was necessary to accomplish high level strategic dialogue. From an external perspective, the overall condition of the West seemed somewhat unsettled. The decade between Vietnam and Williamsburg had not been kind to the U.S. and the economic conditions of all (except Japan) had been erratic. Moreover, Japan was the focus point of dissension in the Western camp in both economic and security terms. Such a condition invited Soviet intrusion. Thus, if the larger fabric of western unity was to be strengthened, it would need to come by way of perceptions of Japanese willful participation.

already in place, Japan's provision of foreign aid. Suzuki announced that Japan would double its Official Development Assistance (ODA) in five years. This was the second such announcement; Prime Minister Fukuda made the first in 1979. This addition to the strategic dialogue was a useful step. Clearly addressing some difficulties that the shifts in the strategic milieu had generated, it was a means by which Japan might contribute in a meaningful way to the security of the West. Yet its character was sufficiently nonmilitary to allow Japan to follow its own policies and keep dampened the anxieties of its regional neighbors. Moreover, the provision of ODA was self-serving (although it became less so with the relaxation of requirements for tied aid).⁶²⁴ ODA increased Japan's international stature and provided increased leverage for Japan and Japanese firms in the recipient countries.⁶²⁵ Nevertheless, while aid to other countries was an important contribution, it did nothing directly to resolve either the trade deficit or Japan's unwillingness to contribute militarily.

Apparently, the other major powers viewed providing money (e.g., foreign aid) as an important but insufficient contribution.⁶²⁶ Aware of this and intent on displaying

⁶²⁴In this way Japan's contributions served both collective and private goods, while in a larger sense they served to integrate emerging economies into the Western capitalist-mercantile system and discount the disruptive effects of communist-inspired meddling.

⁶²⁵The provision of aid to unstable areas, some of which were being contested in the political struggle of the Cold War, also allowed Japan to circumvent communist propaganda aimed at fomenting difficulties in those areas and shutting off the flow of assistance. Such propaganda could hardly be effective to a people who benefited from such assistance. Moreover, should a direct method be employed to shut off assistance from Japan, only those shutting off such assistance could be blamed.

⁶²⁶And with good reason, they knew that the two were interrelated and the more of the burden they carried the less Japan would assume. Moreover, the trade deficit was exacerbated by the Japanese Government's protectionist role (the so-called "Japan Incorporated" perspective). Thus, they developed an image of Japan growing rich at the expense of others and simultaneously unwilling to bear neither the risks nor the burdens. Not surprisingly, the other Western nations who largely carried the burdens viewed the monies Japan

Japan's sincerity of Western alignment, Prime Minister Nakasone evidently went to Williamsburg determined to represent a Japan that was not just an "economic animal," but one ready to shoulder responsibilities, take a stance on issues, and speak out on security matters important to the global community.⁶²⁷ Yet, Nakasone, like Japanese before him (and U.S. officials advocating a greater military role for Japan) was constrained by nations opposed to a larger Japanese military role. Thus, the formula that emerged was largely symbolic, implying much, delivering little, yet generally satisfactory to all.⁶²⁸

One example is the crucial phrase in the joint statement proclaiming indivisibility of the security of the represented countries and a global approach. This

provided as helpful, but having been acquired through the assistance provided Japan, and more rightfully theirs.

⁶²⁷ Again, the USSR may have directly contributed to Japan's taking a more forthright stance through its statements in January, 1983, that the SS-20 nuclear missiles which had been removed from Europe through the Geneva arms control negotiations were to be relocated to Asia. Tokyo's reaction was rapid and negative, and not confined merely to the USSR. Japan obviously objected to the fact that such arms reductions would be negotiated without specific provision that they not be relocated in such a way as to threaten Japan. This eventually led to an understanding, engineered by the Americans, of joint responsibility between Japan and the Europeans. Cesare Merlini, *Economic Summits and Western Decision-making*, (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 38. But Moscow added an extra accent in the form of a pre-summit threatening statement which stated that Soviet missiles might be deployed closer to Western Europe should the deployment of new US cruise missiles and the Pershing II go ahead. The final result of these gestures on all the summit members was to jell their efforts into a statement of resolve. If the Soviet ploy had been to separate Japan from the others, the SS-20 statement had only clarified Japan's commonality of security concerns and the need for greater cooperation among the members of the West.

⁶²⁸ In arriving at a satisfactory arrangement, Nakasone's role may have been more important than initially thought. Allegedly he was able to engage both Mitterand of France and Fanfani of Italy in conversation and, with his "un-Japanese personality," win them over, unnoticed by the "Anglo-Saxons." See Saito, *Japan at the Summit*, p. 80. If this was indeed the case, Nakasone may have been able to remove the objections that France had typically made to the inclusion of Japan in security discussions. But for whatever reasons, France no longer objected to the inclusion of Japan in security discussions, and the resulting unanimity of acceptance of Japan marks the Williamsburg summit as a landmark in Western security strategy.

"new"⁶²⁹ definition of Japan's role being indivisible from Western security was a departure from the previous Japanese public statements that defined Japan's security only as the defense of Japanese territory.⁶³⁰

However, it was the assertion of resolve that seems most impressive in Nakasone's comments. For example, "Western unity can have a political result - bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table." "If we are not united, the Soviet Union may just laugh at us and never sit down to negotiate. As a realistic statement, that is how I think."⁶³¹ The efforts of Nakasone at Williamsburg were strategically clever. He was able to enlist the other summit powers into supporting Japan's presence (which thereby increased Japan's leverage in international fora). In addition, he successfully portrayed Japan's efforts as defensive measures, the full potentiality of which would only come to pass with continued Soviet threats. In short, Nakasone got the other members to accept Japan's assertions of alignment, perceptions of Japanese potential and a Japanese posture of restraint in lieu of actual military contributions.

⁶²⁹ Although this was a forthright *public* statement, it was not new. Japan's position and national strength depended upon the strength of and its alignment with the West, a situation recognized since the end of the Second World War. While Nakasone's statements were lauded in the West as evidence of Japan's shift to a more active military role, there is scant evidence of such a Japanese interpretation. Not surprisingly, both Nakasone and Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe opposed any drastic change in defense policy.

⁶³⁰ However, this sense of Japan's welfare indivisibly bound to the welfare of the West was not new. It had been part of U.S. strategic considerations for decades. See Report to the President, "Strategic Importance of Japan," dated 31 May 1948, pp. 1-9. Japan's more forthright stance suggests a reasoning sequence wherein Japan would act in support of the West for its own best interests, but that the determination of criteria requiring action was Tokyo's to ascertain. The unvoiced implication of Japanese potential in Western security affairs echoes Tokyo's techniques with Washington and are part of strategic dialogues with the coalition of both the West and the East.

⁶³¹ Takeshi Oka, "Japan takes a firm stand with West on defense issues at summit," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 6, 1983, p. 3.

Nor were the Soviets excluded. Nakasone's message was one in which Moscow's recent statements that pertained to relocating nuclear missiles were reflectively cast back upon Moscow. Further, with the inference of great potential, Tokyo put Moscow's future considerations of similar tactics on notice as of unlikely value. In so doing, Nakasone achieved a greater sense of unity with the rest of the industrialized West⁶³² and directly enhanced Japan's security, but without increasing Japan's direct military contribution or envisioned roles.

In all, the 1983 Williamsburg Summit was an exercise in confirmation, a confirmation of strategic alignment, of strategic dialogue, and of the general strategic objectives of the West and Japan. For Japan, Williamsburg marks a significant step, albeit an incremental one, that anchors Japan in the context of the West not only in the perceptions of the Western powers and the communists, but in the minds of the Japanese themselves. In no small measure this definition of status was more important as Japan took a more prominent position on the world's stage.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

. General

The central themes of this investigation have involved three tasks: positing a definition of strategy, constructing a framework for strategic analysis, and examining

⁶³²Nakasone was fortunate in timing; the worst of the world recession was over and most of the nations there represented were able to detect clear signs of recovery. These signs (abetted by Japan's generous ODA contributions over the previous year) allowed the politicians the liberty of focusing on other issues, and thereby obscured and shifted the image of Japan from an exploiter of the system (a "free rider" and outsider), to a contributing member.

Japan's activities and the course of events in specific, formative periods. Taken in the context of the U.S.-Japan relationship, inferentially disclosed were those features that provided the basis for continued U.S.-Japanese postwar security cooperation, explanations of certain policies, enduring characteristics, and some instances of friction.

. Findings

1. Strategy, simultaneously, is theory, process and dialogue, all of which are in a state of continuous evolution. Because of the process of continual evolution, strategy is more a verb than a noun. Moreover, these modes of strategy usually occur at different levels simultaneously and may have varying interactions.
2. The evolution of Japan's strategy shows considerable similarity to elements of balance of power and collective goods theories. Elements of small power alliance behavior by Japan also are applicable throughout the period examined, despite changes in Japan's stature.
3. Although the U.S.-Japan relationship is complementary, the goals, components, contribution, and effect of and on the partners are asymmetrical.
4. The strategies of the U.S. and Japan are interlocked; neither could reach full development without the other. The chief difference between the two is the level of primary focus. Japan's orientation is regional; the U.S. orientation is global. In terms of the respective primary level of focus, neither could afford to fail.
5. Japan's security has depended upon its maintaining good relations with Washington. Japan's need for a sound relationship with the U.S. was critical; the U.S. need for such

a relationship with Japan was important.

6. Japan has been deliberate in using its assets and opportunities in executing a successful strategy. Although chance affected the evolution, Tokyo's reactions to such events were purposive and pragmatic.
7. Only because a benevolent America provided Japan its security and a "safety net" in economics, capital, technical help, and services as its ombudsman in the first postwar decade, did Tokyo have the luxury of a non-contradictory strategy as it framed its policies. Many of Japan's presumed options would have been impractical or impossible without the U.S. standing as guarantor.
8. In the first postwar decade, key American decision makers saw more potential danger (to both Japan and the U.S.) in a weak, vulnerable Japan than from a revitalized one. Further, U.S. officials believed Japan's economic reconstruction would not be threatening to other states if conducted within the context of democratic political development.
9. The continuities of Japan's threat perceptions include that of war involving or negatively affecting Japan, isolation of Japan from resources or markets, and disruption of the international economic situation. Disengagement from the U.S. potentially has elements of all three.
10. Japan avoided overtly identifying any particular country as an "enemy," or in engaging in activities (e.g., military exercises) that clearly indicated an identifiable

country as an "enemy."⁶³³ Thus, the U.S. and Japan disagreed about the focus and scale of combined and individual military and economic efforts premised on common enemy notions, since the particulars of those notions did not coincide. This led to procedural difficulties over the division of roles, responsibilities and burdens.

11. Japan had the opportunity and capability indigenously to develop nuclear weapons, but deliberately chose not to exercise this option. However, Tokyo's constraint is self-imposed government policy which could change abruptly.

12. Japan can produce weapons of all levels of sophistication. With its considerable industrial capability, Japan could become a major weapons supplier in East Asia. Japan deliberately declined the option of producing weapons for export. However, as with nuclear capabilities, the restraint is a self-imposed government policy.

13. Japan's strategy displayed an active use of restraint. Tokyo was reluctant to change any more quickly than other regional powers, since the status quo was extremely favorable to Japan's strategic goals. Similarly, Tokyo was cautious in approaching and resistant to efforts seeking to move Japan beyond certain self-determined parameters, (that evidently define Tokyo's limits of acceptable risk).

14. Japan's national security strategy shows a remarkable consistency⁶³⁴ despite great

⁶³³Yukio Satoh, *The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 34.

⁶³⁴Indeed, it would have been difficult for many changes, especially large ones, to have been made by the Japanese government since the consistency of the policies is a symbol of their validity. Since, as of 1983, essentially the same party had ruled Japan for over three decades, this may be one of the reasons for Tokyo's emphasis on consistency of policies. See Satoh, *The Evolution of Japanese Security Policies*, p. 24; see also Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, pp. 64-65.

gains in national strength, alterations in regional situations, and changes in administration.⁶³⁵

. Interpretations

1. The evolution of Japan's national security strategy illustrates strategy simultaneously as theory, process and dialogue.
2. Japan's strategy is a carefully balanced amalgam, the process of which used all opportunities to expand Japan's interests, and contained the maximum attainable degree of flexibility.
3. From the outset, the entwined strategies of the U.S. and Japan (for each strategy is a portion of the other's) were understood as asymmetrical in goals, composition, contribution, and (probably) effect. It could hardly have been otherwise. However, Tokyo saw that its contributions would grow based on its *own* interpretations of need and be restrained by *self-imposed* limits. In contrast, Washington expected that Japan's contributions would be determined in response to a wider common good and evidence increases in scope as well as scale. As Japan's national capabilities increased, U.S. expectations of greater Japanese participation and contribution grew, which, when unanswered, resulted in disappointment and friction. In this, Japan's behavior is a close match to the "free rider" aspect found in collective goods theory.
4. Despite its asymmetrical form, the complementary nature of the U.S.-Japan security

⁶³⁵ Although the LDP and its predecessors, the Liberal and Democratic Parties, maintained nearly continuous government, the rise and fall of various Prime Ministers, the broad political spectrum within the LDP, and the pulling and hauling between the various political factions suggest that domestic political considerations and maneuvers were as intense as in other multi-party countries.

strategy allowed both partners to realize goals and objectives not obtainable without the other. Its satisfactory processes and dialogues prevented and resolved problems (enhancing its perpetuation), supporting the assertion of it as a significant historical example of success in strategic dialogue and process execution. In this regard, the contributions of both fall into behavioral expectations delineated in both collective goods and balance of power theories.

5. The U.S.-Japan security relationship was more than a simplistic negotiated "deal" of trading an abridgement of sovereignty (acceptance of a foreign military presence) for economic recovery and progress. Both Tokyo and Washington wanted a secure, economically recovered Japan. Tokyo needed to accept the U.S. military presence as there was no other acceptable way to gain military security. Washington had to economically aid Japan as there was no better way to soon see a recovered Japan as part of its global strategy. Complex and pervasive forces including history, culture, geography, ideology, economics, and political theory also played important, if less measurable, roles. The historical antecedents and the ideological mandates germane to the region so delineated the strategic milieu and set its parameters that they foreclosed some strategic options. The perceptual frames that key officials had of the relationship had significant influence. Likewise, elements of chance entered the arrangement. The continuity of longer range economic, political, and military goals of both the U.S. and Japan complemented each other, stabilizing the strategic dialogue and lending an overarching commonality of purpose to the strategic process.

6. Japan's security has depended upon its maintaining good relations with America.

Without the linkage and security shield provided by Washington, Japan's strategic options were more problematical, expensive, and risk laden. Japan's recovery and economic growth, while possible in other conditions, would have been delayed.

Achieving both would have been a more protracted and difficult process. Similarly, outside the framework of the U.S.-Japan relationship, Japan's attainment of viable deterrence would have been most difficult to achieve. Moreover, even had Japan been able to establish such a condition of deterrence, the military capabilities involved would have increased Japan's regional isolation, and damaged its security in other fora.

Virtually no other option could give Japan the opportunities provided by the U.S.-Japan relationship.

7. Japan's security enjoyed several fortuitous developments. The most important of these was that the U.S. was the immediate military victor and occupying power in Japan's disaster of the Great Pacific War. Second, Japan's collapse occurred at a moment in history when the ideological struggle of the Cold War was coalescing. The U.S. adopted a defensive, global, but engaged strategy, and no other power in the region had sufficient strength to remove the Americans. This combination highlighted Japan's value, provided it peace, and sheltered it with overwhelming strength. Third, the outbreak of the Korean War provided Japan's industries the necessary economic boost to overcome the economic stagnation which then beset Japan's economy. Fourth, the U.S. negotiations with Japan included strategic concerns affecting not only Japan, but Korea and other regional powers. While this tended to make Washington more firm on some issues (and thereby bound options), it also induced Washington to be more

flexible regarding issues specifically germane to Japan. Fifth, for Japan, affairs on the Korean peninsula proved advantageous. The war did not spread to Japan and ended in an armistice causing the Koreans (possible competitors -- even opponents) to focus inward. Moreover, the U.S. willingness to maintain military forces in Korea, serves (with ROK forces) as a barrier astride the major Asian invasion avenue to Japan. Sixth, the Sino-Soviet conflict flared at a point in time when confidence in the U.S. guarantee was beginning to wane. The division in the communist camp increased not only Washington's regional stature and flexibility, but that of Japan. Seventh, the extremely rapid increase in technology, particularly that applied to military equipment, enhanced the latent military leverage of Japan. As to Japan's own defense, the combination of technology and insularity pushed any conventional military operation against Japan into operational envelopes (sea, air and amphibious) favoring Japanese (and U.S.) capabilities.

The extent to which Japan was a causal agent in generating these conditions is very small, although the awareness of them by Japanese officials seems to have been acute. Japan's strategic dialogue and processes, especially in the choice of quality instead of quantity, shows Tokyo took advantage of these circumstances in ways that increased Japan's security.

8. Japan made use of the U.S. strategy of containment as both a military shield and an economic one. The military shield allowed Japan to avoid building a military structure that would burden its economy or discount the image of Japan as a peaceful power.

This allowed Japan to avoid negative (military associated) images in both domestic and

foreign fora. The economic shield provided Japan the access to international markets, particularly that of the U.S., which it probably would not have otherwise enjoyed.

Simultaneously, Japanese and U.S. officials successfully influenced Washington constituencies to economically aid Japan; specifically to make up for Japan's "loss" of the China market due to Washington's exclusionist China policy.⁶³⁶

9. The consistency of Tokyo's goals and policies over three decades suggest skillful use of opportunities and assets in maintaining Japan's course.

10. Japan's decision to forego weapons manufacture for export was based upon strategic considerations including the notion that exporting weapons would damage Japan's security in both regional perceptions and in its relationship with America. The lure of profits could not recompense Japan's costs (military, political and economic) in the security arena by raising regional concerns and damaging the U.S.-Japan alignment.

11. Japan overtly eschewed acquisition of nuclear weapons because acknowledging their possession would damage its ultimate security. Yet, as with its decision to forego the export of weapons, Japan retained its production capability and policy flexibility.

Tokyo sought to advance further international controls and limitations on the manufacture, possession, number, or use of such weapons. Yet, Tokyo avoided

⁶³⁶Precisely how much loss (actually, lost opportunity) was occasioned by Washington's policy is unmeasurable. However, considering the antipathy of the Chinese for Japan in the immediate postwar period, the nature of the Chinese communist regime, and China's own difficulties, it is improbable that anything like the prewar arrangement (in either scale or tone) could have been readily or easily accomplished. Be that as it may, it did not prevent both Japanese and U.S. officials from noting the importance of the prewar arrangement or drawing conclusions of the strategic ramifications which might result therefrom. Notably, Japan sought to evade Washington's restrictions, eventually announcing its policy of the separation of economics from politics.

damaging the U.S. ability to provide for its security with the shield of nuclear deterrence, briefly asserted the legality of possessing nuclear arms for "defensive" purposes, deflected political initiatives to revise the constitution aimed at enshrining the "three non-nuclear principles," and may have accomplished all aspects of nuclear weapon construction except assembly and testing. By taking such measures, Japan retained the means to change its nuclear policies quickly. In sum, no real restraint to Japan's change of its nuclear policies exists save those self-imposed.

12. Japan's strategy has included the important (and unusual) active use of restraint. Tokyo has foregone options attractive to domestic constituencies and Washington. It has been cautious, neither moving too fast nor beyond risk level parameters. Yet, as displayed with its policies regarding the construction of its forces, its weapons export policies, its abjuring of sending its troops outside Japan,⁶³⁷ and its foregoing of nuclear weapons, all could be reversed with significant consequences. Thus, by retaining capability and exercising restraint, Japan gains implicit leverage for maintenance of the status quo. Moreover, this technique aids Tokyo in keeping its pacific image intact, avoids the great expenditures associated with carrying out all such policies, and serves to damp escalatory tendencies.

13. The collection of bilateral Pacific alliances crafted after World War II served Washington's desires to contain the USSR, provide surety against the resurgence of a militant Japan, and foster economic and political development along mercantile,

⁶³⁷Until the early 1990s, when participation in UN peacekeeping activities did result in Japan sending members of the SDF as part of Japan's contingent. Notably, this event was accomplished only after protracted, acerbic Diet debate, and then subject to severe restrictions on activities and general conditions.

capitalist, democratic lines. These mandated a very limited military role for Japan. For so long as the essentially bipolar balance of power remained and the sundry regional powers feared a resurgent Japan, Washington was obligated to be both Japan's guarantor and its limiter. Thus, militarily Japan could not expand its capabilities beyond certain, largely subjective limits without undoing the whole series of strategic alignments which enhanced regional stability. Moreover, as Japan developed economic strength, the core to its national strength, that pervasive regional stability was its security. Thus, any initiative to alter the arrangement was virtually certain to be opposed by Tokyo, and generally, by all others to whom that stability was important.

. Conclusions

1. It is unlikely that Japan could have found another security partner that could and would have provided and maintained the support forthcoming from Washington.
2. The U.S. implicitly expected Japan to rearm and do so within the construct of the U.S.-led Western security structure. However, Tokyo had no intention of disproportionately (as defined by Tokyo) increasing its military capabilities despite U.S. pressure and the vague, deflecting assertions made by Japanese officials. Japan needed to maintain its linkage with the U.S., damp regional animosities (especially concerning its military posture), reduce the chance of domestic reactionary developments and economically recover; more than minimal Japanese military forces would damage all these.
3. Japan has been quite aware of the major U.S. goals and how those goals related to Washington's accomplishment of a global security strategy. Tokyo used America's

focus and efforts to enhance its own security by marrying its similar goals to those of Washington, supporting the U.S. effort (an inexpensive, low-risk endeavor), and realizing objectives on its security agenda as the U.S. attained fruition of its own. Thus, Japan insisted upon retaining a significant degree of flexibility in its policies insuring thereby that it would not be dragged into affairs against its desires, nor find itself unduly hampered should U.S. support wane and Tokyo be thrown back upon its own resources.⁶³⁸

4. The greatest danger to Japan was the possibility that Washington might abandon Japan. Japan's vulnerability during the first postwar decade was such that the Japanese Government would have found itself hard pressed to meet even modest external or internal threats. Similarly, at that time, Japan's economic and political stature was fragile. The absence of U.S. support would have resulted in greater difficulties and risks for Japan in economic and political fora, as well as in military affairs. During the remainder of the period, despite Japan's acquisition of considerable strength and stature, the strategic milieu was such that U.S. withdrawal could have upset Japan's

⁶³⁸Such flexibility is apparent in the retention of policies regarding the so-called three non-nuclear principles, weapons export restrictions, zones for sea lane defense, percentage limits on defense budgets, and sundry constitutional interpretations. All of these have drawn close scrutiny and invited critical speculation. For example, Japan's defense expenditure is enormous by comparison to neighboring states supporting much larger military establishments. Yet, precisely what Japan buys with its expenditures is unclear; (it certainly is not the usual ships, planes, and guns). Understandably, the Japanese have not made the particulars of their expenditures very clear. Yet, the continued strong rise in the absolute amount of Japan's defense funds in the decade since Williamsburg invites speculation, not all of which is favorable. It may be that Japan, in insuring flexibility in its national security policies, has been expanding the infrastructure requisite to success in implementing a rapid, major shift in its national security strategy, and doing so in a very low-profile manner. This is not to suggest that such a change has been decided upon; it may be more a case of Japan taking prudent precautions to address contingencies in an uncertain world. While no changes are apparent in the pre-1983 period, the decade following Williamsburg contains sufficient ambiguities to warrant reasoned speculation and detailed examination.

posture, rendering Japan vulnerable.⁶³⁹

5. Without Washington's influence, protective shield, and economic assistance, the domestic development and international reintegration of Japan would have been significantly retarded, even imperiled, with ominous implications for both Japan and America.

6. The strategies of both Japan and America recognized the general orientation of the other and enhanced those aspects advancing their own security goals. The real differences in the U.S. and Japanese situations and capabilities broaden and balance the strategic environment. In this way, those differences may be a source of strength rather than weakness.⁶⁴⁰

7. Because of the complementary nature of the relationship, the effect on the regional

⁶³⁹Indeed. The U.S. regional drawdown following Vietnam, the so-called "Nixon Doctrine," the growth of regional Soviet forces, the re-orientation of China, and the Oil Crisis, singly and in combination presented Tokyo with a worrisome tableau. External awareness of this sparked speculation that Japan would alter its security strategy, in turn fanning fears of an independent, re-armed Japanese giant. Latent mistrust of Japan combined with observations of Japan's great potential and large defense expenditures, resulted in growing anxiety among smaller regional states. These fears were abetted by fears that the U.S. could not, or would not restrain Japan. This last development, which emerged and became more prominent in the post-1983 period, was further stimulated by a combination of Japanese statements (e.g., Nakasone at Washington and Williamsburg in 1983), an increase in Japan's military exercises, and a military equipment upgrade program - all with the evident approval of Washington. Japan's chronic military shortfalls, force asymmetries and continued political and administrative restraints receded into the background. Similarly, the large expansion of Japan's foreign aid received only modest praise. However, with the re-emerging of American confidence in the Reagan administrations and the circumstances surrounding the Gulf War, it became apparent that independent activity by Tokyo was negligible; if Tokyo entertained notions of greatly changed security strategy, the time evidently had not arrived for implementation. Further, although vexing in its insularity, Japan's dithering and indecisiveness bespoke a deep aversion to external military involvement. In sum, the basic particulars of the U.S.-Japan relationship remained in place and Japan's unwillingness, and perhaps, inability to do more attested to a lack of change in its security strategy. All these went far to assuage regional anxieties and rebut allegations of the re-emergence of a militant Japan.

⁶⁴⁰This became even more apparent in the post-1983 period as Japan assumed much of the regional foreign aid burden from the U.S., yet consultations and coordinations between Washington and Tokyo over aid projects and recipients were increased. Thus, as the U.S. ability to provide the aid declined, Japan's ability to provide grew. In alignment for the same general goals, the consultations and coordination of effort suggests an excellent example of allied effort.

environment was stabilizing. This status quo favored all nations except the communists who (although they saw the pattern of great growth unsettling) found it tolerable. When the Sino-Soviet conflict became apparent and China normalized its relations with both Washington and Tokyo, Beijing ceased to be critical of the U.S.-Japan link; even the USSR and North Korea realized benefit.⁶⁴¹ In this regard, *the* crucial feature of Tokyo's strategy, maintaining Japan's linkage and alignment with the U.S., received tacit regional recognition and acceptance since it perpetuated the status quo. This anchored regional stability since Japan, the nation with the greatest opportunity to upset regional stability, derived more benefit than any other from perpetuating the status quo.

8. Tokyo's strategy used the inclinations of other states (in combination with the opportunities of circumstance) to advance Japan's national goals and objectives that may not have been possible otherwise.⁶⁴²

9. Tokyo was willing to make some major adjustments to obtain security. For example, convincing the U.S. immediately after the war that Japan was a proto-democratic country needing sponsorship, assistance and protection, *which the U.S. must provide*, required sacrificing established institutions such as the military (already defunct and discredited). Japan had to devote its energies to peaceful activity (which it was only too

⁶⁴¹Were the U.S.-Japanese relationship to dissolve, Japan would seek some security arrangement with another or attempt to unilaterally insure its own security. Considering Japan's potential, either of these could be more disturbing and eventually threatening in the region (especially since Japan's economic policies probably would be very competitive) than if Japan were to remain linked (and implicitly restrained) by Washington.

⁶⁴²For example, Japan's use of America's ideological orientation during the Occupation period and the Cold War as the mechanism carrying the U.S. into the position of being Japan's security guarantor.

willing to do), and to satisfy the U.S. in matters of political and societal reorganization that (in part) it did. Further, there was the inferential requirement that Japan avoid a leadership role (which not only served Japan's purposes, but was the only regionally acceptable posture in any event). In short, far from being inflicted upon Japan, these were steps likely to have transpired anyway.

The pattern is one of Tokyo, wishing Japan to be cast in a particular role in the perception of U.S. officials, took advantage of certain U.S. tendencies and situations, enhanced and used the momentum therefrom (like jujutsu), to place itself and the U.S. in positions favorable to Japan.⁶⁴³ Significantly, Tokyo also applied this technique in relations with other countries (e.g., China).

10. The analyses of Japan's security strategy illustrates that its core elements are broader than just military matters. Moreover, the nature of the hypotheses, processes and dialogues clearly show strategy to be a multi-party process in which greater success seems to attend those strategies that more completely satisfy the participants. Yet, the notions of strategy being primarily military and justly self-serving persist. As the bonding produced by the communist threat weakens, there will be those in Washington and Tokyo who may focus on frictions and things in difference, endangering thereby the security alliance. Moreover, outside Japan and the U.S. will be those who may sense opportunity through altering of circumstances of the strategic milieu for more narrow purposes. Although this combined, multi-level and multifaceted strategy has

⁶⁴³For example, in this way the U.S., not Tokyo, initiated the re-establishment of some armed force for Japan, a step in keeping with the projections of both Yoshida and U.S. strategic planners like Kennan, Dulles, and Rusk.

served well, the impact of the collapse of the USSR, the ongoing economic transformation of China, and the growing interdependency of all nations suggests that the strategic milieu, the hypotheses pertaining thereto, the strategic processes involved, and the strategic dialogues (internal and external) must similarly adjust. How Japan's strategy adjusts may depend upon how the U.S. and others conduct their strategic dialogues and processes. If the past is a prologue, the forecast is favorable, but uncertain. However, it is certain that strategies in their multiple forms will continue, carrying implications for Japanese policy makers and those involved in Far Eastern affairs.

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